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Abstract
How can a pandemic like SARS be halted in the 
modern age of air travel? This article argues that 
the classical mathematical models of epidemics 
are inadequate for describing the impact of air 
travel on the spread of contagions like SARS. 
Instead, the author proposes a modern model 
that incorporates air travel as the main vehicle 
or vector of disease spreading. The new model 
is based on network science instead of the 
traditional Kermack-McKendrick model and its 
many derivatives. The new model uses spectral 
radius ρ and blocking node analysis in place of 
basic reproduction number R0 as metrics for 
stopping pandemics.
This article compares three strategies for 
defeating pandemic spreading: 1) quick and 
effective removal by quarantine or inoculation 
of (n/R0) people from a population of size 
n; 2) removal by quarantine or hardening of 
airports at the rate of ∆ > γρ; and 3) blocking 
by quarantine or hardening of approximately 
n/ρ blocking nodes in the air route network. 
The third strategy is illustrated for the airports 
and air routes in the OpenFlight commercial 
air route network. Symbols: n: population 
size in terms of people or airports; R0: basic 
reproduction number; ∆: removal rate; γ: 
infectiousness; and ρ: spectral radius.
Stopping a Pandemic
The Black Death (Bubonic Plague) marched 
across Europe at a relatively slow pace of 3 
miles per day. The worst of it swept westward 
from Eastern Europe over a period of 4 years 
beginning around 1347, killing approximately 
1/2 of the inhabitants (75million).  Outbreaks 
like Black Death and the 1918 Spanish Flu (100 
million deaths) continue to fuel rational and 
via the Commercial Air Route Network
Ted G. Lewis
irrational fear of global pandemics even though 
such disasters are few and far between.
Five hundred years after the Black Death 
pandemic, Kermack and McKendrick derived 
the first mathematical model describing the 
spread of an epidemic through contact.1 
The Kermack-McKendrick model (along with 
its many derivatives and extensions) follows 
a logistics or S-curve whereby the number of 
cases in the early stages of an epidemic rises 
exponentially, reaches a peak, and then flattens 
out. Figure 1a shows a near-textbook fit to 
the S-shaped model for the spread of SARS in 
2003.2 Without countermeasures, an epidemic 
grows exponentially in its earliest stages and 
then tapers off as the number of potential 
victims is depleted.
More recently Althaus applied a modified 
form of Kermack-McKendrick model — 
the SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-
recovered) model – to the Ebola outbreak of 
2014.3 The equations and their solution are 
beyond the scope and purpose of this paper, 
however, the data used to validate the SEIR 
mathematical model are shown in Figure 2. 
This data and model were used to estimate the 
basic reproduction number R0, defined as the 
average number of people who contract the 
contagion in order to spread it. 
R0 determines the eventual size of the 
epidemic. Epidemiologists use R0 to predict the 
spread of the contagion:
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If R0 is less than one, the contagion dies out 
on its own. If it is greater than one, the contagion 
spreads as shown in Figure 2 for Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia. Epidemiologists also use 
R0 to estimate 1/R0, which is the proportion 
of the population that must be quarantined or 
inoculated in a timely fashion to halt further 
spreading. R0 ranged from 1.51 for Guinea 
to 2.53 for Sierra Leone, which means that 
66% - 40% of the population would have to 
be quarantined or inoculated in order to halt 
spreading.4
Rapid and effective public health response 
during the early stages of an epidemic can curtail 
uncontrolled spreading as shown in Figure 
1b. This typically means isolation of infected 
people, timely inoculation of susceptible people 
if a vaccine exists, or removal of infected people 
through death or social space separation. In 
modern states, quarantine and inoculation are 
the primary tools of public health. 
If we assume a conservative value of 
(1.51+2.53)/2 = 2.02 for Ebola, approximately 
50% of the population would have to be 
quarantined or inoculated to halt uncontrolled 
spreading. Even if an Ebola vaccine had been 
available in large quantities, mass inoculation 
of millions of people on a timely basis would be 
difficult. 
However, the threat of a global pandemic 
spreading through commercial air travel is 
the focus of this paper. When considering the 
commercial air routes as vectors of epidemic 
spreading, R0 no longer applies.
The SEIR model assumes uniform mixing 
of a population, and a fixed (average) herd 
infectiousness, γ. Uniform mixing means 
likelihood of contact with an infected person 
is evenly distributed throughout a population. 
Infectiousness, γ is the probability of passing the 
contagion from one person to another through 
contact. In addition, ∆ is the removal rate, 
which is achieved through death, inoculation, 
or quarantine. Classical mathematical 
models such as the SEIR and other Kermack-
McKendrick derivatives quantify how to stop an 
epidemic assuming narrow social spacing and 
uniform mixing. The model breaks down when 
spreading takes place through commercial air 
travel.
(a) Global spread of SARS.
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(b). USA spread of SARS.
Figure 1. (a) Spread of the SARS virus in terms of the number of people who contracted the disease versus 
time, and (b). The spread of SARS in the USA was halted by fast and effective public health measures.
Reprinted by permission from Lewis.5
Date (2014)
March 3 April 22 June 11 July 31 September 19
Figure 2. Ebola recorded cases for Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Data points are shown as open 
circles. Solid and dotted lines are from a mathematical model.
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Air Travel
An epidemic becomes a pandemic if it crosses 
regional boundaries. Left unchecked, a 
contagion with γR0 > ∆ slowly marches across a 
continent until it either exhausts the supply of 
susceptible people or reaches an ocean or other 
natural barrier. Ebola became a pandemic 
when it left West Africa and spread to the U.S. 
and Spain. SARS spread to 29 other countries 
before it was stopped. The Black Death ignored 
borders.
The commercial air route network partially 
shown in Figure 3 is the principle mechanism 
of pandemic spreading beyond the origin of a 
disease. Nodes represent airports and links 
represent routes. Epidemiologists hypothesize 
that infected passengers transmit contagions 
by traversing one or more links in this network. 
Hence, the air route network replaces the “flat 
world” model of Kermack and McKendrick 
with a social network “complex world” model. 
Air travel restricts (and extends) the uniformly 
mixed human social network, because air travel 
spreads the seeds of destruction by following 
links in a network. Hence, uniform mixing 
cannot be an underlying assumption of the 
“complex world” model.
The spread of contagions in networks is a 
well-understood and heavily studied topic of 
network science.6  In place of basic reproduction 
rate R0, network scientists use a network 
parameter called the spectral radius ρ, and in 
place of the removal rate equation of Kermack-
McKendrick, we use the Wang et al. relationship 
below. Spectral radius is a measure of self-
organization.7 It depends on the density of air 
routes and the number of routes into and out 
of airports. It is obtained from the connection 
topology of the network. 
Lewis found empirical relationships between 
the fractal dimension of contagion spreading, 
infectiousness, and spectral radius.8 His set 
of relationships is based on the observation 
that network epidemics obey a long-tailed 
exceedence probability density closely 
matching a power law with fractal dimension 
q.9 Parameters b and k are determined by 
simulation and fitting a power law of the form 
C-q, where C is number of infected nodes and 
q is the fractal dimension of the resulting 
exceedence distribution obtained by simulating 
the spread of a contagion from a single node 
to other nodes within a connected network. 
The relationship between fractal dimension, 
infectiousness, and spectral radius is:
A critical point exists when log(q) = 0, 
resulting in the following relationships for 
network epidemics.
1. Spectral radius ρ determines the removal 
rate needed to halt further spreading [Wang 
2003]:10
2. The relationship between spectral radius 
and infectiousness determines risk (and 
severity) of spreading. Constants b and k are 
parameters determined empirically for each 
network .11 
If the product of infectiousness and spectral 
radius is less than removal rate, the contagion 
can be controlled. That is, if the health care 
system removes susceptible passengers from 
the air route network at a rate greater than 
γρ, the network contagion dies out. For the 
OpenFlight1000 network of Figure 3, we have 
ρ = 55.8. Then, ∆ > 55.8γ only if γ < 0.0179, 
or 1.79%, because ∆ cannot exceed 1. The 
OpenFlight3340 (the complete commercial 
air route network) contains 3,340 airports and 
18,277 routes. Its spectral radius is estimated 
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to be approximately 68; b = 0.64, k = 0.35, so 
the critical point γ is (0.64)/(0.35*68) = 2.69%. 
Indeed, the OpenFlight network is subject 
to massive spreading unless a contagion’s 
infectiousness is less than 1%. Even if 
infectiousness turns out to be relatively low, 
the requirement that ∆ > γρ may be difficult or 
impossible to achieve if resources are spread 
across 3,340 airports and 180+ countries.
(a) OpenFlight1000 contains the most-connected 1,000 airports and 14,384 routes.
(b). OpenFlight1000 with 84 blocking nodes shown in white and non-blocking nodes shown in black. The 
spectral radius of this network is 55.8.
Figure 3. Top 1,000 airports and routes obtained from open source data available at  http://openflights.org/
data.html. (a). Nodes are airports and links are routes. (b). Blocking nodes are white and the non-blocking 
nodes are black.
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Blocking Strategies
Halting the global spread of any contagion 
through air travel may require a different 
strategy, because OpenFlight is large, and so is 
its spectral radius. What alternatives do public 
health practitioners have?  This section explores 
a network blocking strategy that identifies 
critical airports as blocking nodes, and critical 
routes as links essential to the continuity of the 
air route network. The blocking strategy is to 
identify blocking nodes and either inoculate or 
isolate them to halt further spreading.
Lewis defines a critical link as a link that 
separates the network into isolated components 
if it is removed.12 That is, removal of a critical 
link divides the network into separate sub-
networks such that it is impossible to reach 
nodes in one sub-network from nodes in other 
sub-networks. Similarly, a critical node is a 
node that separates the network into isolated 
“islands” if removed. Critical links and nodes 
are essential to the continuity of the network. 
On the other hand, their removal blocks 
transmission of a contagion from one region to 
another. Hence, critical nodes are also blocking 
nodes.
There are 84 blocking nodes in Figure 3, 
thus, 84 of the 1,000 airports hold the air 
route network together. Removal, isolation, or 
hardening of 84/1000 = 8.4% of all airports 
prevents a global pandemic in OpenFlight1000. 
On the other hand cancelation of all routes 
or isolation of 1,000 airports is unlikely to be 
economically allowed. So, hardening of 84 
blocking node airports is both practical and 
feasible. 
The full OpenFlight network contains 3,340 
airports and 18,277 routes. Approximately 
11% of the 3,340 airport nodes are blocking 
nodes. Isolation or hardening of these nodes 
divides the entire air route system into sub-
networks separated from one another. The 
“air gap” between airports halts the spread of 
a contagion across sub-networks. However, the 
contagion may still spread throughout a large 
sub-network. 
Levy Flights
Blocking node (airport) strategies appear 
to be attractive, especially if the number of 
blocking nodes is low. However, there is 
some evidence that air travel actually reduces 
consequence (illness and death) rather than 
aggravating it due to the Levy flight pattern of 
most contagions. For example, Hu et al. argue 
that long-tailed Levy flights reduce the virility 
of a contagion and lead to its eradication if 
the fractal dimension of the Levy flight power 
law is less than 2.0.13 Other researchers have 
not confirmed this theory, but if true, it offers 
an unorthodox and controversial alternative 
strategy.
A Levy flight is a biased random walk in 
2-dimensional space (surface of the earth) 
such that the size of displacements between 
waypoints obeys a power law. Levy flights 
occur in nature, especially in animal behavior.14 
They are a form of foraging and diffusion, e.g. 
the pattern of movements to various rides and 
amusements in Disneyland, foraging at stores 
in shopping malls, and the diffusion of wealth 
through a society. The power law of frequency 
versus distance traveled suggests a pattern 
containing many short bursts and rare giant 
strides. Levy flights are frequent bursts of 
short steps and rare bursts of long steps. Lewis 
examines the Levy flight of SARS in detail,15 
and expands on the idea of viruses as objects 
obeying Levy flights.16
The nature of a Levy flight is completely 
determined by the fractal dimension (exponent) 
of the power law distribution obtained by 
observation. The tail of this distribution gets 
longer and heavier as the frequency of long 
steps increases. The fractal dimension increases 
in the opposite direction. For example, a large 
fractal dimension such as 3.5 corresponds 
with a short-tailed distribution while a fractal 
dimension of 1.5 corresponds with a long- or 
fat-tailed distribution.
Fat-tailed distributions have small fractal 
dimensions and thin-tailed distributions have 
large fractal dimensions. A Levy flight with 
fractal dimension equal to 1.6 is “fatter” than 
a Levy flight with dimension 2.0. The expected 
length of a step is larger for 1.6 than for 2.0. 
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According to Hu et al., longer is better, when it 
comes to controlling a disease, suggesting that 
small jumps are more dangerous than large 
jumps.17
Lewis analyzed the Levy flight of SARS and 
estimated the fractal dimension of its power law 
as q = 1.6, which is less than 2.0.18 Hence, Hu et 
al. would expect SARS to die out. SARS actually 
did die out after 6-9 months of spreading to 29 
countries.19 Quick-actions and long-distance 
air travel may have stopped SARS. 
An intuitive explanation for Hu’s conclusion 
is that putting out a large forest fire is more 
easily done if pieces of the fire are picked up 
and moved far away, before the fire gets too 
large. Then, each “sub-fire” can be more readily 
extinguished – none of the sub-fires gets too big 
or out of control. Similarly, dispersing infected 
people long distances apart via air travel makes 
it easier to eradicate the contagion, assuming 
quick action by public health organizations.
Similarly, longhop air travel disperses the 
contagion and isolates infected individuals 
simply by separating them spatially. Dispersion 
of dense clusters of contagion to remote areas, 
with fast and effective quarantine, may be more 
effective than fast and effective quarantine 
alone. This provocative idea needs more testing.
Conclusion
Network models are not meant to replace 
classical models that assume uniform mixing 
and narrow social spacing between and 
among populations. Rather, network epidemic 
models apply when populations are sparse or 
exhibit non-uniform social structure found 
in commercial air travel, “hot spots” of high-
density populations, and other social networks 
exempt from the uniform mixing hypothesis. 
This work extends previous network models 
of epidemic spreading using an empirically-
derived model that relates fractal dimension to 
infectiousness and spectral radius. It proposes 
methods for stopping global pandemics 
that may spread through non-homogenous 
populations and therefore are not accurately 
modeled by classical models. This is the first 
report on the effect of blocking node isolation 
on contagion spreading through a network. 
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Abstract
The search for a uniform risk analysis for critical infrastructure protection prompted a look at 
RAMCAP to see if it accommodates emerging threats from climate change, aging infrastructure, 
and cybersecurity.  This article examines the role of Reference Scenarios in guiding RAMCAP 
estimations of risk, resilience, and countermeasures.  It investigates current infrastructure 
protection practices to identify emerging threats to lifeline infrastructure encompassing the Water, 
Wastewater, Electricity, Aviation, and Internet subsectors.  The investigation found thirty-eight 
Candidate Scenarios which subsequent analysis filtered down to thirteen Nominee Scenarios. 
The Nominee Scenarios include new process-based subclasses and types that are unlike current 
Reference Scenarios. Thus the study found that RAMCAP does not currently address emerging 
threats to lifeline infrastructure.  Those interested in critical infrastructure protection policy and 
implementation may find the insights from this study useful to their own understanding and 
research.
Suggested Citation
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Introduction
Concern over the water and wastewater infrastructure due to emerging threats from climate 
change, aging infrastructure, and cyber attack prompted the Department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS/S&T) to undertake development of a new 
risk analysis standard to  measure risk uniformly across all lifeline infrastructure.  According to 
the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), lifeline infrastructure encompasses 
Water, Energy, Transportation, and Communications,1 four of the sixteen sectors identified 
in Presidential Policy Directive #21 (PPD-21).  Uniform risk analysis, comparing “apples to 
apples” across infrastructure sectors facilitates cost-benefit analysis and strategic planning 
that are critical to optimizing homeland security investments and safeguarding the nation 
against catastrophic incidents, both natural and manmade. A uniform risk analysis comparing 
“apples to apples” can also help the Department of Homeland Security achieve a long-sought 
goal of measuring current resilience and quantifying the efficacy of countermeasures; or in 
other words, to inform the President and Congress where we are, where we are going, and 
at what cost.
The essential importance of a uniform risk analysis for critical infrastructure was recognized 
by the White House when it recruited the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
to develop one shortly after 9/11.2  In 2006 ASME released the final specifications for a Risk 
Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP). RAMCAP is a seven-step 
process that assesses risk for a given asset as a product of threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
resilience, and applied countermeasures. To make RAMCAP uniformly applicable across 
infrastructure sectors, its creators incorporated a reference set of forty-one threat and 
hazard scenarios to guide estimations of its terms.  The 2006 NIPP recommended RAMCAP 
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for conducting risk analysis,3 but was not mentioned in the 2009 and 2013 revisions.  No 
RAMCAP implementations are known to be employed today.4 RAMCAP, however, continues 
to serve as the basis for the American Water Works Association (AWWA) J100-10 standard for 
Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems.5 
In October 2014, the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs (UCCS) was engaged by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the program manager for the DHS/S&T project, to conduct 
a needs assessment of RAMCAP and develop requirements for uniform risk analysis of lifeline 
infrastructure.  The project was divided into three tasks: 1) Analysis of Emerging Threat & 
Hazard Scenarios, 2) RAMCAP Performance Analysis, and 3) RAMCAP Requirements Analysis. 
This article presents the results from Task 1 and insights gained into emerging threats from 
climate change, aging infrastructure, and cybersecurity to the Water, Wastewater, Electricity, 
Aviation, and Internet subsectors.
Background
RAMCAP is a critical infrastructure risk analysis methodology that calculates risk as a product 
of consequence, vulnerability, and threat.6  RAMCAP is comprised of the seven steps listed 
in Table 1.7  It is designed to assist infrastructure owners/operators with identifying risk 
and applying countermeasures to avert or alleviate the “worst reasonable consequences” 
stemming from disruption or destruction of system assets.8   Countermeasures beyond the 
scope of owners/operators to implement could be considered for federal homeland security 
grants under the NIPP Risk Management Framework.9 By applying a uniform risk analysis 
methodology such as RAMCAP, it was possible to rank risk across infrastructure sectors and 
to conduct cost-benefit analysis to prioritize countermeasures, thus offering the greatest 
return on homeland security investment.10







6. Risk & Resilience Analysis
7. Risk & Resilience Management
RAMCAP’s uniform analysis capability is predicated on forty-one Reference Scenarios listed 
in Table 2.  The scenarios help guide owners/operators through RAMCAP’s seven steps in 
estimating values for consequence, threat, vulnerability, and resilience.  The use of Reference 
Scenarios helps RAMCAP meet NIPP risk assessment core criteria for documentation, 
reproducibility, defensibility, and completeness.11 Our challenge in Task 1 was to determine 
whether the given forty-one scenarios sufficiently addressed emerging threats to lifeline 
infrastructure from climate change, aging infrastructure, and cybersecurity.12 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Article 2 (September 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
White, George, Boult, & Chow,  Apples to Apples  4
Table 2. RAMCAP Reference Scenarios (2, p. 55)
# Class Subclass Type ID
1. Hazard Natural Hurricane N(H)
2. Hazard Natural Earthquake N(E)
3. Hazard Natural Tornadoes N(T)
4. Hazard Natural Floods N(F)
5. Hazard Natural Wildfire N(W)
6. Hazard Natural Ice Storms N(I)
7. Hazard Dependency Loss of Utilities D(U)
8. Hazard Dependency Loss of Suppliers D(S)
9. Hazard Dependency Loss of Employees D(E)
10. Hazard Dependency Loss of Customers D(C)
11. Hazard Dependency Loss of Transportation D(T)
12. Hazard Dependency Proximity to Target D(P)
13. Threat Contamination Chemical C(C)
14. Threat Contamination Radionuclide C(R)
15. Threat Contamination Biotoxin C(B)
16. Threat Contamination Pathogen C(P)
17. Threat Contamination Weaponization C(S)
18. Threat Sabotage Physical-Insider S(PI)
19. Threat Sabotage Physical-Outsider S(PU)
20. Threat Sabotage Cyber-Insider S(CI)
21. Threat Sabotage Cyber-Outsider S(CO)
22. Threat Theft Physical-Insider T(PI)
23. Threat Theft Physical-Outsider T(PU)
24. Threat Theft Cyber-Insider T(CI)
25. Threat Theft Cyber-Outsider T(CO)
26. Threat Attack: Marine Small Boat M1
27. Threat Attack: Marine Fast Boat M2
28. Threat Attack: Marine Barge M3
29. Threat Attack: Marine Ocean Ship M4
30. Threat Attack: Aircraft Helicopter A1
31. Threat Attack: Aircraft Small Plane A2
32. Threat Attack: Aircraft Regional Jet A3
33. Threat Attack: Aircraft Long-Flight Jet A4
34. Threat Attack: Vehicle Car V1
35. Threat Attack: Vehicle Van V2
36. Threat Attack: Vehicle Mid-Size Truck V3
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# Class Subclass Type ID
37. Threat Attack: Vehicle Large Truck V4
38. Threat Attack:  Assault 1 Assailant AT1
39. Threat Attack:  Assault 2-4 Assailants AT2
40. Threat Attack:  Assault 5-8 Assailants AT3
41. Threat Attack:  Assault 9-16 Assailants AT4
Lifeline Infrastructure
Water, Electricity, Transportation, and Communications are considered “lifeline” infrastructure 
because they are essential to themselves and all other sectors.13  Lewis classifies them as 
“Level 1” infrastructure upon which all others depend.14 The four lifeline infrastructure sectors 
encompass sixteen subsectors as shown in Table 3.  In order to maintain a manageable 
scope, we restricted Task 1 to the Water, Wastewater, Electricity, Aviation, and Internet 
subsectors. The Internet is actually a subsector of the Information Technology sector.15 Task 
1 examined the Internet subsector, however, because it underpins a large proportion of the 
Communications sector.16
Table 3. Lifeline Infrastructure Sectors & Subsectors
# Sector SSA1 SSA2 CA Subsector
1. Water/Wastewater EPA Water
2. EPA Wastewater 
3. Energy DOE FERC Electricity 
4. DOE FERC Natural Gas
5. DOE Oil
6. Transportation DOT TSA FAA Aviation
7. DOT TSA FHWA Highway
8. DOT TSA FRA Freight Rail
9. DOT TSA FTA Mass Transit
10. DOT TSA PHMSA Pipeline
11. DOT USCG MARAD Maritime
12. Communications DHS FCC Broadcast
13. DHS FCC Cable
14. DHS FCC Satellite
15. DHS FCC Wireless
16. DHS FCC Wireline
SSA = Sector-Specific Agency, CA = Coordinating Agency
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Worst Reasonable Consequences
RAMCAP bases its risk calculation on the “worst reasonable consequence” (WRC) resulting 
from damage or destruction of critical infrastructure assets.17 The AWWA J100-10 standard 
does not define what constitutes a “reasonable” worst case situation except to say it shouldn’t 
combine unlikely coincidences.18  Step 3 of the RAMCAP process assesses WRC with respect 
to identified assets independent of any instigating threat or hazard.19   Various WRC’s occupy 
the concern of the Water, Wastewater, Electricity, Aviation, and Internet subsectors.
Water & Wastewater
Two worst case scenarios specifically concern the drinking water industry: 1) poisoning, and 
2) extended service disruption.  The first concern stems from the fact that 15% of water 
utilities service more than 75% of the US population, making it an attractive target. While 
a valid concern, most experts consider such a possibility highly improbable.20 The second 
concern has two components: 1) the ability to procure a safe water source, and 2) the 
ability to distribute water under appropriate pressure.  Even a minor service disruption in a 
major metropolitan area can cause significant economic damage.  A major disruption in a 
major metropolitan area could have catastrophic economic impact.21 Whereas disruption to 
wastewater services could also impact the economy, environment, and public health, such a 
disruption would be less likely to be considered catastrophic.22
Electricity
A primary concern of the electricity subsector is an extended outage across a significant 
portion of the North American grid.  The August 2003 blackout affected 50 million people in 
the northeastern United States and Canada, causing an estimated $4-$10 billion in economic 
losses.  Though it lasted only a week, the outage resulted in a 0.7% drop in Canada’s gross 
domestic product.23 A Johns Hopkins study determined that New York City experienced 
a 122% increase in accidental deaths and 25% increase in disease-related deaths, and 
that ninety people died as a direct result of the power outage.24  Project Aurora in 2006, 
a joint experiment by the Department of Energy and Department of Homeland Security, 
heightened concern over a large-scale outage by demonstrating how a generator could be 
remotely commanded over the Internet to physically self-destruct.25 Physical damage to 
generators and other critical components on a large scale could result in a prolonged outage 
as procurement for these components range from months to years.26
Aviation
Having already been the instrument of one of the worst catastrophes in US history, the 
Aviation subsector remains wary of 1) passenger aircraft being targeted en masse, and 2) 
aircraft again being subverted into guided missiles.27  In response, the federal government 
has adopted a layered security strategy to keep terrorists and weapons from boarding 
aircraft.28  The reason for increased concern today is that physical security measures are 
ineffective against cyber intrusion, and that either worst case scenario might be realized by 
hacking an aircraft’s avionics.29
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Internet
Concerns about the Internet providing an avenue of attack for creating catastrophe may be 
traced back to the 1996 Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.30  The resulting 
report is attributed with initiating the post-Cold War concern over critical infrastructure 
protection.   Whereas cybersecurity remains a concern for any device dependent on a 
computer chip, the more direct concern is the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
the Internet itself.  A violation of any of these security conditions at scale would drastically 
disrupt the Internet and create catastrophe for many critical services that depend on its 
transport capability.31  Concerns about breaking the Internet focus on two potential targets: 
1) routing services, and 2) Internet Exchange Points.32  Neither would be easy to break, but 
doing so would not be impossible. 
Risk, Resilience, & Countermeasures
The forty-one Reference Scenarios help guide value estimations for RAMCAP evaluations 
of risk, resilience, and countermeasures.  RAMCAP begins by pairing infrastructure assets 
against the forty-one threat and hazard scenarios.33  RAMCAP calculates risk ‘R’ as the 
product of consequence, vulnerability, and threat as shown in (1.0).34  For each threat-asset 
pair RAMCAP asks: 1) what are the consequence costs of losing this asset to this scenario? 
2) what is the probability this asset will be neutralized or destroyed in this scenario? and 3) 
what is the probability that this asset will experience this scenario?35  Consequence costs are 
estimated separately for fatalities, injuries, financial loss to owners, and economic loss to the 
community.  RAMCAP offers conversion tables allowing individual costs to be summed into 
a single representative value.36  The maximum value in each table is 13, thus the maximum 
calculable risk is 52 for any given threat-asset pair with 100% vulnerability and 100% threat 
occurrence.37  
 R = C x V x T  (1.0)
It would be a simple matter at this point to prioritize threat-asset pairs by their corresponding 
risk calculation, but the results would be misleading.  The RAMCAP risk calculation only 
accounts for mitigating factors within the owner/operators’ control “inside the fence.”  It 
does not account for mitigating factors “outside the fence” such as first responders, National 
Guard, or other capabilities that could further reduce the severity or duration of estimated 
consequences.  This is called “resilience” and must be considered in order to gain a more 
complete estimate of total risk.  Accordingly, resilience ‘Rs’ amounts to an attenuation of 
the RAMCAP risk calculation by some mitigating factor percentage as shown in (2.0).38  The 
amount of mitigation depends on the scenario, thus estimates are made and resilience 
calculated for each threat-asset pair.  
 Rs = R x M  (2.0)
It is now reasonable to prioritize threat-asset pairs by their corresponding resilience calculation 
and evaluate countermeasures to reduce risk among the highest ranks.  Countermeasures 
also amount to an attenuation of risk and may be represented by a mitigating factor ‘M-prime’ 
the same as resilience.  Risk after applying a countermeasure, ‘R-prime’ may be calculated 
as shown in (3.0), and the corresponding resilience, ‘Rs-prime’ calculated as shown in (3.1). 
The Gross Benefit (Gb) of implementing a given countermeasure is calculated by taking the 
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difference in resilience before and after it is applied, as shown in (3.2).  The Net Benefit (Nb) is 
the sum of applying the same countermeasure to all threat-asset pairs (3.3).  To select which 
countermeasure to implement, RAMCAP calculates a Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) which divides 
the Net Benefit by the cost of the countermeasure (3.4).  The higher the BCR, the better the 
return on investment.  Of course, the effectiveness and cost of a given countermeasure is 
greatly affected by the type of scenario. 
 R’ = M’ x R  (3.0)
 Rs’ = M x R’  (3.1)
 Gb = Rs – Rs’  (3.2)
 Nb = ΣGb  (3.3)
 BCR = Nb / $  (3.4)
As can be seen, the Reference Scenarios play an integral role in RAMCAP evaluation of risk, 
resilience, and countermeasures.  The question of whether additional scenarios might be 
required to account for emerging threats from climate change, aging infrastructure, and 
cybersecurity could be examined a number of different ways.  We chose to examine the 
question by investigating how these problems are addressed within the current program for 
critical infrastructure protection.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical infrastructure protection has evolved from the authorities and guidance listed in 
Table 4.  The 2002 Homeland Security Act establishing the Department of Homeland Security 
prescribes a risk management approach for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure (P.L. 
107-296, §201(d)(2)).  Accordingly, the 2013 NIPP employs a Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) to 1) set goals, 2) identify assets, 3) prioritize risk, 4) implement countermeasures, and 
5) measure results.39 The RMF is implemented in voluntary cooperation with industry through 
Sector Coordinating Councils representing the sixteen infrastructure sectors identified in 
PPD-21.40 The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the DHS National Protection and 
Programs Directorate (NPPD) is responsible for coordinating RMF implementation across the 
sixteen sectors and overseeing development of corresponding Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs).41 
Every four years, the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) federal representative, with support from 
assigned Coordinating Agencies (CAs), updates the SSP summarizing RMF efforts within their 
assigned infrastructure sector.42
Table 4. CIP Authorities & Guidance
Law Directives Strategies Plans
2002 HSA 1998 PDD-63 2002 NSHS 2005 Interim NIPP
2003 HSPD-7 2003 CIP Strategy 2005 Draft NIPP
2013 PPD-21 2007 NSHS 2006 NIPP
2010 NSS 2009 NIPP
2015 NSS 2013 NIPP
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Risk analysis comes into play in Step 3 of the Risk Management Framework. As already 
mentioned, there are no known implementations of RAMCAP currently employed for RMF 
risk analysis.  However, the Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool employed by the Water and 
Wastewater sector, is certified by AWWA to be RAMCAP compliant.43  According to the 2010 
SSPs, each lifeline subsector employs a different risk analysis methodology identified in 
Table 5.
Table 5. Lifeline Infrastructure Risk Analysis Methodologies
Sector/SSP Subsector SSA RA Methodology
Water & WW Water EPA Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool / Security and 
Environmental Management System
Energy Electricity DOE Site Assistance Visit
Transportation Aviation FAA Aviation Model Risk Assessment
Communications Internet DHS Cyber Assessment Risk Management Approach
Whereas the NIPP/RMF generally addresses all hazards, it does not specifically address 
climate change, aging infrastructure, or cybersecurity.44  Climate change and cybersecurity 
are specifically addressed by executive orders.  Aging infrastructure is separately addressed 
by each subsector.
Climate Change
Issued in October 2009, Executive Order 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental and 
Economic Performance,  directed all federal agencies to develop a Strategic Sustainability 
Performance Plan examining, among other things, risk and vulnerabilities stemming from 
climate change.45 Executive Order 13653, issued in November 2013, supplemented EO13514 
by requiring federal agencies to develop and maintain Agency Adaptation Plans evaluating 
the most significant climate change-related risks and vulnerabilities.
Aging Infrastructure
With the exception of the Internet, federal regulating agencies have devised programs 
addressing problems with aging infrastructure in each of their subsectors. In September 
2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a Clean Water and Drinking Water 
Infrastructure Sustainability Policy to guide investment of State Revolving Funds (SRF) to meet 
a projected need for $247.5B in water transmission and distribution projects over the next 
twenty years. 46  In December 2007, President Bush signed into law the Energy Independence 
and Security Act.  Section 1301 established a federal policy to modernize the electric utility 
transmission and distribution system through research, development, and deployment of 
Smart Grid technologies.47 The Smart Grid is a vision for transforming the electric industry 
from a centralized, producer-controlled network to one that is less centralized and more 
consumer-interactive.48  The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead federal agency 
responsible for Smart Grid, and has tasked the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
with implementing Smart Grid standards developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST).49 Since 2003 the Federal Aviation Administration has been planning 
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and developing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).  NextGen50 is 
designed to relieve congestion in the Air Traffic Control System, which in 2013 the American 
Society of Civil Engineers rated a ‘D+’ in their 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure.51
Cybersecurity
Issued in February 2013, Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,  directed NIST to develop a Cybersecurity Framework and tasked federal 
agencies to evaluate mandating the resulting standards for infrastructure over which they 
had regulatory authority.52  In February 2014, NIST released its Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The Framework is a risk-based approach to managing 
cybersecurity risk composed of three parts:  1) Framework Core, 2) Implementation Tiers, 
and 3) Framework Profiles.53 EPA replied to EO13636 saying there was no need to impose 
mandatory standards, but that it would work with Water and Wastewater utilities through the 
DHS Sector Coordinating Council to implement the Cybersecurity Framework as needed.54 
DOE and DHS made similar replies to EO13636 endorsing voluntary cooperation with the 
Electricity, Aviation, and Internet subsectors.  In lieu of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, 
DOE recommended continuing with the Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability 
Maturity Model (ES-C2M2), and DHS similarly advocated its own Transportation Sector 
Working Group (TSWG) Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Transportation Sector,55 
and Cyber Assessment Risk Management Approach (CARMA)56 for the Internet subsector.57
Findings
The results of investigating current infrastructure protection programs yielded thirty-eight 
Candidate Scenarios listed in tables 6-8.  Climate Change yielded the most Candidate Scenarios 
at twenty-seven.  These are predicated on adverse incidents similar to the forty-one Reference 
Scenarios.  Most are national in scope, though many are regional, confined to coastal areas. 
Some are uniquely local, such as melting permafrost in Alaska. One, Geomagnetic Storm, 
was not identified in any research references, but was considered a sufficient concern to be 
made a Candidate Scenario.  The Climate Change Candidate Scenarios are similar to current 
RAMCAP Reference Scenarios in that they are predicated on some initiating incident.  This is 
not the case for the Aging Infrastructure and Cybersecurity Candidate Scenarios.  Unlike the 
current Reference Scenarios, they are predicated on progress towards some goal, either a 
project such as Smart Grid, or a process such as NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework.  Because the 
specific threats and hazards are too numerous, these scenarios focus on the vulnerabilities 
of the asset in question.  Though different from current Reference Scenarios, the Candidate 
Scenarios are still capable of performing in the same capacity of guiding estimations for 
RAMCAP risk, resilience, and countermeasure evaluations. Table 6 shows the Climate Change 
Candidate Scenarios, while Table 7 shows the Aging Infrastructure Candidate Scenarios, and 
Table 8 shows the Cybersecurity Candidate Scenarios.
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Table 6. Climate Change Candidate Scenarios
Climate Change (27)
Water & Wastewater
1. Reduced Groundwater Recharge
2. Lower Lake & Reservoir Levels
3. Changes in Seasonal Runoff & Loss of Snowpack
4. Low Flow conditions & Altered Water Quality
5. Saltwater Intrusion into Aquifers
6. Altered Surface Water Quality
7. High Flow Events & Flooding
8. Flooding from Coastal Storm Surges
9. Loss of Coastal Landforms/Wetlands
10. Increased Fire Risk & Altered Vegetation
11. Volume & Temperature Challenges
12. Changes in Agricultural Water Demand
13. Changes in Energy Sector Needs
14. Changes in Energy Needs of Utilities
Electricity
1. Disruption Due to Extreme Weather Events
2. Higher Peak Loads Due to Higher Summer Temperatures
3. Decreased Reliability Due to Climate-Related Regulations
4. Constrained Production Due to Water Availability
5. Disruption Due to Rising Sea Levels
6. Extreme Solar Weather
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Aviation
1. Melting Alaskan Permafrost
2. Rising Temperatures and Heat Waves
3. Rising Sea Levels and Storm Surges
4. Extreme Precipitation Events
5. Drought Induced Wildfire
Internet
1. More Severe Storms Due to Rising Temperatures
2. Federal Regulation of Greenhouse Gases
Table 7. Aging Infrastructure Candidate Scenarios
Aging Infrastructure (5)
Water & Wastewater
1. Water Failure Due to Pipe Age & Type
2. Wastewater Failure as Function of Pipe Maintenance and Performance
Electricity
1. Failure as a Function of Progress Towards Smart Grid Implementation
Aviation
1. Failure as a Function of Progress Towards NextGen Implementation
Internet
1. Failure Due to Restricted Capacity of Older Components
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Table 8. Cybersecurity Candidate Scenarios
Cybersecurity (6)
Water & Wastewater
1. Cyber Risk as a Function of Process Maturity as Determined by NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework
Electricity
1. Cyber Risk as a Function of Process Maturity as Determined by NERC Cybersecurity 
Capability Maturity Model
Aviation
1. Cyber Risk as a Function of Progress Towards TSWG Roadmap Objectives
Internet
1. Breakdown of a Single Interoperable Internet through a Man-made Attack, and Resulting 
Failure of Governance Policy
2. Large-Scale Man-made Denial-of-Service Attack on the DNS Infrastructure
3. Partial or Complete Loss of Routing Capabilities through a Man-made Deliberate Attack 
on the Internet Routing Infrastructure
Analysis
We conducted analysis to eliminate redundancies among the Candidate Scenarios.  We 
achieved this  by first comparing the thirty-eight Candidate Scenarios against the forty-one 
Reference Scenarios.  We conducted the comparison  in stepwise fashion by first determining 
the Candidate Scenario’s class.  If the description implied some form of malicious human 
activity, then it was classified as a threat, otherwise it was classified as a hazard.  Next, 
we determined the Candidate Scenario’s subclass  by comparing the description to the 
current subclasses.  This was made easier by our previous  determination of  the Candidate 
Scenario’s class.  For instance, if the Candidate Scenario was classified as a “hazard”, it only 
needed to be determined from the description whether the Candidate Scenario best fit the 
“Natural” or “Dependency/Proximity” subclasses, or neither.  If the Candidate Scenario did 
not fit an existing subclass, then we formulated a new one..  Finally, we attempted to  match 
the Candidate Scenario description with current RAMCAP Reference Scenario Types.  If the 
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Candidate Scenario did not fit an existing type, if there was no match, then we formulated 
a new scenario type. To preclude an undue proliferation of new subclasses and types, we 
compared Candidate Scenario descriptions  against newly formulated subclasses and types.
Applying the preceding process whittled the thirty-eight Candidate Scenarios down to only 
thirteen Nominee Scenarios listed in Table 9.  Interestingly, Nominee Scenarios #10 and 
#13 are basically identical, except the process models for #10 are related to hazards (i.e., 
maintaining capacity), while the process models for #13 are related to threats (i.e., reducing 
vulnerabilities).  Instead of having the same Dependency Subclass as both a hazard and 
a threat, we decided to  create a new Cyber Attack Subclass (CY) under threats.  The new 
Process Maturity Type is inherently different than the Cyber-Insider and Cyber-Outsider 
Types in the Sabotage Subclass in that the latter encompass the actions of malicious agents, 
while the former encompasses actions that protect against malicious agents. 
The resulting analysis indicates that the current set of RAMCAP Reference Scenarios do not 
sufficiently account for emerging threats from climate change, aging infrastructure, and 
cybersecurity.  In order to account for these emerging threats to the Water, Wastewater, 
Electricity, Aviation, and Internet subsectors, RAMCAP should expand its forty-one Reference 
Scenarios and incorporate the thirteen Nominee Scenarios identified in this study, which are 
presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. RAMCAP Nominee Scenarios
# Class Subclass Type Identifier
1. Hazard Natural Drought N(D)
2. Hazard Natural Geomagnetic Storm N(GS)
3. Hazard Natural Heat Wave N(HW)
4. Hazard Natural Melting Permafrost N(MP)
5. Hazard Natural Severe Storms N(SS)
6. Hazard Dependency Asset Capacity D(AC)
7. Hazard Dependency Asset Deterioration D(AD)
8. Hazard Dependency Asset Maintenance D(AM)
9. Hazard Dependency Governing Regulations D(GR)
10. Hazard Dependency Process Maturity D(PM)
11. Hazard Dependency Resource Availability D(RA)
12. Hazard Dependency Resource Quality D(RQ)
13. Threat Cyber Process Maturity CY(PM)
Conclusion
The search for a uniform risk analysis for critical infrastructure protection prompted a 
look at RAMCAP to see if it accommodated emerging threats from climate change, aging 
infrastructure, and cybersecurity.  RAMCAP uses forty-one Reference Scenarios to help guide 
estimations of risk, resilience, and countermeasures.  The Reference Scenarios help RAMCAP 
meet NIPP requirements for documentation, reproducibility, defensibility, and completeness. 
The Reference Scenarios are essential to every step of RAMCAP risk analysis and ultimately 
determining which countermeasures offer the best Benefit-Cost Ratio on homeland 
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security investments.  We investigated current infrastructure protection practices to identify 
emerging threats to the Water, Wastewater, Electricity, Aviation, and Internet subsectors. As 
prescribed by the 2002 Homeland Security Act, the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan employs a Risk Management Framework to systematically identify, prioritize, and 
mitigate risk across the sixteen sectors identified in PPD-21.  Progress is documented every 
four years in Sector-Specific Plans by federal Sector-Specific Agencies working with industry 
through Sector Security Councils.  Whereas the NIPP/RMF generally addresses all hazards, it 
does not specifically address climate change, aging infrastructure, or cybersecurity.  Climate 
change and cybersecurity are specifically addressed by executive orders 13514, 13653, and 
13636 respectively. Aging infrastructure is separately addressed by various capitalization 
programs in all but the Internet subsector:  Water and Wastewater have the State Revolving 
Fund; Electricity has Smart Grid; and Aviation has NextGen. Our investigation of current 
infrastructure protection programs yielded thirty-eight Candidate Scenarios listed in tables 
6-8.  After comparing against the forty-one Reference Scenarios and eliminating redundancies, 
we reduced the thirty-eight Candidate Scenarios  to thirteen Nominee Scenarios in Table 9. 
The Climate Change Nominee Scenarios are similar to the current Reference Scenarios in 
that they are predicated on incidents.  The Aging Infrastructure and Cybersecurity Nominee 
Scenarios are unlike current Reference Scenarios in that they are predicated on progress 
towards some goal or process.  Still, they serve the same purpose as Reference Scenarios by 
guiding estimations for RAMCAP risk, resilience, and countermeasure evaluations.  Thus, this 
study concludes that RAMCAP, in its current form, does not adequately account for emerging 
threats from climate change, aging infrastructure, and cybersecurity.  Accordingly, this study 
recommends expanding the forty-one Reference Scenarios to incorporate the thirteen 
Nominee Scenarios in order to account for emerging threats to the Water, Wastewater, 
Electricity, Aviation, and the Internet subsectors.  Whether or not this will improve RAMCAP 
performance is a question for Task 2.58
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Abstract
We expand on the application of quantifiable deterrence to critical infrastructure/key resource 
protection by considering cognitive biases. These biases include what we call “information 
obfuscation bias” and “prospect bias”, the latter inspired by Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect 
Theory. We show how quantifiable deterrence effectiveness and resulting critical infrastructure 
risk change when we obfuscate notional Port Security Grant investment information from a 
prospective attacker, and we also explore whether these metrics change if we assume Prospect 
Theory is a more accurate explanation of decision making than classical Subjective Expected Utility 
Theory. Importantly, we do not advocate for policy changes but rather expand on a previously 
published methodology that might support such decisions in the future.
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Executive Summary
The goal of this article is to illustrate a process to support decisions on whether to publicize 
information about CIKR security investments intended to deter attacks, or whether to 
obfuscate those investments, by considering cognitive biases. Importantly, we are not 
advocating for publicizing or obfuscating details of federal grant investments in general. We 
simply offer a methodology to support such decisions.
To set the context for this proposed process, we claim that the notion that people make 
completely rational, fully informed decisions is debatable. Expected utility theory (EUT) 
assumes that people act according to their preferences, and preferences are consistent 
regardless of how options are presented. However, Kahneman and Tversky developed 
prospect theory (PT) showing experimentally that decisions may be inconsistent with EUT, 
depending on how options are presented or framed. 
The concept of cognitive bias follows from this alternative to EUT. Other biases may be 
due to limited information availability such as imperfect or incomplete information. These 
biases become relevant to critical infrastructure/key resource (CIKR) risk reduction and 
attack deterrence when we consider adversarial decision making, as attacker intent is one 
component of critical infrastructure risk. 
Deterrence is the process of influencing decision making; we want to manipulate our 
adversary’s assessment of their interests. Expanding on previous published work, we focus 
on quantifiable deterrence as we evaluate the effect of cognitive biases. More specifically, we 
want to evaluate the effects of cognitive biases upon CIKR attack desirability and deterrence, 
hypothesize attacker preferences, estimate the resulting risk, and suggest advantages of 
publicizing or obfuscating CIKR security investments.
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Relevance and Background
We know that CIKR security practitioners already publicize some information and obfuscate 
other information in defense of their facilities. But, can we predict how additional security 
investments might measurably deter and buy down additional risk if an adversary has biased 
perceptions of those investments? Furthermore, we claim it is possible that the effectiveness 
of obscuring or publicizing certain information may not be robust across different utility 
theory assumptions. Thus, the intended audience for this research is broad: CIKR owners/
operators, policymakers, academics, and risk analysts. 
Before we illustrate our process, we provide an extensive literature review in the article, 
covering work on game theory, utility theories including EUT and PT, information availability, 
optimization, and deterrence quantification and portfolio development.  
Our Process
Previous research has explained a generic process to quantify deterrence and show how that 
influences CIKR risk, yielding a “deterrence portfolio” of metrics to support decision making. 
We here extend this process and show how notional deterrence portfolios might change if 
we apply various cognitive biases. We also examine the robustness of this approach across 
different ways of approximating attacker intent. We leverage basic principles of game theory 
in “deterrence games.”
We explore this methodology in a case study of notional CIKR, and notional defender 
budgets such as those that might be available from FEMA’s Port Security Grant Program (See 
Appendix I). 
Importantly, all data and maritime facilities are notional in this case study, but real threat, 
facility vulnerability, facility consequence, and budget data would be used for a real analysis. 
Results of Case Study
We learned that assumptions about how our opponents perceive and rank their options 
dictate the relative advantages of obfuscating or publicizing our deterrence actions as 
CIKR defenders.  For example, if an attacker formulates intent to attack only one target, 
rather than “ranking” multiple targets in order of desirability, that may mean our decision to 
obfuscate or publicize information on CIKR defensive investments does not change expected 
risk. However, more research is needed to generalize such findings.
Options for Future Research
We encourage future research along the lines of modifying assumptions about information 
availability, modifying the expected utility functions used in deterrence games, and applying 
principles of PT in different ways. We also advocate consideration of how investments to 
improve CIKR resilience and/or mitigate attacker capabilities to launch attacks might influence 
the outcome of deterrence games and inform decisions on whether to obfuscate or publicize 
deterrence investment information. In our approach here, we have only focused on notional 
investments to protect CIKR against attacks. Perhaps most importantly to practitioners, we 
suggest efforts to incorporate theoretical findings into real-world risk models.
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The “Big Picture”
Research has suggested that deterrence theory is applicable to many of the 21st century 
threats the U.S. will face, but more work needs to be done to determine how that theory 
is put into practice, or “operationalized.” We believe this extension of an earlier published 
deterrence quantification approach helps advance “operationalization” of deterrence theory 
to a very relevant 21st century threat: terrorist attacks against CIKR.
Introduction
Our objective in this article is to propose enhancements to an existing process to quantify 
the deterrent effects of investments to secure critical infrastructure. To set the context 
for these enhancements, we claim that the notion that people make completely rational, 
fully informed decisions is debatable. Expected utility theory (EUT) assumes that people 
find the best possible solution from among all known options, choosing a solution that will 
maximize their expected utility. They act according to their preferences, and preferences 
are consistent regardless of how options are presented. As one alternative to EUT, Simon 
proposed satisficing theory, which predicts a decision maker will find a minimum acceptability 
threshold, instead of necessarily maximizing their utility to attain the optimal solution.1 
As a second alternative, Kahneman and Tversky  developed prospect theory (PT) showing 
experimentally that decisions may be inconsistent with EUT, depending on how options are 
presented or framed.
The concept of cognitive bias follows from these alternatives to rational, fully informed 
decision making.  Some biases, such as those associated with PT, are influenced by how 
possible outcomes or “prospects” are presented relative to a “reference point” of desired 
utility. This introduces inconsistency into decision making. Other biases may be due to 
limited information availability2 such as imperfect or incomplete information, which may 
lead to satisficing.
Does this matter to critical infrastructure/key resource (CIKR) risk reduction and attack 
deterrence? It matters if we consider adversarial decision making. CIKR risk is the expected 
loss resulting from an attack. Expected can mean probabilistic, or the likelihood that an attack 
will be successful. In DHS terms, likelihood can be a combination of threat * vulnerability.3 
Threat is intent * capability, capability is the probability an adversary can attack a CIKR, and 
intent is the probability that an adversary wants to attack.4 We consider adversarial decision 
making when we focus on intent. 
Adversarial decision making entails how a would-be CIKR attacker considers information and 
decides whether to attack, or to refrain from attack altogether. Their anticipated decision 
reflects their intent. We may not know their intent in advance. However, we might instead 
speculate about: 
1. what they do know about our CIKR, 
2. how they might evaluate options, and 
3. what decisions they might arrive at, subject to cognitive biases and different ways to 
evaluate prospects. 
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More specifically, we want to evaluate the effects of cognitive biases upon CIKR attack 
desirability and deterrence, hypothesize attacker preferences, estimate the resulting risk, 
and suggest advantages of publicizing or obfuscating security investments. Deterrence is the 
process of influencing decision making; we want to manipulate our adversary’s assessment 
of their interests.5 We focus on measurable or quantifiable deterrence as we evaluate the 
effect of cognitive biases. Recent work proposed a way to quantify the effects of deterrence 
upon CIKR risk6, but did not explore cognitive biases. Nikhil Dighe et al. urge that future 
work on analyzing deterrence investment should consider alternatives to EUT.7 With respect 
to imperfect/incomplete information, attacker uncertainties are critical to understanding 
deterrence, but are allegedly rarely leveraged in game-theoretic analysis of counterterrorism.8 
In this work we will call biases resulting from information imperfection and information 
incompletion “information obfuscation biases (IOB).” We will call biases proposed by PT 
“prospect biases.”
Intended Audiences
Some CIKR security information is obvious to the public, such as the presence of armed 
guards at facility entrances. Some information is obfuscated: for example, what does the 
facility’s proprietary security plan say about law enforcement response to a security threat? 
Thus, we know that practitioners already publicize some information and obfuscate other 
information. But, can we predict how additional security investments might measurably deter 
and buy down additional risk if an adversary has biased perceptions of those investments?
IOB might seem more relevant to a CIKR owner than prospect bias: owners and regulators 
may decide whether to make their security measures overt or covert.9 But, it makes sense 
to also consider biases predicted by different utility theories. What if our adversaries are 
motivated in ways that EUT does not account for? Do they evaluate the possible gains from 
successful CIKR attacks on their face value? Or, do they evaluate them relative to some 
desired reference point? 
A CIKR owner may not consider these factors on a daily basis, but risk analysts and 
policymakers might consider them, given the evidence of inconsistent decision making. 
Sensitivities of deterrence effectiveness and risk reduction to different utility theories may 
have real implications for CIKR owners and practitioners. It is possible that the effectiveness 
of obscuring or publicizing certain information may not be robust across different utility 
theory assumptions. Thus, the intended audience for this research is broad: CIKR owners/
operators, policymakers, academics, and risk analysts.
Relevant Work
Taquechel and Lewis give a brief overview of literature on risk analysis and deterrence that 
is relevant to the present work.10 They then explain basic principles of game theory and 
offer a simple approach to information availability. They also discuss the concepts of EUT 
and PT. But, the emphasis in that work is on the basic process to quantify deterrence and 
create “deterrence portfolios.” Thus, the present work will elaborate on the game theoretical 
approach and cognitive biases introduced in Taquechel and Lewis (2012). It will also show 
additional findings to support decisions on whether to publicize or obfuscate deterrence 
investment information. 
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Game Theory
Game theory helps us model the possible effects of our adversary’s perceptions. Those 
perceptions may be influenced by what information we publicize or obfuscate in a deterrence 
game. For example, if we communicate details of our ability to defeat an attack, we may 
deter terrorism, regardless of whether we actually can defeat an attack. Moran claims that 
deterrence works most convincingly between known adversaries who share a common 
estimate of each other’s hostile intentions.11 In contrast, Chilton and Weaver claim that under 
some circumstances, ambiguity will enhance deterrence.12 Which is true?
With regard to a “common estimate” vs. ambiguity, we now discuss two dyads of information 
availability commonly applied in game theoretic analyses: perfect vs. imperfect information, 
and complete vs. incomplete information. 
Perfect or Imperfect Information?
Games can assume either perfect or imperfect information. Perfect information means a 
sequential game, wherein the attacker could observe the defender’s investment courses 
of action (COA), and could analyze the implications of different CIKR attacks. A sequential 
game is “one in which players make decisions following a certain predefined order, and in 
which at least some players can observe the moves of players who preceded them.”13 Often 
sequential games are known as Stackelberg games, and in the context of CIKR protection, 
they are called attacker-defender games. For example, see Brown et al.14 Some claim that 
Stackelberg games are appropriate for real word scenarios because attackers can observe 
CIKR defenses before making decisions.15 However, a game to determine where to invest 
additional resources and deter potential attackers could simulate a defender obfuscating 
their actual investment COA. This would result in a game of imperfect information.
Imperfect information means a simultaneous game, wherein all players select a COA without 
knowledge of the COAs that other players select. This is even if the decisions are made at 
different points in time.16 For CIKR attack deterrence, a simultaneous game would mean: 
1. that the defender would not know in advance which CIKR an attacker had decided to 
attack, and 
2. the attacker would not know in advance where the defender had invested to deter, 
although the attacker may know the investment amount if the defender protected a 
specific CIKR. 
This may mean that an attacker cannot observe the effects of deterrence investment at a 
CIKR. 
The effects of imperfect and perfect information on CIKR protection game results have been 
studied. For example, Hausken et al. compare the outcomes of both simultaneous and 
sequential games. In these games, a defender is considering investment to protect CIKR from 
both terrorism and natural hazards, and an attacker is considering what CIKR to attack.17 For 
sequential games, Yin et.al. propose the idea of a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) in 
a game between an attacker and defender in the CREATE PROTECT model.18 The PROTECT 
approach, created for the U.S. Coast Guard, leverages a Stackelberg algorithm to produce a 
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randomized Coast Guard boat patrol schedule. When executed over a long period of time, 
this schedule theoretically minimizes an attacker’s ability to plan an attack on a maritime 
CIKR.
Complete or Incomplete Information? 
Incomplete information means that players do not know some of the elements which define 
the rules of the game.19 For CIKR deterrence games, this may mean the attacker does not 
know how much a CIKR defender would invest at a specific CIKR target. If an attacker does 
not know dollar amounts of deterrence investments, and dollar amounts are used to create 
the expected utility functions that determine payoffs, then the attacker will have incomplete 
information. 
In contrast, a game of complete information means players know all elements of the game. 
If the attacker knows the dollar amounts invested to deter, they would have complete 
information, assuming they know all of the other elements. This information would be 
publicized by the defender, or easily attainable by the attacker.
The effects of complete and incomplete information on CIKR protection game results have 
been studied. For example, Jenelius et al.20 examine how adversarial “observation error” 
influences deterrence, risk, and optimal resource allocation to defend CIKR.21 Azaiez proposes 
three characterizations of attacker confidence when CIKR vulnerabilities are uncertain: 
optimistic, neutral, and pessimistic.22 
Utility Functions and COAs For Deterrence 
Games
Utility is the value or payoff of the outcome (prospect) of a COA.23 For this research, attacker 
utility will just be the payoff of defender deaths and immediate economic consequences 
from a successful attack. From the defender’s perspective, this loss of life and economic 
damage would be risk, but any retained life and economic productivity is defender utility. 
Morral and Jackson advocate reducing probability of achieving a payoff, as well as the 
value of the payoff itself, in order to deter attacks.24 Subjective expected utility (SEU) is thus 
utility modified by a subjective probability of attaining that utility.25 This is similar to EUT 
except that now a subjective probability governs the expected outcome. These concepts are 
interchangeable and we will use SEU from here on out.
The present work uses a game theoretical approach to measure deterrence, and claims that 
the effect of deterrence is a component of CIKR risk. Therefore, we translate the language 
of game theory into the language of risk analysis. We have determined how expected utility 
functions, used in game theory, can be converted into probabilistic risk equations. This paper 
will leverage utility functions and risk equations that include probabilities of attack success. 
Also, we will model probabilities as functions of investment to reduce CIKR vulnerability.
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What is an appropriate way to model this function? Lewis argues that a linear cost model is 
unrealistic. In practice, a target’s security may be increased by 50% for 10% of the budget, 










Equation 1. General exponential vulnerability-investment relationship
where:
1. vi(Ci) is the vulnerability of the i-th CIKR target, and is a function of defender investment 
Ci, and
2. ai is the slope of the exponential curve, a function of the elimination cost ECi to reduce 
vulnerability to some elimination fraction EFi. 
For exponential relationships, vulnerability cannot be completely eliminated, so an arbitrary 
elimination fraction such as 5% can be used. Bier et al. also assess the probability of an attack 
as an exponential function of budget invested to defend that target.28 It may make sense to 
use a nonlinear vulnerability-investment term if we believe our adversaries are adaptive.
Optimization COA
Since we model expected utility functions as functions of deterrence investments, we 
can calculate the optimal investment to maximize expected utility, either formally or via 
simulation. Lewis calculates optimal investments for CIKR protection using both methods.29 
The formal techniques include Lagrange multipliers.30 We use the optimal CIKR deterrence 
investment as input for one of the defender’s COAs in our deterrence games.
Other studies propose optimization methods for critical infrastructure protection, using game 
theoretic context. For example, Levitin offers techniques for calculating optimal strategies 
for both attacker and defender with respect to complex infrastructure systems, considering 
possibilities of a single or multiple simultaneous or sequential attacks.31  
Utility Theories
Lebow and Stein32 claim that utility can be calculated differently by different rational actors. 
Extending that claim, the present work claims that the application of measurable deterrence 
to CIKR risk analysis and protection must also account for different utility calculations. 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Article 3 (September 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Eric F. Taquechel, Ted G. Lewis,  Cognitive Biases  9
Subjective Expected Utility Theory
With SEU, the expected utility from a COA is relative to a net asset position.33  SEU is traditionally 
thought to govern attitudes toward decision-making and so is not a “cognitive bias.” Rather, 
we treat it here as a baseline against which the influence of PT biases can be evaluated.  
With respect to SEU, Schoemaker explained that risk aversion meant a gamble would be 
less preferred than its expected value for certain, and that risk seeking meant a gamble 
would be more preferred than its expected value for certain.34 This reflects the concept of 
certainty equivalent, the maximum amount someone would pay for some expected utility.35 
Importantly, Schoemaker argued that the certainty equivalent is invariant under different 
conditions of wealth, when assuming SEU.36 If we assume one’s current wealth is one’s 
reference point, or desired utility, then under SEU assumptions the framing of options relative 
to a reference point would not influence one’s risk aversion or risk-seeking preferences.     
To illustrate, suppose one has $10 and faces the prospect to gain $10 with 100% certainty, or 
gain $30 with 33% chance. The expected utility of this “gains-framed” prospect is $20 either 
way. A risk averse actor would prefer the certain bet, whereas a risk seeking actor would 
prefer the gamble. Alternatively, suppose one has $10 but stands to lose $10 with 100% 
certainty, or lose $30 with 33% chance. The expected utility of this “losses-framed” transaction 
is $0 either way. Again, the risk averse actor would choose the certain bet, whereas the risk 
seeking actor would choose the gamble and risk incurring a debt of $20. Attitude towards 
risk determines preferences, and preferences would be consistent regardless of how options 
are “framed.” However, this is not the case with Prospect Theory. 
Evaluating Prospects per SEU – “Ordinary Prospect”
Before we review Prospect Theory (PT), let us define a “prospect” to mean the aggregation 
of possible future outcomes from a COA. This does not necessarily require an assumption 
that PT holds rather than SEU. SEU treats an individual’s expected utility of an “ordinary” 
prospect as the sum of expected utilities (expectation) of that prospect’s possible outcomes. 
“Ordinary” here notes that the prospect is not in the context of a game theoretical scenario. 
For a prospect with two possible outcomes, we have the following example:
U(x,p;y,q) = pu(x) + qu(y)
Equation 2. One individual’s expected utility of “ordinary” prospect (SEU)37
-where the prospect is represented by (x, p; y, q) ; and 
-p is the probability of attaining outcome x; 
-u(x) is the utility of attaining outcome x;
-q is the probability of attaining outcome y; and
-u(y) is the utility of attaining outcome y.
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However, game theoretical scenarios introduce multiple prospects because interactions 
between multiple players with multiple COAs influence each player’s respective expected 
utilities. We propose a concept of “equilibrium prospect” in future discussion. 
Prospect theory
In contrast to SEU, prospect theory (PT) claims that the expected utility from a COA is not 
relative to a net asset position, but instead it follows from the change in value relative to a 
reference point.38 This theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky who determined 
that people make choices differently depending on how options are presented, or “framed” 
relative to reference points. Kahneman and Tversky explained that “the reference outcome is 
usually a state to which one has adapted; it is sometimes set by social norms and expectations; 
it sometimes corresponds to a level of aspiration, which may or may not be realistic.”39  
If the utilities from the COAs of a game are framed for a player as losses relative to a 
reference point, then PT predicts the player will “over-weight” the utilities from those COAs, 
as compared to their utility assuming SEU. That player is therefore likely to take greater 
risks to avoid those losses if currently at their reference point, than he would take for an 
equivalent amount of gain that would put them ahead of their reference point.40 
Returning to Schoemaker’s claim, risk-seekers would pay larger certainty equivalent 
for the possibility of some expected utility than would risk avoiders. However, under PT 
assumptions, framing of prospects would govern attitude toward risk. Certainty equivalents 
would vary under different conditions of wealth, unlike under SEU assumptions. Those faced 
with prospective losses from a reference point would be risk seeking, and those faced with 
prospective gains beyond a reference point would be risk averse. Figure 1 summarizes how 














Low % of high utility
High Certainty Equivalent (CE)
Gamble more preferred than expected value for certain
High CE
Losses predict risk-seeking
Overweight utility when presented 
as loss relative to reference point
High % of low utility
Low CE
Gamble less preferred than expected value for certain
Low CE
Gains predict risk aversion
Underweight utility when presented 
as gain relative to reference point
Figure 1. How SEU and PT Influence Risk Propensity
To illustrate, returning to the SEU example, suppose one has $10 (which is also coincidentally 
her reference point) and stands to gain $10 with 100% certainty, or gain $30 with 33% chance. 
The expected utility of this prospect (including the player’s original net asset position) is still 
$20 either way. However, PT predicts framing will determine attitude towards risk. When 
presented with gains relative to their reference point, players will be risk averse. In this case 
a player would prefer the certain bet of +$10, even though he stood to possibly make a lot 
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more money (+$30). Alternatively, suppose one has $10 but stands to lose $10 with 100% 
certainty, or lose $30 with 33% chance. The expected utility of this transaction is still $0 either 
way. However, since the options are now presented as losses relative to their reference 
point, players will be risk seeking and choose the gamble of -$30, even though they stand to 
possibly lose more money. Framing determines attitude towards risk, which then determines 
preferences. Preferences are now inconsistent depending on how prospects are framed. 
Kahneman and Tversky posed similar prospects to numerous respondents in their research.
These findings suggested inconsistent decision making, which Kahneman and Tversky 
proposed is governed by a nonlinear value function with a reference point at the intersection 
of the axes in Figure 2. Notice that a specific amount of loss holds more value than an 
equivalent amount of gain:
Value
GainsLosses
Figure 2. Value function for PT41
Kahneman and Tversky suggested that in PT, the expected utilities from COAs are modified 
by probability weights and utility values.42 
Evaluating Prospects per PT – “Ordinary Prospect”
PT treats the expected utility of a prospect as:
U(x,p;y,q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y)
Equation 3. One individual’s expected utility of “ordinary” prospect (PT)
-where (x,p;y,q) is a prospect with at most two non-zero outcomes43;
-where π(p), π(q) represent decision weights, which reflect the influence of probabilities of 
outcomes on the overall prospect, but are not themselves probabilities; 
-v(x), v(y) represent subjective values of outcomes (utilities) x and y, based on whether those 
outcomes are gains or losses relative to a reference point;   
-and one stands to receive nothing with probability 1 – p – q, where p+q≤1.
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The decision weights modify probabilities such that low probabilities tend to be over-
weighted. Also, medium to high probabilities tend to be underweighted, much more so than 
lower probabilities are over-weighted. The utility values modify utility such that consequences 
are over-valued if presented as losses relative to a reference point, and undervalued if 
presented as gains relative to a reference point. Given these weights and values, Kahneman 
and Tversky discussed the “certainty effect.” This means people tend to overweight outcomes 
that are certain over outcomes that are merely probable. For gains this generally means sure 
gains are preferred to probabilistic gains. In contrast, for losses, probabilistic (and possibly 
larger) losses are generally preferred to sure losses. Thus, the certainty effect became the 
“reflection effect” for losses.44 
Therefore, to compare deterrence quantification results under SEU assumptions to results 
under PT assumptions, initially we found it appealing simply to modify numerical probability 
estimates in our expected utility functions with probability weights, and similarly to modify 
utilities with utility values. 
However, in our review of PT literature, we could find no evidence that any of Kahneman 
and Tversky’s surveyed respondents literally multiplied their estimates of probabilities by 
probability weights, or substituted weights for probability estimates altogether. Nor could we 
find evidence that subjects multiplied given utilities by utility values. Therefore, Kahneman 
and Tversky’s modified expected utility equations seem to be equations “fitted to the data” 
to explain their findings, rather than equations explicitly used by their respondents.
Unfortunately, we also know of no elicitations in game theoretical context that helped 
formulate PT, nor do we know of any terrorist elicitations that yielded data on terrorist 
preferences for different prospects from critical infrastructure attacks. Therefore, we will 
keep the same structure of the expected utility functions in our deterrence games when we 
assume PT, but instead predict what COA the attacker might prefer based on Kahneman and 
Tversky’s findings. 
Berejikian urges that theories of politics should be “based on models of the individual consistent 
with empirical evidence about how individuals made decisions.”45 Because Kahneman and 
Tversky showed evidence that people make decisions inconsistently, Berejikian then showed 
how to apply PT to deterrence games. This work yielded useful insights but did not discuss 
CIKR risk analysis explicitly.
In addition to Berejikian’s analysis of deterrence and PT, there is some application of PT 
to international relations and other areas of study in the literature, but not much specific 
application to deterrence of terrorist attacks on CIKR. For example, Schaub writes about 
how PT affects the effort necessary to sustain a strategy of deterrence, but focuses more on 
traditional nation-state conflict.46 Yang describes how PT compares to other decision-making 
theories in her dissertation on modeling bounded rationality for protecting CIKR, but does 
not explicitly discuss deterrence.47
Other Biases
An et al. applied the concept of quantal response (QR) to the PROTECT model referenced 
earlier.48 QR suggests that people will select-non optimal COAs with probability inversely 
proportional to costs of making an error.49 This error might be observation error, similar to 
error described by Jenelius et al.50, or payoff error or attacker inability to accurately estimate 
the probability/utility from a COA.
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An et al. compared the effectiveness of their model that leveraged QR bias to the 
effectiveness of models that leveraged other theories of biased decision making. One such 
model leveraged PT, another leveraged PT and incomplete information, and various others 
leveraged additional different theories.51 However, these models did not explicitly quantify 
deterrence.
There are also efforts to indirectly model effects of biases upon defender results, as an 
alternative to modeling adversary decision making. Pita et al. propose a method to bound the 
extent of defender “sacrifice” of expected utility based on a constrained attacker deviation 
from the attacker’s optimal solution.52 
Major Takeaways – Relevant Work
In sum, previous work on topics relevant to our proposed approach captures several key 
points. First, there are two claims in the literature: one that full knowledge of an opponent’s 
capabilities and intentions is more efficacious for deterring adversaries, and one that 
ambiguity will be more efficacious for deterrence. 
Second, games between adversaries can be modeled using complete or incomplete 
information, wherein players either know all elements that define the rules of the game 
or that knowledge is limited. Furthermore, games can also be modeled using perfect or 
imperfect information, wherein players either know what previous actions their opponents 
have taken, or they do not know all previous actions.
Third, expected utility functions reflecting value retained for protecting CIKR have been 
modeled as a function of budget expended to protect those CIKR. Fourth, previous work has 
figured out ways to model optimal investment in CIKR protection, when available resources 
have been insufficient to eliminate all risk.
Fifth, literature exploring the tenets of SEU has shown that attitudes toward risk determine 
preferences, and preferences are consistent regardless of how choices are presented or 
framed. In contrast, PT has shown that framing of options determines a player’s attitude 
toward risk, which then influences player preferences such that choices are made differently 
than expected under SEU. PT has yielded insights that decision makers may tend to 
“overweight” or place more emphasis on outcomes that are certain, than on outcomes 
that are merely probable. However, efforts to apply principles from PT to expected utility 
functions in CIKR deterrence games have been limited. Sixth, there have been other efforts 
to incorporate decision biases into decision making models.
Putting It All Together
How can we leverage these ideas to support decisions on whether to publicize or obfuscate 
deterrence investment information? Taquechel and Lewis explain the generic process 
to quantify deterrence and show how that influences CIKR risk, yielding a “deterrence 
portfolio” of metrics to support decision making.53  We here extend this process and leverage 
the simultaneous game, expected utility function, exponential probability-investment 
relationship, and optimization concepts discussed earlier. 
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We also show how this methodology and resulting deterrence portfolios might change if we 
apply IOB and prospect biases. In doing so we extend Berejikian’s concept of applying PT 
to deterrence, by showing how PT may affect the quantification of deterrence and resulting 
change in risk. We also examine robustness across different ways of approximating attacker 
intent. We explore this methodology in a case study of notional CIKR, and notional defender 
budgets (FEMA’s Port Security Grant Program grants). We first synthesize existing ideas about 
cognitive biases to formulate our own ideas on how to change the deterrence quantification 
methodology.
Our Proposed Concept of CIKR Deterrence Cognitive 
Biases
Taquechel and Lewis used a “modified game approach” in 2012 in that defender risk was 
calculated from attacker expected utility functions from a “game.” This game only explicitly 
showed attacker expected utility functions as outcomes, even though these outcomes 
depended on different defender investments. 
In other words, the game did not calculate a Nash Equilibrium, for which more than one 
player’s utility functions are needed.54 In the current approach we include both attacker and 
defender expected utility functions when analyzing the deterrent effects of different defender 
investment options.  This allows us to explore different equilibria and their implications for 
deterrence and risk reduction. 
Information Obfuscation Bias
Previous work on deterrence quantification has discussed the concepts of credibility and 
signaling.55 The present work assumes that anything signaled or publicized by the defender 
is credible to the attacker, but the defender may obfuscate some things an attacker might 
want to know.
Deterrence games may reflect four possible permutations of information the defender 
publicizes to (or obfuscates from) the attacker. These permutations are: 
1. imperfect and complete information, 
2. imperfect and incomplete information, 
3. perfect and complete information, and 
4. perfect and incomplete information. 
We focus on the first two permutations in the present work. Thus, the attacker will not know 
the defender’s selected COA in all deterrence games, but they may or may not know the 
details of possible COAs.56 
We modify the expected utility functions in incomplete information games based on an 
attacker’s information obfuscation biases (IOB). More specifically, the present work focuses 
on one kind of IOB, what we call organizational obfuscation bias (OOB). This bias reflects 
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“organizational tendencies” – what an attacker would estimate for the impact of defender 
investment when they do not know the actual investment amounts. Inspired by Azaiez 
(2009)57, we use three discrete levels of OOB. 
An attacker’s OOB level is neutral if they would attribute the CIKR defender credit for a 
reasonable amount of defensive effort. This means that the attacker modifies their estimate 
of target vulnerability58 that would result from defender optimal and suboptimal investments 
in a game. A neutral attacker assumes that if the defender were to invest optimally to deter, 
the resulting target vulnerability would be 5% for all targets in the game.59 Also, a neutral 
attacker assumes that if the defender were to invest suboptimally to deter, the resulting 
target vulnerability for all targets would be 50% lower than what it was pre-deterrence. 
An attacker’s OOB level is optimistic if they would attribute the CIKR defender too little credit 
for their defensive efforts. An optimistic attacker believes resulting target vulnerability would 
be 10% for all targets if the defender invested optimally,60 and believes it would be only 
25% lower than what it was pre-deterrence if the defender invested suboptimally. Finally, an 
attacker’s OOB level is pessimistic if they would attribute the CIKR defender too much credit 
for their defensive efforts. A pessimistic attacker believes resulting target vulnerability would 
be 1% for all targets if the defender invested optimally, and believes it would be 75% lower 
than what it was pre-deterrence if the defender invested suboptimally. 
Prospect Bias
Prospect bias will mean that the attacker will prefer outcomes or prospects based on what 
Kahneman and Tversky respondents chose under similar circumstances. We will make 
assumptions on attacker reference points.
 Importantly, Kahneman and Tversky developed Prospect Theory from eliciting preferences 
on prospects from survey groups, where prospects were posed as “sure gain vs probabilistic 
gain” or “probabilistic gain vs probabilistic gain.” Alternatively, prospects were posed as 
“sure loss vs probabilistic loss” or “probabilistic loss vs probabilistic loss.” One can imagine 
the difficulty of interviewing a terrorist to derive their preferences for prospects. Instead, 
we simply apply the principles of PT that resulted from analysis of Kahneman and Tversky 
survey results, rather than the survey methodology itself. 
Approximating Attacker Intent
There are various ways to approximate an attacker’s intent in our approach. We will explore 
whether it makes sense to create deterrence portfolios for each of these proxies, while 
varying cognitive bias assumptions.
Pure or Mixed Strategy NE 
If our deterrence games result in a pure Nash Equilibrium (NE)61, this means we can 
approximate an attacker’s intent to choose their equilibrium COA as 100%. A mixed strategy 
NE62 would mean the attacker might prefer a probabilistic distribution of different COAs, but 
this is conceptually problematic for our approach. Rasmussen explains why mixed strategy 
results can be problematic:
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The number of players needed so that mixed strategies can be interpreted as pure strategies 
in this way depends on the equilibrium probability, since we cannot speak of a fraction of 
a player. For the interpretation to apply no matter how we vary the parameters of a model 
we would need a continuum of players.63 
Since we do not play our deterrence games with a “continuum of attackers,” we save for 
future work the study of mixed strategies as proxies for attacker intent. 
Intent Ratios – Individual COAs 
We explore intent ratios of individual attacker COAs, hereafter referred to as “intent ratios,” 
given the defender’s equilibrium solution in games with pure NE, as proxies for attacker intent. 
Prospects
We consider single maximum-value prospects as proxies for attacker intent, meaning the 
attacker’s intent to execute that COA is 100%. This is similar to assuming the attacker’s intent 
is 100% for a pure NE COA. We now explore how we would do this under both SEU and PT 
assumptions, in game theoretical context.
Prospects and Game Theory -SEU
An alternative to our “ordinary prospect” is a prospect that reflects the result of a game 








(Payoﬀ A1, Payoﬀ D1)
(Payoﬀ A3, Payoﬀ D3) (Payoﬀ A4, Payoﬀ D4)
(Payoﬀ A2, Payoﬀ D2)
Figure 3.  Imperfect Game
The equilibrium solution here is either a pure or mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE).64 
Using the example of Figure 3, a pure NE might be (A1, D1), where the attacker selects COA 
“attack target 1” and the defender selects COA “defend target 1.” 
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Equilibrium Prospect
Thus, the attacker’s equilibrium COA could be called an “equilibrium prospect.” The attacker’s 
expected utility of such a prospect could be shown:
Ua(b,s) = su(b)
Equation 4. “Equilibrium prospect”: expected utility of attacker’s pure NE prospect (SEU)
-where the attacker’s prospect is represented by Ua(b,s) whose outcome is numerically equal 
in this case to “Payoff A1”;
-s is the “success probability” of attaining outcome b (where b = result of a successful attack 
against target 1); and 
- u(b) is the utility of attaining outcome b (the defender’s loss from target 1 –which equals the 
attacker’s gain)
Thus, in an imperfect game with a pure NE outcome, the expected utility of a prospect would 
be represented differently than that of an ordinary prospect as shown in Equation 2.
Ordinary Prospect Resulting From Game: “Aggregate 
Prospect”
We need an alternate way to represent attacker prospects if the attacker does not necessarily 
evaluate their prospects based on an equilibrium solution. For example, we could consider 
prospects with aggregated attacker outcomes that each depend on what the defender chooses 
for their COA:
Ua(b,s;c,t) = su(b) + tu(c)
Equation 5. Expected utility of attacker’s prospect, for one COA
-where the attacker’s prospect is represented by Ua(b,s;c,t) whose outcome is numerically 
equal in this case to “Payoff A1” + “Payoff A2”;
-s is the “success probability” of attaining outcome b (where b = result of a successful attack 
against target 1 given the defender was defending target 1);
-u(b) is the utility of attaining outcome b (the defender’s loss from target 1 given the defender 
was defending it –which equals the attacker’s gain);
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- t is the “success probability” of attaining outcome c (where c = result of a successful attack 
against target 1 given the defender was defending target 2);
-u(c) is the utility of attaining outcome c (the defender’s loss from target 1, given the defender 
was defending target 2 –which equals the attacker’s gain);
The difference between Equation 2 and Equation 5 is that in the latter, outcomes are 
influenced by another player in a game theoretical scenario. In our deterrence quantification 
methodology, we will explore how deterrence might be quantified under assumptions of 
both equilibrium prospects and aggregate prospects. This may have implications for how we 
apply the attacker’s intent to create unconditional defender risk in our deterrence portfolios. 
Prospects and Game Theory -PT
Absent a defensible way to directly incorporate PT principles into utility functions, the 
equilibrium prospect and aggregate prospect are the same under PT assumptions as they 
are under SEU assumptions in our approach. However, Kahneman and Tversky’s principles 
may help predict which equilibrium or aggregate prospects attackers may prefer, based on 
certainty and reflection effects, as opposed to net asset position.
Prospect Intent Ratios
Finally, we explore prospect intent ratios, as proxies for attacker intent. Prospect intent ratios 
reflect the relationship between “aggregate prospects.”
Game Types 
We can now apply these biases to analyze four deterrence game types, and we will elucidate 
each type’s details in the case study found in the appendix. Importantly, all data and the two 
maritime facilities, a chemical facility and a ferry terminal, are notional in this case study, but 
real threat, facility vulnerability, facility consequence, and budget data would be used for a 
real analysis. In general, Types 1 and 2 are games of complete information. Therefore the 
attacker and defender are “playing the same simultaneous game.” Even though they do not 
know each other’s moves, they would agree with each other what the outcomes would be if 
each player made certain moves. 
In contrast, Types 3 and 4 are games of incomplete information. Thus the attacker’s OOB 
would influence their estimates of the expected utility functions. However, the defender’s 
estimate of their own expected utility would be the true, unbiased value, as they obviously 
know their own investments. Thus, we claim this game type requires the analyst to consider 
the results of two different simultaneous games: the “attacker’s game”, and the “defender’s 
game.” We created a heuristic for producing the deterrence portfolios for this game type. 
This heuristic considers whether the equilibrium results of the two games predict the same 
COAs, or different COAs. 
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For game types that assume PT, we define the attacker’s reference point as the maximum 
monetized death/injury plus total economic loss from destruction of both CIKR in the game. 
Thus, all prospects are technically losses relative to the reference point given our notional 
CIKR data, even though they are gains relative to the attacker’s initial asset position. The 
exception is the prospect of attacker restraint, in which case there is no gain. 
Regardless of utility theory, the COA chosen is obfuscated for games of imperfect information. 
However, if that game is also one of complete information, then the following details are 
publicized: 
1. specific optimal and suboptimal investment amounts for each possible COA, 
2. resulting post-deterrence CIKR vulnerability, and 
3. available deterrence budget. 
In contrast, in games of incomplete information, these details are obfuscated. Furthermore, 
the precise calculation of vulnerability, as an exponential function of investment, must be 
obfuscated from an attacker.65 
Major Takeaways – Our Approach to 
Applying Decision Biases to Deterrence 
Quantification and Risk Reduction
In sum, our approach to applying decision biases to games of CIKR deterrence quantification 
does the following. In modifying the approach to quantifying deterrence first introduced 
in Taquechel and Lewis (2012), we first focus on games that assume either imperfect and 
complete information, or imperfect and incomplete information. Second, we create proxies 
for attacker OOB, based on criteria for what they would assume about our defensive 
investments at various CIKR. 
Third, we develop different proxies for attacker intent, which is used to estimate the 
desirability of various attack options, to estimate the quantification of deterrence, and 
to create “unconditional risk” for each CIKR attack option. Taquechel and Lewis (2012) 
introduced a basic proxy for attacker intent that supports the quantification of deterrence. 
Here, we elaborate on that concept. These proxies now vary based on whether we assume 
equilibrium game results will predict a single attacker COA is 100% desirable and all others 
are completely undesirable, or instead attackers “rack and stack” all possible COAs according 
to their relative attractiveness. These proxies also may change if we think an attacker will 
aggregate possible game outcomes into “prospects,” and preferences for COAs may change 
if we assume PT controls attacker decision making rather than SEU.  When we assume PT 
controls rather than SEU, we apply principles of PT to our case study, rather than Kahneman 
and Tversky’s exact methodological approach underpinning the development of their theory. 
These principles include the “certainty effect”, where certain outcomes are disproportionately 
valued over probable outcomes. 
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Case Study- Summary of Results and 
Implications
SEU
Under SEU assumptions, we evaluated deterrence portfolios across different information 
availability circumstances in the case study. Based on this evaluation, we now propose 
an approach for communicating port security grant investment decisions. We do this by 
proposing a question and answering it by summarizing findings from our different deterrence 
portfolios.
“For individual options to proxy attacker intent, is any advantage of obfuscating information 
(over publicizing information) consistent across attacker OOBs?” 
 For the attacker intent proxy of intent ratios: we saw that the defender’s unconditional 
risk was less when we obfuscated information than when we publicized information, for a 
pessimistic attacker. We also saw the same result for the other two OOBs. Thus the advantage 
of obfuscating information was consistent across all attacker OOBs for this attacker intent 
proxy.
 For the attacker intent proxy of prospect intent ratios: we saw that the defender’s 
unconditional risk was less when we obfuscated information than when we publicized 
information, for a pessimistic attacker. We also saw the same result for the other two OOBs. 
Thus the advantage of obfuscating information was consistent across all attacker OOBs for 
this attacker intent proxy.
For the other two attacker intent proxy options (pure NE results and single prospects), we did 
not show any advantage of information obfuscation across attacker OOBs. This is because 
the same deterrence portfolio resulted regardless of OOB. This suggests that if we believe 
an attacker actually does choose an equilibrium solution or chooses the maximum value 
prospect with 100% certainty, we would suffer the greatest unconditional risk. There was 
thus in these instances no quantifiable advantage of obfuscating information over publicizing 
information.
Therefore, assuming SEU, our advantage from obfuscating port security grant allocation 
information seemed to be robust against two different assumptions about how the attacker 
evaluated COAs. However, this illustrated the potential value of collecting intelligence on 
attacker decision making processes, to inform decisions on how we communicate port 
security grant distributions. If we had confidence in knowledge of how attackers evaluate 
COAs, we might be more fully convinced to obfuscate all details of grant allocations and 
evidence of their implementation. Some of these details are restricted from public release, 
but inadvertent release of the restricted material would negate attempts to obfuscate that 
information. Other information is currently public knowledge and may be observable to 
adversaries. 
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What might stakeholders do?
The government and CIKR owners/operators would be well advised to obfuscate the details 
of grant investments that reduce CIKR vulnerability, rather than publicize those details, based 
on our notional data (see appendix). 
For this example, the optimal investment at the chemical facility was $664,566.67. This might 
be used to add more cameras clandestinely to monitor the maritime approaches to the 
chemical facility’s perimeter. This would increase the likelihood that the CIKR security would 
detect an attacker with a backpack bomb, and would lower the overall facility vulnerability. 
The optimal investment at the ferry terminal was $1,335,433.33. This might be used to 
clandestinely train and equip additional security guards to protect vulnerable ferry passenger 
crowds against a similar attacker during peak transit times. 
In order for the defender to gain any advantage in this case, not only must the above 
investments be clandestine, but the following must be obfuscated:
1. the decision to invest optimally, 
2. the exact dollar amounts of the optimal and suboptimal investments, and
3. estimates of resulting target vulnerability.
Equally importantly, the dollar amount of the port security grant must be obfuscated66, thus 
creating a business case to make this specific port security grant award restricted information. 
Prospect Theory
We then evaluated additional deterrence portfolios across different information availability 
circumstances, but under assumptions of prospect theory. We revisit the question originally 
posed when we assumed SEU:
(Assuming PT) “For individual options to proxy attacker intent, is any advantage of obfuscating 
information (over publicizing information) consistent across attacker OOBs?”
 For PT, we only chose one option to proxy attacker intent, and there was no advantage of 
obfuscating information over publicizing information across attacker OOBs. Importantly, an 
optimistic attacker’s preference for attacking both targets might be greater to them if we 
obfuscate information, than if we publicize information, under PT conditions. However, since 
we do not create intent ratios under PT conditions, our unconditional risk will be the same 
from an attack on both targets. This is regardless of whether we obfuscate or publicize grant 
investment information.
What might stakeholders do?
If we assume PT, it makes no difference whether the government and CIKR owners/operators 
publicize or obfuscate the details of grant investments that reduce CIKR vulnerability. This is 
based on our notional data. 
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However, if we focus solely on attacker expected utilities under PT assumptions rather than 
risk, then our comparisons between complete and incomplete information results depend 
on assumptions on attacker OOB. For a pessimistic or neutral attacker, we predict lower 
attacker expected utility if we obfuscate information. In contrast, for an optimistic attacker, 
we predict lower attacker expected utility if we publicize information. 
Major Takeaways – Results of Case Study
Our case study with notional data yielded several insights (see appendix). First, assuming SEU 
controlled decision making, any defender advantage gained from obfuscating information 
about CIKR deterrence investments was consistent across all attacker OOBs when we assumed 
the attacker developed “intent ratios” for all their possible COAs, rather than preferring one 
COA with 100% certainty. This “defender advantage” meant that the unconditional post-
deterrence risk was lower when CIKR investment information was obfuscated than it was 
when it was publicized to a prospective attacker.
Furthermore, we learned that defender advantage gained from obfuscating information 
was consistent across all attacker OOBs when we assumed the attacker aggregated game 
outcomes into “prospects” and prioritized those prospects proportional to their values. 
However, we also learned that obfuscating information yields no advantage to a defender 
if we assume an attacker will choose a single equilibrium solution COA, or will choose the 
maximum value prospect as a COA. Thus, assumptions about how our opponents perceive 
and rank their options dictate the relative advantages of obfuscating or publicizing our 
deterrence actions as CIKR defenders. 
Finally, changing the utility theory assumption to PT, we found that obfuscation or publicization 
of information made no difference on results.     
Future Research 
Information Obfuscation Bias Options
We have only studied games of imperfect information, although we have studied the 
difference between complete information and incomplete information in the present work. 
Future work should examine perfect or sequential games. This may show how deterrence and 
risk change if we publicize or obfuscate which CIKR we are defending, versus how deterrence 
and risk change if we publicize or obfuscate the details of how we might defend our CIKR. 
Also, future work might add a factor for diminished credibility of defender signaling.
Future work might alter the OOB parameters. For example, we have set parameters that 
require our CIKR to have pre-deterrence vulnerability >10%; otherwise our logic could not be 
used. Also, future work might leverage continuous OOB functions, rather than discrete OOB 
levels.
We have proposed the heuristic that the attacker and defender play two separate games 
when information is both imperfect AND incomplete. Expected utility represents outcomes 
of what would happen if the attacker attacked after grant implementation. However, the 
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deterrence portfolios are intended to inform decisions to publicize or obfuscate information 
before an attack, and the attacker has different information from the defender if the latter 
obfuscates information. Thus, we think this is an appropriate initial heuristic, but future work 
may explore alternative approaches. 
We have assumed that all pre-deterrence information is known to both parties. Future work 
might explore outcomes when pre-deterrence information is partially or fully obfuscated 
from the attacker.
Utility Function Options
We have composed utility functions of monetized death and economic losses, multiplied 
by attacker capabilities and CIKR vulnerabilities. Future work may incorporate attacker and 
defender budget and expenditures into those functions. 
Future work might change the elimination fraction in the vulnerability-investment term in 
the expected utility function. We assumed 5%; future work may test results’ sensitivity to 
changes in this input. It also might vary the slopes of the vulnerability-investment curves to 
reflect nuances of how certain investments reduce CIKR vulnerability to attack. Future work 
also might incorporate the attacker’s option to invest to improve their attack capabilities, 
during the same time period as the defender is implementing their grant investments.
Future work might explore results when we treat the attacker’s expected utility of attacking 
both targets simultaneously as the combination of individual expected utilities, rather than 
a joint probability of attacking both targets multiplied by the sum of both targets’ human 
life and economic consequence. We chose the latter approach to model an assumption that 
attacks would be launched simultaneously, but attackers may prefer to “stagger” individual 
target attacks that are part of a larger, coordinated port-wide effort.
Finally, future work may modify the consequence portion of the utility functions to incorporate 
secondary economic effects of attacks. Existing risk models incorporate such factors; we 
chose not to incorporate secondary effects in this approach, but there is no reason not to 
consider incorporating them in future work.
CIKR Data Options
Future work may explore the assumption that attacker capabilities to attack CIKR targets 
differ; here we have simplified and assumed capabilities are the same. 
Furthermore, we assume we do not have sufficient grant funding to reduce vulnerability of 
all CIKR under consideration to the elimination fraction (here 5%). Thus, future work may 
alter this assumption and so we would not necessarily need to optimize.
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Deterrence Through Capability Reduction, 
Security, Resilience?
The present work assumed that only vulnerability reduction investments were made to deter 
attacks as part of the Port Security Grant program. However, future work might examine the 
deterrence effects of resilience investments upon deterrence portfolios, across information 
availability circumstances and utility theories.67 Such investments might reduce the likelihood 
of loss given a successful attack. Future work also might model deterrence effects of reducing 
attacker capabilities.
Optimization Options
We have used mathematically optimal investments as one defender deterrence COA and 
have also used an arbitrary suboptimal investment.68 However, the assumption is that 
suboptimal investment means the defender spends their entire available deterrence budget. 
Future work may assume that the defender spends less than their entire budget when they 
allocate suboptimally. 
Furthermore, we could treat the defender’s objective function as minimization of the 
attacker’s expected utility, rather than maximization of their own utility, and compare results. 
We have formally solved the optimization for a two target game. Future work that considers 
more than two targets may require computer programming to solve for optimal (or near-
optimal) solutions.
Prospect Bias Options: Different Reference Point
We have assumed the attacker only overweights expected utility under PT assumptions. What 
if the attacker stands to exceed their reference point instead? Then, under PT assumptions, 
the attacker would normally underweight these expected utilities.
Biasing Pre-Deterrence Expected Utilities
We could bias the attacker’s pre-deterrence expected utilities as well as their post-deterrence 
utilities. The former are still prospects (albeit with only one outcome each) prior to defender 
deterrence investments. 
Reference Point vs Status Quo: Does Actor “Domain” 
Influence How Prospect Framing Changes Preferences?
A review of Kahneman and Tversky’s work on PT shows that the respondents’ reference 
points are usually equal to the status quo, or what assets the respondents have when 
evaluating prospects. However, they also acknowledge that the reference point might not 
always be equal to the status quo.69  
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We have proposed a notional game in which the attacker will evaluate prospects, but has 
NOT adapted their status quo as their reference point. However, we have no data to support 
preferences in real world situations. We hypothesize that such data may test the current 
theory that prospective gains exceeding a reference point are always underweighted, or 
that prospective losses falling behind a reference point are always overweighted. In their 
formulation of Cumulative Prospect Theory, which revised the original PT, Kahneman and 
Tversky identified scenarios where gains are actually overweighted (an actor becomes risk 
seeking) and where losses are underweighted (an actor becomes risk averse). However, like 
their original PT analysis, this analysis was not done in game theoretical context.
Future analysis might incorporate the concept of actor domain that Linnington discusses.70 
Linnington claims that actor domain is “a state in which the actor resides, that of losses 
or gains. If the actor feels he is in a position of strength, he is in the domain of gains, and 
conversely, if his position is weak, he is in the domain of losses.”71 We might adopt this to 
mean a position of strength reflects a status quo that exceeds a reference point, when 
evaluating prospects. In contrast, a position of weakness might mean a status quo that falls 
short of a reference point.
Kahneman and Tversky also give examples which suggest that an actor is in a certain 
domain.72 However, actor domain relative to a reference point is not explicitly distinguished 
from how a prospect relates to a reference point. They discuss “shifting” of reference points 
and how that leads to inconsistency of preferences, but without explicitly accounting for the 
relationship between actor domain and reference point. 
For example, in a case where someone’s status quo is less than their reference point, their 
risk seeking or overweighting of utility increases.73 This is our attacker in our example. And, 
they should normally underweight the expected utility of any prospective gains beyond their 
reference point. However, this seems to beg the question: if an attacker is in the “domain 
of loss” relative to their reference point when evaluating prospects, should they actually 
overweight prospects that surpassed their reference point, but perhaps to a lesser extent 
than prospects that approached but did not exceed the reference point? This would be a 
“diminishing returns” effect. Intuition suggests any prospects that increase one’s assets will 
be valuable if one starts from a position of weakness, but that value may attrite past a certain 
point. 
Future experimentation could show whether changing the status quo relative to the reference 
point influences the change in preferences for prospects. Kahneman and Tversky claim, “an 
essential feature of the present theory is that the carriers of value are changes in wealth or 
welfare, rather than final states.”74 But, actor domain could be an “initial” state; perhaps it 
could influence how changes are perceived. Kahneman and Tversky acknowledge that there 
is evidence that “initial entitlements” do matter in the evaluation of prospects.75 
We could infer player reference points from the results of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
elicitations76, but they did not do the inverse: structuring the elicitation so as to front load the 
respondents with pre-determined reference points. Thus, future work could elicit preferences 
for differently framed prospects, in the context of explicitly given reference points, to see if 
the original Kahneman and Tversky preference distributions hold. 
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Temporal Options – Opportunistic vs Methodical 
Attackers?
There may be opportunities to introduce temporal complexities into this analysis. Das 
and Teng point out that experimental psychologists, including Tversky, have argued that 
situational factors influence risk taking more than do dispositional traits.77  Das and Teng 
claim that longer-term decision-making is less constrained by situation-specific decision 
factors such as those predicted by PT, and dispositional or context-neutral utility calculations 
are more prevalent. Port security grant implementation can take time. So, depending on the 
assumed timelines of attacker and defender deliberation in deterrence games, we may be 
able to discount one of the utility theories. Perhaps the biases of PT are more salient when 
terrorists are opportunistic, and perhaps SEU is more salient when they have more time to 
deliberately plan. 
Direct Incorporation of PT Principles into Utility 
Functions
As mentioned, we did not leverage utility functions that directly incorporated Kahneman and 
Tversky’s principles from the literature. Future work may leverage Verendel’s Kahneman and 
Tversky modified expected utility functions as input to a deterrence quantification game, 
such that the equilibrium results could be compared. 
Prospect Theory and Information Availability 
Circumstances
Kahneman and Tversky claimed that ambiguity might influence decision weights.78 They did 
not explicitly survey respondents with prospects that involved incomplete or ambiguous 
information. 
Also, Kahneman and Lovallo wrote: “[t]he experimental evidence indicates that the certainty 
effect is not eliminated when probabilities are vague or ambiguous, as they are in most real 
life situations – and the effect may even be enhanced.”79 
Therefore, any future elicitations of preferences for prospects in a game theoretical 
context might include options where information is partially obfuscated. Future work may 
calibrate the respondent’s preferences in absence of complete information, to approximate 
organizational obfuscation biases.
Also, future work might address the effect of cognitive biases on deterrence in iterative 
Stackelberg games of multiple rounds.
Attacker Intent Proxy Options
We have not focused on games that could result in a mixed strategy equilibrium in this 
work. Mixed strategies reflect what one player should do to make their opponent indifferent 
between choices; whereas intent ratios reflect what one player might prefer based on 
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comparison of their own choices. If we think terrorists might be performing game-theoretical 
analyses where they evaluate our strategies, exploring mixed strategy results might be a 
worthwhile exercise. However, if we think that is unlikely, and that they only compare what 
they believe their own outcomes will be, then perhaps we do not need to explore this option. 
It is also possible that using intent ratios instead of pure or mixed NE results to proxy attacker 
preferences avoids the need to speculate how an attacker might estimate our own expected 
utility functions.
Also, one way to interpret mixed strategy results is a proportion of times that one player 
should execute one COA vs other COAs. However, we surmise that if an attacker attacks, the 
defender will adapt and implement additional security measures, thus changing the expected 
utility function values from the original game. This might render the original equilibrium 
mixed strategy solution a sub-optimal solution for the attacker. There is work on adaptation 
and learning in games, especially sequential or perfect information games, which might be 
explored for applicability to deterrence quantification and impact on risk.
Applicability to Cybersecurity?
This approach may be applicable to the cybersecurity world. Cybersecurity and deterrence 
have been analyzed in the literature, but a cursory Internet search for “cybersecurity, 
deterrence and prospect theory” yielded no academic literature on these topics. 
Incorporation into Existing Risk Models?
Future work may explore how to incorporate this proposed methodology into existing risk 
models. For example, the United States Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model, 
or MSRAM, is a risk tool that leverages threat, vulnerability, and consequence judgments 
to “conduct long-term strategic resource planning, identify capabilities needed to combat 
future terrorist threats, and identify the highest risk scenarios and targets in the maritime 
domain.”80
Major Takeaways – Future Research
In sum, this approach to quantifying deterrence and exploring the effects of obfuscating or 
publicizing CIKR deterrence investment information is ripe for further exploration. First, we 
encourage future research in the area of games of perfect information, wherein a defender 
would make their CIKR investment decisions known to prospective attackers in an effort 
to deter attacks. These decisions would entail which CIKR received grant investments. The 
different effects of complete and incomplete information could then be explored given the 
existence of perfect information. The results could then be compared to those of the case 
study in this paper to inform decision making.
Second, we urge modifying the expected utility functions used in deterrence games 
by incorporating defender budgets and best estimates of attacker budgets. Also, the 
consequence component of the expected utility functions might be modified, to test results 
sensitivity.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Article 3 (September 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Eric F. Taquechel, Ted G. Lewis,  Cognitive Biases  28
Third, we encourage exploration of this process when estimates of attacker capabilities 
differ. Fourth, we suggest consideration of how investments to improve CIKR resilience and/
or mitigate attacker capabilities to launch attacks might influence the outcome of deterrence 
games, thereby informing decisions on whether to obfuscate or publicize deterrence 
investment information.
Fifth, we advocate exploring this approach under different assumptions about what quantity 
we are trying to “optimize.” Sixth, we urge exploration of this process under different 
assumptions derived from principles of Prospect Theory. We have only leveraged a couple 
of principles in our current approach. Seventh, we suggest exploring games where mixed 
strategies result, as we have only focused on games that result in pure strategy Nash 
Equilibria here. 
Eighth, and perhaps most importantly to practitioners, we suggest efforts to incorporate 
theoretical findings into real-world risk models.
Conclusion
Taquechel and Lewis claimed, with respect to the initial results of their deterrence 
quantification methodology: “In order to generalize these findings, any advantage of a specific 
information availability circumstance must be robust given utility theory assumptions.”81 
We have shown how this deterrence quantification methodology can be expanded to 
account for organizational obfuscation biases and prospect bias. This has implications for the 
deterrence effectiveness of our potential CIKR investments, and for the resulting defender 
risk. The advantage of obfuscating information was NOT shown to be robust across different 
utility theories. This was because the advantage of information obfuscation held under SEU 
assumptions, but there was neither quantifiable advantage nor disadvantage under PT 
assumptions. Thus, more analysis is needed. 
We summarize here our extensions of previous work. First, we have extended Lebow and 
Stein’s work by claiming that the application of measurable deterrence to CIKR risk analysis 
and protection must account for different utility calculations. Additionally, we have extended 
Taquechel and Lewis’ generic approach to quantifying deterrence and shown how cognitive 
biases may influence “deterrence portfolios” to support decision making. Furthermore, we 
have extended Berejikian’s concept of applying PT to deterrence by showing how PT may 
affect the quantification of deterrence and resulting change in risk.
Chilton and Weaver82 have suggested that deterrence theory is applicable to many of the 21st 
century threats the US will face, but how the theory is put into practice, or “operationalized”, 
needs to be advanced. We believe this extension of Taquechel and Lewis’ original deterrence 
quantification work, as explained herein and in the case study appendix, helps advance 
“operationalization” of deterrence theory to a very relevant 21st century threat: terrorist 
attacks against CIKR. And, Berejikian asserts that prospect theory can explain why deterrence 
succeeds and fails.83 We have taken a slightly different approach: we explored whether 
prospect theory influences the relative deterrence effectiveness of different investments 
and resulting risk, not deterrence success or failure per se.
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Revisiting Moran vs. Chilton/Weaver, we have shown experimentally that ambiguity can 
enhance the end result of deterrence, or the unconditional risk in deterrence portfolios. 
When we compared SEU results for complete vs. incomplete information, we found that 
obfuscating information resulted in lower average defender post-deterrence unconditional 
risk. However, when we compared PT results for complete vs. incomplete, we found that 
information obfuscation made no difference in the end result of deterrence. Thus, a definitive 
answer to settle the “Moran-Chilton/Weaver debate” is not known at this time. This is 
encouraging for the “prospects” of future work in this area!
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Glossary
Expected Utility Theory (EUT): a theory that assumes people find the best possible solution 
from among all known options, choosing a solution that will maximize their expected utility. 
They act according to their preferences, and preferences are consistent regardless of how 
options are presented
Prospect Theory (PT): an alternative theory of utility which has shown experimentally that 
decisions made may be inconsistent with EUT, depending on how options are presented or 
framed
Critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR): systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters84
Information Obfuscation Biases (IOB): decision-making biases resulting from information 
imperfection and information incompletion
Course of Action (COA): in this case, the defender’s options for how to invest at CIKR, or the 
attacker’s choice of what CIKR to attack
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE): a specific type of equilibrium occurring in modeled 
attacker-defender security games, which predicts what utility-maximizing COA an attacker 
who observes the defender’s security posture would take
CREATE: Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism, at the University of Southern 
California  
PROTECT: Port Resilience Operational/Tactical Enforcement to Counter Terrorism model, 
developed by CREATE for the U.S. Coast Guard to plan/execute homeland security patrols
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU): the utility from a specific course of action, modified by 
the subjective probability of attaining that utility
Certainty Equivalent (CE): the maximum amount someone would pay for some expected 
utility
Quantal Response (QR): a theory that suggests that people will select-non optimal COAs 
with probability inversely proportional to costs of making an error
Organizational Obfuscation Bias (OOB): an information obfuscation bias that reflects 
organizational tendencies – reflected in what a terrorist organization might estimate to be 
the impact of a CIKR defender’s investment, when the terrorist does not know the actual 
investment levels
Nash Equilibrium (NE): Theoretical equilibrium solution to a non-cooperative game. A pure 
NE means that in theory each player should prefer their equilibrium COA with 100% intent. 
If all players chose their respective equilibrium COAs during one round of the game, the NE 
solution means each player gets their best possible expected utility given all other players 
are simultaneously trying to maximize their own expected utility. For a mixed equilibrium, 
“mixed strategies” reflect what one player should do to make their opponent indifferent 
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between choices; in a game with two COAs, the first player’s preferences in a mixed strategy 
reflect a probabilistic distribution where they should execute one COA x% of the time, and 
the other 1-x% of the time. Technically a pure strategy NE is one kind of mixed strategy NE.
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM): a risk tool developed by the U.S. Coast 
Guard, which leverages CIKR threat, vulnerability, and consequence information to conduct 
long-term strategic resource planning, identify capabilities needed to combat future terrorist 
threats, and identify the highest risk scenarios and targets in the maritime domain
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP): a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
program to prioritize investments to secure CIKR
Return on Investment (ROI): in this case, the CIKR risk reduced per dollar spent at that CIKR
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Appendix A: Case Study: Port Security 
Grants
Here we apply the deterrence quantification methodology and game types to a case study 
of two notional CIKR. Our two CIKR are target A, a chemical facility in a port, and target B, a 
ferry terminal nearby. For our example deterrence games, the attacker capability to attack all 
permutations of these targets is the same, the pre-deterrence vulnerability of the chemical 
facility is 0.25 and the pre-deterrence vulnerability of the ferry terminal is 0.50, the defender 
has a vulnerability reduction (deterrence) budget of $2,000,000 from a possible port security 
grant, the maximum economic consequence of losing the chemical facility is $5,000,000, and 
the maximum economic consequence of losing the ferry terminal is $10,000,000.  
The estimated deaths from an attack on the chemical facility are the same as those from an 
attack on the ferry terminal, and are monetized.85 The budget data could be estimated from 
previous PSGP applications and the risk data from an existing CIKR terrorism risk model. As 
a baseline, we first create deterrence portfolios under assumptions of SEU and complete 
information.
Data – Complete vs Incomplete Information- SEU
We compare deterrence portfolios that result from games of imperfect and complete 
information, or Types 1 and 2 (SEU), and from games of imperfect but incomplete information, 
or Types 3 and 4(SEU). Each type has subtype “a”, reflecting our different proxies for attacker 






















































Figure 4. Generic Simultaneous Game for Case Study
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Complete Information
Type 1 (SEU): Intent ratios
For Type 1(SEU) and Type 2(SEU), both simultaneous games, our pure Nash Equilibrium result 
predicts the attacker will attack the ferry terminal and the defender will invest by distributing 
optimally the available grant money amongst the two CIKR. The deterrence portfolios for 
Type 1 (SEU) reflect the assumption that intent ratios are a suitable proxy for attacker intent. 































































Figure 5. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 1(SEU)86
E$opt|A represents the quantified deterrence effectiveness of optimal deterrence investments, 
given the attacker attacks the chemical facility. The other three E$opt | terms represent 
quantified deterrence effectiveness of optimal deterrence investment given the other 
three attacker COAs. Positive results mean the attacker is incentivized to attack that target 
or combination of targets, whereas negative results mean the attacker is deterred from 
attacking that target or combination of targets. In this example the attacker is incentivized 
to attack the chemical facility, and is incentivized to attack the ferry terminal, but is deterred 
from attacking both simultaneously. One might intuit that the incentive to attack multiple 
targets simultaneously would exceed that of attacking a single target, but here we show that 
is not necessarily true. 
R|post$opt,k  represents averaged post-deterrence unconditional risk to the defender given 
optimal investments, averaged across all four possible attacker COAs, and leveraging 
intent ratios from the deterrence game. Δ(R|$opt )  represents the change from averaged 
pre-deterrence unconditional risk to averaged post-deterrence unconditional risk, given 
optimal deterrence investments. In this case averaged pre-deterrence risk was monetized as 
$43,018,001.87 so risk has indeed decreased as a result of our optimal deterrence investment. 
Finally,  ROI|A$opt represents the return on the optimal investment at the chemical facility, and 
ROI|B$opt represents the return on the optimal investment at the ferry terminal. 
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Type 1a (SEU): Pure NE result
What if our deterrence portfolio reflects the assumption that the attacker’s intent is proxied 
by the pure Nash Equilibrium outcome rather than by intent ratios as reflected in Figure 
5? Note the absence of deterrence quantification metrics below in Figure 6; we do not feel 
this metric adds anything meaningful for a decision maker when intent=100% as reflected 
by a pure NE. This is because the quantification of deterrence will always be negative so 
the attacker will always be incentivized to attack rather than be deterred, which seems 
unsatisfying. In this case there is one post-deterrence risk value versus an average, since we 
use the equilibrium result only, and change in risk will use pre-deterrence risk from the same 




































 Figure 6. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 1a(SEU)
Is it meaningful to compare Figure 6 to Figure 5? Perhaps not; unconditional risk from a NE 
result would be much higher due to a lack of “dampening” intent ratio <100%. Conceptually, 
are we more comfortable assuming attacker intent will be 100% if the game yields a pure 
NE? Or are we more comfortable hedging for the possibility that the attacker may not pick 
an equilibrium solution, and intent ratios are sufficient proxies for attacker intent? We can at 
minimum show variations in deterrence portfolio data across these assumptions.87
Type 2 (SEU): Prospects – Single Result
What if the attacker evaluates prospects according to the “aggregate prospect” approach? 
When only one prospect is preferred to all others, in Type 1a, we do not have data to support 
quantification of deterrence, just as with a pure NE result. In this case, attacking the ferry 
terminal presents the maximum value attacker prospect regardless of whether the defender 
invests optimally or suboptimally.88 Attacker intent in this case will still be to attack the ferry 
terminal with 100% intent, but this intent considers both possible defender COAs. Since the 
NE predicts what we should do, we show one post-deterrence risk value versus an average. 
The deterrence portfolio is the same as Type 1(SEU) and is shown:
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 Figure 7. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 2(SEU)
Type 2a (SEU): “Prospect intent ratios”
An attacker would only execute one COA, but we could hedge for non-maximization and 
estimate their intent for each individual prospect, creating a probability reflecting the ratio 
of the attacker expected utility of that prospect to the total attacker expected utility from all 































































Figure 8. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 2a(SEU)
Notice that the deterrence effectiveness terms are with respect to all possible defender 
investments, rather than just optimal investment. This is because the attacker considers 
prospects that account for all possible deterrence investments as with Type 2. However, we 
still calculate unconditional risk, change in unconditional risk, and ROI given the equilibrium 
COA. This is because we assume that COA will have been implemented when the attacker 
attacks, and the risk results and ROI should reflect that implementation. 
In comparison to the results of the Type 1 game, where intent ratios governed unconditional 
risk, notice that the attacker is now deterred (rather than incentivized) from attacking the 
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chemical facility, and is more incentivized to attack the ferry terminal. This may be because 
across defender COAs, the aggregate intent ratio for attacking the ferry terminal is larger 
than it is with respect to only one defender COA. The attacker is also more deterred from 
attacking both targets simultaneously.
Unfortunately, the average unconditional risk in Type 2a is greater, also lowering the change 
in risk and ROI. The attacker would be more incentivized to attack the ferry terminal, a higher 
consequence target, if they evaluated aggregate prospects, as opposed to evaluating game 
outcomes individually. This is important to consider if we are not sure how an attacker 
evaluates our deterrence investment communications.
Overall Findings – SEU, Complete Information
Overall, we see that unconditional defender risk is highest if we assume the attacker will pick, 
with 100% certainty, either the pure NE result attacker COA to attack the ferry terminal, or 
the maximum value prospect across all defender COAs, which coincidentally is to also attack 
the ferry terminal. This is the most conservative assumption, and is also most consistent with 
traditional game theoretical and prospect evaluation approaches. Unfortunately, if we are 
interested in the quantification of deterrence as a stand-alone metric, these assumptions do 
not facilitate that.
For proxies of attacker intent where we can quantify deterrence, we would caution against 
claiming deterrence investments are quantifiably more effective (or more ineffective) against 
different attacker COAs, for different attacker intent proxies. This is because the deterrence 
effectiveness of a single investment COA (e.g. mathematically optimal distribution between 
targets) is not the same concept as the aggregate deterrence effectiveness of our “strategy 
space” or all possible investments. But, we have more confidence that the averaged defender 
unconditional risk is higher if we assume the attacker compares prospects than if they 
compare individual outcomes given the defender’s equilibrium COA. Thus, we might take a 
conservative approach and assume the attacker evaluates “aggregate prospects” rather than 
“equilibrium prospects.” 
Incomplete Information
Type 3 (SEU): Intent ratios
Under assumptions of incomplete information in Type 3(SEU) and Type 4(SEU), as with the 
previous types, our pure Nash Equilibrium result predicts the attacker will attack the ferry 
terminal and the defender will invest optimally. This holds across all 3 OOBS.
As with Type 1(SEU), the deterrence portfolios for Type 3 (SEU) reflect the assumption that 
intent ratios are a suitable proxy for attacker intent. We now show deterrence portfolios for 
Type 3(SEU) games, one for each OOB:
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Figure 11. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 3(SEU), OPTIMISTIC ATTACKER
When we obfuscate information about our notional port security grant investments, optimal 
investment deters the attacker from attacking the ferry terminal, as opposed to incentivizing 
them to attack that target when we publicize information. Even for an optimistic attacker, we 
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show that deterrence is quantifiably MORE effective against simultaneous attacks on both 
the chemical facility and ferry terminal, when we obfuscate information. Also, we show that 
deterrence is quantifiably less ineffective against attacks on (i.e. the attacker is less incentivized 
to attack) the chemical facility, the lower consequence target, when we obfuscate information. 
Ensuring a game of incomplete information thus means, in this specific case, that we incentivize 
an attacker to attack a lower value target, and deter them from attacking a higher value 
target, which may be a decision maker’s goal. Examining the rest of each portfolio, average 
unconditional risk is always lower for incomplete information than for complete information, 
regardless of OOB. Notice that, perhaps counter to intuition, the average unconditional 
risk actually decreases as attacker confidence increases. It is possible that the averaging of 
unconditional risk across attacker COAs “smoothes out” any increase in unconditional risk we 
might expect given one attacker COA, as attacker confidence increases. 
An interesting side note is that incomplete information decreases what we call an 
“attractiveness differential” between the chemical plant and ferry terminal, increasingly so as 
attacker confidence increases. This is because the difference between overall intent to attack 
the chemical plant and overall intent to attack the ferry terminal is smaller in the games of 
incomplete information than in complete games. This may be another reason to obfuscate 
information, although again, the entire deterrence portfolio should be considered.89
Type 3a (SEU): Pure NE result:
The deterrence portfolio when we use intent=100% is the same for all three OOBs. This 
is because OOB changes attacker intent ratios, but when intent ratios are not used, the 
defender’s game yields the same results regardless of attacker OOB, so the deterrence 




































Figure 12. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment as a pure NE defender COA, Type 
3a(SEU)
Type 4 (SEU): Prospects – single result
If the attacker evaluates prospects according to the “aggregate prospect” approach, even 
under assumptions of incomplete information, attacking the ferry terminal is the attacker 
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COA that presents the maximum value prospect. Attacker intent in this case will still be to 




































Figure 13. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 4(SEU)
Type 4a (SEU): “Prospect intent ratios”
What if the attacker evaluates prospect intent ratios, but this time with incomplete 































































Figure 14. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 4a(SEU), PESSIMISTIC ATTACKER
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Figure 15. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 4a(SEU), NEUTRAL ATTACKER































































Figure 16. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 4a(SEU), OPTIMISTIC ATTACKER
Here we see that the attacker, if evaluating aggregate prospects under incomplete information 
circumstances, would be incentivized to attack the higher consequence target instead of 
deterred as in Type 3(SEU) games (with the exception of the optimistic attacker). And again 
we see the defender’s average post-deterrence unconditional risk is higher, for all three 
attacker OOBs, when the attacker evaluates prospect intent ratios than when they evaluate 
intent ratios based on equilibrium solutions.
Also, again we see the counterintuitive result that average unconditional risk DECREASES as 
attacker confidence increases. And information incompletion decreases the “attractiveness 
differential” between the chemical plant and ferry terminal, when using an aggregate intent 
ratio, just as it did when using intent ratios for equilibrium solutions.
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Overall Findings – SEU, Incomplete Information
As with complete information, under conditions of incomplete information we see that 
unconditional defender risk is highest if we assume the attacker will pick, with 100% certainty, 
either the pure NE attacker COA to attack the ferry terminal, or the maximum value prospect 
across all defender COAs, which coincidentally is to also attack the ferry terminal. 
For attacker intent proxy options where we can quantify deterrence, we see that 
unconditional risk is greater, across all OOBs, if we assume the attacker evaluates prospect 
intent ratios as opposed to intent ratios. Thus, as with assumptions of complete information, 
under incomplete information circumstances we might conservatively assume the attacker 
evaluates “aggregate prospects” instead of “equilibrium prospects.” 
Data – Complete VS Incomplete Information – PT
Complete Information
Type 1(PT): Feasibility of Creating Intent Ratios for Attacker Intent Proxy
Our notional game yields the same pure NE solution as under SEU assumptions. However, 
intent ratios under PT assumptions should reflect desirability of individual attacker COAs, 
based on principles of Prospect Theory derived by Kahneman and Tversky (hereafter referred 
to as “KT principles”). 
When Kahneman and Tversky elicited preferences for prospects during their development 
of Prospect Theory, the results yielded what we will hereafter refer to as “KT preference 
distributions” for the prospects. For example, they posed the following question90:
“Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both 
decisions, then indicate the options you prefer.
Decision (i) Choose between:
A. a sure gain of $240 [84%]
B. 25% chance to gain $1000 and 75% chance to gain nothing [16%]
Decision (ii) Choose between:
C. a sure loss of $750 [13%]
D. 75% chance to lose $1000 and 25% chance to lose nothing [87%]”
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The bracketed percentages represent examples of preference distributions: here the 
proportion of the sampled respondents who preferred A or B in Decision (i), and preferred 
C or D in Decision (ii). One might say these percentages represent intent ratios for the 
respondents. One could even surmise this could proxy a preference ratio for an individual 
– e.g. if offered Decision (i) 100 times, 84 times one respondent would prefer a sure gain of 
$240; the other 16 times they would prefer the risky prospect.
However, the KT preference distributions shown in the above example and in many of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s other published examples reflect preferences elicited outside the 
context of a non-cooperative competition. Thus, for our present work, we are not comfortable 
trying to derive insights from KT preference distributions to help approximate intent ratios 
as proxies for attacker preferences under Prospect Theory assumptions. 
Alternatively, one might create expected utility functions to use in our deterrence game that 
directly incorporate KT principles, and then evaluate intent ratios as we did in Type 1 (SEU). 
Verendel91 leverages into his utility functions (with some slight modifications) the decision 
weights and values from Cumulative Prospect Theory, which Tversky and Kahneman 
proposed to advance their original theories.92 However, Verendel’s equations use KT principles 
that make assumptions about the relationship between probabilities of all outcomes in a 
prospect, and assumptions about the relationship between utilities of various outcomes, 
but these relationships do not hold in our work.93 Therefore, we were not confident we could 
defensibly apply his utility functions in our deterrence games.
Type 1a (PT): Feasibility of Leveraging Pure NE Result for Attacker Intent 
Proxy
How could we leverage a pure NE result under KT principles, such that we can compare 
effects of obfuscating information to the effects of publicizing information?
First, we might create utility functions that directly leverage KT principles and see if a pure 
NE is the game result. Unfortunately, the same issue we encountered in reviewing Verendel’s 
work applies here. 
Second, we might use insights from Metzger and Rieger.94 They focus primarily on application 
of KT principles to games that yield mixed strategies, but mixed strategies are conceptually 
problematic for our approach. They do show an example where pure strategy NE results 
would create a reference point against which one player might evaluate possible outcomes. 
However, we interpreted this was shown to contrast the effects of the pure NE-induced 
reference frame against the effects of a different reference frame induced by mixed strategy 
equilibria results. We did not find this helpful for explaining how pure strategy equilibria 
might help us proxy attacker intent in a way that would show differences in outcomes.
Type 2 (PT): Feasibility of Prospects – Single Result
What if an attacker evaluates prospects, but according to KT principles? This approach most 
closely resembles the way Kahneman and Tversky elicited preferences – without considering 
game equilbria, and simply proposing probabilistic outcomes as either losses or gains. 
We first consider a notional reference point. If the attacker’s reference point 
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(1) is organizationally driven, rather than situationally driven by an equilibrium game result 
as in Metzger and Rieger, and 
(2) equals, for example, the maximum monetized death/injury and economic consequence 
from destruction of both targets, 
then we can show that the attacker might prefer attacking both the chemical facility AND the 
ferry terminal simultaneously. To illustrate, we show the game that was used as the basis for 
Types 1(SEU) and 2 (SEU), with numerical values of the expected utility functions. This game 
is applicable to PT assumptions insofar as the form of the expected utility functions does not 
change:
Optimal Investment Suboptimal Investment
Attack A $45,472,329.67 $1,789,527,670.33 $7,140,625 $1,827,859,375
Attack B $90,944,659.34 $1,744,055,340.66 $229,500,000 $1,605,500,000
Attack A+B $9,029,443.77 $1,825,970,556.23 $3,578,125 $1,831,421,875
Refrain $1,835,000,000 $1,835,000,000
 
Figure 17. Results of game – SEU or PT, complete information
Next, we show the attacker’s results as combinations of probability and utility, rather than 
the final numerical values:
Optimal Investment Suboptimal Investment
Attack A .049*$914M $1,789,527,670.33 .088*$914M $1,827,859,375
Attack B .099*$914M $1,744,055,340.66 .25*$918M $1,605,500,000
Attack A+B .005*$1,832M $1,825,970,556.23 .002*$1,832M $1,831,421,875
Refrain $1,835,000,000 $1,835,000,000
 
Figure 18. Results of game – SEU or PT, complete information – attacker results expanded
We can now show attacker prospects in a way that allows us to estimate what an attacker 
might prefer by leveraging KT principles. The attacker’s prospect from attacking the chemical 
facility is shown as a combination of probabilities and utilities (outcomes):
UeT|
post
A  = .049($914M) + .008($914M) = .057($921M)
Equation 6. Attacker prospect from attacking the chemical facility, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, complete information
Notice that we change the final utility to a negative number because it reflects a loss relative 
to the attacker’s reference point. For the remaining three prospects, we have:
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UeT|
post
B  = .099($918M) + .25($918M) = .349(-$917M)




AB  = .005(-$1,832M) + .002(-$1,832M) = .007(-$3M)
Equation 8. Attacker prospect from attacking both targets simultaneously, post-deterrence, 
SEU or PT, complete information
UeT|
post
0  = (-$1,835M)
Equation 9. Attacker prospect from refraining, post-deterrence, SEU or PT, complete 
information
We now compare these prospects using KT principles. First, because of the certainty effect 
for losses, or the reflection effect, we can rule out the certain loss of refraining from attack. 
Next, we compare the prospect of attacking the ferry terminal to the prospect of attacking 
the chemical plant. The attacker would probably prefer attacking the ferry terminal to the 
chemical facility, because the latter has a very small probability of a greater loss, as opposed 
to the former which has a small probability of a smaller loss. We estimate this preference 
because KT preference distributions showed that when losses are considered, and both 
outcomes in a prospect have small probabilities, the smaller loss is often preferred (low 
probabilities are overweighted which increases the unattractiveness of the larger loss).
Then, we compare the prospect of attacking both targets to the prospect of attacking the ferry 
terminal. In this case, we predict the attacker would prefer to attack both simultaneously. 
This is because there is a small probability of a much smaller loss. However, notice that this is 
different than what the intent ratio, pure NE, and prospect evaluation approaches (assuming 
SEU) predicted for the attacker COA. These approaches predicted the attacker should attack 
the ferry terminal. Under SEU, they would be maximizing their expected utility. However, 
under PT, they are evaluating prospects against a reference point. This example illustrates 
how different utility theories predict different results. 
The resulting deterrence portfolio, which reflects the defender’s equilibrium COA of optimal 
investment, looks like:
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Figure 19. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 2 (PT)
We note a difference between this result and that of Type 2(SEU). In this case, the change 
in unconditional risk (given defender optimal investment) is negative. This means that 
unconditional risk from an attack on both targets has actually increased given our optimal 
investment. The unconditional post -deterrence risk is much less than it was under SEU 
assumptions when attacking the ferry terminal was most attractive, but the change in 
unconditional risk from pre-deterrence to post-deterrence is reversed: it increases rather 
than decreases. 
Type 2a (PT): Feasibility of Prospects – Prospect Intent Ratios
If we assume attacker intent for each COA is proxied by the ratio of the numerical value of 
that COA’s prospect, to the aggregate value of all prospects in the game, this is no different 
from SEU assumptions. Therefore we do not see any value in exploring this option, absent 
evidence that terrorists make decisions this way under PT assumptions. Alternatively, 
if one developed defensible utility functions that incorporate KT principles directly, we 
could compare the new prospects to yield intent ratios.  However, the same concerns with 
defensible utility functions discussed earlier apply here as well.
Overall Findings – PT, Complete Information
We only found one approach that yielded information to create a deterrence portfolio, 
and one without meaningful deterrence quantification values at that. When an attacker 
evaluates prospects, in this case they would be more likely to choose attacking both targets 
simultaneously, as opposed to attacking the ferry terminal under SEU assumptions. This 
was given a specific reference point, maximum value of both targets. This result yields lower 
unconditional risk for the defender in deterrence portfolios than under SEU conditions. This 
comparison between SEU and PT results, assuming complete information, is encouraging 
because if PT represents reality, we may face less risk than originally thought.
Importantly, we predict that attacking both targets simultaneously is the attacker’s most 
desirable prospect based on similarities between probabilities/outcomes that influenced 
KT preference distributions, and probabilities/outcomes in our deterrence game prospects. 
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However, we reiterate that Kahneman and Tversky did not elicit preference distributions 
under game theoretic circumstances. 
Incomplete Information
Since we only established one approach for evaluating games of complete information under 
PT assumptions, we revisit that approach but instead assume incomplete information.
Type 4 (PT): Prospects – Single Result – Incomplete Information 
































































If the attacker evaluates aggregate prospects, the “pessimistic attacker’s game” is shown, 
with numerical values of the expected utility functions, as follows:
Optimal Investment Suboptimal Investment
Attack A $4,570,000 $1,830,430,000 $28,562,500 $1,806,437,500
Attack B $4,590,000 $1,830,410,000 $57,375,000 $1,777,625,000
Attack A+B $45,800 $1,834,954,200 $3,578,125 $1,831,421,875
Refrain $1,835,000,000 $1,835,000,000
 
Figure 20. Results of “attacker’s game” – SEU or PT, incomplete information, PESSIMISTIC 
attacker
Next, we show the attacker results:
UeT|
post
A  = .005($914M) + .031($914M) = .036(-$921M)
Equation 10. Attacker prospect from attacking the chemical facility, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, incomplete information, PESSIMISTIC ATTACKER
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UeT|
post
B  = .005($918M) + .063($918M) = .068(-$917M)
Equation 11. Attacker prospect from attacking the ferry terminal, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, incomplete information, PESSIMISTIC ATTACKER
UeT|
post
AB  = .000025($1,832M) + .002($1,832M) = .002(-$3M)
Equation 12. Attacker prospect from attacking both targets simultaneously, post-deterrence, 
SEU or PT, incomplete information, PESSIMISTIC ATTACKER
UeT|
post
0  = (-$1,835M)
Equation 13. Attacker prospect from refraining, post-deterrence, SEU or PT, incomplete 
information, PESSIMISTIC ATTACKER
Just as we did under complete information circumstances, we now compare these prospects 
using KT principles. We can rule out the certain loss of refraining from attack again.
Next, we compare the prospect of attacking the ferry terminal to the prospect of attacking 
the chemical facility. Again, because these are losses, and both outcomes have small 
probabilities, the smaller loss is often preferred, so we predict the attacker would prefer 
attacking the ferry terminal over attacking the chemical facility. 
Then we compare the prospect of attacking both targets to the prospect of attacking the 
ferry terminal. In this case, once again we predict the attacker would prefer attacking both. 
This is the same result as predicted when evaluating prospects under complete information 
circumstances. When assuming PT, the bottom line for comparison of results under different 
information availability circumstances seems to be that the attacker’s predicted preference 
does NOT change.
Given our prediction that a pessimistic attacker will prefer to attack both targets, but we will 
invest optimally as the pure NE solution, the deterrence portfolio is shown:
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Figure 21. Deterrence portfolio of optimal investment, Type 3 (PT), PESSIMISTIC ATTACKER
What happens when we assume a neutral attacker?
Optimal Investment Suboptimal Investment
Attack A $22,850,000 $1,812,150,000 $57,125,000 $1,777,875,000
Attack B $22,950,000 $1,812,050,000 $144,750,000 $1,720,250,000
Attack A+B $1,145,000 $1,833,855,000 $14,312,500 $1,820,687,500
Refrain $1,835,000,000 $1,835,000,000
 
Figure 22. Results of “attacker’s game” – SEU or PT, incomplete information, NEUTRAL 
attacker
The attacker prospects are: 
UeT|
post
A  = .025($914M) + .063($914M) = .088(-$921M)
Equation 14. Attacker prospect from attacking the chemical facility, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, incomplete information, NEUTRAL ATTACKER
UeT|
post
B  = .025($918M) + .125($918M) = .15(-$917M)
Equation 15. Attacker prospect from attacking the ferry terminal, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, incomplete information, NEUTRAL ATTACKER
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UeT|
post
AB  = .000625($1,832M) + .008($1,832M) = .009(-$3M)
Equation 16. Attacker prospect from attacking both targets simultaneously, post-deterrence, 
SEU or PT, incomplete information, NEUTRAL ATTACKER
UeT|
post
0  = (-$1,835M)
Equation 17. Attacker prospect from refraining, post-deterrence, SEU or PT, incomplete 
information, NEUTRAL ATTACKER
Comparing the two targets, again we believe the attacker would prefer the ferry terminal. 
Comparing attacking both simultaneously to the ferry terminal, we again believe the attacker 
would prefer to attack both. As expected, the aggregate probability of the outcome from 
attacking both targets is greater for a neutral attacker than for a pessimistic attacker. 
However, it is less than the aggregate probability of achieving the outcome from attacking 
both targets under complete information circumstances. The deterrence portfolio of optimal 
investment in this case is the same as Figure 22.
What if the attacker is optimistic?
Optimal Investment Suboptimal Investment
Attack A $45,7000,000 $1,789,300,000 $85,687,500 $1,749,312,500
Attack B $45,900,000 $1,789,100,000 $172,125,000 $1,662,875,000
Attack A+B $4,580,000 $1,830,420,000 $32,203,125 $1,802,796,875
Refrain $1,835,000,000 $1,835,000,000
 
Figure 23. Results of “attacker’s game” – SEU or PT, incomplete information, OPTIMISTIC 
attacker
The attacker prospects are:
UeT|
post
A  = .05($914M) + .094($914M) = .144(-$921M)
Equation 18. Attacker prospect from attacking the chemical facility, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, incomplete information, OPTIMISTIC ATTACKER
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UeT|
post
B  = .05($918M) + .188($918M) = .238(-$917M)
Equation 19. Attacker prospect from attacking the ferry terminal, post-deterrence, SEU or 
PT, incomplete information, OPTIMISTIC ATTACKER
UeT|
post
AB  = 00.3($1,832M) + .018($1,832M) = .021(-$3M)
Equation 20. Attacker prospect from attacking both targets simultaneously, post-deterrence, 
SEU or PT, incomplete information, OPTIMISTIC ATTACKER
UeT|
post
0  = (-$1,835M)
Equation 21. Attacker prospect from refraining, post-deterrence, SEU or PT, incomplete 
information, OPTIMISTIC ATTACKER
Again we predict the attacker will prefer the ferry terminal to the chemical facility and will 
ultimately prefer to attack both simultaneously. The aggregate probability of the outcomes 
in the preferred prospect is predictably higher for an optimistic attacker than for a neutral 
attacker. And it is now greater than that from attacking both under complete information 
conditions. The deterrence portfolio is the same as it is for neutral and pessimistic attackers. 
However, we are not convinced we should ensure complete information if we assume PT 
conditions apply.
Overall Findings – PT, Incomplete Information
Just as with complete information, we found that an attacker would probably prefer to attack 
both targets simultaneously over all other COAs, given our specified reference point. This was 
consistent across all OOBs.
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Abstract
In a recent quantitative analysis of the past 40 years of terrorist activity in New York City, the 
FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness identified several trends in terrorist 
activity that may have value to future policy formation, both in New York City and in similar 
municipalities elsewhere. This article will discuss this study, which involved the compilation and 
analysis of relevant data on all terrorist activity in New York City from 1975-2015, including the 
specific location of terrorist activity, attack motivation, group affiliation, and weapons used. The 
success of this study in  distilling actionable intelligence from a data set assembled exclusively 
through open-source research serves as an example of the emerging importance and applicability 
of quantitative data analytics for the field of Homeland Security.
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Introduction
Cities are the economic, social, and cultural centers of our world. They are crossroads of 
transportation and hubs of education, commerce, arts, and industry. Nearly four billion 
people call a city their home and millions more commute to one for work. Unfortunately, 
cities can also play a darker role, one that is inextricably tied to the bustling masses teeming 
through their streets: a city is the perfect target. In addition to the crowds of potential victims, 
the many amenities a city provides can also be an attractive spectrum of targets for a terrorist 
attack; seats of government, financial centers, symbolic treasures, and transportation hubs 
are all available marks that would meet the grisly goals of any terrorist. Considering this 
perspective, perhaps there is no target more enticing than the most global of metropolises, 
New York City.
The mention of terrorism in New York City reflexively evokes images of the horrors of the 
World Trade Center attacks on September 11th, 2001. The incomprehensible enormity of these 
attacks can never be overstated. However, to get a better sense of the reality of terrorism in 
New York City, it becomes necessary to look deeper than these horrific images, to the dark 
history of terror that New York has endured over the past decades. It is a history rife with a 
variety of attacks – several different weapon types used, a number of different motivating 
causes, and a lengthy list of terrorists responsible. From the explosive chaos of the turbulent 
days of the 1970’s, through the carnage of 2001, to the post-9/11 world of today, the threat 
of terror continues to be present in the discussion of public safety.
But while the danger has remained, the world has changed drastically over these years; the 
New York of the 1970s was a very different place than the city of today. Likewise, the threat 
of terrorism has evolved. Today’s terrorists are not the same as terrorists in the past – they 
behave differently, they believe different things, and they attack differently. By identifying 
and understanding these differences, the homeland security community can best prepare to 
face the continuing threat of terrorism as it evolves in the 21st century.
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It is only through a deeper understanding of this history that it becomes possible to discern 
the ways in which terrorism is evolving.  By painting a clear picture of where we came from, 
we can hope to bring some clarity to what we, in the counterterrorism field, might be faced 
with next. Such a picture can best be achieved by looking objectively at the specifics of past 
attacks, in the hopes that such insight can help anticipate details of the attacks that are yet 
to come. Considering today’s amorphous threat environment, any information concerning 
terrorist tactics, weaponry, motivation, or location would be an asset to responders and 
policy makers alike.
In order to gain such an objective perspective, it is necessary to leverage the strengths of 
the myriad collections of electronic data that have become available recently. Through 
quantitative analysis of available data, it becomes possible to distill useful information that 
can be a vital tool in helping experienced public safety practitioners continue to craft effective 
counterterrorism policies and procedures.
This article will discuss one such project: a recent quantitative analysis of the history of 
terrorist activity in New York City conducted by the FDNY’s Center for Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness. The analysis focused on the most recent 40 years of the city’s history and 
included all terror-related activity that occurred between 1975 and 2015. As the following 
sections describe, the analysis revealed several significant trends in the data, which could 
prove valuable in policy formation moving forward.
Methodology
There were two distinct phases to this study: 
1. The compilation of a data set of all terrorist activity in NYC from 1975-2015
2. An exploratory data analysis of the data set, focused on uncovering trends in terrorist 
activity
The first step in the project involved the compilation of data points. The vast majority of 
information was taken from the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database1 and further research (mostly 
concerning geographic location) was conducted for each attack. All information was accessed 
through open-source resources available to the public, including and especially reports 
published in mass media. While the sources varied for each of the 236 incidents, electronic 
news archives for the New York Times and the New York Daily News were the most commonly 
used sources. These media reports were primarily used to confirm the exact location of the 
incident for the purposes of creating an interactive map of the attacks as part of a training 
initiative. Any qualitative data gained from the media was corroborated through additional 
sources, as early media reports can often be inaccurate. The availability of reliable media 
sources proved to be a limiting factor to the time period investigated in the study, as reliable 
data on attacks that occurred before 1975 proved difficult to obtain, thereby eliminating 
earlier attacks from investigation. 
In defining “terrorism” and thus setting the parameters for which incidents would be 
examined, the study again used START as a foundation, which primarily defines terrorism 
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as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a 
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”2 Based on 
this definition, START’s data set was expanded to include any omitted relevant local activity 
within the borders of NYC, such as terror-related arrests.
Outcomes for three of the five variables investigated were classified into several discrete 
categories, so as to make meaningful analysis possible. The variables investigated are listed 
below. Bullet points indicate the various categories for each categorical variable.
1. Date of attack 
2. Specific location of incident (street address)










• Other (Anti-abortion, Anti-Islam, etc.)
5. Group affiliation of attacker
• Member of a terrorist organization
• Not a member of an organization (“lone wolf”) 
Once the data set was assembled, an exploratory data analysis was undertaken, using various 
time-series data visualizations in an attempt to identify trends in the variables over the 40-
year study period. For the purposes of this study, the scale of the included incidents (number 
of casualties, financial impact, etc.) was not considered. As a result, smaller incidents were 
given equal consideration to more consequential attacks. This was done in large part to 
avoid the oversized statistical impact of the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, which would 
have significantly skewed the results. 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Article 4 (Septemeber 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Quinn,  A History of Violence  5
Results
The resulting analysis found 5 general trends in the data:
1. The number of terrorist attacks in NYC has decreased steadily since 1975.
2. Terrorist activity has become more concentrated in the outer boroughs in recent years.
3. 40 years ago, attacks motivated by various Nationalist-Separatist movements were the most 
common. Today, attacks motivated by Islamic extremism are most common.
4. The incidence of individual attackers is on the rise, while attacks by members of organized 
terrorist groups are decreasing.
5. Terrorists are using a wider range of weapons, but still rely heavily on explosives.
The following sections discuss these findings in greater detail.
How many attacks have there been?
Since 1975, there have been 236 terror-related events within the 5 boroughs of New York 
City. These events include overt attacks (both executed and attempted), foiled plots, and 
activity found to be providing direct support to terrorist groups.  Of these events, 189 were 
successful attacks (or activity directly related to a successful attack), 35 were attacks that did 
not succeed (bomb failed to detonate, device discovered and disarmed, etc.), and 12 were 










Figure 1. Outcome of Attacks
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How often do attacks occur?
The number of incidents occurring each year has steadily decreased since the 1970’s, as can 
be seen in the following graph:
 2 












i  2. Average Number of Incidents per Year
At the height of terrorist activity in 1976, there were 39 attacks in one year. At the low point, 
there were no attacks for a 3-year period from 1998-2000.4
What parts of NYC are affected?
In recent years, terrorist activity has become increasingly located in the outer boroughs, 
which include Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and the Bronx. Historically, terror attacks 
have overwhelmingly been located in Manhattan, where they focused largely on the high-
profile political and financial targets located there, such as foreign embassies, consulates, 
major banks, and transit hubs. With the notable exception of the two major airports (both 
located in Queens), such prime targets are nearly exclusively located in Manhattan, making 
increased terror activity there unsurprising. However, as the graph below shows, the majority 
of terrorist activity in the last ten years has been located in the outer boroughs. 
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Figure 3. Location of Terrorist Activity
As uncovered by several recent foiled terror plots, much of the activity in the outer boroughs 
involves the organization and planning phases of various plots, as opposed to the actual 
execution of the attacks. These findings confirm that, although the majority of high-profile 
terror targets (foreign embassies, major banks, etc.) continue to be located in Manhattan, 
high-risk terror activity is occurring  more often in outlying sections of the city.
What is motivating the terrorists?
For the purposes of analysis, the spectrum of attack motivations was categorized into 5 
mutually exclusive variables, as follows:
National-Separatist Movement: 
These are attacks motivated by various movements that focused on the advancement of a 
certain political group, often with the goal of establishing a separate state or government.
Anti-government: 
These are attacks motivated by opposition to government forces without the expressed goal 
of establishing an alternative government.
Islamic Extremist: 
These are attacks motivated by Islamic extremism. While many such attacks also have political 
goals similar to those of Nationalist-Separatist movements, the primary role of religion in the 
motivating ideology justifies the creation of a separate category.
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Jewish Extremist:
These are attacks motivated by Jewish extremism. As with Islamic extremism, many of these 
attacks also have clear political goals, but the primary role of religion justifies a separate 
category. In order to capture the changing dynamic of specific religion-based movements, 
the two religion-based categories were not combined into a single category.
Other: 
These are attacks motivated by a variety of other causes that did not fit into any of the above 
categories, such as anti-abortion and anti-Islam attacks. As there were relatively few of these 
attacks, they were grouped together. 
As can be seen in the graphics below, the prevalence of these motivating factors has changed 






Figure 4. Attacks by Motivation
Looking at the charts, two major trends become clear:
1. The sharp decline of Nationalist-Separatist and Jewish Extremism attacks 
2. The dramatic increase of Islamic Extremism attacks
From 1975-85, the majority of attacks were attributable to various Nationalist-Separatist 
movements, which accounted for 64% of all activity (over 100 attacks).5 While a number 
of specific nationalist causes claimed responsibility for attacks in this period, the most 
significant movements were the Puerto Rican Nationalist Movement6, the Croatian Nationalist 
Movement7, and the Cuban Counter-Revolution Movement.8 Attacks by Jewish extremists9 
were also significant in this period, accounting for 24% of all activity. Islamic extremism 
accounted for only 1% of activity.
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In the most recent period, from 2006 to 2015, Islamic Extremism increased dramatically, 
accounting for 58% of activity, while Nationalist-Separatist attacks nearly disappeared, 
decreasing to only 4% of activity. No attacks were attributed to Jewish Extremism. 
Individual attackers or members of a 
terrorist group?
In the past, terrorism was largely a group-based phenomenon. In more recent times, 
however, attacks have been carried out increasingly by individuals working without the direct 
support of a large organization. As the graph in figure five shows, the percentage of attacks 
attributed to an organized terrorist group has been largely decreasing, while the percentage 
of individual attacks is on the rise.
 5 
Figure 5. Percentage of Activity Attributed to a Terror Group
In the politically volatile years of the 1970s and early 1980s, several tightly knit terrorist 
groups carried out the vast majority of attacks. From 1975-80, groups claimed responsibility 
for 90% of all activity. In contrast, from 2011-15, groups were responsible for only 25% of 
activity, while individual actors accounted for the remaining 75%.
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What weapons are used?
While the type of weapons used by terrorists has diversified somewhat over the past 40 
years, the focus largely remains on the use of explosives. In the first decade, explosives were 
used the vast majority of the time, with incendiary attacks comprising a significant amount of 
the remainder of attacks. The prevalence of armed assault has remained largely consistent, 
but there was an increase in the number of chemical and biological attacks in recent years, 
which included a string of targeted Anthrax attacks in 200110, as well as a Ricin incident in 
2013.11 Earlier chemical attacks (1979, 1982, 1986) involved less dangerous substances, such 
as tear gas and smoke grenades, which were deployed in places of public assembly.12
 6 
Figure 6: Attacks by Weapon Type













 6. Attacks by Weapon Type
Policy Implications
While the scope of this study is limited to a basic statistical overview of historical data, 
the findings discussed above can have near-term, practical applications in terrorism 
preparedness efforts in NYC. This may be especially relevant to the efficient allocation of 
the limited resources available to the local entities concerned with terrorist activity, most 
notably the NYPD and FDNY.
For example, citing this study’s finding of increased planning-stage terrorist activity in the 
outer boroughs, the deployment of relevant counterterrorism resources in those geographic 
areas may be considered. This could include increased training for field-level personnel in 
identifying suspicious activity related to the planning phases of a terror plot, such as identifying 
the indicators of weapons-making material, including the production of explosives (such as 
TATP), chemical weapons (such as Sarin gas), or biological weapons (such as Anthrax), all of 
which have been previously deployed in an urban setting.13 
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Another potential policy application could address the emergence of individual attackers by 
adapting investigative techniques to practices that would be more effective at identifying 
a radicalized individual, as opposed to those focused on identifying group activity. Such 
practices would necessarily involve fostering a deeper understanding of the radicalization 
process, which would require additional research to develop effective field-level techniques 
to address this emerging issue.
A third application of this study’s findings could consider the study’s finding of a sharp increase 
of Islamic extremism as a motivating cause and could seek to develop counterterrorism 
practices that address any tactics and targets that may be more prevalent in those kinds 
of attacks. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests Islamic extremist attacks may favor 
suicide bombings and a goal of maximizing civilian casualties, as opposed to nationalist-
separatist attacks, which seem to focus on planted explosives with the goal of destroying 
high-profile property.14 As the relationship between motivating factors and attack modalities 
is outside the scope of this study, further research would be needed to investigate this idea. 
Next Steps
While this analysis offers several insights into the changing landscape of modern terrorism, 
its findings are specific to one location: New York City. In order to paint a more robust 
picture, it will be necessary to undertake similar studies for other cities, both domestic and 
abroad. As a start, further research could include Chicago, Los Angeles, London, and Paris. 
By comparing the findings of this analysis with studies of comparable cities, we may be able 
to gain more telling intelligence of the evolving threat of terror. 
Additionally, further research into this study’s specific findings can and should be pursued. 
This study was initially undertaken in conjunction with a training initiative aimed at raising 
terrorism awareness for field units of the FDNY and, as such, does not explore the many 
possible causal factors that influence its findings. Essentially, this study provides an objective 
statistical description of the history of terror in NYC – further research could explore the various 
causes behind the observed trends. For example, further research could explore why the 
number of terrorist attacks has decreased so drastically. Is this indicative of the effectiveness 
of counterterrorism efforts, or has the allure of NYC as a target somehow diminished? Such 
research could be useful in determining the value of specific counterterrorism tactics or 
tools.
In addition to the research suggested in the previous section, one suggested area of further 
research would be to study the increase of terrorist activity in the outer boroughs, which are 
largely residential areas. The following questions might be explored.  Do the study’s findings 
indicate that terrorists are now more homegrown in NYC, plotting and carrying out attacks 
where they live, rather than coming to New York to carry out attacks? Is this phenomenon 
indicative of increasing effectiveness in counterterrorism investigations, as more plots are 
uncovered during the planning stage?  Does it indicate more public awareness of terrorist 
activity and more cooperation with the police? Is terrorist activity more likely to be discovered 
in areas where specific occupancy types are common (residential, commercial, industrial, 
etc.)? This is of interest as public safety agencies work to effectively allocate limited resources.
Another suggested area of future research would be the growing incidence of individual actors, 
or “lone wolf” attacks. The following questions might be explored.  To what degree are these 
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individual actors influenced by larger groups in which they do not have a clear membership? 
What role does the availability of social media and other electronic communication have 
in these incidents? This dynamic is especially relevant as the counterterrorism community 
works to understand internet-based extremism and recruitment, especially as it concerns 
global entities such as ISIS and Al Qaeda.
Looking to the future
The world is changing and terrorism is changing with it. But despite the continual evolution 
of terrorist practices, the local outlook is not as grim as one might fear. In New York City, an 
ideal target for terrorists of any variety, there are fewer terrorist attacks today than at any 
point in the past 40 years. Counterterrorism efforts have foiled several plots in recent years 
and identified aspiring terrorists before they had the capacity to strike. While many factors 
contribute to such efforts, the role of accurate, reliable information is central to the ongoing 
fight against terror. This study seeks to contribute to this body of information, however 
modestly, and to highlight further  the growing importance of basic quantitative analysis to 
the field of public safety, not only in NYC, but in municipalities nationwide. 
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Abstract
Today’s expanding disaster landscape demands crisis managers to configure their 
organizations to handle a wider range of extreme events. This requires more varied 
capabilities, capacity and delivery of services. The article proposes that crisis managers 
must move away from organization-centered planning to a system-wide approach for 
preparedness. We lay out the limitations of using the current tiered response triangle for 
planning and argue for implementing a system-wide approach by using a Tiered Response 
Pyramid to increase response capabilities and surge capacity for large scale disasters. 
The tiered response pyramid offers crisis managers a way to visualize multiple response 
options that leverage each other’s resources and create a more resilient response system 
for complex events.
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Introduction
Natural disasters, terrorism, violent extremists, industrial and transportation accidents, 
cyber-attacks, infrastructure failures, and utility disruptions are some of the diverse 
challenges crisis managers are called to address. This broadening disaster landscape 
requires crisis managers to configure their response organizations to handle a wider range 
of extreme events, meaning that they need more varied capabilities, capacity and delivery of 
services. However, even as they have diversified their resources, crisis managers have seen 
responses outstripped by the overwhelming demand and cumulative effects of extreme 
events. 
This article offers a system-wide approach to crisis management planning that seeks to 
decrease the fragility of current response capabilities during large scale disasters. To assist 
crisis managers in overcoming response limitations, we argue that crisis managers must 
move away from organization-centered planning to a system-wide approach for building 
crisis response capacity, capabilities, and delivery. The article lays out the shortcomings of 
using the current tiered response triangle for planning. We argue instead for crisis managers 
to enhance their organization-centered tiered triangle by implementing a system-wide 
Tiered Response Pyramid to increase response capabilities and surge capacity during large 
scale disasters. The next crisis will come as a shock in timing, location and form, but how 
crisis managers respond should not be a surprise. To avoid insufficient responses and poor 
coordination, crisis managers must not only look inward at their own organization, but must 
also look outward at the whole system’s capabilities and capacity. The Tiered Response 
Pyramid is a tool for crisis managers to visualize a system-wide response to disasters. 
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Operational Limits
When large and complex disasters unfold, emergency management organizations face 
demands that swiftly surpass their response capacity. This incredible strain has been 
observed during natural disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy or terrorist attacks 
like those which occurred on September 11, 2001. These “catastrophic disasters” are 
defined by the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework as an 
event that “results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale and/or 
government function.”1 These events are not only noteworthy for the extreme impact, but 
also for the novelty and complexity of the response required. In order to respond effectively, 
organizations must increase their capacity or surge to manage large-scale events.2  
The ability of an organization to surge successfully requires response capacity to withstand 
the initial shock, as well as to handle the cumulative stress of an extended crisis response.3 
Louise Comfort, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, uses engineering “fragility 
curves” to illustrate this point. 4 Buildings and bridges are designed using “fragility curves” 
to determine the cumulative stress that a structure can withstand before failing. The World 
Trade Center was designed to withstand a plane crashing into the building, but was not 
engineered to withstand the stress of fast-spreading fires that significantly weaken structural 
steel members to the point of collapse.5 
Failures of crisis responses to large scale disasters are often caused by similar compounding 
of different types of stress. A congressional bipartisan committee found that resources 
are generally adequate for most disasters, however, catastrophic disasters like Hurricane 
Katrina overwhelmed emergency management response providers, illustrating breaking 
points in local, state and federal government response and highlighting the need for a more 
flexible and adaptive fragility curve for extreme events.6 
The potential stressors or threats that could cause a crisis response fragility curve to fail will 
continue to expand as the scope of potential threats and hazards to which crisis managers 
must be prepared to address grows. New threats play an important role in expanding 
the extreme events risk landscape. Events such as 9/11, the London 7/7 transit bombings, 
Mumbai hotel attacks, Kenya’s Westgate Mall, Paris and Orlando active shooters and Ukraine 
cyber-attacks illustrate the potential threats of geopolitical terrorism. Additionally, natural 
disasters have increased globally since the 1970s, showing a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 3.1% with several large scale disasters making headlines worldwide.7 These trends, 
along with public expectation that government will be able to respond effectively to more 
types of events, will increase the pressure for crisis managers to change their fragility curves 
so they are less vulnerable to failure. Similar to the military, a crisis manager’s “ability to adapt 
will be critical in a world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of 
our new security environment.”8 
While buildings and bridges can have their “fragility curves” altered by using new stronger 
materials or differing designs (e.g., the new One World Trade Center in NYC), crisis response 
fragility curves can also be altered by changing capabilities, capacity and delivery to increase 
resiliency or decrease the potential for the crisis response to fail. In fact, the dynamic and 
unpredictable threat environment of disasters necessitates that leaders constantly evaluate 
the effectiveness of their organizational structure and response capacity.9
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In examining what are the operational limits or breaking points along a response fragility 
curve, two important points of analysis for organizations to consider are highlighted. This 
evaluation, according to Yaneer Bar-Yan, must consider the scale and complexity of the 
incident. Large scale events will require more capacity, while complex events entail more 
capabilities.10 Extreme events are both large and complex, which requires both specialized 
skills and a surge of resources. But how can organizations further develop capability and 
capacity to withstand greater amounts of stress? In other words, how can an organization 
change their “fragility curve” for various crises?  
To begin to answer these questions, crisis managers need to be able to compare potential 
demands to operational limitations. The Department of Homeland Security, in the Threat 
and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, recommends understanding operational 
needs and limits by defining desired outcomes, capability targets and resources to manage 
a scenario. For example, a scenario could be what is needed to “evacuate 20,000 people over 
a 3 square mile area within 3 hours prior to the incident.”11 In order to understand the various 
operational needs, crisis managers are best served by classifying the response on three 
levels:
•	 Capability—What can organizations do?
•	 Capacity—How many resources are available?
•	 Delivery—When will these resources arrive?12
Super-Storm Sandy illustrates why crisis managers need to evaluate response across all 
three dimensions. The destructive wind and storm surge caused the loss of electric service 
to millions of people on the East Coast.13 Electrical power companies had the capability to 
restore power, but lacked the capacity locally and regionally to manage such a wide spread 
outage. Utility resources from the West Coast were brought in to meet the capacity needed 
to restore power, which changed the delivery timing. It took time to move these additional 
resources into the disaster area. To understand why a response succeeds or fails one must 
evaluate all three elements. These operational limits are important to consider for any 
response activities, such as search and rescue or hazardous material spills. 
In order to avoid potential failure points or response chain disruption, crisis leaders need a 
deep understanding of the evolving risk environment to compare their response abilities to 
the demands of potential crises. Leaders use intelligence briefings and scenario planning 
to increase their understanding of the risks. However, the potential risks won’t be clear cut 
because “crises are characterized by the absence of obvious solutions, the scarcity of reliable 
information when it is needed, and the lack of time to reflect on and debate alternative 
courses of action.”14 Thus, surge capability and capacity must be built with a degree of 
flexibility in mind that allows for uncertainty in the response requirements. In order to 
withstand the demands of extreme events, crisis managers need to strengthen response 
systems by leveraging an approach that provides adaptive and cost effective solutions. 
Identifying where an organization’s response chain breakdowns might occur is a critical 
part of planning and requires crisis managers to determine their response needs. Such 
knowledge then can be used to build capacity to withstand additional stress before failing. 
Understanding these limitations at the outset provides crisis managers with the opportunity 
to redesign capabilities and capacity that can better withstand the cumulative stress of 
extreme events.  
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Figure 1: Tiered Response Triangle Model
To address the expanding response needs, as well as economic realities, first responder 
organizations have leveraged a tiered response approach to identify capability and 
capacity needs. This tiered organization-centered approach for terrorism and emergency 
preparedness was first proposed by the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) in their 2004 
Strategic Plan.15 Since then, tiered response has become a guiding principle for Homeland 
Security.16 The Tiered Response Model divides mission responsibilities into layered groupings 
with each subsequent layer containing resources trained incrementally to a higher response 
capability.17 Thus, a tiered response model is shaped as a triangle; where many more people 
are trained with basic-level skills and provide support for those with specialized skills 
allowing the organization to boost overall capacity. The vertical axis represents an increase 
in capability, while the horizontal axis indicates greater capacity.
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Figure 2: FDNY Hazardous Material Tiered Response
Decontamination of a civilian at a hazardous material incident illustrates how a multi-tiered 
response works (see figure 2). The entire FDNY has been trained to the operational level 
for hazardous material response which provides basic coverage throughout the city. The 
operational tier is likely to arrive first to initiate lifesaving efforts. This is followed by several 
technician tiers such as HazMat Tech units for rapid rescue, Decontamination Engines to 
clean the victims and HazMat ambulances to provide medical care and transport to those 
injured. This response is then reinforced by the highly trained specialist level. The tiered 
response allows FDNY to increase capacity and speed by integrating each tier into a single 
response matrix. In National Response Framework, the Department of Homeland Security 
articulates that when federal resources are needed it also provides a similar “tiered level of 
support.”18
The tiered response model was adopted by many crisis managers because it creates 
operational and economic efficiencies. It is cost prohibitive to train everyone to the specialist 
level. Even if funding were available, many essential roles needed in a hazardous material 
response or other responses do not require specialist skills. Instead, a variety of units, 
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with incremental proficiencies can establish an incident response that is highly effective, 
economically efficient and sustainable.19 This tiered response model applies most often 
to a single organization’s response skills and/or resources. It is applied sometimes across 
organizations sharing geographic proximity and/or common funding by emergency managers. 
However, each organization response is structured mostly around their capabilities.
Modifying the Tiered Response Triangle
There are limitations, however, in the tiered response model when events occur outside the 
normal routines, such as those requiring a different mix of capabilities, additional capacity 
or faster delivery of resources.  These inadequacies can come from what was excluded in the 
initial planning phase or can evolve over time based on changing conditions. For example, 
in the latter case, as the number of fires decreased, the fire service has taken on more and 
more emergency medical roles to meet the evolving medical needs of an aging population. 
Regarding the former, initial planning can fail when crisis managers only consider the routine 
level of staffing for the tiers rather than taking into account peak demand. A few simple 
modifications or updates to the existing tiered response triangle could address these issues 
and increase flexibility and effectiveness within an organization.
Rebalancing is the redistribution of resources from one tier to another to meet the changing 
needs. For example, New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) Emergency Service Units 
(ESU) are specially trained SWAT teams that have a finite capacity to protect the city against 
multiple terrorist attacks. To supplement these teams, NYPD created a technician level 
tier by moving officers from patrol into several heavy weapons teams (Strategic Response 
Groups). By doing this, NYPD rebalanced their tiered response triangle by subdividing a tier 
to increase protection without hiring new officers. 
Two common rebalancing approaches are: 1) altering the relative size of existing tiers by 
moving resources between the tiers or 2) adding / subdividing tiers by creating a new tier with 
its own unique skills. After 9/11, FDNY rebalanced its Hazardous Material Tiered Response 
Model as illustrated in Figure 2 by increasing the number of HazMat Tech II Units (from 7 to 
12), HazMat Ambulances (from 10 to 39) and Chemical Protection Clothing Companies (from 
10 to 29), as well as adding two additional tiers of HazMat Tech I Units and Decontamination 
Engines, each with 25 units.20 
Not only can rebalancing impact capability and capacity, but it can significantly impact 
delivery. Having more people geographically dispersed with particular skills increases the 
speed with which resources can reach an incident. It is important to regularly re-access 
and rebalance according to the evolving risk landscape. Rebalancing can mean additional 
cost for extra training and equipment. However, there are considerable cost savings if 
overall staffing remains the same. When economically feasible, using the tiered response 
model to rebalance is a good way to update and enhance an organization’s overall response 
capabilities, capacity and delivery. 
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Figure 3: Rebalancing Tiers to Enhance Capability
For larger-scale incidents, organizations often are not able to address the response needs by 
just rebalancing their tiered response model. Daily tiered capacity is outpaced by response 
needs in a crisis. For these incidents, organizations should examine how their tiered response 
model can be expanded to meet these needs. For example, how would an organization 
surge to meet the effects of a powerful tornado that trapped many people in the collapsed 
buildings? In this case, crisis managers would want to expand their capacity at each tier as 
opposed to rebalancing across tiers.
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Figure 4: Recalling Personnel to Expand Tiered Response for Surge Capacity
Expanding a tiered response model—without permanently hiring more people—requires 
bringing into work those members who are off-duty to supplement the response. This 
is accomplished through a recall policy that allows an organization to increase response 
capacity by recalling groups of off-duty people within one or more tiers, thus expanding the 
tiered response outward. Recalling allows an organization to add to the number of trained 
people on-duty during a particular incident, taking advantage of their specialized training 
and experience. 
One element that often needs to be considered ahead of time in a recall is the availability of 
extra equipment. For example, if a response organization plans to recall members skilled in 
rescue techniques, they will need to have additional rescue equipment available for these 
individuals to perform their roles. This can be accomplished by having fully functional spare 
equipment or by repurposing equipment. During the Northeast Blackout on August 14, 
2003, FDNY added 25 Rapid Response Vehicles by repurposing hazardous material support 
trucks, each with two firefighters to respond to calls of people trapped in elevators.
Recall policies can be effective in expanding capacity. However, using total recall policies 
to bring in all off-duty personnel has significant limitations in that it creates a surge that is 
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sustainable for only 12 to 24 hours because there is no one to relieve the people on duty. On 
the other hand, a partial recall reduces the initial surge capacity, but allows for operations 
to continue for an extended period. Generally, to operate 24 hours / 7 days a week, 25% 
of a work force is on duty at any one time with 75% off duty. To create a sustainable surge, 
an organization can pull in an additional 25% of personnel, which doubles the number of 
people on-duty; the remaining 50% of off-duty members are held in abeyance and will be 
used to relieve of the on-duty crew (switching every 12 hours).
The ability to recall personnel and maintain uninterrupted services is referred to as a 
sustainable recall. Organizations that do not have 24/7 responsibility can often expand 
their tiered model with a total recall because natural rest periods exist. Without adequate 
rest, operating personnel will quickly become ineffective and burn out. Based on particular 
incident needs, agency leaders can adjust the resources at the organizational level to have a 
tiered response model that is balanced and sized appropriately to address the crisis. 
Rebalancing and recalling are useful modifications that address some gaps created in 
the current tiered response model, especially around evolving crisis response needs and 
addressing moderate capacity shortages. However, the crisis response required for many 
catastrophic events – from Hurricane Andrew (1992) to Super Storm Sandy (2012) – could 
not have been addressed by a single organization rebalancing or recalling; the response 
to such events requires multiple organizations or a system-wide approach. In addition, 
the organization-centric approach fails to address cost issues associated with overlapping 
resource investments and those associated with effectively identifying neglected resource 
needs.  Thus, considering a system-wide vs. organization-centric approach in the planning 
stages could help identify the capabilities, capacity and delivery these organizations will 
collectively provide to the response effort. 
Tiered Response Pyramid
In preparing for these extreme events, it is important to view the overall response, not as 
many individual organizations each with their own tiered response model, but rather as 
one Tiered Response System created through inter-agency collaboration and coordination. 
Emergency management organizations that coordinate municipal or regional response have 
emphasized this concept of multiple agency response.  However, this shift in optimizing from 
a single organization’s response to a multi-organizational response can be confusing when 
the same triangle diagram is used for planning within a single organization and multiple 
organizations. The tiered response triangle does not create a way to plan for resources 
at the system level across organizations with varying capabilities or delivery. To support 
the system-wide approach, the two-dimensional Tiered Response Triangle is reshaped 
into a three-dimensional Tiered Response Pyramid, which can incorporate other groups. 
Establishing a system-wide approach allows crisis managers to capture important depth at 
the tier level. The reshaping of the triangle into a pyramid helps a crisis manager to consider 
the holistic response, leveraging local, regional, non- governmental organizations (NGO), 
the private sector, volunteers, as well as other national and international assets to increase 
surge capacity, capabilities and delivery.
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Figure 5: Tiered Response Pyramid Illustrates Increased Capability & Surge Capacity
Moving towards a Tiered Response Pyramid allows organizations to consider not only their 
own core competencies, but also other agencies’ crisis mitigation capabilities and capacity. 
Using the tiered response pyramid, Incident Commanders and Emergency Operation 
Centers can better visualize the system-wide response capabilities and anticipate response 
time as additional capabilities requested are often more specialized and drawn from farther 
away. When done as part of pre-incident analysis, it drives crisis managers to think more 
systematically about response needs and resources at the system level across capabilities, 
capacity, and delivery.
This system-wide approach is not entirely new; it has been used in emergency management 
planning.  However, the scope has remained limited. For example, acknowledging that future 
large-scale incidents similar to Super Storm Sandy require more surge capacity than is locally 
available, New York City’s FDNY and Office of Emergency Management (OEM) engaged with 
the National Guard in a tiered system-wide solution. NYC developed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) for the New York State National Guard to respond during disasters. 
The MOU defines three key elements: 1) the requesting process, 2) a list of National Guard 
capabilities, the amount of resources needed, and how long it will take to deliver the assets, 
and 3) how to integrate the National Guard into the incident management systems.21 The 
National Guard is now depicted as part of the surge capacity in New York City’s Tiered 
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Response Pyramid. This system-wide approach with the National Guard can also be used 
by law enforcement to increase security across a geographical area. The Tiered Response 
Pyramid is not just about organizations making agreements with each other, but it is rather 
about shifting the mindset of planning to system-wide approach.
The national urban search and rescue program is an example of this coordination and 
management mindset at the system-wide level. Several fire departments nationally have 
heavy rescue and medical rescue capabilities that perform local search and rescue activities, 
as well as national activities when demand exceeds local capacity. These smaller response 
groups are combined to form regional Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, which are 
part of the national USAR program under FEMA.22 If a disaster requires more than a local and 
state response, FEMA will provide a national response, which occurred on 9/11 when eight 
USAR teams were sent to World Trade Center and four deployed at the Pentagon.23 Surge 
capacity is further increased by engaging international USAR teams, which was demonstrated 
with the international response to Haiti after the earthquakes. This system-wide response 
has been effectively used for years by USAR teams; however, it remains largely limited to 
specialized teams, rather than being expanded to many other first responder activities.
The Tiered Response Pyramid not only allows communities to increase capacity, but it also 
makes available specialized capabilities that local communities would generally not have 
as part of their response, such as radiological experts in case of a radiological or nuclear 
incident. Similar scientific experts in bio-terrorism or pandemics are also useful to include 
in a system-wide approach. Organizations at the local, state, tribal and federal government 
can use the tiered response pyramid to address identified gaps. The system-wide approach 
not only allows communities to leverage resources; it also allows people who work in these 
specialized groups to gain experience and knowledge that they would not have if they only 
served a local community.
A tiered response system recognizes at the outset the reality that no one agency or 
jurisdiction has enough resources for extreme events. By shifting to a three-dimensional 
tiered response pyramid, crisis managers create greater surge capacity, while making 
resource sharing more commonplace. A system-wide approach fills capability and capacity 
needs within individual organizations by closely linking the system together. The Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a national mutual aid agreement that enables 
states to share resources, which could be used to create a tiered response system solution.24 
This is assisted by national resource typing, which provides an understanding of equipment 
and competencies. These programs provide an easier way for organizations to start shifting 
from a tiered response triangle to a tiered response pyramid. 
Moving to a tiered response pyramid multiplies the number of response options as many 
more resources combinations can be tapped allowing communities to reshape their 
capacity, capabilities and delivery. Crisis managers who use the tiered response pyramid 
as an analytical tool will be better able to visualize their preparedness strategies and build 
more resilient responses. State and regional homeland security agencies along with regional 
FEMA offices can help map local communities’ response capabilities, as well as regional and 
national capacity. The tiered response pyramid allows organizations to rebalance capabilities 
for greater day-to-day operational efficiency, while reshaping the organization’s overall 
capacity, capabilities and delivery to handle large-scale incidents. 
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Implementing Tiered Response Pyramid
When transitioning to a tiered response pyramid, it is important to consider what capabilities 
are necessary, how much is required (capacity), and when these resources are needed 
(delivery) to determine who might be best suited to own and share a particular capability. In 
2013, the American Heart Association reported 359,400 out of hospital cardiac arrests. Even 
with all the advances in emergency medical services (EMS), the survival rate was a mere 
9.5%.25 Some crisis managers have started to look at problem not just from an organizational 
framework, but from a system-wide perceptive. Cities such as Seattle have dramatically 
increased the survival rate from heart attacks to 62% using a system-wide approach.26 
They focused on training citizens in cardio pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), giving 911-phone 
instruction on CPR to callers, and providing automatic external defibrillators (AED) in many 
locations, so someone going into cardiac arrest can receive care quickly by educated citizens 
until the paramedics arrive. The paramedics then provide more specialized medical care, 
as well as transport to the hospital where the person receives definitive medical care. Each 
part of this response sequence or response chain is an integral part of an effective response 
and highlights how a system-wide response can expand capabilities, capacity and delivery. 
Varying risk probabilities across communities and geographic areas can suggest where it 
makes sense to fund these resources. For example, The Department of Homeland Security 
has funded response capabilities to address terrorism risks New York City faces, but 
those funds end up enhancing the surge capacity more broadly. During recent floods and 
snowstorms in upstate New York, FDNY sent rescue and incident management teams as a 
regional asset. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a 300 person firefighting team from 
FDNY was sent to New Orleans to assist the New Orleans’ Fire Department. 
Implementing a tiered response pyramid requires more initial collaboration and coordination 
than the tiered response triangle. However, the results for these efforts are an expanded 
ability to respond to potential crises. To transition to the tiered response system, crisis 
managers need to 1) perform a needs assessment, 2) conduct a tiered response analysis, 
and 3) apply the three “R’s” of the tiered response pyramid— rebalance, recall, and reshape.
A crisis response needs assessment requires crisis managers to start by determining potential 
threats their communities could experience. Scenario planning can be helpful in converting 
threats to response requirements. Scenarios allow one to imagine what could be impacted. 
Peter Schwartz describes using scenarios as a tool to help decision-makers deal with 
uncertainty by considering alternative courses of action.27 
In developing this initial list of threats, it is important to consider common or routine 
threats, as well as threats posed by extreme events. Howitt and Leonard describe extreme 
events or novel events as unfamiliar events occurring at an unprecedented scale that 
outstrips available resources, making routine responses inadequate and at times even 
counterproductive.28 Due to the wide range of novel events, crisis managers will want to 
make sure to invest adequate time in brainstorming around what could happen, yet not to 
be so hubristic to think they can predict all scenarios. Crisis managers also might find using 
existing tools and methodologies, such as those laid out in Homeland Security’s Threat and 
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide (THIRA), helpful in creating a full list of threats 
and prioritizing those threats that are more likely to happen. One of those threats that rise 
to the top of the list is an active shooter incident.  
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Once threats have been identified, crisis managers need to do an analysis of tiered response 
capabilities, capacity, and delivery for addressing each potential incident. Crisis managers 
should create a grid that lists all the capabilities needs mapped against the capacity numbers 
and delivery times. For example, an active shooter incident requires a dual mission approach 
of law enforcement engaging the shooter to stop the killing and emergency medical personnel 
quickly providing care for the injured to stop the dying (see Figure 6). From this analysis, 
a list of identified capabilities needs is created by mapping the crisis response skills (e.g., 
SWAT teams to engage the shooters, force protection for medical personnel, medical rescue 
task force to control bleeding and extract victims, trauma doctors and nurses to operate) 
and equipment requirements (e.g., long guns, ballistic protection, tourniquets, hemostatic 
clotting agents, trauma center supplies) for this threat. Then these capabilities are tagged 
























Figure 6: Tiered Response Pyramid Illustrates a Dual Mission Response to Active Shooter 
Incidents
Within crisis management, capacity can be tricky since actual demand for capabilities varies 
significantly. To account for the daily and surge demands, we recommend each capability 
be assigned with at least three levels of capacity – routine capacity, sustainable capacity and 
maximum capacity. These numbers represent the total people or resources required for 
various crisis responses. It is important to also note when resources can arrive because the 
timing is just as important as capability and capacity. For example, quickly giving medical 
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treatment to stop the bleeding of someone who is injured in a terrorist attack provides for the 
greatest chance of survival. This was seen at the Boston Marathon Bombing when seriously 
injured patients received lifesaving care at the scene and then were rapidly transported to 
hospitals for surgery.29  
Based on the identified gaps, crisis managers can build robust tiered response system-wide 
requirements, which can then become a tiered response pyramid by applying the three 
“R’s” of the tiered response pyramid. To fill in the tiered response pyramid, the crisis manager 
should consider multiple potential solutions, as well as multiple partners to close the gaps. 
Crisis managers have significantly more options available for them with the pyramid than 
with the triangle. They can consider internal modifications (rebalancing and recall), as well as 
external partnerships (reshaping). As potential partnerships are identified, it is important to 
consider which control, funding, and deployment models make the most sense for various 
capabilities. 
The tiered response pyramid reframes crisis response activities from the organizational 
level to the system level. It offers a way to visualize crisis management that is no longer 
insular, but engages other crisis managers in building partnerships. The interconnectedness 
required to develop a tiered response pyramid is the underlying basis for disaster planning 
and response.  
Making It Work
This system-wide tiered response proved its value on October 23, 2014, when Craig Spenser, 
a doctor who treated patients in Western Africa with the group Doctors without Borders, 
became ill with Ebola and had to be rushed to Bellevue Hospital in New York City by 
ambulance. Multiple organizations mobilized by deploying a version of the tiered response 
pyramid for patient care and disease mitigation. FDNY dispatched a HazMat Chief, HazMat 
Ambulances and HazMat Tech Units to the doctor’s residence and used personal protective 
equipment originally bought for chemical terrorism as bio protections to transport the 
patient by ambulance to the hospital. The patient was then handed off to the hospital staff 
in bio protective gear and within a short period of time was receiving treatment that saved 
his life. The system-wide tiered response contained this potentially deadly epidemic and 
proper decontamination procedures ensured the safety of all emergency responders. The 
structure of the pyramid allowed seamless adaptation between first responders and hospital. 
This Ebola case demonstrated the flexibility of the tiered response system to leverage core 
competencies and adapt to novelty.
Making the tiered response pyramid work requires crisis managers to think about the 
entire response system’s capability, capacity and delivery. Peter Senge defines this as 
“system thinking,” which allows one to see the underlying structures of complexity and 
the interrelationships of the system parts.30 Crisis managers can apply system thinking to 
preparedness and response by looking at the whole response pyramid. Without system 
thinking, the Ebola response would have been fragmented and unable to adapt, increasing 
the potential of spreading this dangerous disease. 
When confronted with extreme events, success depends on not just having a list of 
capabilities, but a flexible response system, which crisis managers can adapt for new crises. 
It is about being able to recognize and respond to changing patterns by altering the system’s 
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behavior.31 Response agility is composed of balanced resources in each tier and the ability 
to adapt to scale, complexity and novelty. Former four star General, Stanley McChrystal 
argues that robustness is achieved by strengthening parts of the system, while resilience 
is the results of linking elements that allow resources to reconfigure or adapt to a changing 
environment.32 The tiered response pyramid is a tool that allows crisis managers to build 
robust and resilient response systems by strengthening the tiers and reconfiguring the shape 
of their response fragility curve to a system-wide network for managing major disasters.
When US Airways, Flight 1549 (Miracle in the Hudson) did an emergency landing in the icy cold 
waters of the Hudson River, all 155 passengers and crew were rescued because of an agile 
tiered response system that emerged as part of collective innovation. Together, New York 
Waterways’ Ferries, FDNY Fireboats, U.S. Coast Guard small boats and NYPD Helicopters 
remained flexible and aligned their agencies’ core skills to improvise on their water rescue 
operations for an incident they had not had specifically trained for or discussed collectively. 
The system-wide tiered response formalizes practices that have started to evolve both at 
the local and national levels. By providing a standardized structure, the pyramid offers crisis 
managers a common lexicon and an approach to visualize multiple response options that 
leverage each other’s resources and create a more resilient response system. The system-
wide tiered response pyramid allows leaders to customize their organizational tiers and 
innovate collectively in order to be better prepared for novel and complex events. The 
tiered response pyramid gives crisis managers the ability to rebalance and expand, as well 
as reshape their response to adapt to an ever changing world of emergencies and disasters 
by changing the shape of their response fragility curve.
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Abstract
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) lacks a coherent historical record. Often 
this results in the agency repeating the mistakes of its past. By creating a comprehensive 
public record of FEMA and national emergency management efforts over the last half 
century, FEMA can break its cycle of repeating past failures and rediscover successes that 
were otherwise lost to current emergency management leadership.
Suggested Citation
Lucie, H. Quinton “What Comes Around, Goes Around (and Around and Around): Reviving 
the Lost History of FEMA and its Importance to Future Disasters.” Homeland Security Affairs 
12, Article 6 (December 2016).  https://www.hsaj.org/articles/13214
Introduction
In January 2014, government officials and citizens began to reflect on two emergency 
programs the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) put into place after Hurricane 
Sandy in New York. The Rapid Repairs and the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power 
(STEP) programs were an innovative way for FEMA to use its authorities, normally limited to 
providing temporary housing, to make minor repairs to the homes of disaster survivors.1 
Instead of spending millions more to place these families in hotel rooms, rental resources or 
other temporary housing, FEMA could allow survivors to stay in their homes, saving millions 
of dollars and reducing the angst of those forced to leave their communities behind.
However, like any government program created from scratch in the midst of a disaster, it 
suffered from significant problems, inefficiencies, and poor implementation. If only the 
Federal Coordinating Officer for FEMA and his state and local government counterparts did 
not have to create and deliver these programs on the fly. It turns out they did not. These 
programs had already been delivered to the public almost exactly 40 years earlier.
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May 11-12, 1973 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Disaster Relief of the 
Committee On Public Works, United States Senate, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
Senator Burdick. I believe that for the first time in any major disaster OEP [Office of 
Emergency Preparedness] used a so-called minirepair approach whereby damaged homes 
were repaired or restored directly by your agency or by the corps to make them inhabitable. 
What can you tell us about the way you observed the minirepair program?
***
Mr. Carney. Basic theory of it was, sir, that if we made these minimal repairs on a house 
we, could keep the people in their homes. The Governor and I talked about this. He agreed 
that this was the desirable thing to do, to keep the people in their homes. What this would 
do, of course, is cut down on the necessity for trailers. The outside cost of this averaged 
out about $3,000. So you were comparing three thousand on minirepair against 7,000 
or 8,000 plus to put a person in a trailer park. So it was in lieu of temporary housing. I 
would say this, that the minirepair program is the program that enabled us to finish our 
temporary housing in September. It made the difference.
Senator Burdick. Do you know how many units were involved in that program?
Mr. Carney. It was a $9 million program, and 2,780 houses were repaired.
FEMA’S Missing History
The parallels of the 1972 Minirepair and 2012 Rapid Repair/STEP Programs were completely 
unintentional, right down to their names. Nearly 40 years after Hurricane Agnes, FEMA had 
rolled out a “model” program that had already been tested and executed nearly 40 years 
ago. What happened in those 40 years? Why was FEMA, in 2012, using a pilot process to 
run a program that had been around since 1972? The reason is that FEMA has no historical 
record of the delivery of its programs or its legislative and policy origins over the 66 years of 
modern federal disaster relief, nor has FEMA developed a way of delivering this information 
to senior leadership for practical implementation. In short, FEMA finds itself in decade-long 
loops, repeating the successes and failures of its leaders from decades before.
The amount of history, even recent history and policy development, that has been lost 
for consumption can be illustrated from my search for an original copy of the first Federal 
Response Plan (FRP). For nearly two years, I scrounged the Internet and walked the halls 
of FEMA headquarters looking for a copy of the FRP, the forerunner of today’s National 
Response Framework. Issued in 1992, not a single copy could be found anywhere.  I thought 
my last chance would be to take leave and make a trip to FEMA’s Emergency Management 
Institute (EMI) to search its aging U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) library to see if a version of 
the original FRP could be found.2 Using their search tool, I discovered later that there were 
two copies. 3 However, at the time, my only option for accessing the document was a day off 
work and a 150-mile round trip.
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Then, by happenstance, I found a link on the Internet.4  It turns out the only publically available 
digitized copy of the original FRP can be found on a server belonging to the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de Honduras.5 
The lack of effective historical archives covering the  the historical underpinnings of FEMA 
and Emergency Management stands  in stark contrast to the situation at my previous 
government employer. I vividly remember spending a whole Saturday of one of my precious 
liberty weekends from The Basic School in 1999, drifting through the stacks of the recently 
built United States Marine Corps Research Library at Quantico and its 150,000 volumes. 
This library, part of the larger Library of the Marine Corps, is a small part of an entire 
Marine Corps command, led by a Major General, devoted to educational transformation, 
skill development, career learning, feedback, and implementation.6 By comparison, FEMA 
Headquarters, separated from the USFA library at EMI by a 74 mile drive, is nearly completely 
cut off from its historical base of Emergency Management knowledge. The situation is even 
worse for its 10 Regional Headquarters and litany of Joint Field Offices. The bare bones of 
FEMAs virtual library is illustrated by the paucity of historical materials it makes available.7
The Marine Corps, founded 204 years before FEMA, clearly had a head start on preserving 
its historical record, but the gulf between the nation’s second smallest military service8 and 
FEMA is not just explained by a calendar. While there are probably many reasons for the 
disparity, two reasons come readily to mind. First, the Marine Corps makes its history a 
seminal force in its ethos, which was done partly to make the Marine Corps different from 
its sister services since many of its capabilities can be replicated by the others. This means 
that every Marine remembers that the Corps  was founded (in a tavern) on November 10, 
1775, and  likely retains hazy memories of the litany of battles from Bladensburg to Fallujah 
that are read at every Mess Night. But beyond the cultural and peer bonding aspects, there 
is a practical side to this. 
For over 70 years, the basic Marine infantry squad has featured 13 Marines led by a sergeant. 
One can trace a direct line between the Fleet Marine Force Manual MCWP 3-11.2, Marine 
Rifle Squad, from 20029 and similar publications from the end of World War II10, which can 
be easily found in the Library of the Marine Corps.11 The lessons learned decades or even a 
century ago are not just remembered; they directly inform even the most basic functions 
of today’s Marine Corps. This simple example shows  how the proliferation and ready 
availability of historical literature to the public can accelerate the diffusion of knowledge 
outside traditional structures. 
For instance, when I wanted to read a pertinent excerpt from the 1945 rifle squad manual 
cited above, there was not a digitized copy in the library. However I could find exactly 
what I wanted to know on a personal website which had posted portions of it.12 In a world 
increasingly affected by ideas and knowledge from outside traditional mainstream sources 
of academia and subject matter experts, the creation and dissemination of histories and 
reports allows the public to both learn and participate in shaping the future of a discipline 
while preserving the lessons of the past.
The second advantage of having a robust archive is the traditional professional collection of 
military histories. One of the older and most prominent examples is the massive Post-Civil 
War collection entitled The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies.13 This group of records is so detailed that with a quick search 
I can find a mention of my great-great grandfather, Abel T. Sweet, leading a Union infantry 
battalion on an expedition that included the burning of the Virginia Military Institute.14 This 
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example illustrates what can happen when there is common interest between Congress and 
a Federal agency to devote the necessary resources to preserve and disseminate historically 
priceless and important government records and histories. It also begs the question of 
why, with so many former military members serving within FEMA, there has been so little 
recognition of the value of archiving up until this point.
This does not mean that FEMA lacks the infrastructure to relearn its past. The National 
Training and Education Division, housed within the National Preparedness Directorate, is 
tailor-made for this mission, encompassing the Center for Domestic Preparedness, EMI, 
the National Training and Education Division (NTED) and the Naval Postgraduate School 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security (for which I wrote my thesis that led me on 
the search for the FRP). The (re)creation of FEMA’s historical record and delivery to leaders 
of the Emergency Management enterprise, including senior leaders from both inside and 
outside of government, could easily fall within the mission of EMI, NTED or EMI’s Emergency 
Management Higher Education Program. 
Interestingly, in its earliest days FEMA did have a somewhat robust historical program. Buried 
within the link found in the footnote is one of the most important historical legacies given to 
early FEMA, A Legislative History of Federal Disaster Relief, 1950–1974. Hand typed, it reflects the 
doggedness and thoroughness of a man who waited 44 years for the University of Chicago 
finally to accept his doctoral thesis and would see his obituary published in both the New 
York Times and Washington Post.15 Completed in 1983, it was one of at least two monographs 
that linked the nascent FEMA to its predecessor agencies. The other, American Civil Defense, 
1945–1984: The Evolution of Programs and Policies, was published in 1985. Since 1985, a third 
document, Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective, also 
stands with these two. However, other than a word document entitled  Historical Overview of 
U.S. Emergency Management, prepared over a decade ago, essentially no other substantive 
historical records could be found within FEMA. Those that can be located are buried where 
only the curious or the bored can find them. 
With the exception of a 36-page DHS volume issued in 2006, Civil Defense and Homeland 
Security: A Short History of National Preparedness Efforts, it does not appear FEMA has issued 
a single comprehensive historical monograph or retrospective since the mid-1980s. To put 
this in perspective, if I want to read about my fellow  Marines in their fight at An-Nasiriyah, 
Iraq, I can find a 50-page official history on just that one battle alone.16
What are the Potential Benefits of 
Reclaiming FEMA’s History to the Agency 
and the Public?
If FEMA, DHS, and Congress did invest in a vigorous historical program at FEMA, what would 
be the benefits to the agency and taxpayers? As an answer, I can provide several examples 
beyond just the STEP Program.
In 2013, based upon research I had uncovered for my thesis,17 I published a blog post on 
how in the early 1980s FEMA attempted to create a deductible for disasters.18 A disaster 
deductible could provide an objective means to measure a state’s contribution to disaster 
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relief and more accurately capture the division of state and federal responsibilities for 
paying for disasters. The adoption of a deductible could also provide an incentive to focus on 
preparedness and mitigation efforts rather than the current federal disaster relief system, 
which places its primary focus on response and recovery. Completely lost to the agency, the 
disaster deductible concept has now been revived and was recently the subject of a FEMA 
Federal Register Notice.19 
My thesis also discusses the 1990s FRP concept of lead federal agencies. The idea that a lead 
federal agency, as overall coordinator of a federal response to a catastrophic event, could 
be picked from among the agencies with the most technical expertise, and be assigned 
legal and executive responsibility for the particular type of catastrophe, has also picked up 
traction within the executive branch in the last two years. 
There are two other areas of Federal disaster coordination that might also benefit from looking 
to FEMA’s past. Since at least 1980, FEMA has used the title of Disaster Recovery Manager 
(DRM) as a way to delegate authority during disasters from FEMA’s Regional Administrators to 
Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) who coordinate the Federal response to disasters under 
the Stafford Act. While the origins of the term are unclear, from an initial analysis it appears 
the DRM position may have been originally created to relieve Regional Administrators of the 
long term and onerous responsibility for FEMA’s Public Assistance Program. This is the FEMA 
program that provides billions to state, local, and tribal governments and other eligible grant 
recipients to reimburse them for damages related to disasters.
Over time, DRM authority somehow became a way to delegate Federal disaster coordination 
authority and the ability to direct other Federal agencies to respond to disasters and then 
to reimburse them. This is likely unnecessary as this authority extends directly from the 
President to the DHS Secretary to the FEMA Administrator. Most, if not all of the Regional 
Administrator’s disaster response and recovery-related authority is shared with the FEMA 
administrator Therefore the need for FCOs to seek DRM authority adds just another 
bureaucratic layer to FEMA’s disaster response efforts. 
Another area of Federal disaster response and coordination that could benefit from an 
enhanced archive is FEMA’s mission assignment program. Mission assignments are FEMA’s 
authority, delegated from the President, to direct Federal agencies to respond to disasters 
when they normally do not have the authority to respond. It also allows FEMA to reimburse 
those Federal agencies for their efforts. It may be the single most important tool FEMA has 
when responding to disasters. However, FEMA lacks any comprehensive mission assignment 
program. Instead, it has mainly focused on its technical delivery aspects while neglecting any 
sort of comprehensive policy or broader strategy encompassing training, policy, structured 
interagency coordination, and cross-coordination with national and state planning efforts. 
As a result, its regulations are outdated and it has no systemic way to supervise the issuance 
of mission assignments during disasters or to look at the broader policy questions on their 
use.
A thorough review of mission assignments, from their beginnings in the 1950’s through to 
the present, could be of particular value in addressing these shortfalls, which could include 
updating FEMA regulations, the substance of which predate the founding of the agency. For 
example, FEMA’s mission assignment regulations are so outdated, they make no mention of 
one of the two main types of assignments, those for Federal Operational Support (FOS) which 
were created in the early 1990’s after Hurricane Andrew. This review, including provisions 
of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) which include mission 
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assignments, could also inform potential significant policy changes.20 These changes could 
include updating   FEMA’s regulations to allow it to use mission assignments to direct and 
reimburse Federal agencies to respond to disasters even when they have their own authority 
and appropriations to do so. Another potential change could be using mission assignments 
to carry out FEMA’s Homeland Security Act authority rather than just the authority delegated 
to it under the Stafford Act by the President.
Returning to the original example of the Rapid Repair and STEP Programs, if the pilot rapid 
repair program of 1972 had become a longstanding Public Assistance Policy handed down 
to FEMA, or had been rediscovered in a review of its previous attempts at disaster relief 
innovation and program delivery, it might have made a significant contribution to the efficiency 
of FEMA’s response. Instead of waiting until two weeks after landfall, the Rapid Repair and 
STEP Programs could have been launched immediately after the size of the catastrophe was 
revealed. Moreover, these programs could have been exercised and reviewed for years prior 
to being used, likely leading to a far more coordinated rollout and efficient execution. These 
programs probably would also have provided great utility in Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina 
and a handful of other major disasters over the intervening years, potentially saving millions 
of dollars. The fact that FEMA leaders had no idea about the Hurricane Agnes Minirepair 
Program was not their failure; it was FEMA’s failure over the preceding 30 plus years to pass 
on its history and lessons learned to its latest team of leadership.
Beyond the development and rediscovery of programs lost, there could be one other major 
benefit to FEMA: inspiration. FEMA, at its core, is a boring organization. With a mission that 
is anything but boring, FEMA too often finds itself implementing the definition of boring; 
“dull and uninteresting” solutions to the problems it faces. Proof of this fundamental issue 
affecting FEMA is reflected in its latest Viewpoint results from 2015. The 2015 Viewpoint 
Survey, which helps measure the morale of Federal agencies, showed barely more than one 
quarter of FEMA’s employees believe innovation and creativity are rewarded. 
Making FEMA’s leaders and employees more familiar with their agency’s history and the 
programs delivered by it and its predecessors might inspire the next good idea. For rarely is 
innovation and creativity truly spontaneous, rather it often needs a spark. Reinvesting and 
teaching FEMA’s collective history might provide that spark.
What should FEMA do?
First, FEMA needs to invest in its USFA library at EMI. A thorough review needs to be 
conducted to ascertain whether it has the necessary acquisitions and research material 
to become the premier Emergency Management knowledge repository in the world. Any 
shortfalls or deficiencies should be identified and FEMA should provide a specific cost for 
both acquisitions and maintenance. However, given FEMA’s unique ability within the Federal 
Government to accept donations, it should also seek to acquire materials and books through 
less costly means. FEMA should also seek to partner with other libraries and academic 
institutions, which could lead to alternative ways to make these books and materials 
readily accessible to FEMA and other government employees, Emergency Management 
practitioners, academics and the general public.  These efforts should also include making a 
serious attempt at acquiring or making available materials from other nations to build up a 
body of comparative research.
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Second, FEMA must make the entirety of its original and government-produced materials 
available online. FEMA’s employees are scattered across the country, and many of them are 
reservists who only have substantive and continuing contact with FEMA upon deployment. 
FEMA Headquarters is situated too far away to make easy use of its physical library, and 
as far as I know, there are no plans to move it to St. Elizabeths in the next decade. This 
might not make sense anyway, as EMI’s mission already makes it a worthwhile home for the 
library. Digitizing these holdings would also be a leap forward in carrying out FEMA’s mission 
to support the Nation and the Whole Community by “leading and supporting the Nation in 
a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation.”21 These online resources would now make them freely 
available, at minimum effort, to emergency managers of every rank, cutting across traditional 
professional boundaries, academics and students, non-governmental organizations, think 
tanks, media, and the public with a goal of creating a spontaneous combustion of new ideas 
and practices.
Third, FEMA needs to embark on a serious effort to collect, synthesize, and disperse the 
lessons found in its history, particularly those related to disaster response and recovery. 
One approach would be the creation of a comprehensive disaster program book that would 
provide an overview of the programs provided by FEMA and its predecessor agencies to 
every declared disaster or emergency under the Disaster Relief Acts, and their successor, 
the Stafford Act. 
Fourth, the decade’s long struggle between All Hazards and Civil Defense also shares 
strong parallels to that between Emergency Management and Homeland Security. Congress 
originally created two parallel sets of authorities for disaster relief and Civil Defense in 
1950. Throughout the next four decades, Civil Defense and disaster relief, which became 
associated with a focus on “All Hazards”, competed for resources. Increasingly, state officials 
saw the utility of additional funding for their All Hazards responsibilities. At the same time, 
the enormous nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union increasingly made Civil Defense a fantasy 
and Governors and other officials pushed to allow Civil Defense funding and resources to 
be used for disaster relief also. It wasn’t until after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 that the wall 
between the two missions finally fell. 
The current struggle to balance the resources devoted to terrorism and other Homeland 
Security responsibilities with those devoted to disaster relief could be seen as the natural 
continuation of the historical tension between Civil Defense and All Hazards. A review of 
these issues might prove informative to FEMA and national leadership as FEMA expands 
the use of its Homeland Security Act authorities. It may also be fruitful for FEMA to conduct 
interviews with past leadership and employees, with a particular emphasis placed on those 
who served in its predecessor agencies in the 1960s and 1970s, and those who transitioned 
their responsibilities to FEMA throughout the 1980s.
Fifth, FEMA should build on the legislative history it already has through 1984 and create a 
second volume that goes through the present day. This could have a significant effect on any 
future efforts to update or revise the Stafford Act.22 
The Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for the President to mobilize the resources 
of the Federal Government to assist States in responding to and recovering from disasters. 
Created in 1988, the Stafford Act renamed and significantly revised the 1974 Disaster Relief 
Act, which in turn replaced the two other major disaster relief acts from 1950 and 1970. 
Congress provides a stand-alone fund, the Disaster Relief Fund, to carry out the activities 
authorized under the Act.
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Given that the current Stafford Act is a jigsaw puzzle of the compilation of these earlier major 
disaster relief acts, several other major laws, and the addition of the remnants of the Civil 
Defense Act, such a legislative history could be an exceptional resource open to policymakers, 
academics, and the public. One area particularly ripe for review is the historical evolution 
of the statutory authority for the President to provide direct federal assistance upon the 
issuance of a disaster declaration. For nearly 60 years, the original statutory language, much 
of which still remains in the Stafford Act, has been stitched together with various other 
additions and deletions across the decades. Even short of a statutory revision of these 
authorities, such a review could provide significant dividends and expansion of authority to 
the issuance of mission assignments by FEMA.
Sixth, FEMA needs to create two sets of executive leadership courses based on the 
exploration of its history. The first would be targeted at senior executives in FEMA, DHS, its 
partner agencies, and significant non-governmental partners. Similarly situated executives 
from other nations could also be invited. This course would provide an historical overview 
of FEMA as well as U.S. history and experience with Emergency Management, and could 
provide specific case studies of national successes and failures. With so many of these 
leaders arriving in these positions as a second career or from outside of FEMA, they have 
never had the opportunity to build upon the decades of study and practical experience 
found in FEMA’s history. 
The second set of courses would be targeted at FEMA, state and local Emergency 
Management program and emergency managers, and would be focused on the history of 
specific disaster relief programs. For instance, a course could be created just on the evolution 
of public assistance, as now delivered through the Stafford Act, with the express purpose of 
directly influencing future disaster relief policies, plans, and programs. Another course for 
planners might explore the history of policies and choices made during the Civil Defense era 
balancing evacuations with sheltering in place. These courses would fit well within FEMA’s 
recently created National Emergency Management Executive Academy, which serves a 
similar purpose but lacks a comprehensive historical, legislative legacy and policy course.23
Through these six recommendations, FEMA would have the opportunity to break its cycle 
of repeating the same successes and failures of its generations before. They could serve as 
both a way to discover the best (and poor) practices of the past and to provide inspiration 
to new ideas, programs, and efficiencies in the future. There is significant value to be mined 
from the history of FEMA. Sometimes one does not need to find an actual gold mine to make 
money; it may be buried in dusty archives and aging memories. Who knows what other 
discoveries await in FEMA’s past?
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Abstract
3-D printer technology will have negative consequences in the form of weapons that cannot 
be traced, illicit drug manufacture, sabotage, and intellectual property theft. This article 
poses the following questions. How will society be affected by these changes?  How will 
border security organizations accomplish their missions when illicit guns and drugs no 
longer have to be transferred across borders?  How might terrorists use their ability to hack 
design files to sabotage components built by 3-D printers?  This article will focus on what 
can be done to limit, through the use of technology, the sinister uses of the 3-D printer 
while still allowing for the positive benefits that this new technology will bring to humanity. 
The article is structured to describe briefly how 3-D printing technology functions, how the 
technology can be used to print objects with negative consequences to society, and how 
those consequences may be remediated.
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Introduction
The use of three-dimensional (3-D) printers is becoming more pervasive.1  Researchers are 
revealing new objects that can be created using 3-D printing technology at a rapid pace.2 
In addition to inexpensive home-hobbyist printers that are capable of printing a multi-shot 
automatic gun, very sophisticated 3-D printers capable of printing human organs or military-
grade weapons are in production.3  
The use of 3-D printing technology may revolutionize how Americans shop, how medicine 
is manufactured, and how weapons are made. The benefits associated with 3-D printing 
technology may have far-reaching impacts for all of humanity. The global economy will 
change positively as 3-D printing becomes more pervasive, altering where and how objects 
are manufactured, how they are shipped around the world, and how they are distributed. 
However, similar to the Manhattan Project and the first use of nuclear fission, 3-D printer 
technology will have negative consequences in the form of weapons that cannot be traced, 
illicit drug manufacturing, sabotage, and intellectual property theft.
This article will focus on what can be done to limit, through the use of technology, the 
sinister uses of the 3-D printer.   The article is structured to describe briefly how 3-D printing 
technology functions, how the technology can be used to print objects with negative 
consequences to society, how policy may be impacted, and how those consequences may 
be remediated.
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A Brief Review of 3-D Printing Technology
“Computer: tea, Earl Grey, hot.” With those words, fictional character Jean-Luc Picard 
introduced the concept of the Replicator on television’s “Star Trek: The Next Generation” 
in 1987.  Today, modern 3-D printing technology is beginning to realize the concept first 
envisioned by science fiction.
3-D printing, or additive manufacturing as it is also known,4 refers to the production of 
a three-dimensional object through the layer-by-layer addition of material according to a 
geometric computer model.5 The original patents for the technology date back to the late 
1980s with numerous follow-on patents added as new materials and techniques were 
developed.  3-D printing is different than other forms of manufacturing that require either 
the removal or alteration, e.g., molding or extruding, of material to produce a completed 
object.6
An example of how 3-D printing creates an assembled product as opposed to a set of parts 
that still require assembly was described by McNulty, Arnas, and Campbell in Defense 
Horizons: 
Instead of using cutting tools to machine desired shapes from blocks of metal and then 
assembling those parts into a completed tool, a 3-D printer could build a crescent wrench 
by adding a layer of material and stacking another layer on top of that one and fusing 
them together, repeating the process until the wrench is complete.  Additionally, since the 
wrench is not assembled from preexisting parts, it would be a complete entity—unable to 
break into component parts as there is only one ‘part.’ Since the wrench is made by additive 
manufacturing as opposed to conventional ‘subtractive manufacturing’—taking a block of 
raw material and removing excess until the finished product remains—the process as a 
whole is more efficient and less wasteful.7 
The use of the 3-D printer as described above yields a finished product ready to be used 
immediately off of the printer instead of waiting for a completed assembly.
The 3-D printer receives its instructions via a software program generically called computer 
aided design (CAD).  The CAD system models the desired object in a solid-modeling program, 
which means that its models are an agglomeration of points in space rather than a hollow 
group of stitched-together polygons. With its emphasis on solid, volumetric materials, this 
type of modeling is particularly well-suited for 3-D printing.8   
After designing the desired object to be manufactured using the CAD program, a design 
file in a format called Stereolithography (STL) is sent to the 3-D printer.  An STL file renders 
surfaces in the CAD design as a mesh of triangles. The number and size of the triangles 
determine how accurately curved surfaces are printed.9  The 3-D printer interprets those 
STL files into layers, so the object can be built up by the additive printing process.
There are currently seven printing technologies that are in broad development: binder 
jetting, directed-energy deposition, material extrusion, material jetting, powder bed fusion, 
sheet lamination and vat photopolymerization.10  This article will not address the different 
technologies employed by those methods, but it is important to note that they all employ 
a technique that adds material to a previously deposited layer.  Hereafter, for the purposes 
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of this article, the many different techniques for 3-D printing of objects have been grouped 
under the single descriptor, 3-D printing. 3-D printer technology has expanded, so it can 
print a variety of materials.  Appendix 1 lists the many types of materials that may be printed 
by 3-D printers.
Because there is an assortment of materials that can be manufactured via 3-D printing, the 
technology has become attractive for a wide variety of manufacturing purposes.  One of the 
leaders in 3-D printing technology is the Cornell Creative Machines Lab.  Its Director, Mr. Hod 
Lipson, is looking beyond near-term advances in 3-D printing and is trying to stay ahead of the 
curve. He postulates that the field of electronics printing will bring 3-D printing technology 
to the next level. Lipson described where his team is moving next with their research, “we’re 
spending time on electronics printing, active systems, and, in particular, voxels (3-D pixels).” 
Lipson explains that embedding electronics and prefabricated components into conventional 
3-D printing will move the technology toward the creation of integrated systems.11  
3-D printing of organic objects and even complex jet engines is happening today.  General 
Electric recently demonstrated a functional jet engine that was built entirely from 3-D printed 
parts.12  The technological breakthroughs in the field are being made at an exponential pace, 
so much so that it is exceeding the pace predicted by Moore’s law.13 Any discussion of 3-D 
printing becomes obsolete nearly before it is published.  
Unfortunately, criminals and terrorists are very often early adopters that use technologies 
for illicit purposes not originally intended by the inventors and innovators.  A review, then, 
is necessary to examine how the 3-D printing technology may be misused by criminals and 
terrorists.
Opportunities for the Misuse of 3-D 
Printing
Cyber-crime has been associated with the Internet since its growth beyond research and 
military institutions.14  To date, most of that crime has been perpetrated in the realm of 
financial and intellectual property data and information.  With 3-D printing technologies, 
cyber-criminals and terrorists can affect the constructed three-dimensional world by simply 
manipulating the binary code that instructs the printers what to print.  It is believed that 
while still in the infancy of 3-D printing technology, the time is right to discuss the potential 
pitfalls of 3-D printing and to initiate preventive measures and policies to ensure that the 
technology is used for good rather than for criminal intent. There are many opportunities 
for illicit use of 3-D printing technology:  printing of controlled substances, manufacturing 
of weapons that are untraceable, stealing intellectual property and use by competitors, and 
purposeful sabotaging of competitor’s designs.  All of these scenarios provide opportunity 
for bad actors to use this technology for crime or terrorism.
Currently, two of the world’s three largest illicit trades are drugs and arms; the third 
being the illegal harvesting of endangered species. Drugs are by far the biggest category, 
accounting for slightly less than one percent of global commerce or $321.6 billion dollars a 
year, according to a 2003 UN report.15  The Small Arms Survey estimates that illegal trade 
accounts for roughly 10 percent of the Arms market and accounts for perhaps two billion 
dollars annually.  Terrorists and criminals can make large sums of money on the trade of 
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these items because society has made it illegal to openly trade these goods through unofficial 
channels.  Governments often target specific organizations that are avowed enemies of the 
state to limit their access to illegal substances and arms.  3-D printing offers a new tool 
to terrorists and criminals attempting to circumvent the limitations placed upon them by 
governments.
Printing Pharmaceuticals
Printing pharmaceuticals became commercialized in August, 2015 when the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration approved the first 3-D-printed pill: spritam levetiracetam, a drug that 
can reduce seizures among epileptics. Manufactured by American pharmaceutical company 
Aprecia, it is produced not by a tableting machine but by a special process in which the drug’s 
active and inactive ingredients are laid down layer-by-layer.  This unusual manufacturing 
technique helps Spritam’s patients in particular. By building each dose individually, Aprecia 
says it can make each pill more porous and more potent than more traditional techniques 
allow. Pills printed through the company’s special process “disintegrate [orally] in less than 
10 seconds,” Aprecia explains, which is unusually quick for a high-dose drug.16  The use of 
3-D printing has improved the efficacy of the drug because of the manufacturing process 
which will add a new economic variable to the pharmaceutical industry by improving drug 
performance instead of having to discover new drug compounds.
In a 2012 TED Talk, Lee Cronin of the University of Glasgow described a new approach to 3-D 
printing that could enable patients to print their own medicines at home. What’s needed, he 
explained, is a universal set of “chemical inks” as well as a way to 3-D print the lab instruments 
and these chemical inks at the same time. In essence, this would let 3-D printers catalyze the 
chemical reactions to print drugs when needed.  As a result, the pharmaceutical industry 
could eventually witness a transition from filling prescriptions to providing algorithms for 
the drugs. Doctors could hand off an algorithm to a patient to go print at home on a 3-D 
printer rather than jotting down a prescription on a piece of paper. These algorithms would 
include information about the set of chemical inks needed to print the medicine as well 
as the molecular blueprints.17  When commercialized, printing of drugs at home will place 
the tools to print any drug compound into the privacy of the home and out of the view of 
regulatory agencies.
Personalized medicine creates an approach whereby each patient is treated based on his 
or her precise genetic makeup. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines precision 
medicine as an emerging approach for disease treatment and prevention that integrates an 
individual’s variability in genes, environment and lifestyle. Precision health may be the secret 
to predict and ultimately prevent various diseases already present in the inner workings of 
our genetic profile.18
A new era is beginning where drug ingredients are punched into a 3-D printer wired with 
a set of chemical inks. Known patient allergies are preprogrammed into the 3-D printer to 
avoid negative reactions to medications. In the future, pharmaceutical drugs created at home 
will eliminate the ingredients to which the patient is allergic but keep the ones needed.19 
There are downsides to 3-D pharmaceutical printing, including illegal drug manufacturing, 
mislabeling, and cybersecurity concerns.  Regulators and the pharmaceutical industry will 
have to work together to keep illicit activity at bay.20  
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Along with the potential benefits of personalized medications that match an individual 
patient’s genome, the opportunity for misuse of those pharma- printers is also significant.21 
With the proper set of chemical inks, a 3-D printer can be programmed to produce 
methamphetamines, cocaine, and Oxycontin.22 Law enforcement will have to adapt quickly to 
the new dynamic of drug abusers who print their own drugs instead of buying them through 
the established methods of the past.  The possibility of illegal drug abusers experimenting 
with their own drug cocktails will also become easier with the 3-D printer.  As amateur 
chemists develop new compounds to get to that next new high, the potential consequences 
of users trying out new compounds may prove fatal. As an example, users of an illegal drug 
known as K2 continue to use it despite known hazards.  
Once the original K2 chemical compounds were banned on the federal and state levels, 
entrepreneurs both overseas and homegrown began to tweak the formula – named JWH 
for its creator, chemist John Huffman. These later versions created vaguely the same 
effect (as marijuana), but police have been stymied in their ability to make arrests if the 
molecular structure of the substance varies by even a hydrogen atom from that outlawed 
by legislation. K2-induced side effects, which can include vomiting, high blood pressure, 
and even seizures and hallucinations, have caused a sudden, alarming rise in trips to local 
emergency rooms.23
Despite the known hazards of K2, amateur chemists continue to produce it and desperate 
people continue to buy it.  
Every year, Texas Department of Public Safety and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents 
catch hundreds of drug runners, called mules, and confiscate thousands of pounds of illegal 
drugs crossing the Mexican border.  The need to smuggle contraband across the border 
will lessen with the advent of 3-D printers capable of printing illegal drugs.  Before that fear 
becomes a reality, the chemistry must be digitized so that a blueprint for the molecules 
directs the printer to build the illegal drugs from scratch.  
Glasgow University chemist Lee Cronin explained it: 
Nearly all drugs are made of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, as well as readily available 
agents such as vegetable oils and paraffin. With a printer it should be possible that 
with a relatively small number of inks you can make any organic molecule.  
Cronin’s idea is to make prescription drugs downloadable; however, when actually built, 
Cronin’s “chemputer” could make illicit drugs available to anyone, in whatever quantity and 
quality desired.24  
It is unclear how homeland security and law enforcement will mitigate these problems before 
they begin. David Hodgson, partner in Deloitte’s healthcare and life sciences team says, “The 
current global, regional and local regulatory environment is incapable of accommodating the 
ambiguity of a 3-D printing process.” Untangling whether regulatory efforts should target 
the printer,  the ingredients used by the printer, or the person doing the printing becomes 
an important question.25  
One method for ensuring that illegal drugs cannot be printed is to control the drug blueprints 
accepted by the printer as a valid print file.  Manufacturers could program 3-D printers 
to accept only a set of encrypted drug templates, which would ensure that only legal and 
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approved drugs could be printed.  An additional check set into the printer’s firmware would 
match a blueprint queued up for a print job against a known set of unacceptable chemical 
compounds.  If unacceptable compounds were detected in the print file then the printer 
would not execute that print request.  In order to accomplish a solution similar to what 
is described above, it is necessary to produce legislation that would require 3-D printer 
manufacturers to create those checks before initiating a print job.  Furthermore, there 
is a need for a private or government consortium that would hold a library of legal drug 
blueprints that a printer would validate against before initiating the print job.
Untraceable Weapons Manufacture
Probably the most widely publicized potentially negative consequence of 3-D printing is the 
printing of untraceable firearms.  Opponents of strict regulation of 3-D firearm printing claim 
that printing a gun is not just making a weapon; it is also making a free speech argument. 
It is an argument that combines the act of gun-making with an ideological challenge about 
freedom of information and file-sharing.26  In countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia where there is strict gun control, people may choose to print weapons as a 
way around those controls. 
Cody Wilson, a self-described “crypto-anarchist,” said, 
The Internet and cryptography are these anarchic tools that can allow for the 
expanse of citizen action. We like the idea of the market becoming completely black 
and starving the nation-state from all the money they claim.27 
Cody Wilson’s nonprofit organization, Defense Distributed, released a video showing a gun 
firing off over 600 rounds—illustrating what is likely to be the first wave of semi-automatic 
and automatic weapons produced by the additive manufacturing process.
The assault rifle model number AR-15 is designed to be modular, meaning it can receive 
different types of “uppers” (barrels) as well as different-sized magazines. “This is the first 
publicly printed AR-15 lower demonstrated to withstand a large volume of .223 ammunition 
without structural degradation or failure,” Wilson writes. “The actual count was 660+ fired 
on day one with the 3-D printed lower. The test ended when we ran out of ammunition, but 
this lower could easily withstand 1,000 rounds.”  Already, he says, over 10,000 people have 
downloaded the lower CAD file, and more have downloaded it through BitTorrent.28  
In May 2013, Wilson also designed the Liberator, the world’s first fully 3-D printed plastic 
gun, designed to fire standard .380 handgun bullets, and 100,000 people around the world 
downloaded the drawings.  When asked by the press how he felt about his accomplishment, 
Wilson replied that now “anywhere there is a computer and an Internet connection, there is 
a promise of a gun.”29 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced its own version of 
the Liberator.  “We downloaded files, we created firearms from those files, and we tested 
those firearms,” Earl Griffith, chief of ATF’s firearms technology branch, said in a briefing with 
reporters at ATF headquarters in Washington.  The ATF’s testing showed that the weapon, 
while not quite as powerful as most guns, could penetrate several inches of soft flesh as well 
as a human skull. The Liberator can only fire one shot before it must be reloaded, but ATF 
officials noted  that’s all a determined assassin needs.30  
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The design of the Liberator includes a block of metal that technically makes it legal under 
the Undetectable Firearms Act, which requires that a certain amount of metal be included 
in a weapon so it is detectable.31 However, the metal plays no role in the weapon’s function 
and could be easily removed.
It is worrisome that technology is now available to anarchists and terrorists to print weapons 
that cannot be traced by authorities and that can be produced in the privacy of a personal 
workshop.  In history, the ability to covertly manufacture weapons has been available to 
the skilled machinist; however, the required skill to accomplish the manufacture of an 
untraceable weapon has dropped dramatically with the advent of 3-D printer technology.
The ability to 3-D print guns privately will allow individuals to bypass background checks, the 
primary way that guns are regulated. Today, licensed firearms dealers conduct background 
checks and ensure that they sell only to people legally eligible to purchase.  President Obama’s 
2013 gun-control proposals32 included not only more restrictions on who is permitted to buy 
and own guns, but also called for private sellers — who today don’t have to run background 
checks — to sell instead through licensed dealers.  The relevance to 3-D printing is that a 
person can avoid the intent of the regulation process by printing a gun instead of buying it 
from a licensed gun seller.
According to today’s federal law,33 an individual may purchase a long gun (rifle or shotgun) at 
age eighteen and a handgun at age twenty-one, as long as the purchaser has not committed 
a significant crime, is not mentally ill, and is a citizen.  It is not possible, however, to enforce 
the above regulations when individuals print weapons at home. With no seller, who will 
run background checks or deny purchases? The government’s control mechanisms become 
moot.
The lower, or “lower receiver” portion of a firearm, is the crucial part that contains all of 
the gun’s operating parts. Under American law, the lower is what is defined as the firearm 
itself and is what is registered with the Federal government.34It holds together the stock, 
the grip, the ammunition magazine, and the upper receiver, which includes the barrel and 
the chamber where the cartridge is detonated. As Doug Wicklund, senior curator at the 
National Rifle Association museum explained, the lower receiver always has carried the 
serial number because it’s the part that remains when the others wear out and are replaced. 
Like the frame of a bicycle or the motherboard of a computer, it’s the nucleus of the machine 
around which everything else is constructed.35  
With the advent of 3-D printing, the gun’s lower receiver can be produced with no unique 
identifier and no trail leading back to the manufacturer.  This creates the opportunity for 
anyone to print a gun in the privacy of their home without fear of the weapon ever being 
traced back to them.
3-D printed guns pose a problem for homeland security and law enforcement officials 
because the weapons produced by printing are unlikely to be caught using traditional 
investigative methods. As an example, the US border protection system catches thousands 
of weapons and tons of ammunition each year at US Ports of Entry between Mexico and the 
US.36  The possibility of losing weapons that are detected at border checkpoints would no 
longer be a problem for terrorists and criminals if they can print their weapons once they 
have reached their destination.
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Technology may once again be employed to help with the potential problem of untraceable 
weapons.  The designs of lower receivers have some common elements that can be 
screened for by the 3-D printer.  Since ammunition comes in standard sizes the dimensions 
of components that hold the ammunition, such as magazines and the chamber, can be 
checked for in an incoming design.  The printer could be designed such that a specific code 
must be entered into it before it will print an object that has the dimensions or functionality 
similar to that of a lower receiver.  The printer user would receive that code by registering for 
it with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).  Upon entering the code, the 3-D 
printer would be permitted to print the part and the code would also be printed on the part. 
This kind of a solution has a very broad impact.  A new system of registering receivers to 
3-D printers would be required at the ATF.  The 3-D printer designs would become more 
complex to add the checking algorithms and the registration software.  This would not stop 
a user from grinding off the serial number, but it would register the original manufacture 
of the receiver.  Printer manufacturers, motivated by profit margins, are unlikely to add 
this additional complexity unless legislation is passed that requires them to do so.  Further, 
the ATF will not create the registration process unless legislation is passed that requires 
them to do so.  Regardless of how difficult the policy changes may be to register weapons 
manufactured using 3-D printers, it is technically achievable to identify a lower receiver print 
job.  The policy changes will prove to be much more difficult to achieve than the technical 
changes.  Gun lobbies will object to attempts by the Government to control 3-D printed 
weapons.  Politicians will be under significant pressure by their constituents to stay away from 
the issue.  It is beyond the scope of this article to address that issue; however, meaningful 
protection against 3-D printed guns will only occur if politicians have the courage to move 
past the lobbyists and address new policy.
Intellectual Property Theft
The Intellectual property (IP) protection challenge related to 3-D printing has gained visibility 
as the technology emerged from prototyping and began to produce objects and products 
from a broad range of materials. As defined by the National Crime Prevention Council, 
IP is any innovation, commercial or artistic; any new method or formula with economic 
value; or any unique name, symbol, or logo that is used commercially. Intellectual property 
is protected by patents on inventions; trademarks on branded devices; copyrights on 
music, videos, patterns, and other forms of expression; and state and federal laws.37 
IP is a critical asset to the U.S. economy and to national security.  In 2013, Gartner38 predicted 
that by 2018, 3-D printing will result in the loss of at least $100 billion per year in IP theft, 
globally.39 To date, very few technical solutions that address this challenge have appeared 
on the market.40  
IP theft has been a significant problem across the Internet.  A thief steals IP by accessing 
and copying another’s ideas or product design. Thieves can reap huge profits by putting 
the original idea into production before the originator has done so. IP theft can damage the 
reputation of the original maker of the counterfeited product, cause the loss of competitive 
advantage, and risk national security. 
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Much of the world’s problem with intellectual property theft can be traced to one country: 
China. Eighty-five percent of the counterfeit goods seized in the European Union in 2010 
were believed to have come from China.  Almost eight percent of China’s gross domestic 
product comes from counterfeiting creative works, consumer goods, industrial products, 
and software.41
The scope of IP theft in the U.S. is significant.  In the United States, the 14,841 seizures of 
counterfeit goods and unlicensed knockoffs had a domestic value of more than $260 million 
and accounted for 76 percent of all counterfeit goods.42 In testimony to the U.S. Congress, 
FBI Assistant Director of the Counterintelligence Division, Randall C. Coleman stated: 
Our foreign adversaries and competitors are determined to acquire, steal, or transfer a 
broad range of trade secrets in which the United States maintains a definitive innovation 
advantage. This technological lead gives our nation a competitive advantage in today’s 
globalized, knowledge-based economy. Protecting this competitive advantage is vital to 
our economic security and our national security.43  
As 3-D printing becomes more of an integral practice within manufacturing, thieves will 
focus on stealing the stereolithography (STL) files.  With the STL file, the thieves will have 
not only the appearance and dimensions of a component but also clear identification of the 
materials used, the tolerances selected and the means for assembly.  In addition to facing 
the loss of their IP, victims will potentially lose the race to first distribute their products to 
the market.
IP can be stolen from a 3-D printer as described in a National Institute of Standards and 
Technology paper published in 2014: 
Many replication devices use nonvolatile storage media to manage jobs and control the 
device. Potentially all of the information that was ever processed, stored, or transmitted by 
the device could remain in the nonvolatile storage indefinitely. Nonvolatile storage media 
for replication devices is most often in the form of a hard disk drive or solid state drive. 
Some replication devices may also provide for the use of removable solid-state memory 
cards. Information stored within a replication device may leave organizational information 
open to numerous exploits and compromises of confidentiality or integrity.44  
The use of nonvolatile storage within a 3-D printer leaves it potentially open to hacking 
threats via a network attack.  When 3-D printers are not protected by appropriate security 
controls, information stored on the device becomes vulnerable to hackers attempting to 
gain access to the IP stored on the machine.
As noted in the NIST paper referenced above, some of the common threats to all digital 
equipment connected to the internet, which includes 3-D printers, are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1.  NIST Guidelines to Secure Data Integrity
Although the cyber threat to 3-D printers is not unique to these digital devices, the threat 
is no less pernicious because it is well known.  Many new technologies are derivatives of 
other technologies that may have more mature controls around them.  Often, however, 
those mature controls don’t migrate to the new technology immediately with potentially 
deleterious effects.45
IP protection can be addressed from multiple perspectives. Some key perspectives are: 
(1) securing content such as 3-D models, which are used to create 3-D prints; (2) creating 
markers on the objects that authenticate those objects; and (3) search engines that compare 
3-D objects.46
Gartner recommends that clients implement digital asset management and product data 
management software to control access to digital content, which is the source 3-D data 
needed to create 3-D prints. Those responsible for protecting enterprise IP should also 
monitor the market for vendors that embed markers on 3-D prints. For example, Applied 
DNA Sciences promotes its use of DNA to mark genuine products with visible or invisible 
signatures that, when screened, identify the product as genuine. This is a feasible approach, 
although Applied DNA Sciences is not yet widely known, nor is the technique proven on a 
significant scale. 
3-D geometric search technology (such as that available through Geometric and Siemens 
PLM Software) shows promise in detecting the illegal use of content to print counterfeit 
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parts.47 The search engines can compare 3-D models to print against other 3-D objects that 
the search engine might find on the Web. When matches across 3-D models are sufficiently 
close, a suspect model might be identified for further review. While such technology is in 
the early adoption phases for sourcing parts, an extension to IP protection is a possibility.
Enterprises either will redefine their business strategies to reduce the potential impact of 
IP theft, or introduce steps in the manufacturing to ensure that original and replacement 
parts are not counterfeit. Some 3-D printer manufacturers may emphasize value-added 
security services that protect against the theft of IP or sabotage of stereolithography 
(STL) files, rather than prioritizing the physical creation of products as their key value 
proposition.  DNA marking or alternative processes will increasingly become an integral part 
of creative processes.  Implementation of IP protection practices will lengthen design, R&D 
and manufacturing processes.  This is likely to increase the costs of designing, producing, 
sourcing and maintaining products.48  Implementation of value-added security services may 
put manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage when competing against unscrupulous 
producers; however, customers who value legitimate goods and who are fearful of possessing 
stolen goods will demand legitimate products.
Sabotage
Using similar attack methods as those described for the theft of IP, criminals or terrorists 
could choose a more malevolent approach and sabotage the component being printed by 
a 3-D printer.  Although this is a much more complex attack than the more simple IP theft 
threat, the STL file could be altered by the attacker to change key structural components 
so they would not function as originally designed.  As an example, the structural bulkhead 
components that are made by a 3-D titanium printing process for BAE’s49 Typhoon fighter-
bomber could be adversely impacted by sabotaging the print file.
These aft end components provide critical structural support for the engines as well as 
for the vertical and horizontal stabilizers.  If the 3-D STL file were altered to change the 
metallurgic properties of the titanium as it was being deposited, or if the webbing were made 
more porous than originally designed, the structural consequences could be catastrophic. 
Similar sabotage can be envisioned for the printing of vaccines.  An organic pathogen could 
be introduced into the original vaccine’s STL file resulting in a harmful poison.  Unless 
100% quality control measures were taken to test for such pathogens, they could remain 
undetected until people fell ill from the introduced toxin.  
Although sabotage to military jet components or to vaccines can happen now, the real 
danger to products being created via 3-D printing is that they all are being created from an 
original binary data file composed of ones and zeros.  A saboteur doesn’t have to physically 
attack an object in order to damage its original purpose; instead, the attacker merely alters 
a computer file, and the 3-D printer does the work for him.  The attacker doesn’t even have 
to be in close proximity to the object being sabotaged – he or she can attack from half a 
world away. 
The other danger from sabotage is loss of productivity.  Unless STL files are checked for 
validity before the printer begins its work, a sabotaged file will enable the device to print an 
unintended object--resulting in lost time and resources.  That has already been demonstrated 
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by the STUXNET worm50 when it specifically infected a certain make and model of high-speed 
centrifuges.  Although the Siemens centrifuges are not 3-D printers, the controller logic is 
very similar.  The attack achieved its desired effect of slowing the enrichment of Uranium 
by the Iranians.  An attack by terrorists could have a similar desired result of slowing the 
production of objects critical to a U.S. project.
PMC Group President Michael Chipley confirms that 3-D printers attached to a network 
present a danger to the manufacturing industry; “a weakened printed part that makes it 
into an assembly line, or even worse, out to a delivered system or product” could be very 
dangerous. Chipley, who is an expert on cyber security, concurs that the NIST report was 
valid, stating that unsecured 3-D printers connected to the internet could be an easy target 
for spies or terrorists.51  The subtle difference of a sabotaged part made from 3-D printing 
versus a sabotaged part made through a traditional machining method is that the sabotage 
can be done by a saboteur operating remotely instead of a saboteur working directly with 
the manufacturing machine, completely changing the security paradigm.52
A saboteur could implement the act of sabotage by changing the pattern of ones and zeroes 
that comprises the CAD of an object.  To prevent that act, the system must detect the pattern 
change by comparing the received STL to the original design of the object.  
A process to confound sabotage means additional steps in the programing of the 3-D printer. 
Today, a 3-D printer receives an STL file and adds it to its queue for execution.  To obviate 
sabotage, a step needs to be added to check the STL files against the original CAD file to 
ensure that nothing has been altered.  This additional step may be accomplished through a 
number of techniques.  As an example, a “checksum”53 value may be added to every word of 
computer instructions sent to the 3-D printer.  The printer would calculate a checksum value 
of the instructions it has received and compare it to the checksum value from the original 
CAD file, and if it did not match, the printer would know that the file had been altered. 
Alternatively, the STL file can be encrypted by the originating CAD system and decrypted 
by the printer.  A saboteur would have to decrypt a file first in order to sabotage it, which is 
difficult to accomplish with today’s encryption algorithms.  
Of course, a saboteur could alter the CAD file in the original design software before the 
STL file is sent to the printer.  This gets into cyber security issues which are not a part of 
this article; however, available literature is rich with content regarding the detection and 
mitigation of cyber-attacks.54  To be sure, the cyber warfare environment is a continuous 
arms race and keeping CAD software application and operating system software current 
with the latest versions is the best protection against evolving threats. 
To date, 3-D printer manufacturers and CAD system developers have not incorporated the 
additional checks into the design of their systems and are unlikely to do so until legislatively 
mandated.  Instead, the focus for 3-D printer manufacturers has been to decrease their 
costs while maximizing their product’s features.55
Homeland Security Implications
Mandating that 3-D printers not be used for illicit purposes will have little to no effect on 
how they may be used by individuals determined to print illegal objects.  The consequences 
of 3-D printing for homeland security organizations are broad and deep.56  Numerous 
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organizations may be impacted by the illicit use of 3-D printers by criminal and terrorist 
organizations.  The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
organizations will encounter significant challenges when drugs can be printed closer to the 
end customer.  Both organizations employ significant resources to try and stop the flow of 
illicit drugs close to production of the drug rather than at the final retail distributor.  They 
employ that strategy in order to try and eradicate the drug flow closer to the drug kingpin 
as opposed to stopping the low-level drug pusher.  However, if the low-level drug pusher 
also becomes the producer then interrupting the supply chain will no longer be an effective 
means for interdiction.  One could argue that instead of interdicting the flow of illegal drugs, 
the DEA and CBP will interdict the constituent chemicals.  But if the constituent building 
blocks are carbon, hydrogen and oxygen there is no way those elements can be controlled.
Printing of mostly plastic guns with only small amounts of metal included will make the use 
of magnetometers much less effective as a detection method.  The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) will have to change their screening methods if plastic guns become 
more broadly introduced into society.  Law enforcement organizations and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) will have to change the means through 
which they try and regulate arms.  Registration efforts are centered on the sale of weapons 
from licensed dealers.  Background checks of prospective purchasers are conducted with 
the anticipation that people who should not legally possess a gun are stopped before the 
purchase is completed.  That process is circumvented with the advent of 3-D printers that 
produce guns.  Law enforcement will have no way to trace gun ownership.  There will be no 
method for determining the extent of the number of guns on the street.  Weapons created 
by 3-D printers and recovered at crime scenes will have no owner provenance.  As the 3-D 
printer evolution continues, printing of ammunition will also be possible, thus rendering 
moot the concept of control of guns via control of ammunition.
It is currently legal to 3D-print guns, and it will remain legal until lawmakers make laws that 
make it illegal. The ATF is not a policy-making agency, so they cannot enforce a law that does 
not exist. Americans create technology much faster than lawmakers can regulate it. That can 
be a positive thing; in this case, however, it’s a dangerous one. As Cody Wilson said when he 
created the first 3D-printed gun, “I recognize that this tool might be used to harm people—
It’s a gun.”57
Intellectual property (IP) theft via 3-D printing will pose significant problems for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Immigrations, Customs Enforcement and the judicial system.  Anti-
counterfeiting campaigns have long linked counterfeit products to organized crime and 
terrorist groups, but this has not yet proved compelling to consumers – one reason being the 
lack of evidence (or rather the publication of such evidence) linking the two.  Dennis S. Prahl, 
a lawyer at Ladas and Parry comments: “I would hope that the message that trademark 
counterfeiting is strongly linked to terrorist and organized crime activities will gain traction 
in the public consciousness, but until al Qaeda is actually linked to fake handbags or watches 
in some raid, the media may not catch on to this story.”58 
Proving what is authentic and what is fraudulent will become problematical unless genuine 
objects are created with authentication markers that can’t be replicated by forgers.  Further, 
the provenance of the 3-D printed object is difficult when anyone with a printer and the 
right materials can duplicate an object.  The FBI and local law enforcement organizations will 
need to expand their cyber units to accommodate the increase of investigations resulting 
from the additional theft of IP via the use of 3-D printers.
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The FBI and private industry will both be affected as they employ resources to search for 
and stop sabotage implemented via 3-D printing.  The National Security Agency (NSA) will 
also be impacted as they will be enlisted to try and determine if sabotage was initiated by 
foreign actors.  Since sabotage may be initiated by a nation attempting to foil the production 
of a national asset or by a company trying to maintain a market share by disrupting its 
competition, law enforcement as well as the Intelligence Community (IC) will be employed to 
try and identify the perpetrator of the sabotage.  
The above examples merely scratch the surface of how the homeland security community 
may be affected as criminals and terrorists expand their use of 3-D printers. Standard 
operating procedures used by Government agencies will require change to meet the new 
threat.  Expensive technologies developed and deployed to catch the movement of illegal 
objects at borders and airports will be rendered useless since guns and drugs can be printed 
at the terrorist’s or cartel member’s destination.  Industry must create new technologies, 
and government must create new laws to allow for interdiction of undesirable STL files.
Conclusion
In 2014, Congressman Steve Israel (R-NY) introduced legislation that would fully ban 3-D 
guns. Although it did not pass, he plans to reintroduce legislation that would once again 
ban 3-D guns and all plastic firearms. Israel argued: “[m]y legislation is about making sure 
that we have laws in place to ensure that criminals and terrorists can’t produce guns that 
can easily be made undetectable. Security checkpoints will do little good if criminals can 
produce plastic firearms and bring those firearms through metal detectors into secure areas 
like airports or courthouses.”59  
Can successful legislation against the use of 3-D printers, programed to print objects that 
would be considered undesirable by American society, be passed into law?  Laws could be 
created but would be largely unenforceable.  In the case of weapons60, even though legislation 
currently exists mandating that a gun must be registered to someone legally permitted to 
own a gun, most weapons used in a crime have been obtained illegally.61  Instead, other 
technological solutions must be considered in order to prevent, or at least track, the printing 
of objects deemed socially undesirable.  
Since two of the world’s three largest illicit trades are drugs and arms, the 3-D printer will 
provide a new tool for organized crime to use as they manufacture goods to traffic in those 
trades.
Organized crime has benefited from the control of illicit goods by governments and by 
trafficking in black market products. Their near monopolies have allowed them to control the 
nearly two trillion dollar annualized trade in illicit goods.  But what happens to their business 
model when guns and drugs are democratized?  The advent of 3-D printing of drugs, organic 
materials and weapons provides the potential for much easier access to illegal drugs and 
untraceable weapons.  
Considering the size of these illicit trades and the amount of money that criminals now 
make from them, organized crime will react to the threat that 3-D printing will have on 
their business. One thing the world has yet to see is what happens when the Mexican drug 
cartels declare war on a technology while simultaneously using the technology for their own 
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nefarious purposes.62  This article has shown that technological means can be employed 
to control the production of undesirable products through the use of 3-D printing.  Those 
technological solutions (or something like them) should be employed so that society 
can realize the potential benefits that 3-D printing offer while controlling the negative 
consequences that may accompany the wide-spread adoption of 3-D printing.
Legislation will not be enough to stop the 3-D printing of illicit items; however, legislation 
can and should be enacted to require manufacturers of 3-D printers to install encrypted 
templates for weapons, illicit drug compounds and trademarked designs so that the printer 
will not print objects that correspond to one of those protected templates. Much like current 
anti-virus software, the templates will have to be continuously updated to stay current with 
illicit designs, but that kind of solution would put teeth into legislation that prohibits 3-D 
printing of illegal material.
Although there is no evidence that terrorists have used 3-D printers in their actions to date, 
that is not a reason to assume that they never will.  Leadership in homeland security and law 
enforcement should not ignore the potential illicit use of 3-D printers until those problems 
have become real – action to employ technical solutions should be taken now while the 
industry is still young.
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Abstract
Emerging problems often surprise lawmakers 
and agency officials and result in rapid, 
reactive governance. The political attention 
an issue does receive may or may not be 
sufficient to resolve the emergent problem, 
and in many cases may be an overreactive 
auto-response dictated by public opinion 
and issue salience. This study examines 
the emergence of congressional attention 
post-crisis; demonstrates that black swans, 
wicked problems, and complex domestic and 
social issues each trigger episodic attention 
differently; and finally, establishes a multi-
dimensional model of emerging crises, laying 
the bedrock to define new theoretical models of 
episodic attention in Congress. 
Introduction
There are specific variables— distinctive 
characteristics of crises as they emerge— 
that enable and accelerate the emergence of 
attention following a crisis, and establish the 
power to compel change in public and political 
opinion. Examining the relative frequency and 
number of congressional hearings related to 
particular crises throughout history reveals 
that there are specific combinations of forces 
such as size, intensity, timing, resource draw, 
fault, and cause that are more likely to result 
in greater attention to emergent issues than 
others. Further, this article demonstrates the 
interrelationship of the characteristics of crises 
to what Dr. Anthony Downs termed the issue-
attention cycle and the emergence of political 
opportunity— what Dr. John Kingdon terms 
the policy window.1
I assigned quantitative values in place of 
typical qualitative descriptors of crises in order 
to derive crisis-values which could be tested 
The Issue-Attention Cycle and Political Reality
Christopher M. Kimrey 
for correlation to the degree of congressional 
attention an emerging crisis received.2  I then 
applied statistical analysis to examine relevant 
relationships between the characteristics of 
crises and the emergence of congressional 
attention. Consistently, findings of the analysis 
demonstrated with a high degree of confidence 
a strong relationship between a crisis’ 
characteristics and emergence of congressional 
attention, both in its total amount of attention 
and rate of emergence of attention. Based on 
findings, there remains little question that 
characteristics such as the size of the crisis, the 
intensity and rate of emergence, the resources 
the crisis requires, and the cause and culpability 
all contribute to the emergence of the issue-
attention cycle and subsequently the policy 
window post-crisis.
Punctuated attention caused by the episodic 
nature of emerging problems tends to result 
in extreme and rapid reactions of officials and 
thus causes the subsequent displacement of 
other issues on the public agenda.3 By more 
fully understanding emerging problems, what 
influences these issues, and what reaction they 
may garner, agencies such as the Department 
of Homeland Security can more fully align 
themselves post-crisis.4 This article is crafted 
considering the necessity to  guide the reaction 
of governance post-crisis. 
This article is an abridged version of the 
literature review on relevant political models, 
analytical methods used, and findings of a 
more complex study crafted for the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security. The full study explores 
in depth the concepts introduced within 
this article including the policy window and 
issue-attention, and provides the foundation 
for further research on the application and 
implications of this work.5   
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Issue Attention, The Policy 
Window, and Other Relevant 
Theories
We went, what, a month, month and a half, 
where people were pretty sure that Ebola was 
going to kill us all? Well, nobody asks me about 
it anymore.
—President Barrack Obama6
Congressional attention and legislative action 
post-crisis inhabit the intersection of several 
contemporary theories of political science and 
problem emergence, specifically Downs’ issue-
attention cycle, Kingdon’s policy window, 
and Gerston’s characteristics of emerging 
crises. Downs’ issue-attention cycle is one of 
the foundational theories of this study and its 
findings. Downs theorizes there is a somewhat 
predictable five-stage cycle of attention that 
emerges after particularly powerful events. 
His theory of issue-attention represents how 
individuals react to salient issues that reach 
the public stage. However, this study has found 
that the issue-attention cycle is not confined to 
public interest alone, but rather is applicable 
to legislative attention as well. The process by 
which crisis attention emerges and declines—
its issue-attention life-cycle—reveals patterns 
of congressional attention that are repeatable 
across crisis types. These patterns  are evident 
in natural disasters, terrorism, civil unrest, and 
immigration issues and are identifiable at both 
macro (national) and micro (regional) levels. 
The emergence of legislative attention is the 
manifestation of what Kingdon refers to as the 
policy window.  The policy window represents 
a finite period in which an issue’s salience 
and relative importance compels action on 
the part of the polity. This finite period is the 
famous ‘opportunity in crisis’ referred to by 
Rahm Emmanuel during the height of the 
economic crisis.7 It is important to note that 
while research conducted in this study clearly 
elucidates the issue-attention cycle, Kingdon’s 
policy window remains somewhat harder to 
demonstrate because of the potential for post-
hoc reasoning. The emergence of political 
attention is not the same as the emergence 
of opportunity, which is triggered by the 
availability of specific preconditions. In many 
cases, although attention may be present and 
the issues compelling, there may be no political 
action.
As theorized by Baumgartner, Gerston and 
others, emerging problems command attention 
by their salience (how novel the occurrence), 
their intensity (how rapidly they emerge), and 
the resources the problem demands (what will it 
“cost” to solve).8 Rochefort and Cobb contribute 
to this theory suggesting that culpability and 
blame also contribute to an issue’s relevance.9 
In discussing the influence of these variables, 
and specifically their combined influence 
on emerging crises, Dr. Gerston explains, 
“[t]he more the categories grow in tandem, the 
more likely that they collectively will present a 
triggering mechanism.”10 This suggests a sort 
of synergistic effect which is confirmed by the 
findings of this study. Kingdon refers to the 
contributors of the policy window development 
as streams, the confluence of which activates 
the window. Kingdon’s streams (the problem, 
the political state, and available policies) do 
not all enter the process at the same time,11but 
rather the political state and policies may exist, 
merely awaiting the right problem and thus 
its issue-attention cycle to emerge. This work 
endeavors to better define what problems 
are more apt to generate significant political 
interest, thus compelling the emergence of the 
policy window and political action.
Research Design
This work answers the following questions. 
Do specific characteristics of a crisis, such as 
scope, intensity, timing, resources, cause, and 
fault enable and accelerate the emergence 
of attention post-crisis and give an issue the 
power to compel change in public and political 
opinion? Can the emergence and intensity of 
the issue-attention cycle and policy window 
be attributed to the characteristics posited by 
Gerston and others? 
This study attempts to answer these 
questions by examining the characteristics 
identified by Gerston and others and applying 
them to a variety of crises.  For this study, 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Crisis
Scope (s) Narrow (city-wide)= 1 Moderate (regional/ statewide)=2 Broad (national)= 3
Intensity (i)
Low (no deaths, injuries, 
no major destruction, no 
economic impacts) = 1
Uneven (few deaths, injuries, little 
major destruction, slow to medium 
emergence, little economic impacts) = 2
High (significant 
impacts to life, safety, 
property, economy) = 3
Time (t) Gradual (> 1 year) = 1 Moderate (4 mos. to 1 year) = 2 Rapid (< 4 mos.) = 3
Resources (r) Few = 1 Medium = 2 Significant = 3
Fault (fa) Accident/unrelated = 1 Oversight = 2 Intentional = 3
Cause (c) Natural = 1 Manmade = 2 --
several additional variables were added 
to Gerston’s theory to differentiate causal 
factors surrounding the emerging problem 
and to account for human involvement and 
culpability. The added characteristics were 
selected based on their use in other political 
science and problem-emergence models, such 
as Anthony Downs’ issue-attention cycle and 
work by Rochefort and Cobb.12
In total, six variables, shown in Table 1, were 
selected for this study and tested for correlation 
to emergence of legislative attention. The six 
characteristics have been assigned numerical 
values based on their degree of severity and how 
substantially they affected the emerging crisis. 
Table 1 shows the qualitative and quantitative 
assignments given to each characteristic.
Within Table 1, the novelty of the event may 
influence the perceived intensity and salience 
of the problem, and therefore may influence the 
value of intensity. Another factor to consider 
concerning the variable of timing is the event 
frequency. A higher frequency of similar 
powerful events may result in greater influence 
on the overall perception of the issue.  
To discover which variables are more prone 
to elicit congressional attention, a varied 
sampling of crises were selected, ranging in 
size, type, severity of impacts, and aftermath. 
Table 2 is a summary list of the crises in this 
research. 
Table 2. Selected Crises
September 11, 2001 AIDS Illegal immigration
Hurricane Katrina NSA breach Global warming
Housing crisis Enron Social security
Economic crash Northridge earthquake Da’esh (ISIS)
Ebola Ferguson, MO Veterans’ Affairs crisis
Unaccompanied migrant children 1960s riots Exxon Valdez
Hurricane Andrew Corporate scandal MC252 oil spill
Child obesity Bosnia Oklahoma City Bombing
The crises selected vary in economic impact, 
number of fatalities, socio-economic 
implications, region in which they occurred, 
and other critical factors. Measuring issue-
attention and the public impact would be 
done through media syndicates and the 
degree of media output on a given issue.  To 
measure political issue-attention for this study, 
congressional hearings on a given issue were 
used as the unit of measure to quantify the 
degree of issue-attention. 
Table 3 depicts the sources of data on 
congressional hearings and the timeframe of 
data gathered from those sources. 
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Table 3. Source Types of Data
Source Dates available Data retrieved from source
Library of Congress For information pre-1946 Includes no. of hearings/ hearing data for issues.
Political Agenda Project From 1946–2013 Hearings, media data, presidential remarks, etc.
Congress.com From 2012–1014
No. of hearings, reports, committee activity on given 
issues. 
Congressional hearings used to populate 
this study are cataloged using two sources: 
University of Texas, Austin College of Liberal 
Arts Public Policy collections, and the Library of 
Congress for hearings after 2010. Each source 
provides an aggregated list of all hearings on a 
particular policy topic. The data are collected 
in spreadsheets and counted for the number 
of times a particular set of words matching 
with the crisis arises, either within the title or 
the hearing description. An example would be 
counting the frequency of the occurrence of the 
term “terrorism,” found in the Hearing before 
the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism to 
Review Department of State 2000 Report on 
Trends in International Terrorism. 
For each crisis, I calculated the total number 
of hearings, number of subsequent years the 
issue was heard, the mean number of hearings 
per year, and rate of emergence of the issue. 
Each crisis was then assigned a total value 
using the following model.
Model 1 relates the total value (T) of a crisis 
to the number of congressional hearings and 
can be expressed as: 
T = m * A, where m = f (scope, 
intensity, time, resources, fault, 
cause), 
and A= (Vf - Vi) / time; where 
Vi = n of hearings at initial 
emergence, and Vf = n of 
hearings at height.
Taking the product of the first four 
characteristics and adding the remaining 
values for fault and cause, whether natural 
or manmade, will represent the total value of 
the combined six characteristics from Table 
1. The result will be the net value of the crisis, 
represented by the variable (m).
In determining a crisis’ final value T, equals 
m multiplied by the number of hearings the 
issue receives from Congress. Vi represents the 
number of congressional hearings occurring at 
the initial emergence of the crisis. Vf represents 
the number of hearings on the crisis at the 
highest point prior to decline. The time span 
of emergence (in years) from initial hearings 
to the hearings’ highest point is represented 
by t.13 Once acceleration is determined, it is 
multiplied by m, resulting in the total value of 
the crisis. This treatment was done in an effort 
to determine whether there are any similarities 
between emerging crises in Congress and, more 
importantly, to determine if greater values of 
variables correlate in any way to the number of 
hearings an issue receives.
I used two correlation tests in this study. The 
first test, the multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), tests whether one or more 
independent variables correlate to two or more 
dependent variables. The second test employed 
was the univariate analysis, which was used as 
a verification of findings. As a good scientific 
practice, all tests were conducted using a 
confidence level of 95 percent (significance 
level α = 0.05). 
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Outcome of Analysis
The idea that the future is unpredictable is 
undermined every day by the ease with which 
the past is explained. 
—Daniel Kahnemam 14
By developing a numerical value-scale and 
assigning quantitative values in place of typical 
qualitative descriptors of crises, I was able to 
derive crisis-values which were successfully 
correlated to the degree of congressional 
attention an emerging crisis received, 
determined by the number of congressional 
hearings.15  I then conducted statistical analysis 
to examine relevant relationships between the 
characteristics of crises and the emergence of 
congressional attention. For the influence of 
characteristics on crises independently, the 
crises in Table 2 were evaluated testing the 
hypothesis where each individual characteristic 
of Table 1 was treated as an independent 
variable and total congressional hearings as 
the dependent variable. A one-way MANOVA 
revealed a highly significant multivariate main 
effect for the combined total characteristic value, 
revealing a value of P < 0.01.16  This result alone is 
sufficient support for this study, in that specific 
qualitative characteristics of crises, when 
quantified and combined, accurately describe 
the emergence of congressional attention post-
crisis as posited by Gerston, Rochefort, and 
others. Results of the MANOVA indicate that 
of the six characteristics, only three of the six 
demonstrated statistical significance, and only 
one of the three—scope—demonstrated high 
significance. Cause of the crisis appears to 
have the least effect on congressional attention, 
according to MANOVA results.17
This study also finds that this dynamic 
does not occur equally across all types of 
emerging crises and not every variable influences 
emerging attention appreciably. When crises 
occur, the impacted population (either directly 
or indirectly) tends to be the most powerful 
influencer of attention. This is demonstrated 
by the value of scope and may be attributable 
to psychological effects of powerful, symbolic 
events such as September 11th, Pearl Harbor, 
Katrina and others. Powerful events tend to 
elicit equally powerful reactions, either because 
of immediate tangible impact or because they 
are highly influential on perception.18
For a crisis, the variables cause and 
intensity have the least effect on congressional 
attention when evaluated independently of 
other characteristics. Whether an event is 
naturally occurring or human-caused is not 
as powerful as culpability (intent/ fault). This 
is evident in major crises such as Hurricane 
Katrina, which are arguably just as powerful in 
influencing legislative attention, if not more so, 
than crises such as September 11th and major 
oil spills.  Further, the degree of injuriousness 
of the emerging crisis, measured as intensity, 
was deemed in this study as not significantly 
impactful to congressional attention when 
analyzed independently.19 Crises which  are 
costly or which result in a significant number of 
fatalities, yet which emerge over long periods, 
are very isolated, or do not require substantial 
resources to abate, typically do not result in 
significant attention. This dynamic is manifest 
in the number of medical malpractice deaths 
compared to the threat of Ebola within the U.S. 
Although the latter garners enormous amounts 
of attention in Congress, media, and from 
the public, it is the former that claims nearly 
440,000 lives annually.20 Similarly, single 
characteristics such as intensity, when coupled 
with others, for instance a crisis’ novelty or the 
rate of emergence, result in a synergistic effect 
causing a more significant influence on issue-
attention. Examples of this dynamic include 
global warming and immigration reform. This 
pattern becomes especially pronounced when 
examining the issue by its rate of emergence, 
discussed further below.
Findings suggest the more widespread 
and intense social issues become, the more 
they impact congressional hearings. This is 
a finding which is intuitively plausible when 
considering the emergence of the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s; an interesting proof 
will be the reaction of Congress to nationwide 
civil disturbances and police shootings/tactics 
emerging as this is written. If the issue of civil 
rights and police tactics continues to spread and 
continues to increase in intensity, there should 
be a sharp increase in attention by Congress 
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followed by a gradual decline and period of 
stasis. The passage of landmark legislation 
such as the removal of the Confederate flag 
from the South Carolina State House grounds 
in 2015 represents a textbook example of the 
emergence and capitalization of the policy 
window at the regional level.
Figure 1 illustrates the variance in emergence 
of the issue-attention cycle as related to the 
selected 24 crises in this study using exceedance 
probability and fitted power-law distribution 
where the y-axis represents the percentage of 
probability an event will not exceed and x -axis 




More common issues, 
re-emergent issues result 
in lower avg. hearings in 
congress. ex. Civil rights, 
AIDS, obesity, housing 
market, immigration.
Cluster (b): 
Domestic issue w/ no 
culpability. i.e., VA, 
Katrina, Ebola, Global 
Warming, et al.
Cluster (c): 
Issues w/ culpability. 
Exxon, DWH.
Figure 1. Rate of Acceleration of Congressional Hearings
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When observing the acceleration rate of 
congressional attention in evolving crises using 
exceedance probability, the sample naturally 
organizes itself into three distinct clusters of 
crises.  The majority of the sampled crises 
fall within cluster (a), comprising up to the 
50th percentile.  This cluster is comprised of 
socially complex issues and domestic crises 
(tornados, obesity, housing, etc.), emerging 
at a rate of between one and eight hearings 
annually. Cluster (b) is comprised of more 
complex crises including both Taleb’s black 
swans and Rittel’s wicked problems.21  The 
important distinction in cluster (b) is that the 
issues tended to be domestic in nature and 
lacking significant culpability (unaccompanied 
children, Ebola, Katrina, Global Warming). 
Crises falling within this cluster comprise the 
50th to 90th probability percentile and tend to 
emerge at a rate of between 13 and 22 hearings. 
Finally, issues comprising cluster (c) are those 
with significant culpability. These are the most 
rapidly emerging issues and represent the 
highest 5% of probability emerging at a rate 
of greater than 25 hearings. Crises comprising 
this cluster include EXXON VALDEZ oil spill, 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and Da’esh (ISIS). 
These issues tend to be larger, have national 
implications, and have clear culpability.
Deconstructing the emergence and decline 
of attention revealed a clearer illustration of 
the issue-attention cycle whereby most crises 
last approximately two to three years; in nearly 
all cases, including dissimilar crisis types, the 
decline in attention from its highest point 
will be ≈67% from the previous year.  Of the 
total sample number of randomly selected 
crises, only four events exceeded a cycle of 
issue-attention greater than five years. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
More complex issues having a broad impact 
across society result in higher congressional 
attention, between 10 and 15 hearings annually, 
but indicate an extremely low emergence rate 
annually (≈0.4 – 2 respectively) because they 
emerge over long periods. Examples include 
climate change (24 years) and immigration (64 
years). The data revealed in this study reaffirm 
an observation by Rochefort and Cobb, who 
suggest that “global warming is an illustration 
of an issue whose severity is debated with 
disputants vehemently disagreeing over its 
extent, timing, and impact.”22 Interestingly, as 
crises transform over time, so does attention. 
The fore mentioned—immigration and 
climate change—both adapted accordingly 
in congressional attention as the dynamics 
of the issues changed, caused by the influx of 
unaccompanied children across U.S. southern 
borders and the emerging scientific evidence 
supporting global warming. This change 
contributes to the synergistic effect introduced 
earlier. Unaccompanied children changed from 
merely an issue of immigration to a wicked 
problem, due to an unprecedented increase in 
the number of children across the border, the 
amount of resources and money required to 
address the crisis, and the crisis’ emergence rate. 
The change increased the number of hearings 
on the immigration issue by over 400 percent, 
from 10 hearings annually to nearly 60. The 
international accords chartered in Paris in 2015 
represent monumental advancements toward 
combating global warming and climate change 
and underscore the global implications of an 
intractable issue with significant momentum. 
The changes seen in global climate change and 
immigration reflect the shifting of political 
interest over time as the governing dynamics of 
an issue are debated in government.23 
The strong correlation between the 
aforementioned governing dynamics 
(characteristics) of a crisis and policy responses 
of government, as illustrated repeatedly, 
suggest congressional attention is episodic and 
reactive. This is consistent with Gould’s theory 
of punctuated equilibrium.24 
Figure 2 illustrates the general construct of 
crises and issue-attention based on the findings 
of this research.
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Figure 2. Political Issue-Attention Compared by Crisis Type, Created May 8, 2015
The illustration in Figure 2 is an 
approximation; it is based on the averages of the 
various types of crises presented in this study. 
Although the decline and secondary emergence 
of attention does not occur in all cases, it occurs 
frequently enough and in the same manner and 
proportions that it is worth noting here, and is 
an interesting repeatable phenomenon worth 
further study.25 
As illustrated in Figure 2, black swans result 
in extremely rapid emergence of political 
attention, though the decline is typically 
equally as steep. The mean rate of emergence 
of congressional attention for black swans 
in this study was found to be nearly twice 
the rate of wicked problems.  The black swan 
is an anomalous occurrence representing 
catastrophes of the greatest scale whose 
emergence as shown in Figure 1 represent 
the 90 to 99th percentile probability of all 
cases within this study.  During the decline of 
interest phase of Downs’ issue-attention cycle, 
both in the case of wicked problems and black 
swans, the initial retreat almost predictably 
approaches 67%, followed by slight resurgence 
in interest then complete withdrawal.
Implications of Issue-
Attention on Homeland 
Security
Uncertainty is an uncomfortable position, but 
certainty is an absurd one.
—Voltaire
This study has established that there is 
a relatively predictable cycle to political 
attention which is generated in many cases by 
the characteristics of and reactions to crises. 
The creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security is recent evidence of this reaction. 
Similar patterns of reactive governance can be 
found in the New Deal of the 1930s, growth in 
defense after World War I and II, and President 
Johnson’s War on Poverty—likely the most 
costly reactive endeavor of all.26 However, 
history has also demonstrated that most 
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issues tend to be displaced quickly by others of 
ostensibly greater importance. In recent years, 
public interest has sharply faded regarding 
homeland security, particularly terrorism, 
only to re-emerge over concern for Da’esh. The 
nation’s intense focus on post-9/11 protection 
and fortification has been replaced by images 
of natural disasters, creating a change in focus 
to emergency management, preparation, and 
resilience. The decline and re-emergence of 
attention may be the recognizable manifestation 
of Downs’ issue-attention cycle, applied to 
homeland security and the contemporary 
political process. Once salient issues reach 
their dramatic climax, they become susceptible 
to being displaced from public attention (and 
the political agenda) by other newer problems 
as they emerge.
This decline of issue-attention presents the 
larger challenge. A shifting political landscape 
means potentially changing priorities. These 
priorities are shifting to a new frontier of the 
war on terrorism as this is written. The push-
pull dynamic in contemporary homeland 
security issue-attention consists of two 
dangerously asymmetric threats— Daesh and 
cyber-terrorism. The beginnings of a shift are 
occurring in cyber, a newly emerging field within 
homeland security marked by the creation of the 
Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. 
The Federal Information Security Management 
Agency, established in 2002, increased its 
already growing budget by 100 percent from 
2009 to 2010 following Executive Order 13636 
and Presidential Policy Directive 21.27 Over the 
next three years, the agency’s budget continued 
to increase by $1.3 billion annually.28 With 
an event meeting the requirements of the 
characteristics of a crisis,29 cyber will arguably 
represent the next punctuated growth in 
homeland security. However, like other issues, 
cyber will predictably wane in several years as 
new priorities emerge to displace it. Already, 
cyber as an important issue to national security 
may be giving way to the threat posed to the 
West by Da’esh and home-grown extremism. 
In defining the patterns of episodic attention 
and political opportunity in crisis, there is an 
underlying ethical risk present. Significant 
crises often necessitate the re-examination, re-
assessment, and, in some cases, re-structuring 
of the status quo political arrangements. An 
acute understanding of the transfer of attention 
and punctuated shifts of policy can better 
enable the astute, savvy politician to influence 
the attention cycle for gain, or it may likely 
present opportunity to not invest where it may 
not appear to be lucrative to do so for the long 
term (i.e. where there is no potential for growth 
or long-term political opportunity). Examples 
might include childhood obesity, civil rights, 
and social security reform. Issues of this kind, 
because of their lack of salience and power, are 
not likely to garner interest unless politically 
advantageous.30 It is generally accepted that 
one cannot go against public opinion and 
expect to stay in democratic politics for long. 
It has been attributed to President Woodrow 
Wilson, a career statesman, who said the public 
sentiment is like the wind used by a sailing 
ship. The sailor can use it to power a voyage but 
cannot sail against it. Therefore, knowledge of 
the attention cycle might enable politicians to 
align themselves with the emerging crisis likely 
to be most salient and ignore those that are not. 
The more concise defining of reactive 
congressional attention presented here enables 
anticipatory governance and thus limits 
reactive governance post-crisis. This theoretical 
advancement establishes a control-measure 
in the current process of political agenda 
development as it pertains to the generation 
and acceptance of policy alternatives. Currently, 
political opportunism caused by reactive 
attention of Congress typically results in fertile 
opportunity for advocates to push pet solutions 
or attention to special problems. It also 
provides opportunity for key political figures 
to initiate punctuated growth of government. 
This feature of reactive governance is precisely 
what the theory of anticipatory governance is 
designed to prevent. Advocates of particular 
policy solutions know that when the policy 
window is open, it is open only for a short 
time.31 They also know that the policy window 
determines the flow of money, and money flows 
produce the potential for shifts or shoring up 
of power. There is a conflict dynamic among 
reformers between those within the elite intent 
on conservative reforms to protect the status 
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quo, and those intent on more liberal reform 
of institutional arrangements. Changes in 
policy goals, institutions, and polity settings 
influence revenue flow, thus influencing power 
distribution.32
The future spectrum and landscape of 
homeland security and protection against 
terrorism, the cornerstone of the Department 
of Homeland Security, represents the terrae 
incognitae—the land of the unknown. Investing 
in the protection against unknown and 
unknowable threats provides a real challenge to 
homeland security professionals in articulating 
policy change from equilibrium. Homeland 
security professionals should become astute 
at understanding threats, measuring their 
often-opaque environs, and most importantly 
articulating the value of investment in risk 
mitigation through resilience rather than 
protection against the unthinkable.
To this end, this study establishes a pattern 
in emerging attention post-crisis in response 
to which legislators and agency officials can 
anticipate the emergence of the policy window. 
Crises with higher quantitative values elicit 
markedly higher degrees of congressional 
attention. For example, crises with high values 
in three of four characteristics will result in 
nearly 50 percent more hearings annually than 
crises with characteristics totaling a lesser 
value.33 Furthermore, the research presented 
has made clearer the subject of issue-attention. 
Through analysis, this study has validated 
findings that groupings of crises such as black 
swans, wicked problems, and socially complex 
and domestic crises result in varying degrees 
of congressional attention. Quantitative 
data on social and domestic/ regional crises 
indicate, for instance, that the attention to 
these categories of crises lasts twice as long as 
wicked problems and black swans, yet accounts 
for  approximately 10 percent of the number of 
hearings annually, with the median number of 
hearings each year between one and 15. 
This study has established a foundation 
to better understand the scope and duration 
of attention post-crisis. This understanding 
enables efforts to develop a model to support 
anticipatory governance of catastrophic 
events. Based on the data analysis in this 
study, it is clear that events will continue 
to occur with regularity and that events are 
somewhat predictable in their scope and scale, 
as is legislative reaction to such crises. Using 
statistical analysis and probability models may 
help to clarify emergent crises or at least better 
define the problem space and second order 
effects of a catastrophe. In addition, they may 
help mitigate reactive governance that tends 
to occur as a result of emerging crises. This is 
an area deserving of more scholarly attention, 
and although this study merely presents a 
foundation, it has shown the depths to which 
this subject can be mined. 
Other areas of issue-attention that should be 
considered for further study include: 
The duration of the issue-attention cycle 
and whether prolonged, heightened awareness 
creates a proportionate increase in negative 
sentiment. Understanding the issue-attention 
cycle and its consequences will more fully aid 
emergency managers, response professionals, 
and presidential staff in preparing both short- 
and long-term risk management messaging 
and strategies. Strategic communications of 
this nature may be communicated post-crisis 
to frame appropriately narratives of local and 
state officials, the public, and media.
Analysts can define the emergence, timing, 
and duration of the issue-attention cycle to 
more accurately predict the policy window. 
Although contemporary research does examine 
what contributes to the emergence of issues, 
quantifying the timing and duration of issue-
attention may prove a far more challenging 
task.34 Additional study should be undertaken 
to determine the re-emergence of the policy 
window without a triggering event. This 
dynamic is seen after most major crises, as 
noted in Figure 3, and relates to congressional 
attention as well as social media attention and 
public opinion polling. 
Awareness of new theories regarding 
legislative attention resulting from problem 
emergence can help institutional leaders 
to react more rationally to emerging crises. 
The competing narratives to this effort will 
be those which suggest that history cannot 
foretell anything about future events, nor can 
the reaction to previous unpredictable events 
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portend anything about future behavior. 
This is erroneous, myopic thinking. Evidence 
reinforces, with a high degree of statistical 
significance, that certain crises correlate 
strongly to specific reactions in the legislature. 
As posited by Dr. Dana Meadows, thinking in 
terms of a systems structure is key to defining 
otherwise chaotic systems. She explains, 
“[s]ystem structure is the source of system 
behavior. System behavior reveals itself as a 
series of events over time.”35 Her thesis suggests 
that chaotic problems become less surprising 
when accumulated instances can be distilled 
into dynamic patterns of behavior.36 This is 
precisely what has been established in this 
study. Event-event analysis (e.g., that one event 
correlates to another) reveals nothing regarding 
why the system behaves in the manner it does. 
The core of this study seeks not only to define 
the roots of episodic attention post-crisis but 
also to define the “system” behind the event.37
As Meadows eloquently suggests, history 
reveals a great deal about the potential of 
future events and can serve to greatly reduce 
the degree of irrationality and uncertainty that 
accompanies the events in the terra incognita. 
Employing systems models as theorized by 
Dr. Meadows, future research can define new 
theoretical models of episodic attention in 
Congress, examining how powerful coalitions 
affect the dynamics of issue-attention and 
political opportunism.
By having a more acute sense of the 
reaction of governance to particular emerging 
crises, one can better prepare messaging 
and the general construct of political agenda 
setting. More importantly, the more precise 
understanding of emerging problems aids in 
more completely defining the landscape of 
complex crises, thereby lessening the need 
for reactive governance. Rather, it allows for 
a more measured and proactive post-crisis 
response. What would this look like in practice? 
Anticipatory governance goes to the theory 
of nineteenth century scholar of the English 
Constitution, Walter Bagehot. His theory of 
double government speaks to a bifurcated 
nature of governing. In double government, this 
is the division between  Madisonian governance 
(reactive congressional decision making 
resulting from emergent attention post-crisis), 
and Trumanism (departmental decision-
making and programmatic development which 
is measured and which guides legislative 
decision-making). The latter prevents reactive 
governing, which ultimately leads to anemic 
single-faceted regimes like the post-9/11 DHS. 
An improved understanding of the 
probability and the risks posed by a crisis to 
a community better allows for assessments of 
return on investment and intentional strategic 
messaging. By building a comprehensive 
landscape of a variety of dissimilar crises, one 
can see the patterns of attention emergence, 
calculate probability of occurrence and size of 
events, and develop programs that represent 
“over the horizon” preparedness and mitigation 
activities by investing in the necessary resilience 
needed to combat the ill effects of crisis. When 
the behavioral aspects of issue-attention post-
crisis are known to decision makers, it should 
be more evident that an initiating event should 
not be needed to compel change. This changes 
the requirements of Kingdon’s tenets, and may 
perhaps even change the notion of a policy 
window. The merit of this research transcends 
the organizational or political future of a single 
entity or specific stakeholder. Ideally, this 
work will provide a completely different lens 
through which to view the dynamic of emerging 
crises and episodic attention, providing an 
opportunity to see things, understand them, 
and then react differently. 
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Abstract
National legislation requires America’s 
homeland security agencies to disrupt 
transnational human smuggling organizations 
capable of transporting terrorist travelers 
to all U.S. borders. Federal agencies have 
responded with programs targeting extreme-
distance human smuggling networks that 
transport higher-risk immigrants known 
as special interest aliens (SIAs) from some 
35 “countries of interest” in the Middle East, 
North Africa, and Asia where terrorist 
organizations operate. Yet ineffectiveness 
and episodic targeting are indicated, in part 
by continued migration from those countries 
to the U.S. southwestern border since 9/11. 
Should an attack linked to SIA smuggling 
networks occur, homeland security leaders 
likely will be required to improve counter-
SIA interdiction, or do so preemptively. With 
a better understanding of how SIA smuggling 
networks persist in foreign geopolitical eco-
systems, despite U.S. disruption efforts to 
date, could their most vulnerable fail points 
be identified for better intervention targeting? 
This essay presents the key findings of a 
systematic analysis of U.S. court records 
about SIA smuggling, as derived from 19 
known prosecutions and a variety of other 
data between 2001 and 2015. It will discuss 
suggested leverage points and conclude with 
a list of strategy options for a more effective 
disruption campaign against them. 
How to Combat the Dark Networks that Can Move Terrorists 
over American Land Borders
Todd Bensman
Introduction
In the year 2000, President George W. Bush 
took office promising to accommodate the 
American economy’s labor demands with a 
temporary worker visa program that also would 
have legally normalized millions of Mexican 
workers and reduced their need to cross the 
U.S. border clandestinely. The president’s plan 
was such a priority that his first foreign trip, in 
February 2001, took him to Mexico to discuss 
reform with his enthusiastic counterpart, 
President Vicente Fox.1 Momentum toward a 
bilateral accord had advanced to such a degree 
by September 5, 2001, that President Fox 
and his wife came to the White House for the 
American president’s first state dinner. 
But, as the president would write in his 
post-office memoir, “then 9/11 hit.”2 A mere 
six days after the Fox visit to the White House, 
the president was no longer thinking about 
the Mexicans whose difficulties he planned to 
relieve. As former President Bush later noted 
in his memoir, Decision Points: “My most 
serious concern was that terrorists would slip 
into our country undetected. I put the idea 
of a temporary worker program on hold and 
concentrated on border security.”3
This historical anecdote may stand at 
some variance with prevailing perceptions 
that contemporary U.S. immigration and 
border security policy evolved primarily 
around Mexican nationals and other Spanish-
speaking migrants. But a preponderance of 
leadership policy statements, presidential 
papers, government commission reports, and 
the very language of post-9/11 legislation more 
persuasively suggest the motive was preventing 
Islamic terrorist border infiltration. Although 
the 19 hijackers of the 9/11 attacks had entered 
the country by visa and identity fraud—not 
The Ultra-Marathoners of Human Smuggling:  
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Essay 2 (May 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Bensman,  The Ultra-Marathoners of Human Smuggling 2
through land borders—the concern driving 
border policy was that similarly probing follow-
on attackers would breach the land borders 
next; the deleterious consequences on Mexican 
migrants were unintended collateral damage. 
No known plot has ever publicly surfaced. But, 
enter the example of the November 13, 2015 
Paris attacks. These and subsequent ones in 
Brussels were carried out in part by citizens of 
France and Belgium who had been away fighting 
with the Islamic State terrorist organization 
in Syria and Iraq, but who had clandestinely 
slipped back for the attacks among thousands of 
illegal immigrants assisted by human smuggling 
networks.4 With these migrating foreign fighters 
came proof of concept for what had long been a 
mere border infiltration threat theory both in 
Europe and in the United States. 
This essay re-visits the original, if somewhat 
forgotten, catalyst for current U.S. border 
security and immigration policy: a form of 
human smuggling organization that can enable 
terrorist travelers like the returning European 
attackers to also reach the U.S.-Mexico border 
from countries terrorist organizations like 
ISIS call home. Even before 9/11, these human 
smuggling networks were regularly transporting 
migrants—and potentially, terrorists among 
them—from some 35-40 Islamic “countries of 
special interest” in the Middle East, South Asia 
and North Africa. The asylum-seeking people 
they moved would come to be known as “Other 
than Mexicans, (OTMs)” and then, even more 
specifically as American strategy developed 
around them, the OTM subcategory “special 
interest aliens (SIAs).”
Both SIAs and the smugglers who ran the 
sophisticated, globe spanning networks that 
move them over oceans and across urban 
and wilderness landscapes of vast continents 
became much hunted in the years after 9/11. SIA 
smuggling networks qualify as “dark networks” 
described by counterinsurgency scholar Sean 
Everton.5 These are clandestine enterprises 
that profitably move outlawed contraband and 
unwanted people as part of a vast underground 
economy. Invisibility is their greatest 
competitive advantage. In this kind of business, 
handshake bargains are struck for journeys, 
false documents and ill-gotten visas in Middle 
Eastern casabas, Kenyan refugee camps, and 
outside foreign embassy gates. The journeying 
occurs, seen while unseen, in the airport 
terminals of South Africa, the unpoliced jungles 
of Colombia and Panama, in speedboats off the 
Pacific coast of Guatemala, at the ungoverned 
borderlands of developing African nations, and 
in the bus depots of Bolivia and Peru.
The hunt for these ultra-distance human 
smugglers, and the prospective terrorist travelers 
they can transport, has been part of a virtually 
forgotten or unknown counterterrorism-
immigration control strategy that has unfolded 
far from the public controversies about physical 
land borders. Its objective has been to disable 
the smuggling networks in foreign lands 
and thus reduce the volume of their higher-
risk migrant clients and discern any terrorist 
travelers camouflaged among them. Finally, 
and as a last resort, the strategy hoped to net 
those getting through the foreign dragnet at 
the home border. The idea was always that if 
economic opportunists or war refugees could 
be transported from countries of interest to the 
U.S. land border, then certainly so too could 
terrorists living in those states; they had to be 
caught en route or deterred.
But as it turns out, the American effort 
hasn’t been going well, according to various 
government reporting and other information.6 
While it is true that no SIA is publicly known 
to have mounted a homeland attack plot to 
date in the United States, the public record 
demonstrates that these ultra-marathoners 
of human smuggling have continued ferrying 
SIAs, including Syrians, to the Texas, California, 
Arizona and New Mexico borders with annual 
regularity since 9/11—and that the prospect for 
terrorist travelers to be among them remains.7 
The routes generally follow South America-
Central America-Mexico pathways with a 
United States terminus. Most importantly, 
these networks have, on occasion, transported 
individuals with suspected involvement in 
Islamic terrorist organizations. 
The purpose of this essay is to provide 
detailed knowledge about how the smuggling 
occurs and a strategic blueprint for how to 
approach it the day when American homeland 
security leaders are called upon to reduce the 
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Table 1. Court Cases Examined
# Smuggler Nationality Case Number
1 Ashraf Ahmed Abdallah Egypt 1:101-cr-00465-RMU DCDCE
2 Merzhad Arbane Iran 103-cr-20765 FLSD
3 Muhammad Hussein Assadi Iran 1:2002-cr-00030 DCDCE
4 Samuel Lovelace Boateng Ghana 1:07-cr-00298-RMU DCDC
5 Salim Boughader-Musharraffile Lebanon 3:02-cr-03048-W SDC
6 Ahmad Muhammad Dhakane Somalia 5:10-cr-00194-XR TXDW
7 Samual Abrahaley Fessahazion Eritrea 4:09-cr-00498 TXDS
8 Rakhi Gauchan Nepal 3:14-cr-0068-DCG TXDW
9 Annita Devi Gerald Guayana 4:09-cr-00690 TXSD
10 Maher Wazzen Jarad Iran 1:02-cr-00090-HHK DCDCE
11 Muhammad Qasum Lala Pakistan 2:04-cr-00287-RSL WASH DW
12 Nizar Kero Lorian Syria 4:05-cr-00332 TXDS
13 Zeayadali Malhamdary Iran 2:05-cr-00502-SMM AZD
14 Abtom Merhay Eritrea 1:12-cr-00076-RBW DCDCE
15 Rosa Umanzor-Lopez Guatemala 4:12-cr-00250 TXDW
16 Kaushik Jayantibhal Thakkar India 4:12-cr-00250-1 TXDS
17 Anthony Joseph Tacy United States 1:10-cr-00122-LMB VED
18 Irfan Ul-Haq Pakistan 1:11-cr-00056-JDB DCDCE
19 Neeran Zala Jordan 1:04-cr-00401-RMC DCDCE
threat of terrorist border infiltration in the 
way their European counterparts now have. 
It is based on a deconstructive study of 19 
U.S. prosecutions of SIA smuggling networks 
between September 2001 and September 2015, 
the total known cases. Incorporated into the 
study, which used NVivo qualitative analysis 
software, were thousands of pages of court 
records and non-court narrative data, such as 
the public testimony of U.S. security leaders, 
official government reports, and credible media 
information. 
This essay recommends a variety of strategies 
that American homeland security leaders can 
apply to likely fail points in the SIA smuggling 
networks as they continuously move clients 
through Latin America and Mexico. While 
it does not assess the degree to which these 
migrants pose an attack threat, this discussion 
rests on less disputable rationales: that SIA 
smuggling networks provide the capability 
for terrorist travelers to reach the American 
border. Finally, an effective American effort 
to reveal and suppress SIA traffic is not really 
a choice anyway. It’s the law; virtually all of 
the major 9/11 border security legislation 
explicitly requires U.S. agencies to deal with 
the transnational terrorist travel and human 
smuggling threat to homeland border security.8
Background
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 cemented 
the foundations of the new border security 
counterterrorism regime by establishing one 
of its key objectives as “preventing the entry 
of terrorists and terrorist weapons” by threat 
actors described as “transnational terrorists, 
transnational criminals and unauthorized 
migrants.”9 The National Strategy to Combat 
Terrorism described one of its top goals as 
“denying terrorists entry to the United States” 
by disrupting their travel “internationally 
and across and within our borders,” and 
undermining the “illicit networks”…that 
facilitate the travel.10 
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The hallmark Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated 
“a cohesive effort to intercept terrorists, 
find terrorist travel facilitators, and 
constrain terrorist mobility domestically and 
internationally.”11 The act created a Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Center, still very 
much a going concern, to collect intelligence 
on human smuggling and “clandestine terrorist 
travel,” far from American borders.12 The Secure 
Fence Act of 2006 states that its purpose is “the 
prevention of all unlawful entries to the U.S., 
including entries by terrorists.”13
It was the legislated new priorities that 
led to a doubling of border patrol agents by 
2014 to 21,000.14 The first of several Border 
Patrol strategic plans in 2005 marked that 
agency’s new priority mission as: “establishing 
substantial probability of apprehending 
terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to 
enter illegally between ports of entry.”15
The formal SIA interdiction priority is 
traceable to a November 2004 memorandum 
from U.S. Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar 
to all field agents.16 It listed 35 countries of 
interest and instructed border agents to take 
eight listed actions when migratory citizens of 
the countries were apprehended (see Figure 1). 
The first step required a “Significant Incident 
Report” be filed to the CBP Situation Room 
within an hour of any SIA apprehension. 
Afterward, all SIAs over the age of 14 would be 
put through national security database checks 
and their pocket contents seized for analysis. 
Most were to be interviewed by intelligence 
agencies and FBI agents. Federal agencies with 
immigration-control missions, such as ICE, 
were assigned to chase SIAs and their smugglers, 
often in Latin American locations. To pave 
the way, the U.S. State Department expanded 
the number of cooperative counterterrorism 
agreements and attaché offices to some 75 
countries,17 particularly throughout Latin 
America, where SIA smuggling routes ran, but 
elsewhere in the world as well.18 The primary 
agency assigned to SIA-interdiction duty was 
the ICE Office of Investigations, later renamed 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).19 ICE 
described the mission involving 240 agents in 
some 48 foreign attaché offices20 as an effort 
to “aggressively pursue, disrupt and dismantle 
foreign-based criminal travel networks – 
particularly those involved in the movement of 
aliens from countries of national concern.”21
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Secretary Janet Napolitano offered a rare public 
acknowledgment of the effort in 2012 when she 
said, 
There’s a whole category called SIAs—special 
interest aliens is what it stands for. We watch 
that very carefully. We have been working—
not just with Mexico, but countries of Central 
America, in terms of following more closely 
people transiting the airports and the like. 
And so, again, our efforts there are to try to 
... take as much pressure off the physical land 
border as we can.22
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The Problem
Some American enforcement efforts to 
dismantle SIA networks since 9/11 have 
occurred in countries along established 
smuggling passages through South America, 
Central America, and Mexico. Numerous 
indicators, however, suggest ineffectiveness 
of effort and episodic targeting. Government 
audits state that federal agencies tasked to 
disrupt SIA movement have been diverted 
to drug investigations, that successful 
investigations appear limited to one or two per 
year, and that hundreds of SIAs annually have 
reached the U.S. southwestern border since 
9/11. One Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) assessment, for instance, questioned 
whether American law enforcement stationed 
abroad has spent too much time pursuing drug 
investigations (83 percent of their cases) rather 
than SIA smugglers.24 Pointing out neglect of 
the SIA issue, a 2012 GAO investigation of the 
Border Patrol’s work toward national security 
goals found slow progress in deterring SIA 
immigration.25 The report noted that hundreds 
of SIAs had reached the border, and that while 
these account only for those caught, the greatest 
percentage were more than 20 miles inland, 
indicating that more were slipping undetected 
into the interior.26
Perhaps the most potent indication that 
enforcement strategy lags the trend is that SIAs 
have reached the U.S. southwestern border in 
steady annual numbers since the start of the 
post-9/11 American law enforcement effort.27 
Government data reflecting SIA apprehensions, 
episodically obtained by media outlets, show 
they consistently reached the southwestern 
border each year since 9/11, with unknown 
Figure 1. Countries of Interest in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia
The 35 countries identified in a November 1, 2004 memorandum by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Chief David Aguilar to all field agents.23
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numbers undoubtedly slipping through 
undetected. 
For example, one set of SIA apprehension 
data reflecting September 2001 through 
2007 showed that nearly 6,000 SIAs from 40 
countries had reached the southwest border.28 
Other SIA apprehension data made public 
since 2007 suggest the traffic has continued at 
a regular pace.29 A 2009 GAO audit of border 
patrol highway checkpoints 25 miles inland 
from the Rio Grande found more than 530 SIAs 
logged in 2008 alone, including three “identified 
as linked to terrorism.”30 A Texas Department of 
Public Safety intelligence report leaked in 2015, 
citing U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) data, asserted that there were more than 
493 encounters with SIAs in Texas during the 
first nine months of 2014, a 15 percent increase 
over the same time the previous year.31 The 19 
cases collected for the study suggest—though 
do not confirm—a relative paucity of such 
investigations by the assigned U.S. agencies. To 
be fair, U.S. officials do note in various public 
forums that transcontinental SIA investigations 
are highly complex and difficult because they 
cross so many international jurisdictions, 
require reliable bilateral cooperation, operate 
covertly, and are expensive.
The tenacity of SIA smuggling occurs 
in a void of academic literature about all 
human smuggling, particularly the only form 
considered a terrorism-related homeland 
security threat. This dearth of knowledge is 
problematic because strategy and tactics are 
best served by comprehension. In 2011, for 
instance, the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) released a survey of 
available literature on global human smuggling 
and “irregular migration.”32 The survey found 
it problematic that so little research had been 
done to understand such a consequential 
phenomenon.33 Among the literature survey’s 
findings of scholarly neglect, for instance, was 
that research had suffered from unreliable 
data, unbalanced geographical coverage, use of 
theoretical frameworks not globally applicable, 
disparities in the quality and quantity of 
information about how networks are organized, 
and perspectives over-representing destination 
countries at the expense of transit or origination 
countries.34 This survey failed to mention the 
potential for terrorist travelers.
Understanding how SIA networks function 
from a systematic break down of the 19 
known federal court prosecutions of them, 
and showing them as complex interdependent 
systems, would seem a fundamental first step 
to improving enforcement outcomes against 
them. Yet American efforts to date have gone 
scarcely known, and therefore not publicly 
questioned, evaluated or professionally audited 
and validated as would be expected of most 
legislated government strategies. 
SIA Smuggling 101
SIA smuggling is not one-stop shopping. Like 
any other industry, fees and services cater up or 
scale down depending on clients’ ability to pay. 
Those wishing to reach the United States may 
choose services that range from all-inclusive, 
doorstep-to-doorstep guided journeys, to more 
piecemeal arrangements that cost less. 
Ultra-distance SIA smuggling organizations 
are primarily based in foreign countries 
and depend on loose, but highly effective 
transnational alliances. As ICE Executive 
Associate Director James A. Dinkins testified 
to Congress in 2010, these multi-component 
alliances involve various operators, such as 
recruiters, brokers, document providers, 
transporters and corrupt foreign officials, 
to exploit vulnerabilities in the immigration 
and border controls of many nations.35 
Organizationally, 12 of the 19 studied networks 
were full-service, stage-to-stage smuggling 
systems that featured a pyramid-like 
architecture. 
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 Figure 2. Organizational Structure of a typical full-service SIA smuggling network
Routes
To understand which methods SIA smugglers 
choose to move their human cargoes, and 
why, it is first necessary to understand the 
where. It turns out that smugglers have quite 
logical reasons, to be described, for why they 
transported their U.S.-bound migrant clients 
from their home countries in the Middle East, 
North Africa and South Asia along certain air, 
land, and sea paths. While initial routings were 
somewhat unique to each of the three regions, 
eventually all converged in the Americas along 
common northward passageways. 
SIAs from the Middle East often moved 
through Turkey and Greece to the Gulf states 
of UAE and Qatar, but also European countries 
such as France, Spain, Italy, and Germany—
and sometimes, through Russia. Major air 
hubs in these countries then linked them to 
the Americas: Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, 
Guatemala, and Mexico. 
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Figure 3. Departures from Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and Initial Landings in the Western 
Hemisphere. Routes derived from U.S. court prosecutions and open-source reports
From North African countries such as Somalia, routes often ran from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan through 
the Gulf States, South Africa, and occasionally Europe.
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Figure 4. Departure Routes from Africa to Latin America
From South Asian countries such as Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, migration entailed among the 
highest fees because distances to Latin America 
were greatest and thus SIAs travelling on these 
routes faced the highest risk of law enforcement 
interceptions along the way. Routes most often 
transited through South Africa, the Gulf States 
and Europe.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Essay 2 (May 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Bensman,  The Ultra-Marathoners of Human Smuggling 10
Figure 5. Departure Routes from South Asia to Latin America
Once SIAs reached the Western Hemisphere, 
some nations were frequently used either for 
“staging,” or “transit.” A distinction should 
be made between them. In staging countries, 
migrants linger for days, weeks, or sometimes 
months, awaiting coordination for the next 
travel phase in smuggler-controlled safe houses 
or hotels. Migrants in transit countries were, by 
contrast, on the move, stopping only for sleep or 
rest. Some staging countries doubled as transit 
countries, most notably Mexico and Guatemala. 
Twelve of the 19 smuggling organizations used 
either Brazil (5) or Ecuador (7) for landing and 
staging SIAs. Other commonly used landing 
and staging countries included Cuba, Mexico, 
and Guatemala. Guatemala and Panama figured 
prominently in almost all of the examined 
data about SIA smuggling because they act as 
funneling land bridges that must be crossed. 
In all countries, north was the direction of 
migration.
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Figure 6. Travel Routes into the United States via Latin America
The Seven Fail Points
Route choice, it turns out, appears to be 
deeply embedded in the ability of SIA 
smugglers to discern and leverage country-
specific circumstances and opportunities. 
Sometimes, one or two critical enabling 
factors in each country or region determined 
their success. Knowing what some of these 
critical enabling factors are can inform law 
enforcement intervention and intelligence 
collection activity. While this research does 
not identify every probable critical enabling 
factor, a number did emerge in the data. These 
are identified as fail points, which American 
border security strategists should consider 
addressing. Following descriptions of these fail 
points, strategies for best exploiting them are 
suggested.  
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The Kingpins
Until their arrests, all of the prosecuted 
kingpin smugglers successfully operated full-
service stage-to-stage guided operations and 
even partial service organizations by relying 
extensively on personal mobility and knowledge 
of other languages. They held dual-citizenship 
passports, bi-national residencies, and knew 
two or more languages. Approximately 18 of 
the 19 prosecuted smugglers maintained dual 
citizenships and/or residences in more than 
one country; one (Umanzor-Lopez) lived in her 
native Guatemala but apparently was able to 
travel into and out of the United States, while 
several American SIA smugglers traveled at 
will to countries of interest and then back to the 
United States.36
Additionally, SIA smugglers often 
maintained pivotal access to key corrupt officials 
or to fraudulent document supplies. Most of 
the smugglers appeared to make significant 
use of their knowledge of other languages, 
particularly Spanish and English. Mobility and 
multilingualism enabled these SIA smuggling 
kingpins to legally enter and exit staging and 
transit nations at will, and to manage clients 
and indigenous partners along the way. 
Prosecutors summed up this specialization 
when they described the versatility of Eritrean 
national smuggler Halbtom Merhay this way: 
“the defendant is believed to be a citizen of Great 
Britain, to reside in the United Arab Emirates, 
and to travel frequently to London, England” 
and therefore “has contacts with fraudulent 
document vendors, human smugglers, and 
travel agents in numerous countries.”37 
American and British passports, given their 
acceptability in the widest range of nations, 
proved to be of particular value for Merhay 
and others of the prosecuted smugglers. For 
example, the Syrian SIA smuggler Nizan Lorian 
held U.S. citizenship but maintained residences 
in Guatemala and Mexico, enjoying ease of 
travel throughout Latin America and the United 
States on his American passport. 
Investigators noticed that the American 
passport of naturalized U.S. citizen Neeran 
Zaia, who was also a citizen of Jordan and spoke 
Arabic, Spanish, and English, showed extensive 
travel to the Middle East and throughout South 
America. 
These attributes, though, present a key 
organizational vulnerability too; they likely 
render SIA smuggling kingpins less dispensable 
than those who run other kinds of smuggling 
enterprises because their capabilities are so 
highly specialized and necessary, suggesting 
relatively low organizational resiliency which 
can be targeted. 
Information from the collected data could 
not sufficiently determine the ease with which 
arrested SIA smuggling kingpins were replaced 
and their disrupted operations restored, a 
subject worthy of additional study. But some 
limited reporting suggests that restoration may 
be slower than in other kinds of illicit black 
market enterprises. A U.S. immigration officer 
testified in a Mexican court affidavit that after 
the Mexico-based Lebanese smuggler Salim 
Boughader-Musharaffille was arrested in 2003 
for transporting hundreds of Lebanese SIAs 
into California, at least several months passed 
before some of the traffic resumed.38 Left 
unclear in the reporting is whether or not the 
new organization was able to move migrants by 
the hundreds as did Boughader-Musharaffille. 
Other case records revealed that underlings do 
lie in wait for kingpins to be removed or to step 
aside, although timelines were not available 
to indicate delay times. For instance, the 1997 
arrest of a “legendary” Ecuador-based alien 
smuggler named George Tajirian, responsible 
for smuggling hundreds of Middle Easterners 
into the United States during the 1990s, was 
followed by a competition for the helm among 
numerous successors.39 The prolific Iranian 
smuggler Mohammed Hussein Assadi won out 
and ran a highly lucrative network until his own 
2002 arrest.
Mexican and Latin American 
Consulates in Islamic nations
The foreign diplomatic missions of some 
Latin American transit countries—inside the 
originating countries of interest—figured often 
in extreme-distance SIA smuggling. These 
outposts provided crucial travel documents 
that could put migrants within closer striking 
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distance of the American border. SIA smugglers 
incorporated into their business models the 
acquisition of travel visas and passports from 
Mexico’s consulate offices in Lebanon, Turkey, 
and India; Belize’s diplomatic mission in 
Singapore; Guatemala’s consulate in Jordan; 
and Cuba’s embassies in Syria and Kenya. 
The reason for this has a logical basis; such 
visas or passports can land migrants closer to the 
U.S. border, reducing distance, cost and risk. SIA 
travelers still in their home countries prefer to 
first reach Mexico directly, given its U.S. border 
access, then in descending order of preference, 
nations to Mexico’s south. Therefore, Mexico’s 
foreign missions were among the most valuable 
and problematic. Court cases and public data 
showed that Mexico’s embassies have figured in 
SIA smuggling in Cuba, Turkey, India, Jordan, 
Colombia, Lebanon, and Belize, where visas 
or blank passports were fraudulently sold for 
thousands of dollars each.
To be sure, Mexican authorities have taken 
steps to fire and prosecute some consular 
employees caught taking bribes, as they did 
after discovering that the Lebanese smuggler 
Boughader-Musharrafille was paying 
employees of Mexico’s Beirut embassy to 
provide visas to his hundreds of California-
bound clients.40 After a Mexican investigation 
of Beirut-based Mexican embassy employees 
in November 2003, a veteran Foreign Service 
officer was fired; the investigation proved the 
employee sold the passports for up to $4,500 
each in service to Boughader-Musharrafille’s 
network.41 The same investigation turned up 
evidence that Mexican visas and passports 
also were being sold out of other unspecified 
Mexican consulate offices, including the one in 
Cuba.42
The 2005 smuggling prosecution of Iranian 
smuggler Zeayadali Malhamdary showed that 
fraudulent use of Mexican visas and passports 
continued after the Beirut investigation. 
Malhamdary predicated his entire operation 
on acquiring Mexican visas, for which he 
would charge $12,000 each, boasting to one 
undercover agent that he had used them to 
smuggle 60 Iranians over the Arizona border.43 
Malhamdary would meet his prospective 
Iranian clients in Tehran or European cities 
and collect their passports. A third party would 
obtain the Mexican visas (the method is not 
revealed) without the applicants’ required 
physical presence, returning them to their 
owners for travel.
Mexico’s Honorary Consul in Jordan, 
appointed in 2004, acknowledged in a 2007 
media interview that his predecessor, under 
American pressure, was dismissed for accepting 
bribes to provide Mexican visas to those wanting 
to cross the U.S. border.44 Honorary Consul 
Raouf N. El-Far said in 2007 he then began 
routinely receiving lucrative bribery offers from 
Iraqis, Syrians, and Jordanians who openly 
disclosed plans to be smuggled over the U.S. 
border. He described one offer from a Jordan-
based smuggler to pay $100,000 per month for 
10 visas per month in perpetuity, an offer El-
Far said he declined because “it is against my 
principles.”45 Under U.S. pressure after 9/11, El-
Far said that Mexican intelligence, for the first 
time, conducted a background investigation 
on a Jordanian consul—himself. The check, he 
said, was so thorough “they wanted to know 
how many times I kissed my wife before I go to 
bed.”46
Despite such efforts to enforce integrity 
following 9/11, Mexican consulate offices 
remained vulnerable. In March 2008, for 
example, three Afghans were discovered at the 
Kuwait airport posing as Mexican citizens en 
route “home” to Mexico.47 The Afghans were 
detained during a layover when a Kuwaiti 
customs officer asked them to speak Spanish 
and two of the three could not. Each carried an 
authentic, bar-coded passport with Mexican 
pseudonyms.48 Investigation showed the 
Afghans paid $10,000 each for the passports 
from the Mexican consulate office in Mumbai, 
India.
Three Iraqi Kurds apprehended after 
crossing the Texas-Mexico border in 2009 
similarly told a reporter they paid a Turkish 
smuggler named “Murat” $20,000 apiece to 
secure Mexican visas, along with airfare.49 They 
said they gave Murat their passports and then 
the next day met Murat at the Mexican embassy 
in Ankara, Turkey, where the smuggler handed 
them their Iraqi passports with Mexican visas 
inside.50 
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 Other countries of Latin America with 
diplomatic stations in countries of interest 
included Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, 
the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. 
The Guyanese smuggler Annita Devi Gerald, 
who had citizenship and a house in Belize, 
worked with co-conspirator Dhanraj Samuel 
of Trinidad and Tobago to move Indians and 
other South Asians from Singapore to Houston, 
Texas. To enable the travel, they provided 
fraudulent Belize business visas obtained from 
that country’s consulate office in Singapore, 
then provided Mexican visas to ease domestic 
air travel within Mexico. Fees were included in 
$20,000 package deals.51
Sometimes corruption played a definitive 
role in the document provision, but so too, 
may fraudulent applicant behavior intended 
to outwit visa application personnel. A typical 
example emerged from an FBI informant 
placed inside a Texas detention facility and 
who asked for a smuggler to get his brother 
out of Somalia. The Brazil-based Somali 
smuggler Ahmad Dhakane, who had just 
been apprehended crossing the border from 
Mexico, told the informant that he could do it 
by obtaining six-month Brazil missionary visas 
through a Nairobi church and 90-day Mexican 
visas for $9,000.52 As a bonus, Dhakane let 
the informant know that missionary visas also 
enabled his clients to obtain free traveler’s 
health insurance.
The enabling power of Latin America’s visas, 
through diplomatic missions abroad, also 
is exemplified by the experience of 24-year-
old Iraqi war refugee Ahmr Bahnan Boles, 
who fled with hundreds of thousands of other 
Iraqis in the mid-2000s to neighboring Syria 
and Jordan.53 In Damascus, Syria, a limited 
service smuggler offered, for $700, to obtain 
a visa from Guatemala’s consulate station in 
downtown Amman, Jordan. Boles himself did 
not personally appear, as is required.54 With the 
visa inside Boles’ Iraqi passport, he paid $70 
for a transit visa at the local Cuban embassy 
in Damascus. With an airline ticket from 
Damascus through Moscow, the visas enabled 
Boles to reach Cuba, then Guatemala City and 
finally Texas.
Hostile Nations
Countries diplomatically estranged from the 
United States offered the critically enabling 
advantage to SIA smugglers of relative 
imperviousness to U.S. demands for action or 
bilateral cooperation. Cuba, Venezuela, Russia, 
Bolivia, and, to a certain extent, Ecuador, 
figured often in SIA smuggling as transit and 
staging countries. 
For example, Boles traveled through Moscow 
with no questions asked on his way to Cuba. 
And in explaining why his embassy provided 
visas to Iraqis like Boles in Damascus, a Cuban 
Foreign Service officer in that country’s Syrian 
embassy told a reporter he was pleased to send 
Iraqis, even potential terrorists, to the home 
state of President Bush, as just desserts for 
starting the Iraq war. “I’m sorry your president 
is from Texas,” he said. Now, you’re receiving 
your own medicine. The problem started in 
Texas, and it’s finishing in Texas.”55 
The willingness of Cuba and Moscow to 
allow unquestioned passage to Boles, with little 
regard for U.S. sensitivities, underscores a more 
expansive role that such estranged nations have 
played in the years since 9/11. For instance, 
Venezuela, which has been at diplomatic odds 
with the United States since Hugo Chavez came 
to power in 1999, was an SIA transit country 
in several of the examined court prosecutions. 
The U.S. Department of State’s 2014 Country 
Reports on Terrorism noted that Venezuela had 
not cooperated fully with U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts for nine consecutive years.56 In 2007, 
long lines of local citizens in the Venezuelan 
embassy in Damascus, Syria, waited for nine 
different kinds of tourist and business visas 
described as easy and affordable to receive.57 
Bolivia, which had cut most ties to the United 
States in 2008 when a leftist government took 
power, has figured as an SIA staging and transit 
country.
In addition to cold diplomatic relations 
limiting or precluding responsiveness to U.S. 
security concerns, sometimes corruption played 
a definitive role in the document provision, as 
did fraudulent applicant behavior to outwit visa 
application personnel. 
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U.S. Asylum Fraud
An asylum claim at the American southwestern 
border provides the best chance for SIAs to 
gain legal status, with citizenship in the offing, 
and at the same time avoid the unacceptable 
loss of smuggling investment fortunes that 
deportations portend. For those reasons, SIA 
smugglers have incorporated the promise of 
asylum as a critical enabling factor to business 
continuity and client recruitment. That SIAs 
often seek political asylum differentiates 
them from most migrants crossing the 
American border, who cannot make ostensible, 
required claims of racial, religious, or political 
persecution.58 
The motive to commit such fraud is powerful. 
For an SIA, deportation means the loss of tens 
of thousands of dollars in fees not easily raised 
for follow-up attempts. Court records from four 
of the 19 cases, as well as other sources, showed 
that SIA smugglers took pains to instruct their 
clients to defraud the U.S. asylum system 
with false persecution claims. For instance, 
Mexico City-based Nepalese smuggler Rakhi 
Gauchan coached most of her clients, including 
a Pakistani client she believed was a terrorist, 
in how to offer fraudulent persecution stories 
most likely to ring well with asylum officers.59 
Gauchan had her clients, for instance, tell 
immigration officials that they belonged to 
persecuted political parties, regardless of their 
actual affiliation, and once recommended that a 
client rejected for Italian asylum, which would 
disqualify him for U.S. asylum, should simply 
invent a new story.60 
Such fraud occurs against a backdrop of 
questionable U.S. effectiveness to detect it. 
A 2008 GAO survey of asylum officers, for 
instance, showed that 75 percent believed “they 
needed additional training to help them detect 
fraud, conduct security checks and assess the 
credibility of asylum seekers.”61 The report 
also concluded that asylum officers believed 
they were approving many likely fraudulent 
claims, and that investigating authorities 
and federal prosecutors nationwide routinely 
rejected most criminal referrals. In 2014, four 
Republican congressmen asked the GAO to 
investigate the asylum process after a leaked 
DHS report showed that up to 70 percent of 
cases contained proven or possible fraud.62  A 
December 2015 GAO report on the system’s 
continuing vulnerability to fraud concluded, 
in part, that government agencies still “have 
limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud,” and 
had still “not established clear fraud detection 
responsibilities … in asylum offices.”63
Exploiting the asylum system was 
embroidered into SIA smuggling operations. 
Middle Eastern and South Asian migrants 
consistently ranked among the top 20 approved 
asylum seekers from 2000 through 2009,64 even 
though such trends have long raised national 
security concerns. A Congressional Research 
Service Report noted the concern was that 
terrorists from countries of “special concern, 
(i.e., Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Afghanistan, Yemen and 
Somalia) would seek to hide fraudulent asylum 
claims among the hundreds of thousands of 
pending cases.”65
Several cases anecdotally demonstrate that 
SIAs with disqualifying terrorist associations 
and pasts view asylum fraud as an effective 
means to achieve legal status after they have 
been smuggled. One is the case of Somalia 
natives Abdullahi Omar Fidse and Deka 
Abdallah Sheikh, who were smuggled to 
the Texas border in 2008 with counterfeit 
passports, Mexican visas, and airfare to Mexico 
City.66 In their asylum petitions, they falsely 
claimed that the terrorist group al-Shabaab 
killed their family members. The story, crafted 
to meet baseline legal standards for starting 
asylum processes, would have worked if 
Fidse had not told an undercover informant—
stationed in the detention center—that he was 
an al-Shabbab member with terrorism training, 
combat experience, and a plan to conduct an 
unspecified terrorist operation once in the 
United States.67 
The probable prevalence of asylum fraud 
among country of interest SIAs, as well as clear 
indications that the American system is highly 
vulnerable to it, represents a leverage point 
opportunity for improved law enforcement 
asylum fraud detection and supporting 
intelligence collection.
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Expatriate Communities of Latin 
America
SIA smugglers and individual migrants 
found critical facilitating support from 
within expatriate communities of similar 
ethnicity or nationality located inside the 
key staging countries of Brazil, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Guatemala, and Mexico. Expatriate 
communities provided critical same-language 
hubs that enabled referrals to smugglers and 
clients, fraudulent document acquisition, 
communication, money transfers, lodging, and 
temporary employment to raise funds for travel. 
The phenomenon has been noted before. In a 
study of illegal migration to Europe based on 300 
interviews, Staring found “ethnic networks,” 
based on an embedded infrastructure of tea 
houses, cafes, mosques, shops, and cultural 
organizations along routes.68 Aside from the 
potency of a shared language, Staring wrote, 
common origins among the smuggler and client 
“are the foundation for the support compatriots 
can expect to receive.”
For SIA smuggling through Latin America, 
hotels and boarding houses used to stage SIAs 
seemed to fit Staring’s findings. They became 
central social exchanges where ethnic and 
religious compatriots conspired to breach the 
American border, such as a hotel that Somali 
smuggler Muhammad Dhakane maintained 
in Sao Paulo, Brazil or a Holiday Inn in Quito, 
Ecuador used often by the Syrian smuggler 
Nizar Lorian. 
Iraqi war refugee Ahmr Boles’ case 
exemplifies how expatriate communities can 
figure in long-distance SIA journeys. In 2006, 
Boles was making his way from Syria to Texas, 
more or less on his own. After purchasing a 
Guatemalan visa from a document broker 
in Syria, Boles flew alone to Guatemala City, 
where he found himself short of knowledge 
and funds to proceed. However, Boles had been 
told he could fulfill these needs in the city’s 
Zone 1, a central market where hundreds of 
Arabic-speaking merchants owned businesses 
and residences.69 Boles soon found a small 
apartment and work selling electronics in one 
of the Zone 1 shops with names such as The 
Rio Jordan and The Egyptian. Boles had new 
friends put him in touch with smugglers. The 
common language and sympathy Boles found in 
Zone 1 proved crucial to his ability to continue 
northward. Amar Radi, secretary of the Arab 
Community of Guatemala, acknowledged Zone 
1’s crucial role enabling the Middle Easterners 
to continue on their way north.70
Ecuador is another country in which helpful 
expatriate communities from countries of 
interest emerged to service human smuggling 
enterprises that naturally moved in after the 
government in 2008 ended all visa requirements 
to enter the country. In the Boateng case, an ICE 
agent testified that, in cities like Quito, Ecuador, 
African migrants frequently gather at Internet 
cafes and “exchange information about how 
to move on to other places.”71 In 2011, under 
U.S. pressure, Ecuadorian authorities and FBI 
agents raided 11 buildings in Quito thought to 
house illegal expatriate “Moslem” communities 
based on American allegations that they were 
aiding and abetting terrorism and human 
smuggling to the U.S. border.72 FBI agents were 
allowed to interview many Pakistanis in this 
expatriate community, after which six were 
extradited.73
From his base in Tijuana, Mexico, home to 
thousands of Lebanese immigrants and their 
descendants, the Lebanese smuggler Salim 
Boughader-Musharafille was not an itinerant 
smuggler; he was a well-known restaurateur 
with deep roots in Tijuana. Boughader-
Musharaffille owned the popular La Lebanesa 
Café. An underground, transcontinental 
information grapevine was centered at the cafe, 
drawing those already en route or those wishing 
to be smuggled over the California border to 
make arrangements. 
Catch, Rest, and Release Policies
Mexico, Panama, and other countries of Latin 
America sheltered, fed and then provided 
temporary legal status to released, apprehended 
SIAs, rather than deporting them to home 
countries. This practice enabled migrants to 
easily continue their northward journeys for 
the same reasons they need U.S. asylum: early 
deportation would result in the loss of once-in-
a-lifetime fortunes in smuggling fees not easily 
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raised for follow-up attempts. Catch, rest, and 
release policies, especially in geographically 
necessary Mexico and Panama, mitigated any 
potential deterrent consequence.
One clarifying example is the passage from 
South America into Central America by way 
of Colombia and Panama’s Darien Gap, which 
the 2014 State Department Country Report 
on Terrorism called “a growing pathway for 
human smuggling with counterterrorism 
implications.”74 The SIA smugglers who 
funneled their clients into this route often 
started the journey from the busy landing and 
staging countries of Ecuador and Brazil. No 
military or police are posted in vast swaths of 
territory along the borders of either Colombia 
or Panama, despite media and U.S. government 
reporting about the route.75 The 2014 State 
Department report, for instance, stated that 
Colombian border security “remained an area 
of vulnerability” in part because only 1,500 of 
the country’s 180,000 national police officers 
were devoted to border security elsewhere.76 
It is natural that SIA smugglers would take 
advantage of a key land bridge through an 
environment where government interference 
is so unlikely. However, SIA travel along this 
route would be deterred were it not further 
aided by Panama’s catch, rest and release 
policy. Once through Colombia, SIAs are 
funneled into Panama’s remote 40-mile 
Darien Gap region with thousands of other 
migrants each year.77 But rather than incur the 
cost of long-term patrolling, detention, and 
deportation, Panama provided food, housing, 
and a release with temporary legal status. The 
policy enabled refreshed migrants to continue 
legally northward to the United States.78 Otto 
Reich, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs, told the Wall 
Street Journal that, despite knowing the Darien 
Gap traffic may threaten U.S. national security, 
Panamanian officials “know they are coming 
to the U.S. and…will no longer be Panama’s 
problem.”79
Once through the rest of Central America, 
SIAs become beneficiaries of Mexico’s catch-
rest-release policy. Many SIAs are apprehended 
at Mexican airports in Tuxla, Tapachula, 
Mexico City, and Monterrey as well.80 Many 
more are apprehended during land travels 
north. However they are apprehended or turn 
themselves in, Mexico provides respite for 
a couple of weeks and then release with legal 
papers encouraging them to finish the trek to 
the U.S. southwestern border. An ICE agent 
testifying in the 2010 asylum fraud case of the 
Somali smuggler Dhakane, described Mexico’s 
policy: “Most of them, all of the East Africans 
and many from the Middle East, they will 
surrender at Tapachula (in the state of Chiapas 
bordering Guatemala), the Mexicans will hold 
them for, you know, ten to fifteen days, and 
then they will give them an order of voluntary 
deportation, and they are given 30 days to leave 
the country at that point.”81
Critical Enabling Factors of Six 
Nations
For good reason, it turns out, SIA networks 
have purposefully routed their clients through 
the same six transit or staging countries in 
Latin America on the northward march to the 
U.S. southwestern border: Ecuador, Brazil, 
Colombia, Panama, Guatemala, and Mexico. 
Beyond catch, rest, and release, these six 
nations all feature several distinct enabling 
geopolitical factors, which proved critical to the 
forward progress. These are: politically passive 
governments indifferent to trans-migration 
and U.S. security concerns, weak government 
institutions and budgets that preclude direct 
action, formal policies that unintentionally 
assisted the smugglers (such as catch, rest, and 
release), and the corruptibility of border and 
airport customs officials.
Colombia’s institutional weaknesses and 
disinclination to patrol and deport have already 
been detailed. But also highly emblematic of all 
of these critical enabling factors is Guatemala, 
which has been described as a super-highway 
of virtually unimpeded human smuggling 
to Mexico.82 The human smuggling industry 
has become so politically and economically 
powerful that at times it has completely co-
opted government control over border and 
customs police. Border control on Guatemala’s 
south and north border is largely nonexistent.
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In 2007, Santos Cuc Morales, Guatemala’s 
National Director of Migration, told a reporter 
that American intelligence officials and 
diplomats asked him to assist in a crackdown 
“because of terrorism and the situation in 
Iraq.”83 Morales said he replied that he could 
not help, because he had no operational 
control over his 450 agents stationed along the 
nation’s borders, at airports and at seaports; all 
were under the almost complete influence of 
smugglers and corrupt government bureaucrats 
with financial stakes in the industry.84 As his 
country’s most senior immigration enforcement 
official, Morales said he wished he could help 
the Americans avert another terrorist attack, 
which he said “could happen because of the 
corruption here. It’s the reality of things.”85
Gustavo Barreno, a federal prosecutor 
in charge of enforcing Guatemala’s human 
trafficking laws from 1997 through 2005, 
described working closely with American 
intelligence and law enforcement after 9/11 
to disrupt SIA smuggling networks operating 
openly in the country.86 The joint effort, 
however, was shut down when a major 
operation unearthed a smuggling ring that 
moved Arab migrants through the country. 
After the investigation turned up links to senior 
Guatemalan politicians, the entire American 
program was abruptly canceled, and Barreno 
said he was ousted from government.87 “The 
business is gigantic,” he was quoted saying. “You 
have no idea. Everyone is involved—everyone. 
And for an Arab to come into Guatemala it’s 
really easy—really easy.” 88
A number of court prosecutions since the 
2007 interviews with Morales and Barreno 
indicate the problems persist. For instance, 
according to a 2010 indictment, the Brazil-
based smuggler Fessahazion would have a 
Hispanic driver casually pay off border guards 
as they crossed through Guatemala en route 
to Mexico.89 A 2014 Washington Examiner 
newspaper investigation of Guatemalan human 
smuggling concluded, after interviewing 
present and past senior government officials, 
that “it is clear that the human smuggling 
business resembles…legal enterprises like 
McDonalds and Mazda.”90
In another example of the unintended 
consequences of formal national policy, in 
2008, Ecuador dropped all visa requirements 
for anyone in the world wishing to visit 
for 90 days, after which human smuggling 
operations moved to the country.91 Human 
smugglers seized on the opportunity. In 2012, 
the researcher Freier interviewed hundreds of 
migrants and senior government leaders about 
the consequences.92 She concluded that, almost 
immediately, smuggling networks began 
bringing SIAs from South Asia, North Africa, 
and the Middle East through the country.93 
Senior Ecuadorian leaders and policy makers 
told Freier that pressure by U.S. diplomats 
who were concerned about terrorist travel 
forced Ecuador to resurrect visa restrictions 
two years later, for 10 nationalities, including 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Pakistan.94 But the quality of 
Ecuadorian follow-through was questioned. 
Freier cited secret U.S. diplomatic cables 
published by Wikileaks showing that American 
diplomats had to continue pressuring even 
after the ostensible reversal, concerned that 
Ecuador had taken no real action. By 2011, the 
U.S. forced mass arrests of Muslim immigrants 
in Ecuador.95
Although less is known about what happens 
outside of the six identified countries of Latin 
America, anecdotal evidence indicates the same 
critically enabling factors of corruption, official 
indifference, and formal policy also draw SIA 
smugglers to the Gulf States for staging and 
transit to Latin America. And, South Africa 
emerged in the study as a key air hub transit 
point for SIAs bound for Latin America. 
Strategy Recommendations: 
Expand Law Enforcement 
and Intelligence Operations 
Abroad
The strategy recommendations offered in 
this section constitute a mix of expanded 
conventional law enforcement and intelligence 
operations abroad. Carrying them out would 
require a robust foreign security assistance and 
development aid program, backed by a willful, 
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muscular diplomatic initiative, targeting at 
least the six Latin American countries used 
most frequently by SIA smugglers.
Governments in Latin America can be 
expected to resist expectations that they shift 
their own limited local resources to robust new 
priorities primarily serving American interests. 
To help secure the expanded commitments 
necessary, new program-specific U.S. infusions 
of money, equipment, technical assistance, and 
training should be tied to local government 
progress that will: 
End catch, rest, and release policies 
in Panama and Mexico and fund the 
establishment of deportation processes 
and capabilities such as repatriation 
flights that would remove SIAs to their 
home countries.
Funding would enable expansion of the legal 
system capacity and bed space needed to support 
deportation processes in Mexico and Panama. 
Such a strategy is not without precedence. 
The Schengen Area countries in Europe and 
Australia, for instance, facing significantly 
increased migrant flows, recently provided 
supporting security aid and infrastructure that 
allows transit countries to detain and deport 
apprehended aliens from the Middle East and 
North Africa before they can “land” and claim 
asylum. European governments have achieved 
repatriation agreements with key source and 
transit countries such as Turkey, Greece and 
Morocco, and have been funding the return 
of locally apprehended migrants to home 
countries.96 
Fund the creation or expansion of 
corruption-vetted, mobile customs 
and border patrol units substantially 
dedicated to seeking out SIAs in 
currently unpatrolled bottleneck 
regions.
This interdiction and deterrence strategy 
contemplates implementation in all six 
identified countries to address internal 
leverage-point circumstances. The prioritized 
countries, however, should be Colombia, 
Panama, and Guatemala—the main land bridges 
linking South America to Mexico. These new 
customs and border patrol units, shielded from 
corruption, would quickly shift deployment in 
remote regions, guided by intelligence as to 
when smugglers shift to avoid intervention. 
The concept of U.S.-backed, vetted military 
and police units is not without precedent in 
Latin America, where they have been deployed 
in Colombia and Mexico for joint counter-drug 
trafficking operations.97
Increase the number of American 
counter-smuggling investigators from 
conventional law enforcement agencies, 
especially ICE agents deployed to 
attaché offices in the key transit 
countries. The agents would target 
exclusively SIA kingpin smugglers and 
their potential successors.
Policy leaders should ensure that SIA 
smuggling investigators are not diverted to 
drug trafficking cases, as past GAO reporting 
has noted. This strategy targets kingpin 
smugglers in recognition that their specialized 
capabilities and skills are not easily or quickly 
replaced. U.S. investigators would identify and 
track smuggling hierarchies in their regions 
of operations and share information with 
investigators in other regions.
The U.S. should pressure the governments 
of Ecuador, Brazil, and Guatemala to recruit 
informants and conduct surveillance targeting 
expatriate communities, hotel complexes, and 
cultural locations around which SIA smuggling 
is facilitated. At the same time, the U.S. should 
deploy American intelligence officers to collect 
information inside the same ethno-national 
enclaves.
Expatriate immigrant communities in 
Latin American cities, as well as local hotels in 
proximity to them, are known for staging. As 
such, they are rich, untapped potential sources 
of intelligence on local smuggling, as well as on 
traveling and indigenous violent extremists, 
corrupt border guards, and airport officials.
Invest in retraining and increasing staff 
in the U.S. Citizen and Immigration 
Service (USCIS) Asylum Officer Corps 
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so that its agents can be better equipped 
to extract intelligence information and 
leads from SIA asylum seekers who 
reach the U.S. border, as well as to help 
detect asylum fraud.
This initiative acknowledges that USCIS 
officers have been left ill-equipped to detect 
large-scale asylum fraud. It also acknowledges 
that the USCIS asylum officer cadre has unique 
access to a category of asylum seekers that has 
proven to be a highly rich source of intelligence 
information about smuggling facilitators, 
routes, and modus operandi: SIAs who have 
been detained. USCIS officers should capture 
intelligence information that otherwise may 
never be collected while also more strenuously 
rooting out those defrauding asylum vetting 
processes. 
Use state and local law enforcement 
agencies associated with fusion centers 
in U.S. states that border Mexico to 
interview apprehended SIAs in their 
jurisdictions, and provide the resulting 
reports to federal partners for analysis 
and use in international investigations.
Since 9/11, local policing authorities 
have been designated as partners in many 
counterterrorism efforts, often through fusion 
centers where agencies are purposefully 
housed together to enhance better sharing and 
collaboration. Such law enforcement officers 
are often vetted, trained, and have federal 
security clearances. When federal agents are 
unable to interview all detained SIAs, local law 
enforcement resources should extend coverage 
on grounds that SIA have so often proven to be 
among the most prolific sources of actionable 
intelligence about their smugglers.  
Ensure that the governments of Mexico, 
Guatemala, Belize, Ecuador, (and 
Cuba, once full diplomatic relations 
are restored) more robustly monitor, 
vet, audit, and investigate for corrupt 
practices within foreign service staffs 
stationed in consulate offices and 
embassies in countries of interest. At 
the same time, unilaterally deploy 
American intelligence officers to collect 
information about potentially corrupt 
foreign consulate offices.
This strategy would confront an important 
leverage point: corrupt or inadequate visa 
and passport issuance from the consulates of 
key Latin American transit countries, which 
eases SIA travel. This strategy would introduce 
integrity operations by home countries, 
reinforced and aided by covert American 
intelligence collection that could be leveraged 
in various ways.
Establish an expectation that local 
governments turn their intelligence 
collection activity toward terrorist 
travelers and SIA smuggling kingpins, 
as well as Islamic extremists and 
criminals residing in ethno-national 
expatriate enclaves. Expect that they 
alert American investigators about 
all SIA detentions and grant access to 
any detainee for intelligence collection 
purposes.
This strategy seeks to support pursuit 
of kingpin smugglers, potential successors, 
and SIA facilitators that American law 
enforcement can investigate and arrest. 
Cultivating apprehended migrants as sources 
of information about kingpins would exploit 
the finding that SIA migrants have been 
among the most prolific information sources 
and have frequently been willing to work with 
investigators and prosecutors.
Deploy CIA officers to diplomatically 
estranged and hostile SIA transit 
countries, or repurpose those already 
stationed to develop human source 
networks capable of reporting about 
SIA smuggling and terrorist travelers.
This strategy speaks to an intervention 
chokepoint where smugglers take advantage 
of absent U.S. law enforcement inside 
diplomatically hostile or uncooperative states. 
SIA travel has often depended on such relations 
to enjoy relatively free operational reign in 
Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.
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Conclusion
Nicholas Winton was the British subject 
credited with saving 669 Jewish children 
from the Holocaust by forging their travel 
documents and transporting them out of Nazi-
occupied Czechoslovakia over nine months in 
1939.98 Winton had resorted to theft, bribery, 
blackmail, and forging their exit visas to mask 
the origin of the children because foreign 
governments, including the United States, had 
refused to provide timely asylum or legal entry 
to the children.99 Winton was never prosecuted 
for human smuggling or asylum fraud as would 
be urged for such smugglers here; rather, in 
2002, Queen Elizabeth knighted him for his 
deeds, and he has since been lionized as a 
humanitarian hero in films and books.
The Winton case should serve as a reminder 
to current American homeland security leaders 
that any initiative to bring SIA smugglers to 
justice and deport and deter their clientele 
should be balanced by a conscientious program 
to discern the true identities and motives of 
all those encountered along the routes, in 
humanitarian consideration that non-terrorists 
may well authentically need sanctuary, as did 
Winton’s 669 children. Taking this care would 
be in line with other core U.S. values, many 
explicitly embodied in asylum law requiring 
sanctuary for those persecuted on social, 
political, or religious grounds.
At the same time, however, what is called for 
here is an increased capability to separate the 
malevolent from the benevolent, and that cannot 
be done unless the invisible are made visible 
with detection and interdiction efforts. These 
efforts would be made all the easier if many of 
the strategies outlined here reduce the risk pool. 
Border security author Christopher Rudolph 
correctly notes that migrants such as the 9/11 
hijackers, who were not known or visible until 
it was too late, have attacked, killed and plotted 
to do more of the same. Migration in all of its 
forms, Rudolph points out, is one of the primary 
means by which “sleeper cells” have actually 
sought to proliferate and justifies rational state 
responses to detect and sort them.100 “What is 
threatening about the clandestine entry of alien 
terrorists and the presence of sleeper cells in 
the homeland is essentially their invisibility,” 
Rudolph writes. “They are a specter lurking 
in the shadows. Thus, security would seem to 
require policies that increase visibility so that 
entry of potentially dangerous individuals can 
be prevented.”101
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Abstract
The Department of Homeland Security holds 
the statutory mission to protect the nation’s 
critical infrastructure which is composed of 
nationally significant systems and assets. 
The loss of this infrastructure would result 
in debilitating consequences to the safety 
and security of the United States. Based on 
a meta-analysis of government policies, the 
current critical infrastructure protection 
efforts may be misdirected even though it is 
the cornerstone mission of the department to 
prevent terrorism and enhance security. Even 
when a facility is destroyed, the consequences 
may be more complex than a blanket mission of 
protecting all facilities against all threats and 
hazards can address. These findings can justify 
reducing the scope of the current infrastructure 
protection mission by assuming a greater 
level of resilience within complex systems 
and adopting a risk-based methodology for 
evaluating only the infrastructure that would 
cause debilitating impacts on the safety and 
security of the nation.
Introduction
Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations 
of our biggest buildings, but they cannot 
touch the foundation of America. These acts 
shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel 
of American resolve.
— President George W. Bush, September 11, 
20011
The literal foundations of the United States 
are the critical infrastructure (CI) systems that 
provide essential-to-life services on which the 
American people are dependent. DHS asserts 
that these CI systems are “so vital to the United 
States that their incapacitation or destruction 
A Case Study Analysis 
David Riedman
would have a debilitating effect on security, 
national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination thereof.”2 
Even after the Twin Towers fell, America 
remained capable of functioning, and President 
Bush said that night, “the functions of our 
government continue without interruption…
our financial institutions remain strong, and the 
American economy will be open for business, as 
well.”3
While the attack had caused fear and 
disruption, it had not crippled an enormously 
complex and resilient national system of 
infrastructure facilities. If terrorists cannot 
damage the functionality of America (even 
on the local level) by toppling 100-story 
commercial high-rise buildings, what kinds of 
facilities would have a debilitating impact on 
the entire nation if they were destroyed? 
This article presents portions of the Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) 
Master’s Thesis “How Critical is Critical 
Infrastructure?” which explores the idea that 
not all infrastructure designated as critical 
meets the definition of criticality; sometimes 
when supposedly critical infrastructure, 
especially commercial facilities, are damaged 
or destroyed, it turns out the facility was not 
critical after all. The overall systems of essential-
to-life infrastructure across the country are 
more resilient than the current methodologies 
presuppose.
This research is a meta-analysis of 
government policies on infrastructure 
protection intended to address the question 
of how these facilities became designated as 
critical and whether the scope of the current 
infrastructure protection effort is inhibiting the 
department’s ability to accomplish the mission. 
This research is limited to the risk evaluation, 
vulnerability assessment, and protection of 
physical infrastructure facilities.
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Definition of “Critical 
Infrastructure”
Federal government reports, plans, policies, and 
directives from the 1980s to today emphasize 
that CI is comprised of the interconnected 
systems that can cause debilitating impacts 
to the safety and security of the nation if 
they are destroyed by natural disasters or 
terrorism. Key documents in defining this 
protection mission have included President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 13010, the USA 
PATRIOT Act, Presidential Policy Directive 
63, multiple iterations of the National Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and 
the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review. As the concepts within the policies 
have developed over time, the definition of 
CI has remained focused on those nationally 
significant systems and assets, the loss of which 
















X X X X X
2013 NIPP X X X X
2013 PPD-21: CI X X X X X
2013 Executive Order 
13636
X X X X X
2011 NCIPP Level 1/
Level 2 Program
X X X X X
2009 NIPP X X X X X
2008 NIPP SRTLTT 
Guide 
X X X X X
2007 National Security 
Strategy
1
X X X X X
2005 Interim NIPP X X X X X
2003 HSPD 7 X X X X X
2001 USA PATRIOT 
Act
X X X X X
1998 PDD/NSC-63 X X X X X
1996 Executive Order 
13010





would result in debilitating consequences to 
the safety and security of the United States.
As demonstrated by Table 1, thirteen 
overarching federal government policies 
released over the past 19 years consistently 
describe critical infrastructure as being 
nationally significant, providing vital services, 
being part of an interconnected system, causing 
debilitating impacts if destroyed, and providing 
a service necessary to the health and safety of 
the general public.
DHS currently provides a wide-ranging 
list of facilities within 16 different sectors that 
are considered to be critical.4 Based on this 
analysis, infrastructure that lacks national 
significance, criticality, and interconnectedness 
to other infrastructure systems does not meet 
this definition. This creates a discrepancy 
between the federal policies that define critical 
infrastructure and how DHS currently addresses 
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its statutory infrastructure protection mission 
to identify, prioritize, and protect the nation’s 
most vital infrastructure.5
Federal government documents over 
the past 35 years have a consensus in their 
definition of CI being the systems and assets 
that are nationally significant, the loss of which 
would result in debilitating consequences to the 
safety and security of the United States. This 
represents a significant incongruence between 
the federal policies which define CI and the way 
DHS currently views infrastructure facilities. 
While DHS takes an all-inclusive approach to 
include as many facilities as possible under the 
designation as “critical,” CI has consistently 
been defined as only the systems that are 
nationally significant. This problem is apparent 
when looking at the commercial facilities sector 
due to the measures of criticality that relate to 
physical attributes of the facilities, but which do 
not relate to nationally significant essential-to-
life services or maintaining economic security. 
To challenge the current CI protection 
policies relating to commercial facilities 
further, case studies of the World Trade 
Center (WTC) and the Las Vegas Strip raise 
questions regarding general assertions of the 
negative economic impact occurring after the 
destruction of a “critical” commercial facility. A 
case study of the 2014 toxic chemical spill into 
the primary water source serving Charleston, 
West Virginia also provides an example that 
is contrary to the argument that the loss of a 
facility serving as sole provider of an essential-
to-life service results in debilitating impacts 
across all infrastructure sectors within a local 
area.
Case Studies of Seemingly 
Critical Facilities
The facilities that DHS designates as CI should 
cause debilitating impacts to the nation if 
destroyed, but what if the loss of these facilities 
did not even have a debilitating impact on 
a local level? The destruction of the original 
WTC, the destruction of 14 Las Vegas Strip 
casinos, and the chemical contamination of the 
sole water source in Charleston, West Virginia 
did not result in debilitating local impacts. 
Surprisingly, the New York and Las Vegas cases 
actually lead to positive economic impacts at 
the local level.
It should be noted that the loss of human 
lives can occur with the destruction of critical 
facilities, but the IP mission is not always 
focused on reducing human losses. In 2013, 
32,719 traffic collision fatalities occurred on 
roadways6 that fall under the CI transportation 
systems sector, but it is the mission of 
DHS to protect the physical transportation 
infrastructure from terrorist attacks rather 
than investing resources to prevent thousands 
of annual deaths from occurring during vehicle 
accidents on the highways.7 It is within the 
scope of the DHS mission to assess how a bridge 
could be attacked with explosives by terrorists, 
but not to assess if installing higher guardrails 
could prevent a car from accidently driving off 
the bridge.
The commercial facilities sector is an 
example of facilities currently deemed to be 
CI, but the analysis within the following case 
studies shows that the buildings were not 
essential to the nation, not single points of 
failure, and not providing functions upon which 
other infrastructure systems were dependent. 
These commercial facilities are not critical due 
to redundant and resilient functions within this 
sector. As the analysis of the Lower Manhattan 
office market demonstrates, resiliency occurs 
within the subsectors, and as a result, the 
impacts from facility losses were not nationally, 
regionally, or even locally significant. In New 
York, when office buildings were destroyed by 
the 9/11 attacks, others were readily available 
to absorb the demand for office space within 
the local market.
Refining the methodology for how facilities 
are categorized as critical, or not critical, can 
reduce the total number of CI facilities and the 
overall complexity of evaluating infrastructure. 
Removing the “critical” designation from 
facilities that do not cause national devastation 
or cascading effects to other infrastructure 
when destroyed can be beneficial by allowing 
DHS to refocus resources on fulfilling the 
department’s statutory mission of protecting 
essential infrastructure systems.
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Case Study 1:  
How the Loss of World 
Trade Center was Critical 
to Redeveloping Lower 
Manhattan
The large brokerage houses that once lined 
Wall Street and its cavernous side streets have 
spread far and wide in Manhattan, a reflection 
of how the area south of Chambers Street is 
no longer the dominant financial services 
center it once was. With aging buildings that 
cannot accommodate huge computers, and 
a declining need for financial companies 
to be near each other, The Street and its 
neighborhood are mere reminders of what 
they once were.
— New York Times, 19948
A steady exodus of banks, brokerage houses 
and insurance companies in recent years 
has left the capital of capitalism struggling 
at the very moment the economic system it 
epitomizes is sweeping the planet.
— Boston Globe, 19969
I think it is inevitable that Downtown [Lower 
Manhattan] will reinvent itself once again. 
The process is already underway, and I am 
very optimistic about its future.
— David Rockefeller, 200210
“It’s 1 World Trade Center’s stunning 
combination of ultra-modern design and 
super-sustainable efficiency that makes it a 
truly towering achievement.” 
— WTC.com Marketing Material, 2015
Before September 11, 2001, twin landmark 
towers stood over the New York City skyline 
(Figure 1), but many of today’s amenities that 
make Lower Manhattan one of the most valuable 
real estate markets in the world did not. No 
Fulton Street Transit Center existed to organize 
a jumble of train lines and buses. A walkable 
park hosting more than 500 free concerts and 
waterfront condominiums stretching along the 
Hudson River also did not exist. The Downtown 
Connection bus line did not bring 800,000 
annual riders to the area. Thirty billion dollars 
in combined public and private investment 
was not available to transform the aging WTC 
into a gleaming Class-A Leadership in Energy 
and Environmental Design (LEED) Platinum11 
property. Visitors now stay in nearly 8,000 
hotel rooms, which is triple the number that 
existed before 2001.12
 
The 9/11 attacks were the largest loss of 
life in American history from terrorism and a 
major national tragedy. But out of the rubble, 
the economic landscape of Lower Manhattan 
transformed in a manner that would never have 
been possible without the total loss of the WTC.
Figure 1. New York City Skyline in 1995 and 
2014.13
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Commercial Real Estate in 
Manhattan 
Manhattan is now one of the largest commercial 
office markets in the world. According to 2014 
tax records, 1,941 commercial office buildings 
are valued at $95.6 billion.14 In 2000, it was 
assessed at $42.9 billion15 ($58.9 billion 
adjusted to 2014 inflation16), which shows the 
property values have almost doubled in the last 
13 years since the 9/11 attacks, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.
While the destruction of the WTC caused a 
major impact to the area, things were not in 
great shape prior to the attack. The year 1995 
was the lowest point in a troubled decade for 
Lower Manhattan. Nineteen of the 20 largest 
stock brokerage houses had closed, 18 of the 
20 largest advertising firms had left, and only 
seven of the original 35 Broadway theaters 
remained open. Thomas Leuck described the 
situation thusly,
[t]he flight of major brokerage houses and 
investment banks has left the neighborhood 
burdened by old office buildings, with nearly 
a quarter of their space vacant, and with 
their prospects of luring tenants undermined 
by small floors, poor ventilation and wiring, 
and outdated architecture. Now, while they 
still need larger and more modern buildings 
than can be found on the blocks around Wall 
Street, the priority of many of the securities 
companies is to find the best deals they can 
strike on corporate real estate, with few 
reservations about moving off the beaten path 
in Manhattan.17
Tax incentives and large amounts of 
vacant office space allowed tenants outside 
the financial industry to move into Lower 
Manhattan. In 1996, major tenant additions 
included American Airlines, Pfizer Inc, 
and Gruner & Jahr USA Publishing. Mayor 
Giuliani’s Wall Street revitalization plan 
also called for converting office spaces into 
residential properties. Vacancy rates still 
remained around 70% and the square footage 
rate for the American Airlines 15-year lease was 
only $33 ($45.3 adjusted to 2014 inflation) per 
square/foot (the new WTC is currently leasing 
for $72/ft).19
Figure 2. Assessed Property Values in Lower Manhattan between New York City Fiscal Year 1991–2000.18
At the center of the changing office market, 
which was transitioning from stockbrokers 
and advertising to a variety of international 
businesses, was the WTC towers. The Twin 
Towers were designed and built during the 
heyday of big Wall Street brokerage houses and 
included 7.6 million square feet of space, which 
were not designed for computers and modern 
office amenities. In 1995, the WTC had a 25.1% 
vacancy rate, which meant that nearly 2 million 
square feet of space was vacant (an entire 
40-story high-rise building of empty space).20 
The enormous amount of vacant space at the 
WTC negatively impacted real estate and rental 
prices throughout the entire area.
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Loss of the World Trade Center
In the aftermath of 9/11, without the WTC 
(original or new), the office space market in 
Manhattan was well positioned for growth. 
The immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack 
caused fear across the American public but 
did not deter citizens and businesses from 
quickly returning to Ground Zero. In 2004, the 
City of New York Independent Budget Office 
forecasted that office employment would regain 
the peak it had reached in 2000 by 2010. It 
appeared that currently vacant space, as well 
as space expected to come on-line during the 
2005–2010 period (i.e., Time Warner Center, 1 
Bryant Park, the New York Times building, and 
the Bloomberg building) would be sufficient 
capacity to accommodate the new workers 
even while the trade center buildings remained 
under construction.21 
According to the Independent Budget Office, 
the destruction of the World Trade Center and 
damage to surrounding buildings removed 
roughly 30 percent of the downtown Class-A 
office inventory. Contrary to expectations, this 
loss did not result in a spike in rents caused 
by the precipitous decline in supply. Instead, 
the spreading impact of employment losses 
due to the local recession that had started in 
the spring of 2001 and accelerated after the 
attack, combined with the existence of leased 
but unoccupied ‘shadow space’ in midtown 
and downtown, enabled the real estate market 
to absorb most of the displaced tenants with 
little effect on rents. Instead, downtown 
vacancies grew and rents fell during 2002 
before stabilizing somewhat during 2003 and 
2004.22 
As demonstrated by Figure 3, commercial 
office leasing peaked in 2002 following the loss 
of the WTC and the need to secure new office 
spaces. Above average leasing continued in 
2003 and 2004. As the new WTC and other 
redeveloped Lower Manhattan properties have 
opened, office-leasing activity peaked in 2013 
and 2014.
Creating New Markets
The criticality of an individual facility, even an 
enormous commercial facility like the original 
WTC, is nearly impossible to evaluate because 
even though it seems to be counterintuitive, 
the destruction of the old WTC allowed for the 
creation of a more valuable facility. 
Figure 3. Lower Manhattan Commercial Leasing Activity 2001–2014.23
The original seven building WTC site 
contained 11.2 million square feet of office 
space, which accounted for 4% of the total 
office inventory in all of Manhattan.24 If the 
original WTC were 100% occupied with the 
hotel maintaining peak average occupancy, 
the combined site properties would generate 
a maximum of approximately $545 million in 
annual revenue, as demonstrated in Table 2.
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Table 2. Original World Trade Center Maximum Leasing Revenue Estimate




1 World Trade Center 3.8 million $47.00 $178,600,000 
($245,534,550)
2 World Trade Center 3.8 million $47.00 $178,600,000 
($245,534,550)
3 World Trade Center
(Marriott Hotel)




4 World Trade Center
(9-Story Low-rise)
200,000 (estimated) $47.00 $9,400,000 
($12,922,871)
5 World Trade Center
(9-Story Low-rise)
200,000 (estimated) $47.00 $9,400,000 
($12,922,871)
6 World Trade Center
(8-Story Low-rise)
180,000 (estimated) $47.00 $8,460,000 
($11,630,583)
7 World Trade Center
(retail/47 stories)
1.86 million $47.00 $87,420,000 
($120,182,701)
Total: 14 million $544,981,105 
($749,225,591)
To attract tenants from multi-national 
corporations and compete with surrounding 
properties, premium commercial offices are 
designated as “Class A.” Office space rental 
prices are grouped in three classes by the 
Building Owners and Managers Association 
International (BOMA). The classes include:
• Class A—Most prestigious buildings 
competing for premier office users with 
rents above average for the area. Buildings 
have high quality standard finishes, state of 
the art systems, exceptional accessibility, 
and a definite market presence.
• Class B—Buildings competing for a wide 
range of users with rents in the average 
range for the area.  Building finishes are 
fair to good for the area and systems are 
adequate, but the building does not compete 
with Class A at the same price.
• Class C—Buildings competing for tenants 
requiring functional space at rents below 
the average for the area.25
 
By today’s standards, the original WTC, 
which was built in the 1970s, would likely not 
meet the criteria for a Class A building, and 
subsequently, would not demand the highest 
rates and draw the premier tenants paying top 
dollar. The new WTC is designated “Class A” 
and if the buildings are 100% leased, the total 
leasing revenue will exceed $1 billion annually 
(Table 3).
Table 3. New World Trade Center Maximum Leasing Revenue Estimate
Property Square Footage Price per Square-
Foot (annual)
Total
One World Trade Center 3 million (Class A office) $72.44 $217,320,000
2 World Trade Center 2.8 million (Class A office) $72.44 $202,832,000
3 World Trade Center 2.5 million (Class A office) $72.44 $181,100,000
4 World Trade Center 2.3 million (Class A office) $72.44 $166,612,000
7 World Trade Center 1.7 million (Class A office) $72.44 $123,148,000
WTC Transportation Hub 350,000 (retail) $319.00 $111,650,000
12.65 million Total: $1,002,665,000
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Figure 4. Measuring the Effects of the September 11, 2001 Attack on New York City.27
Figure 5. Economic Impact of Redeveloping the World Trade Center Site.29
While the loss totals appear to be staggering, 
they are dwarfed by the positive economic 
impacts of the redevelopment, which were 
estimated to be $15.7 billion annually (direct, 
indirect, and induced) in a study produced 
for the Lower Manhattan Development 
Corporation, as shown in Figure 5.28 
The new WTC buildings have the potential to 
generate $250 million more in annual revenue 
than the old buildings. This total would likely 
be much higher because the old Twin Towers 
would struggle to compete with surrounding 
premium office spaces or the excess office 
space across the entire Lower Manhattan office 
market would collectively drive down property 
values. Instead, the new WTC buildings are the 
cornerstone of the revitalized Lower Manhattan 
office market.
Cost of 9/11 Attack versus Economic 
Impacts of Redevelopment
A 2002 study by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Economic and Policy Review 
estimated the total losses from the 9/11 attacks 
including earning losses, property damage, and 
cleanup to be between $33 and $36 billion.26 
Of those losses, the physical losses shown in 
Figure 4 total $21.6 billion.
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WTC Case Study Conclusion
The loss of life at the original WTC was a tragic 
event, but with it, the sudden disappearance 
of the original WTC buildings caused a 
significant decrease in total square-footage of 
available office space, which served to stabilize 
an oversaturated and declining commercial 
real estate market in Lower Manhattan. Fear 
of future attacks did not deter people and 
businesses from returning to Lower Manhattan 
either. Through public and private investment, 
the new WTC has been constructed to be more 
efficient in a design that meets the office market 
demands of premium clientele in Manhattan. 
The smaller but more luxurious office footprint 
draws nearly double the price per square-foot 
and provides more retail, transit, cultural, and 
public spaces for the general consumer. 
The $21.6 billion estimate of the capital 
losses30 ($16.4 in physical buildings) associated 
with the 9/11 attack only represent direct losses 
impacting the WTC itself. CI is defined by the 
interconnectivity of the systems within each 
sector and across multiple sectors. Manhattan 
has an estimated $804.4 billion office market 
with 32.8 million square-feet of office space. 
Compared to the overall office market, the loss of 
the WTC represented 2% of the total commercial 
office building value while also being 29% of 
total office space (in an oversaturated market).31 
In addition to stabilizing the office leasing 
market, redevelopment has transformed the 
mid-1990s Lower Manhattan market, which did 
not offer premier real estate, luxury shopping, 
world class hotels, destination dining, and 
tourism, into an area that produces cumulative 
consumer spending of $5.2 billion annually 
according to the 2014 Lower Manhattan Real 
Estate Market Overview produced by the 
Alliance for Downtown New York.32
The 2006 Homeland Security Advisory 
Council—Report on Critical Infrastructure 
Task Force reported that the impacts of 
terrorism and 9/11 extended “well beyond 
the direct ‘ground zero effects’ and were 
exacerbated by citizens’ choices based on their 
altered perception of risk. Ultimately, the 
ability of CI to recover fully from a catastrophe 
depends on the actions of the consumers.”33 The 
exact “ground zero” location of the 9/11 attack 
has become a tourism destination of itself. The 
110,000-square-foot National September 11 
Memorial Museum was initially expected to 
draw 2.5 million visitors per year, but exceeded 
500,000 visitors during the first two months of 
operation in May and June 2014.34 The number 
of hotel rooms in Lower Manhattan near the 
location of the attacks has tripled since 2001, 
which demonstrates significant interest as a 
destination for tourists (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Number of Hotel Rooms in Lower Manhattan.35
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The loss of the original WTC is a case that 
is opposite to the principles of a facility being 
“critical infrastructure.” Rather than causing 
debilitating and cascading negative impacts 
to the nation or surrounding region, the loss 
of the buildings was a net-positive to the 
components of the commercial facilities sector 
in Lower Manhattan. It is unlikely that a viable 
plan would have been available to demolish 
and rebuild the WTC without an unplanned 
event destroying it. Without the 9/11 attack, 
the continued existence of the original Twin 
Towers would have resulted in sustained over-
saturation of the Manhattan office market with 
an excess amount of outdated and undesirable 
Class B office space. Over the past decade, the 
office market pressure has continued to grow for 
LEED Certified and Green Office space, which 
would have continued to decrease the price per 
square-foot at the WTC as surrounding buildings 
drew away Class A customers.36 The enormous 
amount of office space within the original Twin 
Towers would have likely continued to depress 
the surrounding market and economic growth, 
and deter capital investment into the area.
The original WTC buildings and commercial 
facilities in general should not be considered 
“critical infrastructure” because commercial 
markets are too complex with numerous 
contributing variables for DHS or a group of 
industry representatives to make assumptions 
that individual facilities are supremely 
important. It is very unlikely that anyone would 
have said the largest building in New York 
City was not critical, but the destruction of it 
paved the way for massive redevelopment and 
economic growth, as seen in Figure 7.
Figure 7. 1 World Trade Center Website.37
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While it was unforeseeable at the time, the 
Lower Manhattan area that was most heavily 
impacted by the September 11, 2001 attacks is 
more valuable today and better positioned for 
the future than it was prior to 2001. If terrorists 
cannot cripple this nation by toppling 100-story 
commercial high-rise buildings, what kinds of 
facilities would have a debilitating impact on 
the entire nation if they were destroyed? Instead 
of being designated “critical,” the majority of 
infrastructure facilities are insignificant to the 
functions of the overall system because the loss 
of these facilities does not cause widespread 
disruptions to the nation, region, or even the 
local area.  The worst circumstances may spur 
the greatest opportunity for positive change, 
which could shift homeland security strategies 
to focus primarily on effective recovery rather 
than protecting existing systems.
Case Study 2: 
Las Vegas Casinos and 
Critical Infrastructure
The National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets assigned DHS with the responsibility to 
“develop a uniform methodology for identifying 
facilities, systems, and functions with national-
level criticality to help establish protection 
priorities; build a comprehensive database to 
catalog these facilities, systems, and functions; 
and maintain a comprehensive, up-to-date 
assessment of vulnerabilities and preparedness 
across critical sectors.”38 
Below the national level, DHS’s Regional 
Resiliency Assessment Program evaluates 
clusters of CI and key resources within a 
geographic area.  In a regional geographic area, 
jurisdictions have different interpretations of 
the types of facilities critical to their jurisdiction, 
to the larger region and the nation. According 
to a DHS grant funded study, Clark County: 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 
produced by Urban Environmental Research, 
[t]he protection of the nation’s infrastructure 
assets (or critical infrastructure) from 
disruption and destruction is a primary 
function and concern of all levels of 
government. Clark County, internationally 
known for the Las Vegas Strip and lavish 
casino entertainment (Figure 8), is unique in 
that the structure of the local economy is built 
primarily on gaming. In the evaluation of 
critical assets in Las Vegas, Nevada, the most 
important assets are clearly the casinos and 
glitter of the Strip.39 
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 
defined CI as the “systems and assets, physical 
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national 
public health and safety, or any combination 
of those matters.”40 The Clark County: Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Asset report describes 
the international and national significance 
of Las Vegas and The Strip’s casinos as the 
most critical assets, but are these commercial 
facilities even critical at the local level?
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What Gaming Facilities Subsector 
Members Expect from DHS
The National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan: Commercial Facilities Sector—Annex 
2: Gaming Facilities Subsector describes 
the facilities in the sector as soft targets 
vulnerable to the public’s fear and perceptions 
of security. To protect casinos from potential 
terrorist attacks, the costs of making physical 
changes are significant and a need exists for 
tax incentives to reduce the economic burden 
on owners for making improvements. The 
goal of the subsector is to “implement security 
measures that are efficient, cost-effective, and 
as unobtrusive as possible.”42 Across the gaming 
subsector, facilities have “expressed concerns 
over sharing assessment information with the 
Federal Government for any initiative that 
makes formal decisions on the prioritization of 
assets (i.e. concluding that one asset is more ‘at 
risk’ than another).”43
The gaming subsector cites $5.6 billion in 
direct gaming tax revenue as the justification 
for federal resources and protection as CI 
facilities, but the requests of the subsector 
council include tax incentives, which would 
reduce this revenue. To distribute resources 
across 445 facilities effectively, DHS must make 
a determination of risk, priority, and criticality, 
but the gaming subsector also does not support 
any effort to document one facility as more 
important than others.44
Las Vegas Casinos
In planning for protection of a CI facility such as 
a Las Vegas casino, protective measures would 
address the use of explosives by terrorists 
to damage or destroy the building. Since the 
economic depression in 2006, explosives have 
destroyed many of The Strip’s “critical” casinos, 
but these explosives were planned detonations 
to implode vacant buildings intentionally. 
Since 2006, the Castaway, Boardwalk, Bourbon 
Street, Stardust, New Frontier, and Klondike 
casinos have all been imploded. During the same 
time period, the Lady Luck, Sahara, Western, 
O’Shea’s, Gold Spike, and Riviera casinos have 
Figure 8: Image of the ‘Fabled’ Riviera Casino That Closed on May 4, 2015.41
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Figure 9. Population of Las Vegas, NV by Year.47
Figure 10. Nevada Real Per Capita Income per Year.48
all closed.45 The implosion of six casinos and the 
closure of six others over the last decade means 
that 12 of Las Vegas’ 87 casinos (currently 75 
are open), or 14%, of these CI facilities have 
been lost.46 The loss of a critical facility should 
result in debilitating impacts to the nation, so 
how has the loss of 12 critical facilities impacted 
the local area in Las Vegas?
From 2005 to 2013, the population of Las 
Vegas has increased from 544,608 to 603,448 
(Figure 9). Real per capita income increased 
slightly from 2005–2007 before dipping to 15% 
lower than pre-casino closures at $25,918 in 
2013 (Figure 10). Residential rental rates have 
remained fairly constant over the same time 
period (Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Monthly Rental Rates Las Vegas by Year.49
In Las Vegas, the casinos are considered 
to be critical facilities, which would result in 
debilitating impacts to the local economy if 
they were destroyed, but as 14% of the casinos 
were imploded or closed, the population of the 
city increased while median rental prices and 
incomes remained fairly constant.
The casinos that have closed permanently or 
been demolished in Las Vegas had previously 
been cornerstones of The Strip. The most recent 
facility to close is the Riviera Hotel and Casino, 
which was the first high-rise built in the area 
in 1955, and which included 2,100 hotel rooms. 
The hotel featured A-list celebrity guests, 
professional boxing title fights, and performers 
including Elvis Presley and Louis Armstrong.50 
While 1,200 employees at the Riviera lost 
their jobs, more than 950,000 of 1,029,70051 
employable people in Las Vegas remain 
employed, maintaining an unemployment rate 
of 7.2%, which is just over the national average 
of 5.4%.52 
If the loss of “critical infrastructure” casinos 
in Las Vegas did not result in widespread 
detrimental impacts to the city, should 
these facilities be considered to be “critical 
infrastructure” to Clark County, Nevada? If the 
impacts of the closures were negligible at the 
local level, it is unlikely that these casinos have 
any regional or national implications to CI.
Resiliency within the Las Vegas 
Casino Industry
While the Clark County: Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Asset report describes The Strip’s 
casinos as the most critical assets, it is not 
the individual physical properties that are 
critical, it is the overall gaming industry that is 
essential to the city. The individual properties 
are not critical, as shown by the 12 casinos 
closed between 2006 and 2015 without causing 
major disruptions to the tourism industry 
(Figure 13), hotel occupancy (Figure 13), 
or gaming revenue (Figure 12). When DHS 
determines how to spend federal funding for 
providing protection to CI, not a single casino 
needs protective measures, and it would be 
prohibitively expensive to protect every casino 
against all threats. In a terrorist attack scenario, 
simultaneously destroying all 80 casinos on the 
Las Vegas Strip would be the largest terrorist 
attack in world history, and is very unlikely 
to occur. The gaming industry in Las Vegas is 
already “protected” by the resiliency within 
the network of eight casinos along The Strip. 
An attack against a single casino, or group of 
casinos, would not cause the entire gaming 
industry to crumble because the loss of 12 casinos 
to closure has not significantly impacted key 
indicators (visitors, hotel occupancy, and tax 
revenue). An attack across the entire industry 
is not realistic. In other words, the protection of 
the key asset (gaming industry) already exists 
within the current system without additional 
assistance from federal funding and resources.
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Figure 12. Annual Tax Revenue of Las Vegas Strip Casinos 2001–2012 via University of Las Vegas 
Center for Gaming Research.53
Figure 13: Las Vegas Visitor Statistics from Visitor and Convention Authority.54
The Clark County: Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Asset report also describes that a 
terrorist attack would deter visitors from 
traveling to Las Vegas, which would be 
extremely detrimental to the hotel and gaming 
industry. Following the 9/11 attacks in New 
York City, annual tourism has increased every 
calendar year since 2001. In 2013, 54.3 million 
people visited New York City, which is 16 
million more than 2000 (36.2 million).55 The 
exact site of the terrorist attack has also drawn 
19 million visitors to the 9/11 Memorial since it 
opened in 2011, which suggests that a terrorist 
attack occurring at a facility is not necessarily 
a deterrent to future visitors. Furthermore, a 
memorial for the attack may become a tourist 
destination in itself. 
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Individual Gaming Facilities are Not 
Critical Infrastructure
At the federal level, the gaming facilities 
subsector uses total gross revenue and tax 
revenue as the justification for the inclusion of 
casinos as CI. The DHS gaming subsector also 
does not identify individual facilities as being 
more or less critical than other gaming facilities. 
Choosing not to delineate importance (based on 
revenue, economic impact, tax base, population, 
or any other measure) aligns with the concept 
of the resiliency that has been demonstrated 
across the Las Vegas Strip casinos. No individual 
casino in the country has significant impacts on 
the gaming industry at the local, regional, or 
national level. A network of hundreds of gaming 
facilities provides a variety of gambling options 
even if specific locations are unavailable due 
to business closure, a terrorist attack, or any 
other reason. This resiliency within the gaming 
subsector buffers disruptions and allows for a 
steady generation of revenue without the need 
for federal resources to be dedicated to the 
protection of specific gaming facilities.
Case Study 3:  
Scarcity of Function and 
a Single Point of Failure 
for The Charleston, West 
Virginia Water Supply
Clean water is essential to human survival across 
the world. A mix of public and private utilities 
provide water services in the United States, and 
protection of these critical services falls under 
the DHS CI water sector. Loss of water services 
causes both an immediate risk to human health 
and cascading impacts across other CI sectors 
dependent on water services.56 Prioritizing 
the protection of water infrastructure on the 
nationwide level is described in the 2010 
NIPP Water Sector Specific Plan through the 
evaluation of “higher-consequence and higher-
priority utilities.” The plan further specifies 
that “four criteria are used to better identify 
these national level high-consequence assets: 
(1) population served; (2) amount of chlorine 
gas stored on site; (3) economic impact; and (4) 
critical customers served.”57
In January 2014, a toxic chemical spill of 10,000 
gallons of 4-methylcyclohexanemethanol 
contaminated the Elk River one and half 
miles upstream of the City of Charleston in 
West Virginia. This spill resulted in the total 
contamination of water services (drinking, 
washing, bathing) to 300,000 residents in nine 
counties.58
Public water utility service was the primary 
source of water for the majority of the residents 
in the area: 
• 17.6% of residents reported having 
rainwater and 5.6% reported well water 
available, which resulted in the majority of 
residents requiring bottled water because 
tap water was not available. 
• 37% of residents reported using tap water 
during the “do not use” order, which showed 
that adequate supplies of bottled water were 
not available for all water related activities 
including showering/bathing.
• 78.8% of users during restriction showered/
bathed with contaminated water.59
The chemical spill into the Elk River is an 
example of both a scarcity of function and 
a single point of failure in an infrastructure 
system. Municipal water service was the 
primary provider of clean water (an essential-
to-life service) for the residents of Charleston 
and the surrounding counties. Without the 
municipal water service, a scarcity of function 
occurred because other sources were unable 
to provide adequate supplies of the necessary 
service to the population. The upstream 
contamination represented a single point of 
failure in the water service system because no 
alternate source was available from which the 
water treatment facility and water system could 
draw. The chemical spill into the sole water 
supply for the majority of citizens caused the 
entire water service infrastructure to fail.
This failure of the water infrastructure 
system is an example of a CI system critical 
to the local jurisdiction. The lack of water 
services in an isolated area was not regionally 
or nationally significant to water infrastructure 
systems. The lack of water to this isolated area 
was also not debilitating to the region or the 
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nation. This example is useful for studying 
scarcity of function and single points of failure 
in a CI system.
Currently, DHS measures the consequences 
of loss of water services by evaluating the 
public health effects, economic impacts, 
psychological impacts, and interdependencies 
and dependencies with other infrastructure 
sectors.60 It seems more useful to evaluate the 
criticality of water systems through the scarcity 
of the water infrastructure function and the 
existence of a single point of failure in delivery 
of the service. At a local and regional level, 
resiliency in the delivery of essential services 
exists across infrastructure sectors. In the West 
Virginia chemical spill, regional and national 
systems provided bottled and trucked water in 
an effective manner to meet service demands.
The Charleston outage is useful for 
evaluating the loss of single sources of essential 
functions at the national level. The Hoover 
Dam is the sole provider for water service to 
1.3 million citizens.61 The Hoover Dam also 
holds back a 9.2 trillion gallon62 reservoir 
that would require a million gallons of a toxic 
chemical to contaminate. In West Virginia, the 
mining industry positioned 10,000 gallons of 
a dangerous chemical near a waterway but no 
million-gallon storage tanks of toxic chemicals 
are positioned directly around the Hoover Dam. 
It is also not a viable scenario for a terrorist 
group, or other enemy, to transport millions 
of gallons of a toxic chemical to a nationally 
significant water source. It would take 20,000 
tractor-trailer trucks carrying 5,000 gallons 
of a chemical to amass one million gallons of 
a contaminant. Even if the Hoover Dam were 
somehow contaminated with a chemical, it 
would likely have minimal impact on its ability 
to generate four billion kilowatts of power,63 and 
the subsequent functions of other infrastructure 
sectors dependent on it for water.
Figure 14: Interdependencies with Water Sector Infrastructure from National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan.64
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On the national level, do sole providers and 
single points of failure exist in CI systems and 
services? If they do exist, how large is the scale of 
the disruption needed to break the system? For 
example, what volume of toxic chemicals would 
be needed to contaminate the Hetch Hetchy 
Water System that serves 1.7 million citizens65 
in San Francisco, CA? Would an accidental or 
intentional release of that volume of chemicals 
be viable? It is likely not a viable scenario. In 
the local case of the Charleston spill, water for 
drinking, cooking, and bathing was impacted 
but did the contamination have any impact on 
other infrastructure systems, such as electrical 
power, telecommunications, transportation, 
petroleum liquid, or natural gas as shown in 
Figure 14 from the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan? A drinking water outage is not 
necessarily an outage of all water uses across 
every infrastructure function that uses water as 
a component.
The January 2016 FEMA Emergency 
Declaration66 issued for lead contamination 
in the water supply of Flint, Michigan further 
emphasizes this concept that the total loss of 
a seemingly critical system does not instantly 
cripple all infrastructure functions in the 
impacted area. There is enough redundancy 
within regional and national infrastructure 
systems to provide essential water services 
through bottled water, federal assistance to 
serve as a stop gap to defer the cost of bottled 
water, state assistance to repair the municipal 
water system, and public-private infrastructure 
services to reconnect the Flint area to Detroit’s 
water system as a temporary solution.67
Findings and 
Recommendations
The concepts presented within this article 
suggest that DHS is failing to fulfill the mission 
of protecting the infrastructure that is critical to 
the nation by expending resources on misaligned 
efforts at thousands of insignificant facilities. 
On a local and regional level, redundancy and 
resiliency occur across infrastructure systems 
that allow affected areas to absorb outages and 
unaffected areas to provide alternative services. 
As a backstop, national emergency response 
capabilities can quickly deliver essential 
services during outages, such as the bottled 
water supplied to Charleston, WV following 
the chemical spill into the water supply. Also, 
the enormous complexity within infrastructure 
systems makes predicting the impacts of 
outages extremely difficult, as demonstrated 
by the unanticipated economic gains in Lower 
Manhattan following the 9/11 attacks.
While infrastructure systems are 
interdependent, redundancy and resiliency 
also occur, which allows the larger systems 
to continue functioning during disruptions. 
Resiliency, or the ability of a facility to continue 
functioning, is the opposite of criticality. The 
ability of resilient systems to resume or continue 
functioning is the opposite of the failures and 
breakdowns in systems that DHS uses to frame 
the definitions of CI. This concept of resilience 
follows the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan, which states that, “resilient infrastructure 
systems are flexible and agile and should be 
able to bounce back after disruption.”68 Within 
the resilient systems, disruptions that occur 
may cause beneficial changes. Policies centered 
on guarding a vast array of facilities from all 
types of risks potentially have the negative 
impact of preventing progress at the expense of 
protecting the status quo.
Additional research into CI failures following 
the same methodology as the case studies 
within this article could determine if negligible 
losses, or even positive gains, occurred in a 
variety of circumstances. Looking at property 
values, tourism, tax revenue, hotel occupancy, 
and average rental prices of New Orleans, 
LA 10 years prior to and 10 years following 
Hurricane Katrina would likely show that the 
post-disaster city has made positive economic 
gains that position it for a better future. 
Greensburg, KS was completely destroyed by 
an EF-5 tornado in 2007, but is now known 
to be a model green community because all 
the buildings have been built to the highest 
environmental certification and are wind 
powered.69 It is unlikely that Greensburg would 
have become a national model of environmental 
sustainability without the tornado destroying 
all the town’s existing infrastructure. In August 
2007, the I-35 Bridge over the Mississippi 
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River in Minneapolis collapsed and traffic had 
to be rerouted until the replacement bridge 
opened in September 2008. The bridge would 
have been considered a critical component 
of the transportation infrastructure, but the 
resiliency within the system allowed for a mere 
traffic disruption rather than a catastrophic 
failure of the entire system occurring.70 While 
sports stadiums and arenas are infrastructure 
considered critical to the local or regional 
economy, these facilities have been frequently 
demolished as facilities age or teams are sold, 
then relocated. One example is the KeyArena 
in Seattle, WA, which housed the NBA Seattle 
SuperSonics from 1967–78, 1985–94, and 
1995–2008, but which continues to function 
in the interim periods without a team and still 
provides a venue for various forms of sports 
and entertainment today.71 Across the United 
States, large shopping malls were the hubs of 
commerce, but many are vacant today.72 Many 
shopping malls are considered CI by DHS, but 
has the disappearance of the physical retail 
infrastructure resulted in economic losses to 
the surrounding areas?
Also, theoretical scenarios involving the 
destruction of infrastructure facilities or 
systems should be explored based on the 
arguments presented within this article. If 
infrastructure systems have high levels of 
resilience and following disasters, areas are 
redeveloped in a more efficient and valuable 
manner, what would happen following a major 
cyber-attack that crippled the entire national 
power grid? While DHS and the Department 
of Energy work on strategies to harden the 
existing grid,73 would a catastrophic failure 
result in the creation of a decentralized 
and sustainable energy infrastructure? The 
seemingly worst-case scenario of losing the 
existing power grid could eventually result in an 
improved energy delivery system, which would 
position the country for a stronger future. The 
worst circumstances may spur the greatest 
opportunity for positive change, which could 
shift homeland security strategies to focus 
primarily on effective recovery rather than on 
protecting existing systems.
Based on these findings, DHS should ensure 
that everything designated as “critical” meets 
the definition of criticality, the methodologies 
used for evaluating infrastructure align to 
the mission of protecting the nation from 
terrorism, and protection efforts account for 
the existing resiliency within the systems that 
provide essential-to-life infrastructure across 
the country.  Many infrastructure facilities are 
inconsequential if attacked, and if the loss of a 
facility does not cause widespread disruptions, 
it is not CI. DHS should shift from an inclusive 
CI policy that allows facilities to self-designate 
and self-assess risks to a policy that assumes 
facilities are inconsequential to the security 
and functions of the nation unless proven 
otherwise.
A solution for accomplishing the task 
of effectively identifying, prioritizing, and 
protecting CI is to refine the criteria for how 
facilities are determined to be critical. A lower 
number of critical facilities will reduce the 
overall scope of the protection mission. Adopting 
a risk-based approach for both prioritization of 
facilities  and evaluation of national impacts 
can assist DHS in more effectively designating 
facilities as “critical.”
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Abstract
In “Security and Prosperity: Reexamining the 
Relationship between Economic, Homeland 
and National Security” I used an analytical 
framework to identify key components of the 
Economic, Homeland and National Security 
relationship, explore their connection in the 
literature and the real world, and then identify 
the impact of ‘metamorphic forces’ that further 
shaped the relationship.  This analysis refines 
the analytical (EHN) framework into seven 
components (Elements, Outside Forces, 
Complex Systems, Outcomes, Analysis, 
Reimagination, and Transformation), 
summarizes its initial application, and tests the 
validity of its application to another homeland 
security issue.
Introduction
During early studies of atoms, physicists 
postulated about their contents, but did not 
understand the connection between protons, 
neutrons and electrons, so they had to figure 
out how they were related by observing what 
happened when they did things to the atoms. 
When recounting early sub-atomic research, 
Bill Bryson in A Short History of Nearly 
Everything described how in 1910, Ernest 
Rutherford “fired ionized helium atoms at a 
sheet of gold and, to his astonishment, some 
of the particles bounced back.”1  Through the 
use of a particle accelerator (a new invention) 
Rutherford took a known entity, in this case 
a helium atom, and smashed it into another 
atom in order to observe what ‘came out’.  Via 
this process, he could validate his hypothesis 
on what is contained in an atom (of whatever 
element) and how the components relate to one 
another.  
In “Security and Prosperity: Reexamining 
the Relationship Between Economic, Homeland 
National Security Analysis Framework
Bijan Karimi
and National Security,” I utilized an analytical 
framework akin to that used in early atomic 
exploration to identify key components of the 
Economic, Homeland and National Security 
(EHN) relationship, explored how the elements 
were connected in literature, compared that 
connection to the real world, and then identified 
the impact of outside forces that further shaped 
the element relationship.  
The EHN framework uses a similar concept: 
understanding the security elements under 
study, identifying external forces that impact 
the elements, and then observing the result 
(both expected and unexpected) to get a better 
understanding of the complex systems that 
are at play between the security elements and 
the external forces.  The results then allow for 
someone to reimagine how the relationship 
could be changed (we are not dealing with 
forces of nature in this case) and what steps are 
needed for the transformation.
This essay explores the reuse of that 
analytical framework and tests the validity of 
its application to another homeland security 
issue. 
My initial exploration was based on the notion 
that economic security (ES), or some variation 
thereof, has been discussed for several decades, 
and there was little debate on its importance. 
It is an assumed component of a functioning 
society and homeland security.  However, there 
is no evidence to explicitly link the two in the 
literature. So, why is homeland security (HS) 
considered inseparable from economic security 
as stated in the National Security Strategy and 
what are the implications for this connection?
If national security (NS) is outward facing 
and homeland security is inward facing, will 
taking steps to ensure economic security have 
different impacts on these two areas? Does global 
economic interconnectedness blur the lines 
between domestic and international policy? If 
Applying the Economic, Homeland and 
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so, do homeland security decisions impact the 
global economy? If HS is inseparable from ES 
and HS is part of NS, do ES decisions have the 
same impact on both areas? Understanding the 
tangled triangle between economic, homeland, 
and national security may impact decisions on 
domestic and foreign policy in order to ensure 
the success of each initiative. What if the very 
steps being taken to increase economic security 
were actually making homeland security more 
difficult by causing unforeseen or unintended 
consequences?2
When systems are connected, it can be very 
difficult to comprehend the complexity of the 
individual components and how they interact 
with each other. In The Watchman’s Rattle, 
Rebecca Costa discusses the issue of cognitive 
threshold—essentially the limit at which an 
individual can grasp elements of a complex 
situation.3  It turns out that individuals 
unconsciously resort to “silos” to insulate 
and isolate key activities in order to make 
understanding easier.4   In the end, the very 
situations people are trying to solve are being 
simplified to the point of becoming a non-
issue because the cognitive threshold has been 
reached. In order to study the EHN relationship 
and not oversimplify the relationship in a 
way that distorted my analysis, I developed 
an analytical framework that allowed me to 
organize my observations and analysis of this 
complex topic.
This essay begins with an overview of the 
framework and explanations of the different 
components.  Then we turn to an in-depth 
review of how the framework was applied to 
studying the ES, HS and NS relationship.  The 
framework is then applied to a new issue, in this 
case the prioritization of national preparedness 




 The first step of the EHN 
framework consists of identifying 
the elements to be studied, 
determining the working definitions, and 
outlining the suspected connections between 
these different elements. How are they related? 
How do they affect one another? Some of these 
definitions and connections may be unclear. 
Clearing up such ambiguity is part of the EHN 
examination process and one of the goal 
outcomes from the framework.  Rutherford 
knew atoms were made of parts, but he didn’t 
know how many or how they might all fit 
together.5
Outside Forces
 Outside forces are those factors that 
may exist separately from the 
elements and their connections. 
There are direct and indirect forces 
that may need to be considered when studying 
the connections between the elements, both of 
which may be difficult to identify initially. The 
outside forces may also vary based on the 
perspective of the individual looking at the 
elements. One observer may see several issues 
that affect the relationship; yet someone else 
may see an entirely different set of forces at 
work. The key is to identify and analyze those 
forces that are most likely to impact the 
connections in order to hypothesize how they 
will affect the elements.  While unaware at the 
time, Rutherford and his contemporary 
researchers would eventually come to discover 
(albeit 20 years later) the strong and weak 
nuclear forces which bind atoms together.6
Complex Systems 
 The next step is to understand 
complex systems. Each of the 
elements and the connections 
between them form a system that is 
acted upon or influenced by the outside forces. 
The different connections, leads and lags, and 
feedback loops between different system 
components (or elements) may lead to other 
relationships that were not clearly understood. 
In  Thinking in Systems, Donella H. Meadows 
and Diana Wright define a system as: 
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…a set of people, cells, molecules or 
whatever—interconnected in such a way 
that they produce their own pattern of 
behavior over time. The system may 
be buffeted, constricted, triggered or 
driven by outside forces, but the system’s 
response to these forces is characteristic 
of itself and is seldom simple in the real 
world.7 
Systemic risk occurs when complex systems 
interact with one another, and the creators 
of those systems do not understand the 
connections. Then, when there is an unintended 
consequence, it is unclear what affect that will 
have on the overall system.8 It is important 
to understand the interconnections and 
interdependencies in an increasingly complex 
world in order to conduct “what-if” analysis 
and evaluate potential behaviors.9 Analysis has 
moved from risk identification to considering 
and understanding the interconnectedness 
of risks and their secondary and tertiary 
impacts.10 These interdependencies may also be 
unbalanced (i.e., the impact in one direction is 
different than in the reverse direction), creating 
an asymmetrical relationship.11 These complex 
systems exist in every relationship.  Sometimes 
the only way to know what is going on inside 
an unknown is to look at inputs (in this case 
our elements) and our assumptions about their 
relationships (connections).  In the early 1900’s 
physicists could not see anything as small as an 
atom so they had to figure out what it was and 
how it worked by observing what happened 
when they did things to it.12  
Outcomes
 In an empirical experiment, a 
researcher makes note of the 
elements and known 
relationships being studied, 
documents the outside forces, and then notes 
the outcomes (both expected and unexpected) 
when the entire relationship is set into motion. 
The expected results involve the system 
behaving as we had originally hypothesized 
given the connections between the elements 
and the outside forces acting on them (i.e. 
ionized atoms passing through gold foil). 
Unexpected results (i.e. particles bouncing 
back) may give the researcher more insight into 
the complex system relationship between the 
elements, their connections and outside forces. 
This is particularly important because this is 
the piece that will allow us to understand the 
importance of the outside forces and help us 
identify areas that we may want to change. 
Direct implications are first order effects where 
indirect implications are secondary or tertiary 
and may be difficult to observe during the 
testing phase.
Analysis
Analysis is examining the 
outcomes and attempting to 
answer the “so what does this all 
mean?” question. In this social 
experiment, the inputs have been identified 
and the outcomes have been observed.  The 
analysis section links those two states by 
hypothesizing what external forces and complex 
systems are at work. This section may also 
create more questions than it answers. How do 
the expected and unexpected outcomes differ? 
What is the impact on the overall relationship 
between the elements? How do the elements 
actually align?  Would others have the same 
results if they were to conduct a similar 
examination? Rutherford, Hans Geiger, and 
Niels Bohr all examined the results of the foil 
research and hypothesized about what it meant 
for understanding sub-atomic particle 
structures.13
Reimagination
 Reimagination is the opportunity 
for the researcher to consider the 
outcomes and the analysis and 
make determinations as to what 
could be changed in the understanding of 
elements, their connections, and outside forces 
in order to create more expected outcomes 
from the element relationship. Do the elements 
or their definitions need to change?  Is there an 
external force that needs to be mitigated (or 
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enhanced)?  What complex relationships were 
uncovered that may introduce previously 
unknown system lags or impacts? Not until the 
1920’s did Werner Heisenberg, who had been 
reimagining all along, develop the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle to describe that electrons 
are particles that behave like a wave, providing 
an explanation for the uncharacteristic sub-
atomic behaviors being observed.14
Transformation
The final step in the EHN 
framework is transformation and 
implementing change and also 
where we leave Rutherford’s 
experiments on atoms. The road 
map has been laid out by exploring 
the outcomes, analyzing the “so 
what” question, and reimagining 
the relationship between the elements and the 
impacts of outside forces on those elements.  It 
is important to appreciate that others may want 
the situation to change to fit their preferences 
(which are different from one’s own.).  When 
initiating change, the researcher must consider 
how it will impact others and what steps those 
others may take to mitigate perceived negative 
impacts (from their point of view) to achieving 
their ultimate goal.
Summary
The EHN framework (Figure 1) is a cyclical 
process.  The framework was previously used 
for studying the connection between economic, 
homeland and national security. It can also 
serve as a template by which a social scientist 
can identify the components of a problem 
being studied, postulate on forces and systems 
that may be causing observed outcomes, and 
analyze results in order to recommend change 
or create a more desirable outcome. In the next 
section, we will look at how this framework 
was applied and in the subsequent section, the 
framework will be applied to a novel problem to 
test its transferability.
Figure 1. The EHN Framework
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First Application
The framework was first utilized in the study 
of the relationship between homeland and 
economic security based on the statement 
“Homeland Security supports economic 
security,” which was found in the 2014 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR).15  The QHSR goes on to say that “…
as recognized in successive national security 
strategies, homeland security is inseparable 
from economic security.”16  
The National Security Strategy (NSS) 
states that America’s economic growth and 
power supports national military strength.17 
This would suggest that there is a national 
security (NS) component to the country’s 
economic strength. Economic security (ES) and 
homeland security (HS) are concepts that have 
been linked in foundational homeland security 
documents; however, the interrelationship 
between economic and homeland security is 
not clearly explained or justified.   Figure 2 
identifies the initial elements being studied, 
analytical observations, external forces, and 
system complexity that lead to outcomes and a 
reimagined security relationship.
Figure 2. Analytical Process Used to Explore the Relationship Between Economic, Homeland and 
National Security.
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Elements
I observed some level of definitional clarity 
for the security elements through the analysis. 
However, when viewed as a component in a 
complex system, the relationship of ES, HS, 
and NS becomes cloudy. The definitions put 
forth in the literature examination (primarily 
in doctrine) are at odds with the scholarly 
research. The literature review suggests that 
while there is a connection between ES and 
HS, the more important relationship to explore 
for policy development lies between ES and 
NS. Additionally, where there are connections 
discussed between ES and NS, it is primarily 
in the literature. When ES-HS connections 
are discussed, it is primarily in government 
doctrine, and there is little explanation of why 
the connection exists. 
To understand the connections between the 
elements, I began by exploring the definitions 
of the terms and then turned to how they are 
linked.  Figure 3 summarizes the different 
security elements and their connections which 
were explored in the research. 
Figure 3. Security Elements and Conceptual 
Connection
Through this process, I found that journals 
primarily focus on investigating the ES-
NS relationship, whereas federal doctrine 
attempts to discuss the ES-HS connection, 
but often ends up describing the stronger NS 
connection. In the journals’ formulation, ES 
is the source from which national strength 
emanates, for without economic security, the 
U.S. government is unable to project itself 
militarily and diplomatically across the globe. 
In total, the relationship that is described in the 
literature is not the one that actually exists. 
Definitions
A review of the literature and doctrine related to 
each element revealed that there is a difference 
in how economic and national security are 
discussed in these sources. Most of the 
literature focuses on the relationship between 
economic security and national security. None 
of the materials had a discussion about all of the 
elements together, and as such the definitions 
are focused more narrowly.   
Economic security, or some variation 
thereof, has been discussed for several decades. 
In a collection of essays on national economic 
security from 1982, editors Alting von Geusau, 
Frans A. M. von Geusau, and Jacques Pelkmans 
explain why the topic was gaining more interest 
by economists and governments. According to 
them:
[a]fter exposure to two oil shocks, booms in
raw material prices, the threat of a world food
crisis … and rising popularity of economic
coercion among nation-states, there was little
surprise in observing economic security to rise
to the most prominent element of national
security.18
At the time, there was some overall 
agreement that economic security refers to 
something bigger than just what is necessary 
to promote the economic wellbeing of the 
country.19 Just over 20 years later, in Economic 
Security, Kahler stated, “the economic 
uncertainty of the last decade has caused 
countries to revisit their understanding of this 
concept and the associated definition.”20 A 
fluctuating economy and its impact on domestic 
conditions continues to be a significant issue, 
but whatever the issue is, “it” seems to extend 
beyond just the economy. Pankov believes that 
economic security is not only the protection 
of national interests but also the readiness 
and ability of government institutions to 
create mechanisms to implement and protect 
national interests in the development of a 
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national economy.21 Mijalković supports this 
view, but extends it to include the absence of 
threats that could endanger economic stability 
and independence.22 He believes, “economic 
power is a traditional ‘lever’ of national 
security and the state’s role in the international 
community.”23 In a report published by RAND, 
Neu and Wolf believe that economic security 
is the ability of the U.S. to protect its own 
economic prosperity via domestic policies and 
international influence.24 This perspective 
was clarified by Cable a year later when he 
identified three conceptual definitions for 
economic security: 1) the investments that 
directly impact a country’s ability to defend 
itself, 2) the economic policy instruments that 
can be used for the purpose of aggression, and 
3) the extent to which a weak economy may 
undermine the ability for a country to project 
power.25 A generally accepted definition of ES 
in the U.S. would posit that national interests 
are supported through an economic system 
that supports free exchange and supports the 
upward mobility of the nation.26 
Homeland security was not part of the 
national discussion until the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing.27 The phrase had appeared in 
some documents, but was used interchangeably 
with homeland defense. It entered the common 
lexicon after the 9/11 attacks via Executive Order 
13228, which defined it as the “implementation 
of a comprehensive national strategy to secure 
the U.S. from terrorist threats/attacks.”28 The 
2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security 
released just months after 9/11 states that, 
“terrorism directly threatens the foundations 
of our Nation—our people, our democratic way 
of life, and our economic prosperity.”29 This 
established some direction for the nation, but 
after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the need to 
help communities respond to natural hazards 
took center stage. This caused Christopher 
Bellavita and others to ask if homeland security 
should focus on “meta hazards,” where there 
are areas of confluence for issues, conditions, 
etc. that affect many other areas (e.g., fiscal, 
infrastructure, education) and require a “view” 
higher up than the local level.30 When looking 
at HS as an all hazards activity, the amount 
of money spent on terrorism contradicts this 
definition. The homeland security vision 
articulated in the 2007 national strategy is 
very broad, including everyone (i.e., citizens) 
working together to ensure a free, wealthy, 
and friendly nation.31 In 2012, Reese explained 
that the events of 9/11 precipitated the creation 
of DHS with the intent to focus on terrorism, 
but that definition was expanded in 2005 
after Hurricane Katrina to “include significant 
disasters, major public health emergencies, and 
other events that threaten the United States, the 
economy, and the rule of law...”32 Christopher 
Bellavita, in “Changing Homeland Security, 
What is Homeland Security” aptly described 
the multiple definitions that are being used by 
today’s homeland security enterprise (HSE) 
professionals. Many definitions of HS are 
derived from looking at the homeland security 
enterprise through the lens of a group with a 
niche set of interests.33 Bellavita concludes, and 
the researcher agrees, that the most commonly 
accepted definition relates to the prevention 
of, and protection and recovery from terrorist 
activities.34 In a 2012 Congressional report, 
Reese furthered Bellavita’s research, noting that 
“homeland security, regardless of the definition 
or strategic document, is a combination of 
law enforcement, disaster, immigration, and 
terrorism issues”35 
There has been a tremendous amount of 
research, most of which fairly consistently 
defines national security (NS) as the ability 
to maintain the nation’s physical boundaries, 
economic relations, and social institutions from 
outside threats. The first National Security 
Strategy (NSS) in 1987 characterizes national 
security as the blueprint for freedom, peace, and 
prosperity.36 At the time, the United States was 
engaged in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. 
In subsequent years, the NSS changed to reflect 
the extant and emerging threats, but posited 
that the overall pillars of national security 
came from political, military and economic 
strength. When defining its mission, the 2007 
National Strategy for Homeland Security 
also provided clarity on the “instruments of 
national power and influence—diplomatic, 
information, military, economic, financial, and 
intelligence.”37 Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 
argue that the scope must be expanded to better 
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reflect the breadth of issues that have an impact 
on the security field. However, they bounded 
this expansion by offering that any additions 
must pose an “existential threat to a referent 
object” and not just a regular political issue.38 
The literature and doctrine differ on the ways 
to maintain national security, but offer similar 
perspectives on its basic elements —the ability 
to project power militarily and politically, both 
supported by economic strength. In Thinking 
about National Security, Brown argues, 
[n]ational security is the ability to preserve 
the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to 
maintain its economic relations with the rest 
of the world on reasonable terms; to protect 
its nature, institutions, and governance from 
disruption from outside; and to control its 
borders.39 
Linkages
Of equal or greater importance than the 
definitions are the connections that exist 
between the elements. While it may seem that 
the definition would drive the relationship, 
the reverse is often true; by seeing how these 
elements are related, we can also clarify their 
definition. 
Domestically, the connection between ES 
and HS was cemented after World War II, 
during the implementation of the Marshall 
plan. The U.S. provided economic support to 
the allies to help them rebuild. The literature 
review revealed that authors are consistently 
inconsistent when describing the impact of 
economic success (security) and the resulting 
human (homeland) security. There is no 
empirical nexus between ES and HS and little 
research connects the two elements together. 
Losman makes this the centerpiece of his article 
Economic Security: A National Folly? He 
directly questions the emphasis that has been 
placed on economic security and clearly states 
that military resources should not be used to 
promote economic security. Further, he points 
out that the ‘relationship’ between economic and 
homeland security has been assumed and the 
importance persists in domestic policy without 
any check for validation.40 As previously seen, 
Mijalković and Milošević believe that the two 
concepts are closely linked, and that economic 
interests support homeland security.41 Losman 
disagrees, feeling that homeland security, or 
the military specifically, is used to sustain 
economic security.42 In 2011, DHS Secretary 
Janet Napolitano said economic and homeland 
security go hand in hand, stating that “…the 
economy is dependent on our ability to secure 
and facilitate the flow of people and goods from 
our shores.”43  
The connection between ES and NS is well 
established in the literature. Economic strength 
is presented as one of the key pillars of national 
strength and it provides the foundation from 
which the U.S. can project itself globally. The 
2015 National Security Strategy clearly states 
the importance of the economy domestically 
and internationally: 
[t]he American economy is an engine for global 
economic growth and a source of stability 
for the international system. In addition to 
being a key measure of power and influence 
in its own right, it underwrites our military 
strength and diplomatic influence. A strong 
economy, combined with a prominent U.S. 
presence in the global financial system, creates 
opportunities to advance our security.44 
Securitization of economic issues elevates 
their importance and suggests that they 
require additional protection because of their 
relationship to national security.45  In National 
Economic Security, von Geusau, von Geusau, 
and Pelkmans provide a broad definition of 
“national economic security” that includes 
economic policy as part of the broader concept 
of security.46 Pankov provides additional clarity 
by stating that national economic security is a 
state of the national economy characterized by 
sustainability and immunity to the impact of 
internal and external factors that disrupt the 
normal process of living.  In 2011, Shelia Ronis 
asked if economic security is an overlooked 
component of national security. She believes 
national security is traditionally focused on 
strength of infrastructure, but that national 
security should also include a healthy economy 
and policies that promote that state.47 A clear 
connection between domestic economic 
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strength and national power is evident in the 
2010 National Security Strategy, where it states 
that, “[o]ur prosperity serves as a wellspring for 
our power. It pays for our military, underwrites 
our diplomacy and development efforts, and 
serves as a leading source of our influence in 
the world.”48 The domestic economy must be 
robust enough to sustain national strength and 
future growth. She posits that this is a deterrent 
to enemies and supports defense.49 
Jane Holl Lute, former Deputy Secretary of 
Homeland Security, said in her 2011 speech to 
the American Bar Association that, “[n]ational 
security is strategic, it’s centralized, it’s top-
driven. Homeland security is operational, it’s 
transactional, it’s decentralized, it’s bottom-
driven.”50 This statement clearly articulates the 
different focuses of the disciplines and helps 
delineate responsibility. With Bellavita’s earlier 
explanation that HS is an element of NS,51 we 
have a good idea regarding how these elements 
are related. In a lecture to Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security students, Masals 
discussed new multilateralism, stating that, 
“the boundaries between foreign and domestic 
policy are gone.”52 He asserted that HS and NS 
should not be viewed as separate activities; 
rather, they are one in the same and should be 
treated as such. America can learn from other 
countries’ approaches to security (homeland 
and national) because many of the issues are 
transnational and need resources from both 
“sides” to cooperate and work together.53 
This is underscored by the 2010 National 
Security Strategy statement that we need to 
move beyond having distinctions between 
the two elements.54 Morag, in Comparative 
Homeland Security, believes that the construct 
of homeland security is a uniquely American 
concept.55 The nation’s geographic boundaries 
and location have allowed it to believe that 
issues take place within and outside its borders; 
thus it is hard to compare with other nations 
who see homeland and national security as one 
and the same. Bellavita asks why we should 
maintain an artificial separation of homeland 
security and homeland defense. This approach 
would treat homeland security as a sub-set of 
national security and function as another lever 
of national power. 56 
Unclear definitions in the literature do 
not prohibit describing the interactions 
between economic, homeland, and national 
security elements and providing clarity where 
connections exist between the different security 
elements. A link between ES and HS exists, but 
is not well substantiated.  ES is a cornerstone 
of NS and the link is well documented in the 
literature.  Describing HS as the operational 
embodiment of NS policy suggest that they are 
part of the concept.   Each element supports 
the other although to different degrees and 
with different outcomes. Figure 4 clarifies the 
linkages initially identified in Figure 3 and 
shows that, while the link goes both ways, ES 
and HS primarily support NS.
Figure 4. Security Element Linkages
Applying specific research methods allows 
a more detailed analysis of the literature and 
leads to some surprising results, and we can see 
that there is a complex network of interactions, 
complicated by outside forces. 
Outside Forces 
Economic, homeland, and national security 
elements do not exist in a vacuum; rather, they 
exist within a broader system and are shaped 
themselves by outside forces that provide subtle 
but substantial pressure. Globalization is the 
exchange of social and cultural ideals and the 
extension of economic ties between countries. 
It is also characterized by greater integration of 
other countries and cultures into the primarily 
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western (liberal) perspective.57 Securitization 
involves saying that something (person, place, 
or thing) or some condition of the item poses a 
security risk.58 An issue may become securitized 
because there is a real existing threat or because 
the issue is presented as a threat by an individual 
who would benefit from the elevated concern. 
This practice confuses the true importance of 
issues and is often politically motivated. 
Globalization
Since the Bretton Woods Conference following 
World War II, the U.S. has taken a leadership 
role to encourage global economic prosperity 
through the establishment of international 
standards and the International Monetary 
Fund. To support U.S. economic strength, 
companies look to globalization for a way 
to expand into new markets. Regional and 
bilateral trade initiatives need to be in place to 
ensure that international markets will be open 
to new entrants and support deeper integration 
among participants,59 while bringing in allies 
and new partners to strengthen economic ties. 
The National Intelligence Council 2020 study 
(conducted in 2005) claims that globalization 
will be a pervasive “mega-trend” that will 
significantly impact other global trends.60 Its 
prediction proved accurate and has materialized 
faster than anticipated. Countries are entering 
a new era where economic-driven governance 
is superseding that of political nation-states.61 
The interconnected financial markets make 
economic impacts wider reaching. Creation of 
supra-state entities and agreements (e.g., World 
Trade Organization, North American Free Trade 
Agreement etc.) move countries away from a 
nationalistic economic focus because global 
economic integration needs to have structure 
(i.e., common laws) to guide expansion among 
participating nations. The World Economic 
Forum’s 2014 Global Risks survey highlighted 
that increased global trade and movement 
of capital support economic growth, but also 
increase volatility.62 This is a condition that 
advanced economies will attempt to counteract 
through policy reforms designed to increase 
market resilience.63 Globalization is not without 
drawbacks; it changes the traditional political 
role of the state and changes global power 
dynamics through supra-state organizations. 
In its most recent Global Risk Survey, the 
World Economic Forum clearly summarizes 
the challenges that arise from countries making 
domestic economic decisions:
[i]n today’s interdependent global economy, 
whenever countries focus on their domestic 
market—even if the decisions are taken by 
central banks rather than politicians—there 
is potential for unintended effects on other 
countries to spill over into the geopolitical 
sphere.64
In a 2004 article, Lewis states that 
America’s economic strength will be eroded 
with the movement of jobs around the world 
and the subsequent international economic 
reorganization.65 
Securitization
Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde state that, 
“[s]ecuritization is a more extreme version of 
politicization” in Security: A New Framework 
for Analysis.66 Securitization is quite simple—
all it involves is the process of a speech act; 
effectively, saying something is a security issue 
securitizes it.67 Normally, this process is done 
by the state because it has the legitimacy to 
identify something as posing an existential 
threat; however, media expansion has allowed 
other individuals or groups (e.g., corporate 
CEOs or public interest parties) to make such 
statements. If securitization is self-referential, 
that means that anyone can securitize 
something because she or he feels it needs to 
be securitized, even if the issue of concern does 
not pose an existential threat. There is also a 
“cost” of securitization—in particular to liberty 
and democracy. Securitization often leads to 
steps that reduce the very rights guaranteed to a 
free society—life, liberty, and property. Losman 
explains, “[o]ver the past quarter century civilian 
leadership and the military community… have 
transformed the concept of economic security 
into a prominent national security issue.”68  In 
their analysis, Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 
rightly question the assumptions that have 
been made. They assert that, “[m]uch of what 
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might be seen as ES issues are in fact either 
normal or politicized economic relations.”69 
ES has been securitized by individuals in order 
to either elevate or confuse issues. Losman 
believes many narratives have been distorted 
by fear and fiction in order to increase their 
prominence.70 
Outcomes 
We have explored the definitions of our elements 
and examined how the body of knowledge 
describes their link to one another. Now, 
we investigate the expected and unexpected 
outcomes of the current relationship. The 
concepts of globalization and securitization 
have a significant effect on the complex 
relationship between economic, homeland, and 
national security.  
Expected 
A stable economy fosters a stable society. A 
decrease in national income leads to a decrease 
in stability, and in turn, a decrease in social 
stability causes population unrest, which 
can cause an unstable homeland security 
environment. This theme is discussed by 
Ichikowitz, and the U.S. national preparedness 
report. It is also discussed by the World 
Economic Forum 2013 report, most often in 
reference to challenges faced by developing 
nations.71 Improving social stability will lead 
to improvements in economic and national 
security. If human security is the responsibility 
of the state, it can be accomplished through 
economic and national security activities. 
In effect, the state can improve society to 
create the increased perception of personal 
security. The individual need for ontological 
security (consistency of condition) can be 
extrapolated to the nation.72 Thakur discusses 
how security-oriented research supports the 
idea that investments in homeland security 
increase human security in “A Political World 
View.”73 Losman believes it is preferable to 
spend limited national funds to create jobs, 
boost the economy, and increase education 
in order to develop personal resiliency, rather 
than on military applications. President Bush 
in the 2002 National Security Strategy eludes 
to this possibility by stating, “[p]overty does 
not make poor people into terrorists and 
murders. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and 
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to 
terrorist networks and drug cartels within their 
borders.”74 
The United States economy is the source 
of national strength and prosperity for its 
citizens. Porter and Mykelelby make this point 
succinctly in A National Strategic Narrative 
by stating, “[o]ur strength as a world leader is 
largely derived from the central role we play 
in the global economy.”75 Pankov points out 
that international economic security is closely 
related with the national economic security 
of all countries in the world. Therefore, if 
countries want national economic security, 
they need to support policies that reinforce a 
stable international economy.76 Mijalković and 
Milošević believe fiscal policy is just another 
tool to promote positive relationships and 
prosperous exchange between other nations.77 
Most authors acknowledge that nations use 
economic incentives to encourage other 
governments to behave in certain ways, often 
favoring political allies. Economies no longer 
stop at geopolitical boundaries; thus, increased 
economic integration reduces self-sufficiency 
and increases vulnerability because of the 
tight coupling with the economies of other 
countries.78 Supra-state economic groups then 
begin to have more power than socio-political 
ones. However, as mentioned earlier, economic 
coupling for stability may be an acceptable 
trade-off for the loss of some political 
autonomy. The DNI 2020 report predicts that 
large multi-national companies and economic 
partnerships will have increasing sway and 
will drive change throughout the world, yet 
their actions are outside the control of any 
nation-state.79 As such, national economies are 
less insulated from economic shocks on the 
other side of the world. As stated in Economic 
Security in an Era of Globalization and the 
2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 
unintended consequences with global impacts 
may occur as a result of increased system 
connectedness and complexity.80 Therefore, 
as President Obama stated, the U.S. needs 
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more flexibility with domestic policy to adapt 
to external conditions.81  The World Economic 
Forum expresses concern around how the global 
economic fragility (in the attempt to achieve 
economic security) is diverting resources away 
from other social and political issues because it 
is not a broader concept.82 However, the U.S. 
2002 National Security Strategy suggests the 
opposite is true—social issues can be addressed 
through economic means, which can also 
strengthen ties between nations. According to 
the 2002 the National Security Strategy: 
[f]ree trade and free markets have proven 
their ability to lift whole societies out of 
poverty—so the United States will work with 
individual nations, entire regions and the 
entire global trading community to build a 
world that trades in freedom. 
Economic strength supports the political 
foundation necessary for a stable society. The 
economic relationships that we enter into 
with allies are no less important than NATO’s 
military relationships. 
Political influence is tied to economic 
policies; Kahler, Mijalković, Mondale, and 
Neocleous all refer to this connection in their 
works. Moreover, they all acknowledge that 
nations use economic incentives to encourage 
other governments to behave in certain ways, 
often favoring political allies. Where they differ 
is on the extent of the influence and whether it 
should be used for political gains. State political 
power may be diminishing in areas where there 
is significant globalization.  So what happens 
when countries are not able to make political 
decisions because of economic encumbrances? 
In “Genuine National Security: A People’s 
Definition,” Eisenhower made the case that 
the U.S. has become a debtor nation and this 
may cause leaders to adjust fiscal and monetary 
policy to suit our creditors because they hold 
significant sway in our economic health.83 
Decision makers need to balance economic 
welfare with optimizing political power. 
Ultimately, the goal is to minimize the ability to 
be coerced by outsiders.84 Cable raises the issue 
that global political strength (or the strength of 
countries on the global stage) may be decreasing 
because: “[i]n practice what is slowly emerging 
is a complex hierarchy of institutions and 
informal arrangements at the national, regional 
and global level (and points in between) to deal, 
case by case, with various economic security 
threats.”85 These institutions are outside of the 
state-system and do not have the same level 
of accountability as an elected official—they 
are a proxy.  Establishing economic security 
priorities should not be influenced by political 
considerations because, as Medevdev observes, 
doing so obscures which problems require 
immediate attention.86 Neu and Wolf believe 
there is a recognized connection between the 
health of the domestic economy and the ability 
to influence international policy.87 In The 
Economic Dimensions of National Security, 
the authors explain that: 
[t]he most basic elements of the international 
commercial infrastructure have been the 
freedom of peaceful international passage for 
trade purposes and the sanctity of property 
rights. Throughout its history, the U.S. has 
exercised its diplomatic and military muscle to 
protect U.S. access to international shipping 
routes or exploitation of U.S. owned foreign 
assets from confiscation or expropriation.88 
An increase in prosperity leads to improved 
social conditions and political stabilization. 
Globalization is a driving force behind this 
prosperity. However, exposure to new cultures 
can lead to violence, and economic partnerships 
can reduce overall political control. There 
are clear political implications driven by the 
relationship of ES to HS and NS. We begin to 
see more clearly that the connections between 
ES and NS are essential to having the political 
strength to remain a global leader, and that the 
ability of the U.S. to influence world events is 
becoming more dependent on the economic 
strength we possess.89 The impacts discussed 
above allude to the complicated interaction 
between the economic, social, and political 
components of ES, HS, and NS, and are not 
altogether different than those described in the 
literature. 
Unexpected
A World Economic Forum (WEF) 2014 study 
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remarks, “[t]he greater the interdependencies 
between countries and industries, the greater the 
potential for events to bring about unforeseen, 
cascading consequences.”90 Knowing how 
the systems interact and the nature of the 
lag between actions in one area is important 
to understand when projecting likely future 
benefit or the need to invest now in order to 
prevent disruption in another area.91 A key point 
of many of the WEF studies is that there is not a 
single risk; it is the cascading interdependency 
that is of concern. As Siminiuc points out, “the 
link between economics, security and stability 
should be viewed dynamically.”92 Globalization 
and securitization are powerful forces that 
slowly and continuously change the economic, 
homeland, and national security relationship. 
They shape the individual systems and the 
complex interaction between them and other 
areas of government.  At times, they lead to 
unintended consequences.
Two manifestations of the external forces at 
work on the security relationship can be seen in 
the following examples. In both cases, the desire 
for economic security has led to secondary and 
tertiary consequences that were not anticipated, 
although they were not necessarily unlikely. 
In one case, we see ES through globalization’s 
cultural pressure, which metastasizes into 
terrorism. In the second, the same drive for ES 
leads to short-term thinking and misallocation 
of resources which causes national insecurity.
Economic Security Leads to Homeland 
Security Threat
In the process of expanding markets to 
maintain economic strength, cultures and 
ideas are coming together at a speed and in a 
way with which individuals are not prepared to 
cope emotionally. Not only is the West  tapping 
into new markets, we are also taking our way of 
life, perspectives, and viewpoints, and sharing 
those with others as we go. Moghaddam, in 
a series of books, expresses the belief that 
Muslim fundamentalists view globalization 
as a significant threat against which they 
must defend themselves and their traditional 
heritage.93 While it does not justify their actions, 
it provides one explanation of the possible 
genesis. Moghaddam goes on to posit that, 
“[w]idespread identity crisis in Islamic 
communities underlies the present 
radicalization being experienced by these 
communities, as well as the terrorism 
emanating from them.”94 
Figure 5 summarizes the social concepts 
behind the impact of globalization on Muslim 
communities, and the potential behaviors 
those impacts cause. To be sure, there are 
many reasons why an individual may become 
violent: power imbalance, disenfranchisement, 
defending community, or as is more commonly 
reported, because of religious beliefs. 
Quality of life expectations have been 
raised by exposure to western society and 
ideals. If there is no opportunity to meet these 
expectations, then radical steps may be taken 
to create change. Marmot states that there are 
three issues that drive social classification: 
money, status, and power. How individuals 
react to perceived deprivation (and the lack 
of self-respect that may accompany it) is often 
derived from social classification and can 
create violent situations.95 In its extreme form, 
terrorism (religious, political, and cultural) 
is used to maintain differentiation and resist 
globalization.96 This hermeneutic provides 
justification for terrorist action as some 
militant groups believe the rest of the world 
needs to change, not them.97 Globalization 
and the cultural dichotomy it fosters does not 
guarantee creation of a terrorist, but it may 
drive more people towards religious affiliation 
because of the mental, emotional, and social 
net it provides.98 
Economic Security Leads to National 
Insecurity 
To maintain a strong economy and support 
political and military strength abroad while 
ensuring prosperity domestically, businesses 
seek access to larger markets in which they 
can sell their products and services. The 2000 
National Security Strategy observes that 
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Figure 5. Unintended Consequence of Globalization on Homeland Security
globalization is an unstoppable trend.99 Yet, the 
increasing globalization of business operations 
has made the local economy more susceptible 
to shocks and uncertainty. The international 
economy plays a considerable role in domestic 
economic conditions; foreign policy and 
national security should support policies that 
strengthen the international economy.100 
Economic security provides the important link 
between social and national security. Thus, a 
stable international economy is closely related 
to maintaining domestic (homeland) security. 
The current discussion of economic security 
does not acknowledge the complex system in 
which these decisions are being made. Figure 6 
summarizes the unintended NS consequence of 
using globalization to bolster economic security. 
While the expansion does provide short-term 
economic benefits, it comes at the expense of 
lasting innovation. There is a balance needed 
between short-term benefit and the long-term 
prosperity; we may need to forego benefit 
now for future returns.101 Thus, the economic 
foundation needed to project global strength is 
not solid, weakening national security.
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Figure 6. Unintended Consequence of Globalization on National Security
Analysis 
 
Through the analysis, I found that the equal-
parts relationship between ES, HS, and NS 
described in the literature is not what actually 
exists. The definitions for ES, HS, and NS 
vary in terms of clarity and complexity. The 
connections between these elements are 
similarly confusing and depend on the lens 
of the individual evaluating the situation. For 
example, the doctrine authors focused on HS 
and chose to discuss activities most relevant to 
the mission. Taken individually, the discussions 
would suggest a balanced relationship; 
however, when examined more broadly, the 
relationships are uneven. The relationships 
are a wild mash-up of activities and strategies 
which must function individually and which do 
not tie together or really reference one another. 
Most of the literature and doctrine explores the 
elements in this 1-to-1 relationship, negating 
the broader context that truly defines the push-
pull between the elements. 
Economic security is concerned with the 
overall fiscal health of the nation, which 
includes personal financial health, business 
stability, economic growth, and protection 
from circumstances that would degrade any 
of the same. Homeland security is domestic 
protection from threats (intentional), 
preparation for hazards (natural), and the 
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response and recovery from these events. The 
large list of activities related to HS has given 
DHS (and the homeland security discipline) 
a large area of responsibility with competing 
priorities. National security is still seen as an 
overarching concept to which other elements 
are dependent. While that may be true, the 
direct connection between these is not clear. 
There are some connections to be sure, but 
they are not clearly explained or understood so 
someone can understand how a decision for the 
benefit of HS or ES can benefit NS. 
The primary issue with “where we are now” 
is that it does not exist in a world where only 
these three security components exist together. 
The world is connected technologically, 
economically, and politically, but the political 
connections are more fragmented. Nations are 
economically joined but politically separated.102 
Reimagination
Various doctrinal statements point out that 
threats and hazards in the homeland security 
realm are often influenced by external social, 
political and economic forces.  Thus, before a 
system is disturbed or changed, the observer 
should understand how it works.  In June 
1974, NATO members discussed how economic 
difficulties of one member could pose big issues 
on the ability of other members to maintain 
financial effectiveness; this condition posed a 
threat to the foundation of western society (i.e., 
ability to project power) and they believed it was 
important to develop policies that will govern 
international economic issues.103 According 
Activities related to the prevention, 
protection, preparation, response and 
recovery from threats and hazards and 
the preservation of the nation’s integ-
rity and territory from domestic and 
foreign enemies
An open, integrated economic system 
that supports individual health, free 
exchange, and the upward mobility of 
the nation through mutually beneficial 
partnerships while maintaining finan-
cial resiliency, long-term strength and 
national solvency
Figure 7. Reframing and Defining the Security Relationship
Today, the nation needs a galvanizing vision 
that puts the prosperity and sustainment of 
our nation at the forefront. We need a unifying 
construct which brings the security elements 
together, is focused on larger, long-term issues, 
and orients resources to address national 
issues. 
to Mondale, “[b]oth Bretton Woods and the 
Marshall Plan stemmed from the recognition of 
the interdependence—that the economic health 
of the major countries of the world affected 
the security and well-being of the others.”104 
Homeland security and national security are 
complimentary, but have been separated due 
to legal doctrine designed to keep domestic 
and international protection separate. This has 
created duplication of effort and fragmented 
goals—the opposite of what the nation needs. 
The analysis produced the following 
observations:
1. There is not a balanced relationship 
between ES, HS and NS
2. The security relationship is an uneven 
overlap of the security elements
3. Outside forces play a key role in shaping 
the security relationship
4. The unintended consequences hinder 
the very security elements they are 
designed to improve
I believe that the blurry definitions and tight 
connections between these elements support 
the assertion that discussion on this topic 
should focused on two areas, illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
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Figure 8. Strategic and Tactical Recommendations to Focus on Security and Prosperity
Table 1 provides details for each of the 
recommendations as they relate to creating 
a discussion focused around security and 
prosperity rather than the individual elements 
of economic, homeland and national security.
Table 1. Description of Recommendations
Recommendation Description
1. Develop a 
National 
Narrative 
The country needs a strategic plan that unites our populace, crosses political 
perspectives, and promotes a sense of purpose for a generation. To promote 
economic security that will benefit national security (and in turn homeland 
security), it is better to focus government policy at the national level and explore 
its impact on the nation’s overall state of security.  
2. Integration of 
DHS and DOD
Complex systems (i.e., government agencies) are structured to perpetuate 
themselves, so recommending the integration of two of the largest departments 
in the federal government would be an unrivaled challenge, but one that is not 
without merit. There are compelling signals that the security functions in both 
agencies would operate more efficiently if brought together in one department 
rather than maintaining the artificial separation. 
3. Create a 
Department of 
Prosperity
The Preamble to the Constitution defines our federal government’s basic 
purpose as “… to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” The financial 
market- driven focus on short-term returns is detrimental to the country’s 
long-term health and not yielding investments in education, health care and 
infrastructure—essential elements for sustained prosperity. 
Transformation
Figure 8 summarizes five recommendations 
designed to address the four observations 
identified above and show how they are 
conceptually related to one another as well as 
the ‘level’  they are trying to address.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Essay 4 (May 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG






The long-term solution to terrorism is prevention, but prevention is not just 
stopping a radicalized individual from carrying out a planned attack; it should 
also contain activities that prevent an individual from becoming radicalized. 
While long-term solutions are being implemented to change the environment 
that creates the crucible for radicalization, existing initiatives that have been 
described in national security strategies should continue in order to blunt and 






A consistent theme in multiple National Security Strategies (NSS) is the 
importance of promoting prosperity abroad. Economic stagnation sets in where 
political unrest and social strife exist. These are some of same locations where 
Islamic radicalization is taking hold—not that these are directly correlated 
or have a causal relationship. The U.S. should increase efforts to support 
developing economies. 
None of the recommendations above can be 
accomplished without the public support for 
change; it is not a matter of just doing different 
things, it is doing the same or similar things 
with a different goal in mind. True economic 
or national security requires members of the 
public to see the common goal and orient their 
activities towards meeting the objective.105 In 
her discussion of defining homeland security, 
Reese mentions that coordination among the 
different federal agencies and state and local 
partners involved in HS (over 30 in some cases) 
is very challenging.106 Without having the right 
goals and key performance indicators, the 
wrong thing may get measured and encouraged. 
According to Meadows and Wright, “[i]f the 
desired system state is national security, and 
that is defined as the amount of money spent on 
the military, the system will produce military 
spending.”107 
In their 2011 book, The Dictator’s Handbook, 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith 
discuss how any change to existing policy will 
likely alter the power balance between the 
winners (those who benefit from the policy) and 
the losers (those who are negatively impacted). 
To generate support for the creation of a new 
policy, leaders need to overcome resistance 
to maintaining the status quo (where winners 
want things to stay the same). In a closed 
system, there is limited good to be shared by 
both parties.  Table 2 summarizes the potential 
outcomes for the effects of a policy change on 
two groups.
Table 2. Policy Change Outcomes
Loser and Winner of policy Explanation
LG1     LG2 Neither Group 1 (G1) nor Group 2 (G2) benefits.
LG1     WG2 One group benefits from policy and any change will alter balance between G1 and G2 but no overall im-
provement for both.WG1     LG2
WG1     WG2 Change in system will benefit both G1 and G2.
To successfully implement policy change, 
all parties must be oriented towards a common 
goal (change problem space) and away from 
individual subsystem goals.108 By changing 
the system (or how the problem space is 
constructed) to an open system when proposing 
a new policy, there is the possibility for all 
groups to benefit from the change. In closed 
systems, once a change is made, winners receive 
more rewards and losers receive punishment. 
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As policy complexity grows to affect multiple 
groups, it is important to understand who 
makes up the winning coalition (essentials who 
must support the initiative), key supporters 
(people influential in the transformation), and 
the nominal selectorate (individuals that have 
some say but have no significant role).109 These 
are groups whose needs should be considered 
when contemplating any policy change. Each of 
these groups will be impacted differently by all 
the changes recommended, and each may take 
steps to support or derail them based on their 
perception of how the change will impact them 
(see Table 3).
Table 3. Groups to be Addressed When Implementing Political Change 
Essentials
Senior decision makers whose 
support is a requirement for 
success
These are representatives of multilateral economic agencies (e.g., GATT, G7, ASE-
AN, NAFTA), foreign leaders, elected U.S. officials on Senate and House commerce 
committees, Secretary of Commerce and leaders of global businesses etc.
Influentials
Individuals who make the 
decision
These are foreign policy makers and business leaders of large U.S. companies. 
These individuals are making business decisions to exploit global trading relation-
ships and maximize profits. They are donors to political campaigns and advocate 
for economic incentives and tax breaks that benefit U.S. businesses.
Interchangables
Every person who has some 
say in the decision
These are members of the public and consumers. The challenges associated with 
globalization are likely to affect this group the most in the way of lost jobs (out-
sourcing), decreased wages (keep costs low) and lack of domestic production 
expansion (off shoring).
The relationship between ES, HS, and NS is 
a complex one and it has tangible impacts on 
the social, economic, and political well-being of 
the nation. The actual security relationship (ES 
driving NS which also encompasses most of HS) 
differs from what is described in the literature 
and doctrine (ES, NS and HS being equally 
important), leading to a misunderstanding 
of the security environment. Furthermore, 
outside forces (globalization and securitization) 
press down on the security elements and have 
unintended, sometimes violent consequences. 
By reimagining the relationship between 
security elements as the connection between 
security and prosperity and setting a national 
strategy, decisions can be made that will 
support the long-term health and success of the 
nation.
Extending the Framework
To evaluate the utility of the EHN framework, 
it must be used to analyze another issue, in this 
case the prioritization of national preparedness 
activities and the funding streams that support 
those initiatives.  The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) identifies core 
capabilities that help jurisdictions to achieve the 
national preparedness goal of “[a] secure and 
resilient nation with the capabilities required 
across the whole community to prevent, 
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from the threats and hazards that pose 
the greatest risk.”110  FEMA does not provide a 
prioritization of these activities, but instructs 
state and local jurisdictions to use the Threat 
and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA) process to identify capabilities on 
which to focus.  However, through Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant funding, 
priorities are implicitly identified by the federal 
government which may not align with Federal 
or local priorities.  The EHN framework will 
be used to ascertain whether this federal grant 
program is incentivizing the improvement 
of the right core capabilities, or if it distorts 
where effort is needed. This will be done using 
the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) 
as one example by comparing results from the 
National Preparedness Assessment and CCSF 
THIRAs. This exploration is not a detailed 
analysis, rather a ‘moist finger in the air to 
determine wind direction’ check of extending 
the framework.
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Elements
The core capability list was created 
as part of the 2012 National 
Preparedness goal.  The intention 
of the document is to provide a list 
of capabilities that local, state and federal 
jurisdictions should strive to meet in order to 
prepare themselves in an ‘all hazards’ (i.e. both 
man-made and natural disaster events) 
approach.  The capabilities are grouped into 
five mission areas (Figure 9) with the Planning, 
Public Information and Warning, and 
Operational Coordination capabilities shared 
across all missions.111  Within each of these 
mission areas, FEMA identifies core capabilities 
that organizations should strive to meet in 
order to be prepared to deal with an emergency 
event.  
Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery 
Planning 









Transportation Economic Recovery 
Intelligence and 






























Measures  Mass Care Services 
Natural and Cultural 
Resources 
 
Risk Mgt for 
Protection Program 
and Activities  
Mass Search and 
Rescue Operations  
 
Screening, Search, 
and Detection  
On-scene Security 







   





Public Health and 




 Figure 9. Mission Areas and Core Capability List112
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When these directives are discussed, there 
is no prioritization suggested for which area is 
most important.  Some have more capabilities 
which could suggest increased relevance, but the 
directives serve primarily a taxonomic purpose 
rather than prioritization.  Jurisdictions are 
tasked with determining the areas that need the 
most attention.
A Threat and Hazard Identification and 
Risk Assessment (THIRA) is a comprehensive 
assessment of the threats (intentional) and 
hazards (natural) in a jurisdiction, the areas 
of exposure, and the jurisdiction’s ability to 
respond to the threats and hazards.  Risk 
analysis is an important component of 
emergency management. It allows jurisdictions 
to gain a greater understanding of the risk 
landscape, evaluate current capabilities against 
known threats and hazards, and identify 
resources available to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, and respond and recover from 
our greatest risks. Using THIRA results, we 
can identify gaps in preparedness and drive 
investment towards building and sustaining 
core capabilities to address those gaps.  The 
gaps identified are not threat or hazard specific, 
rather they identify what is needed to make a 
jurisdiction more prepared and resilient.  See 
Figure 10 for a summary of these concepts.
Figure 10.  Components of a Capability Gap Analysis
The 2015 National Preparedness Report 
summarizes the progress towards meeting 
the core capabilities and identifies areas for 
sustainment and improvement.  It aggregates 
information from states, territories, and 
urban areas from THIRA analyses which were 
conducted in 2014 and which identified the 




•	 Long-term Vulnerability Reduction 
•	 Economic Recovery 
•	 Access Control and Identity Verifica-
tion 
The City and County of San Francisco 
conducted a similar analysis and identified 
the following threat and hazard likelihoods 
(Table 4) as well as core capabilities that need 
attention.114 
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Table 4. Top Three Threat and Hazard Likelihoods in San Francisco
Threat Likelihood Hazard Likelihood
VB IED High Flooding Very High
Aircraft as weapon High Earthquake Moderate
IED High High Wind High
The primary capabilities that need more 
attention in order to address the threats and 
hazards are:
•	 Critical Infrastructure Protection




Congress established the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) as part of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 in order to 
fund activities primarily focused on terrorism 
prevention.115  UASI grant money has been 
allocated by the federal government to increase 
our nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, 
mitigate, and recover from a terrorist act. The 
federal government allocates funds to urban 
areas in order to support high-density urban 
area capability-based preparation for acts of 
terrorism identified during THIRA analysis.116 
This terrorism (threat) focus is a requirement 
for the justification of grant-funded projects. 
If jurisdictions do not spend funds in this way, 
they will not be reimbursed.  This ‘power of the 
purse’ encourages state and local government 
to expend funds in accordance with the federal 
priorities.  
The relationship between the FEMA Core 
Capabilities, National Priorities, San Francisco 
priorities and UASI grant funding priorities is 
expressed in Figure 11. 
   
Figure 11 Connection of Priority Elements
As the framework describes, the elements do 
not exist in a vacuum.  They are impacted by 
outside forces which we will examine next.
Outside Forces
 In both federal and local instances, 
there are significant outside forces 
that likely impact the element 
relationship.  In both arenas, political 
opinion plays a key role.  Nationally, the daily 
reports of the threats posed by the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), China’s expansion into 
the South China Sea, and North Korea’s ballistic 
missile testing  shapes the narrative about 
public safety and impacts the perceived level of 
national preparedness. In San Francisco, the 
public is worried about income inequality, 
homelessness, the economy and global 
warming.  These issues speak more to human 
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security and the lack of public resiliency in the 
Bay Area. 
At the federal level, the money was initially 
allocated in order to improve the overall 
preparedness and legislators are keen to make 
sure that the money is being used for that 
purpose as well as being spent in a timely fashion. 
The local forces involve political pressure for 
preparedness and significant pressure for 
human security.  Law enforcement and fire 
agencies, as well as emergency management, 
consider themselves essential elements in the 
preparedness process and seek funding for 
individuals, equipment, and training in order 
to keep their resources prepared to support the 
community. Figure 12 identifies some external 
forces that influence the funding decisions 
being made at the national and local (San 
Francisco) level. When outcomes are analyzed 
other forces may also become apparent.
National San Francisco
•	 Political priorities
•	 Homeland Security Act mandates
•	 Budget priorities
•	 Popular opinion and fear 
•	 Rise of new threats




•	 Economic health post disaster
•	 Types of threats/hazards
•	 Department underfunding
•	 Differing definitions of who is a ‘first 
responder’
•	 THIRA findings
Figure 12 External forces influencing funding decisions
Complex Systems
 Within the web of complex systems 
there are connections between each 
of the different elements as well as 
between outside forces acting on 
those elements, and they all have feedback 
loops that are influencing one another. 
Understanding these complex systems will 
allow the researcher to better predict the likely 
outcome from known inputs (i.e. elements and 
external forces).
Outcomes 
 The amount of money allocated 
by Congress for the Urban Area 
Security Initiative has decreased 
from its initial high in 2010117; 
however, it has remained relatively consistent 
(varying by +/- $10M) over the last three years. 
Table 5 identifies direct impacts of the UASI 
funding and associated constraints:
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Table 5 Expected and Unexpected outcomes of UASI grant allocations
Expected Unexpected
Federal
•	 Overall level of national preparedness 
has increased
•	 Funds improve core capabilities
•	 Some jurisdictions make questionable 
purchases
•	 State ‘hold back’ for administration may 
not align with local needs
San Francisco
•	 Funds improve core capabilities 
•	 Overall preparedness has increased.
•	 Funding is directed towards supporting 
positions and the purchase of equip-
ment
•	 Unable to use funds for certain capabil-
ities that need more attention
•	 Challenging to spend funds because of 
narrow performance windows 
•	 THIRA results point to new areas of expo-
sure that have not been addressed
•	 Measuring specific capability gains is chal-
lenging because goals are too vague
Two indirect impacts of the UASI grant 
allocations are:
•	 UASI requirements to expend grant 
funds within 2 years of award put 
significant additional hardship on local 
jurisdictions. The unintended conse-
quence is that local entities purchase 
items that could be procured within the 
timeline rather than those that were 
most needed but required longer to 
obtain.
•	 A 2011 study of the effectiveness of 
UASI grant funds highlights a key 
issue when examining how program 
awards were used – measuring suc-
cess.  The report separates measuring 
the effectiveness of the program versus 
increasing overall preparedness and to 
indicates there is no scientific equation 
to quantify the impact.118
Analysis 
 By examining the elements, their 
connections, and the impact of 
outside forces, we see that specific 
local capabilities are not being 
addressed because they do not align with UASI 
funding goals.  The local focus is on preparedness 
and addressing more pressing political issues, 
but funding being provided is targeted towards 
something else.   The concept of rational choice 
assumes that decision makers are functioning 
as rational actors when deciding if they will 
allocate capital for disaster protection and 
mitigation or to some other activity.  However, 
research by Healy and Malhotra clearly explains 
a different story: 
…voters significantly reward disaster relief 
spending, holding the incumbent party 
accountable for actions taken after a disaster.  
In contrast, voters show no response at all, 
on average, to preparedness spending, even 
though investing in preparedness produces a 
large social benefit.119
The complexities of this mental calculation 
reflect an intricate relationship between social, 
political, and economic tradeoffs.120  Other 
insights include:
1. Core capabilities are a suitable benchmark 
for preparedness, but goals are vague 
2. THIRA process is an effective way to assess 
jurisdiction needs
3. Federal and local THIRA results are related 
but don’t directly align
4. There is a disconnect between federal grant 
goals and local needs/priorities.
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Reimagination
 Decision makers need a framework 
to understand where investments 
need to be made to reduce the 
impact of disasters.  Local, state, 
and federal governments have a 
limited amount of working funds, and may be 
reluctant to spend these precious funds towards 
mitigating something that might happen in the 
face of addressing issues that have an impact 
now.  
As seen above, if elected officials make 
rational choices, they are not necessarily 
‘rewarded’ by constituents who value immediate 
benefit over long term investments that may 
decrease the overall impact of a future event. 
If decision makers (i.e. government elected 
officials) want to remain in office, they may be 
more likely to make irrational decisions about 
disaster preparation because they are more 
focused on the short-term, ‘what’s in it for me’, 
focus of their constituents.  
To address these needs, recommendations 
include:
1. Develop tangible core capability measures 
and align them with pressing political 
issues
2. Change grant performance period back to 
3 years
3. Continue THIRA as primary way to identi-
fy capability areas that need improvement
4. To promote national preparedness, use of 
UASI funds needs to be expanded beyond 
terrorism to ‘all hazards’ use.
Other areas for improvement are likely, but 
for the purpose of evaluating the framework 
this should suffice.
Transformation
Some of the outcomes that drove 
the analysis are a few years old 
and have already been addressed, 
notably, UASI grants have 
returned to a 3 year performance 
cycle after local jurisdictions 
identified the challenges they were 
facing.  Additionally, the Bay Area 
UASI (of which San Francisco is part) developed 
more detailed metrics for each of the core 
capabilities.
In the first application of the framework, 
we described how the Dictator’s Handbook 
suggests that any proposed change (i.e. 
transformation) will have winners and losers. 
The winners will want to fight for new change 
that will likely benefit them while losers may 
want to maintain the status quo and their 
preferred environment.  Both of the changes 
above faced similar challenges.  Changes to how 
UASI grant money can be used, even if it aligns 
with federal and local capability gaps, will likely 
be challenged because money will be diverted 
from existing programs in order to fund new 
ones. This issue, of course, is not foreign to 
people who have been in government for any 
period of time. Once a program has been put 
into place, it is very difficult to change. 
Conclusion
Application of Framework
A challenge for any researcher is to clearly 
define the question being examined and 
organize the related observations in order to 
conduct thoughtful analysis. If the wrong issue 
is identified then the wrong solution may be 
developed.  The EHN framework emerged as a 
tool to identify the key components of the issue 
and the context in which it exists.  There are well 
established processes for analysis – inductive, 
deductive, exploratory, descriptive, qualitative 
and quantitative.  Several of these processes 
were applied in “Security and Prosperity” once 
the core issue had been correctly identified. 
The EHN framework helped organize the 
information available in order to more 
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effectively apply the analytical processes.  It is 
a reusable solution composed of organization 
techniques, analytical tools and thought guides 
to focus and simplify the study of other issues.  
To test the transferability of the framework, 
it had to be applied to a novel problem to see if 
it would help focus the analysis and decrease 
the time to study the issue.  The problem being 
studied was whether or not national and local 
homeland security priorities were aligned. 
Initially the study was focusing on what was 
written in doctrine by both groups but when 
applying the framework the linkage was not 
clear.  By identifying a link (in this case grant 
funding), I was able to establish a marker for 
intent – where the Department of Homeland 
Security wanted the funding spent vs where a 
local jurisdiction (e.g. San Francisco) actually 
applied it.  Considering the outside forces 
that impact the relationship led me to 
identify the different political environments 
that significantly influence how the money 
is allocated/spent (i.e. budget priorities). 
Complex systems exist at both levels and are 
likely extensive; because this is a proof of 
concept they were not  explored intensively, 
but the framework acknowledges that they 
exist and likely had a significant effect on the 
outcome.  This helped identify the expected 
and unexpected outcomes once grant funding 
was spent in San Francisco.  Most importantly, 
because the right issue was studied, the 
Reimagination and Transformation process 
generated targeted solutions.
Applying the EHN framework to the 
comparison of national and local preparedness 
priorities did not contain the necessary 
analytical rigor needed to truly study the issue; 
rather, it was intended to focus on studying 
the framework’s applicability to a novel issue. 
Based on the research findings, I believe the 
EHN framework is helpful to structure the 
exploration of social issues.  
Next Steps
Determining the validity of the framework does 
not require empirical study.  When studying 
social science issues there is no single structure 
best suited to issue analysis.  During the 
research of my thesis “Security and Prosperity: 
Reexamining the Relationship Between 
Economic, Homeland and National Security”, 
the EHN framework emerged to help provide 
the analytical structure.  
This research is not intended to invalidate 
other frameworks in use; rather it is to provide 
a new tool that may be helpful to researchers 
as they move forward in their own exploration. 
Other researchers may choose to use the 
framework when examining their next issue 
to see if the structure helps with their own 
analysis.
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Abstract
For more than fifty years, North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has 
been responsible for conducting aerospace 
warning and control missions for the 
defense of North America. In accomplishing 
those operations, Commander NORAD is 
responsible for making the official warning to 
both the president of the United States and the 
prime minister of Canada if North America is 
suddenly under aerospace attack. Now, with 
the dramatic increase in worldwide cyberspace 
events, NORAD has begun examining its own 
potential role within this new domain. Would 
involving NORAD in the military cyber attack 
warning process, leveraging its unique and 
proven binational structure, provide any 
advantages to both nations?
   To analyze this question, this essay traces 
NORAD’s warning mission history, discusses 
the basic concepts involved with “cyber 
attacks,” identifies key U.S. and Canadian 
military cyber organizations, and examines 
significant U.S. and Canadian cyberspace 
government policies. It then proposes three 
potential new courses of action for NORAD, 
identifying advantages, disadvantages, and 
proposed solutions to implementation. The 
essay ends by recommending that NORAD 
advocate for unrestricted cyberspace national 
event conference participation. This would 
be a realistic, achievable first step offering 
significant improvement in both NORAD’s 
cyber attack situational awareness, as well as 
improving overall operational responsiveness.
Introduction
For more than fifty years, North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has 
been responsible for conducting aerospace 
warning and aerospace control for North 
America. These two aerospace missions involve 
By Randall DeGering
the combined efforts of military forces of 
both the U.S. and Canada to detect airborne 
threats approaching or flying within North 
America (aerospace warning) and then taking 
appropriate actions to determine the aircraft of 
interest’s actual intentions (aerospace control). 
The commander of NORAD is responsible for 
making an official assessment to the president 
and the Canadian prime minister if it is believed 
North America is under aerospace attack.
Similarly, U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) is responsible for defending 
the U.S. military’s cyberspace enterprise. The 
commander of USCYBERCOM is responsible for 
making an official assessment to the president 
if the U.S. military is under cyber attack. Would 
involving NORAD, with its unique and proven 
binational structure, in the military cyber attack 
assessment process provide any advantages? 
With cyber attacks by nation-states on the 
increase, the question arises as to whether 
there is an advantage to involving a binational 
military command in the assessment of military 
cyber attacks. Potential advantages include 
operational efficiencies, improved cyberspace 
defense readiness, and/ or enhanced situational 
awareness of a precursor cyberspace attack 
before any kinetic attack upon North America. 
Disadvantages involve the difficulties in sharing 
cyberspace defense information between U.S. 
and Canadian cyberspace defense agencies, 
or the potential lessening of operational 
effectiveness of USCYBERCOM cyberspace 
operations themselves.
Using existing national policy and guidance, 
as well as dialogue with Headquarters NORAD 
and USNORTHCOM, USCYBERCOM, and 
Canadian military cyberspace practitioners, 
this essay proposes three courses of action 
that NORAD might consider, outlines the 
advantages and disadvantages of each, and 
concludes with a recommendation. 
What is NORAD’s Role in Military Cyber Attack Warning?
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Historical Background
With the beginning of the Cold War during 
the late 1940s, American defense experts 
began planning a new, comprehensive air 
defense strategy they believed was critical for 
defending the U.S. against attacks by long-
range Soviet Union strategic bombers. Led 
by the U.S. Air Force’s newly established “Air 
Defense Command” (created in 1948), regional 
commands were charged with protecting 
various areas of the U.S. from bomber attacks.1
In August 1949, the Soviet Union detonated 
its first atomic bomb under project “First 
Lightning.”2  The test shocked the Western 
powers, as the American intelligence community 
had previously estimated the Soviets would not 
develop an atomic weapon until 1953, at the 
very earliest.3  It was now predicted the Soviet 
Union would soon have the means to drop 
atomic weapons on the U.S. using long-range 
strategic bombers.
As concerns about Soviet nuclear capabilities 
became dire, in 1954 the Department of 
Defense formed a new, multi-service command 
called “Continental Air Defense Command” 
(CONAD) involving Army, Naval, and Air Force 
personnel. As their service contribution, the Air 
Force provided interceptor fighter aircraft and 
agreed to operate an extensive array of arctic 
distant early warning radar sites which would 
act as a “trip wire” against any surprise Soviet 
bomber attack being launched over the North 
Pole (the shortest attack route from Russia.) 
In addition, the U.S. and Canada had begun 
mutual defense negotiations, centering on 
building three series of long-range ground radar 
warning sites across Canada—the southern 
“Pinetree Line,” the “Mid-Canada Line,” and 
the famous northern “Distant Early Warning 
(DEW) Line.” 
Based upon the remarkable success of these 
joint United States-Canadian radar construction 
efforts, in 1958 the U.S. and Canada then jointly 
agreed to create an innovative “North American 
Air Defense Command” (NORAD), merging 
the operational control of both United States 
and Canadian air defense forces under a new, 
combined binational military command.
Adding to the continental defense 
challenge, Soviet engineers soon developed 
new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 
capable of delivering small, newly developed 
hydrogen bomb warheads. Thus, long range 
missile attacks now became a new, critical 
defense problem, as NORAD’s vast line of arctic 
air defense radar sites could now “not only [be] 
outflanked, but literally jumped over.”4
In response to this growing Soviet ICBM 
threat, beginning in 1959, NORAD developed 
the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
(BMEWS). Consisting of huge 165 feet high 
by 400 feet long radars, BMEWS became the 
first operational ballistic missile detection and 
warning system, designed to provide 15–25 
minutes critical warning of a Soviet missile 
attack launched directly over the North Pole.
Later, because of growing concerns these 
BMEWS radars were unable to observe actual 
Soviet launches occurring far beyond the 
Earth’s horizon, the U.S. began developing 
its own missile technology to orbit successive 
generations of early warning satellites capable 
of immediately detecting any ICBM launch 
occurring around the globe.
Space-based early warning progressed from 
the nascent “Missile Defense Alarm System” 
(MIDAS) developed in the 1960s, to the more 
capable “Defense Support Program” (DSP) 
series of satellites employed during the 1970s 
to 1990s, to the current “Space-Based Infrared 
System” (SBIRS) series of satellites first 
launched in the 2000s.  
Operating from geostationary orbit over 
22,000 miles above the earth, early warning 
satellite systems are designed to detect 
immediately any missile launches or nuclear 
explosions occurring across the globe.  Using 
sensitive on-board sensors designed to detect 
infrared emissions from intense heat sources, 
these early warning satellites then send an 
immediate message to NORAD warning of a 
possible ICBM launch.5
Thus, an evolving Soviet threat caused 
NORAD to adapt its warning missions to 
include both aircraft and missile attacks on 
North America. Reflecting that evolution, the 
1981 NORAD Agreement officially changed 
the command’s name to the North American 
“Aerospace” Defense Command.
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New Warning Missions for 
NORAD
In the aftermath of the 9/ 11 attacks, Canada and 
the U.S. created a Binational Planning Group 
(BPG) in 2004 to work on numerous proposals 
for creating wider cooperation between U.S. 
and Canadian military plans and protocols, 
and to look for common mission areas in which 
the two countries could share information. 
One area of mutual interest was improving 
awareness of maritime threat routes which 
surround the North American continent.6 
In a letter to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Commander NORAD supported 
the concept of NORAD being tasked with 
a new maritime surveillance, warning, and 
information sharing mission.7  After lengthy 
staffing actions between military headquarters, 
the U.S. and Canada signed a renewed NORAD 
Agreement (effective May 2006) assigning 
NORAD its new Maritime Warning mission, 
consisting of “…processing, assessing, and 
disseminating intelligence and information 
related to the respective maritime areas and 
internal waterways of, and the maritime 
approaches to, the U.S. and Canada, and 
warning of maritime threats to, or attacks 
against North America utilizing mutual support 
arrangements with other commands and 
agencies, to enable identification, validation, 
and response by national commands and 
agencies responsible for maritime defense and 
security.”8
Six years later, in 2012, both the U.S. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
and the Canadian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) 
jointly directed Commander NORAD to conduct 
a “NORAD Strategic Review” to address the 
following specific issues:
• Review current and potential future roles, 
missions, and command relationships
• Inform and support analysis of need for 
investment in NORAD capabilities
• Recommend linkages to align respective 
national research and development, 
planning, programming and budgeting 
processes related to NORAD requirements
• Recommend ways to align readiness 
reporting processes.9
When asked about the pending NORAD 
Strategic Review, General Charles Jacoby 
(then-Commander NORAD) replied, 
[w]e are deliberately moving out on a review 
that looks at the threat assessment, readiness 
assessment and program assessment 
processes that we need to put in place or 
revitalize, as the case may be, to ensure that 
we’re staying ahead of the threat. The threat to 
North America is changing and increasing as 
time goes by, and that includes cyber threats, 
threats to space, changing in the extremist 
threat to North America, changing in some 
of the more conventional threats and making 
sure that NORAD is positioned to keep faith 
with the agreement. (Emphasis added.)10
Completed in November 2014, the Strategic 
Review identified the emergence of new threats 
and capabilities which have the potential 
to affect NORAD”s ability to deter, detect, 
and defeat threats to Canada and the U.S. 
Specifically addressing cyberspace, the Review 
stated,
NORAD must be aware of current and 
emerging cyberspace threats and the means 
by which NORAD’s systems will be protected 
in order to meet their mission requirements. 
Therefore, NORAD must develop agreements 
and processes with trusted organizations and 
agencies to better analyze, characterize, assess, 
and share the impact of cyberspace events on 
NORAD operations, and the steps taken to 
defend NORAD networks against cyberspace-
attacks.11 Improvement of information sharing 
processes with cyberspace organizations and 
examination of new relationships can fill 
operational gaps to enhance NORAD mission 
assurance. (Canada’s Department of National 
Defence) and (U.S.’ Department of Defense) 
should examine NORAD’s potential roles 
and responsibilities in providing binational 
cyberspace warning for North America. 
(Emphasis added.)12 
Thus, since 1958, NORAD has a proven 
history of adapting and evolving to meet 
changing military defense challenges using 
new technology—from its early years providing 
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ground-based radar warning of approaching 
Soviet bombers, to ground-based radar 
warning of in-bound Soviet ICBMS, to satellite-
based warning of any missile launch occurring 
around the world, to extended radar warning 
of approaching cruise missiles, to the warning 
of suspect maritime vessels approaching North 
America.
NORAD has sole responsibility for receiving 
early warnings from numerous space-based 
and ground-based sensors and developing an 
integrated North American attack assessment. 
And because all of the sensors feeding into 
NORAD travel across the broader “information 
superhighway,” there exists a genuine risk of 
potentially hostile nations conducting damaging 
cyberspace operations against NORAD (to 
include blinding NORAD to actual threats, or 
feeding the Command false information for 
incorrect action.) With the recent increase in 
world-wide cyberspace events, NORAD thus 
has begun examining its own potential role in 
this new operational domain.
Growing Military 
Cyberspace Threats
In his testimony to the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence on January 29, 2014, James 
Clapper (Director of National Intelligence) 
provided an overview of the various 
international cyber threat actors currently 
challenging the U.S., stating “[w]e assess that 
computer network exploitation and disruption 
activities such as denial-of-service attacks will 
continue. Further, we assess that the likelihood 
of a destructive attack that deletes information 
or renders systems inoperable will increase as 
malware and attack tradecraft proliferate.”13
First, Director Clapper highlighted his 
growing concerns regarding the evolving 
Russian cyber threat: 
Russia presents a range of challenges to U.S. 
cyber policy and network security. Russia 
seeks changes to the international system for 
Internet governance that would compromise 
U.S. interests and values. Its Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) is establishing its own cyber 
command, according to senior MOD officials, 
which will seek to perform many of the 
functions similar to those of the U.S. Cyber 
Command.14 
As an example, the FireEye network security 
company stated they had reason to believe 
an “advanced persistent threat” (APT) from 
Russia had been operating since at least 2007, 
and was engaged in espionage against political 
and military targets. The report outlined how 
it was believed Russian hackers had targeted 
the Georgian Ministry of Defense; interfered 
with the Bulgarian, Polish and Hungarian 
governments; targeted Baltic military forces 
supporting U.S. Army training; and targeted 
several North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) organizations.15
Director Clapper then explained to the Select 
Committee how China was also becoming a 
serious cyberspace threat to the nation, stating, 
China’s cyber operations reflect its 
leadership’s priorities of economic growth, 
domestic political stability, and military 
preparedness… Internationally, China also 
seeks to revise the multi-stakeholder model 
of Internet governance while continuing its 
expansive worldwide program of network 
exploitation and intellectual property theft.16 
Underscoring this threat, in May of 2014, 
the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five 
members of the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), charging these individuals with 
hacking into computer networks owned by the 
U.S. Steel Corporation, Westinghouse Electric, 
and other major corporations. The Justice 
Department indictment specifically focused 
on “Unit 61398,” acknowledged as being 
the Shanghai-based cyber unit of the PLA. 
While acknowledging that countries conduct 
espionage for national security purposes, the 
indictment charged it was illegal for China to 
employ national intelligence assets to steal U.S. 
corporate secrets in order to gain an economic 
advantage.17
Director Clapper also warned the Select 
Committee about two other serious cyber threat 
actors.  He argued that “Iran and North Korea 
are unpredictable actors in the international 
arena. Their development of cyber espionage 
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or attack capabilities might be used in an 
attempt to either provoke or destabilize the 
U.S. or its partners.”18 Regarding Iran, U.S. 
Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-Michigan) 
stated, “Iran has boosted its cyber capabilities 
in a surprisingly short amount of time and 
possesses the ability to launch successful cyber 
attacks on American financial markets and 
its infrastructure.”19  Finally, North Korea has 
expended enormous resources to develop its 
cyber warfare cell called “Bureau 121” under the 
General Bureau of Reconnaissance, a spy agency 
run by the North Korean military.20 South 
Korean intelligence contends that Bureau 121 
has repeatedly conducted cyber attacks against 
numerous South Korean businesses, to include 
incidents in 2010 and 2012 targeting banks and 
media organizations. Pyongyang rejects these 
charges.21
Thus, one can clearly see the Intelligence 
Community’s increasing concern about the 
cyberspace threat posed by several potentially 
hostile nations, and the general consensus that 
these global threats are indeed serious and not 
abating.
What should be considered a 
“Cyber Attack”?
In their article “Cyber-Weapons,” Thomas 
Rid and Peter McBurney state there is no 
internationally agreed-upon definition of a cyber 
weapon. Therefore, they proposed the following 
definition: “[a] cyber weapon is seen as a subset 
of weapons, more generally as computer code 
that is used, or designed to be used, with the aim 
of threatening or causing physical, functional, 
or mental harm to structures, systems, or 
living beings.” (Emphasis added.)22 Expanding 
upon this proposed definition, in his book 
Cyberattack, Paul Day proposed four levels of 
cyber weapons.23
• Level 1. “Dual use” software tools provided 
with a computer’s organic operating 
system, such as network monitoring tools, 
which can be converted into hacking tools 
and used to exploit security vulnerabilities.
• Level 2. Software tools that can be 
downloaded for computer security purposes 
that are then abused to compromise 
networks and computers. This software 
is specifically designed to allow skilled 
operators to test and penetrate system 
security, but in the wrong hands can subvert 
a network. 
• Level 3. Malware designed only to exploit 
and infect other computers. Examples 
include RAT, spyware, and botnet clients. 
Again, these programs are widely available 
on the Internet.
• Level 4. Purposely built cyber weapons 
covertly developed by nation states with 
the expressed intention of waging cyber 
warfare. The most famous example is the 
“Stuxnet” worm discovered in 2010. (This 
level would match cyber weapon attacks as 
outlined by Rid and McBurney.)
In order to discuss the merits of any proposed 
cyber attack warning policy, it would be helpful 
to have a clear definition of what specifically 
defines a “cyber attack.”
Media Definitions 
While the news media repeatedly warn us 
about “cyber attacks,”24 there currently are 
no uniformly agreed-upon terms to describe 
cybersecurity activities. Typical cyber actions 
are often publically described as:25
• “Cyber-vandalism” or “hacktivism” 
(defacing or otherwise temporarily 
interfering with public access websites)
• “Cyber-crime” or “cyber-theft” (defrauding 
individuals to obtain their personal 
identification data, or actual theft of funds 
from financial accounts)
• “Cyber-espionage” (covertly stealing 
sensitive or proprietary information)
• “Cyber-warfare” (conducting military 
operations using cyber means).
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Popular cyber terms used in the media 
include “breach,” “compromise,” “intrusion,” 
“exploit,” “hack,” “incident,” and “attack.”26 So 
what is the difference between these various 
terms? Specifically, from a military viewpoint, 
what should be meant by a “cyber attack”?
NATO Definition
We begin by defining an “act of aggression” 
as being “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations.”27 Examples of acts of 
aggression outlined by the United Nations in 
its resolution include:
• The invasion or attack by the armed forces 
of a State into the territory of another State
• Bombardment by the armed forces of a 
State against the territory of another State, 
or the use of any weapons by a State against 
the territory of another state
• The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State
• An attack by the armed forces of a State on 
the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air 
fleets of another State.28
Given this general definition of an act of 
aggression, what does it mean to conduct 
a “cyber attack?”  To answer this question, 
beginning in 2009, NATO undertook a three-
year project to identify the international laws 
applicable to cyber warfare, with a goal of 
defining specific rules governing such conflicts. 
Working with twenty international law scholars 
and cyber practitioners, this working group 
eventually published their Tallinn Manual on 
the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare in 2013.
First, the Tallinn group developed a general 
definition of the “use of force” for cyber 
operations: “[a] cyber operation constitutes 
a use of force when its scale and effects are 
comparable to non-cyber operations rising to 
the level of a use of force.”29
The group found focusing on the “scale 
and effects” of a cyber operation was a useful 
approach when attempting to distinguish 
between cyber acts which unmistakably qualify 
as use of force (e.g., such as acts that injure 
people or damage property) and cyber acts 
which do not cause physical harm. Used this 
way, “scale and effects” effectively captures 
the qualitative factors to be considered in 
evaluating whether a cyber operation reached 
the level of other kinetic actions analogous to a 
use of force.30
The group next developed a set of eight 
specific factors to consider in judging whether a 
specific cyber operation actually constituted the 
“use of force.” As stated in the Tallinn Manual, 
these include:
• Severity Consequences involving physical 
harm to individuals or property will in and 
of themselves qualify the act as a use of 
force…the scope, duration, and intensity 
of the event will have great bearing on the 
appraisal of their severity
• Immediacy The sooner consequences 
manifest, the less opportunity States 
have to seek peaceful accommodation of 
a dispute or to otherwise forestall their 
harmful effects
• Directness Cyber operations in which the 
cause and effect are clearly linked are more 
likely to be characterized as uses of force
• Invasiveness As a rule, the more secure 
a targeted cyber system, the greater the 
concern as to its penetration. For example, 
cyber operations targeting State domain 
names (e.g., “.mil” or “.gov”) could be 
considered more invasive than cyber 
operations directed at non-State domain 
names (e.g., “.com” or “.net.”) 
• Measurability of Effects The more 
quantifiable and identifiable a set of 
consequences, the easier it will be for a State 
to assess the situation when determining 
whether the cyber operation in question has 
reached the level of a use of force 
• Military Character  The closer the 
connection between the cyber operation 
and military operations, the more likely it 
will be deemed a use of force
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• State Involvement The clearer and 
closer a nexus between a State and cyber 
operations is, the more likely it is that other 
States will characterize them as uses of 
force by that State
• Presumptive Legality Finally, the 
group clarified that acts not forbidden 
by international law are permitted and 
are presumptively legal. Propaganda, 
psychological operations, espionage, 
economic pressure, etc., are all actions 
allowed by international law. Thus, cyber 
operations falling into these internationally 
legal categories will be less likely to be 
considered by States as uses of force.31
Using these specific factors, the Tallinn 
group then developed a definition of the “threat 
of force” under cyber operations: “[a] cyber 
operation, or threatened cyber operation, 
constitutes an unlawful threat of force when 
the threatened action, if carried out, would be 
an unlawful use of force.”32 Finally, linking all 
previous definitions into a coherent concept, 
the Tallinn group developed an authoritative 
definition of what constitutes a genuine “cyber 
attack”: 
“[a] cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether 
offensive or defensive, that is reasonably 
expected to cause injury or death to persons 
or damage or destruction to objects.”33
Thus, after considerable legal deliberations and 
debate, the Tallinn group developed a definition 
of “cyber attack” useful in policy development, 
military strategies, and international affairs. It 
excludes non-lethal activities (such as cyber-
crime and cyber-espionage) and allows for both 
state and non-state actors.
More importantly, the NATO definition 
clearly provides a logical connection between 
the legal concepts of “an act of aggression,” “use 
of force,” “threat of force,” “armed attack,” and 
“self-defense.” And it provides useful factors 
for consideration in determining whether the 
“scale and effects” of a specific cyber operation 
constitutes an actual armed attack upon a State.
Expressing similar concerns about growing 
worldwide cyberspace threats, NATO endorsed 
a new “Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy” during 
its 2014 North Atlantic Council Summit. In its 
published Declaration, NATO stated:
[t]he policy reaffirms the principles of 
the indivisibility of Allied security and of 
prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, 
and defence. It recalls that the fundamental 
cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to 
defend its own networks, and that assistance 
to Allies should be addressed in accordance 
with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the 
responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant 
capabilities for the protection of national 
networks…Close bilateral and multinational 
cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the 
cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance.34
Alternative Definition
Interestingly, in January 2015, Admiral James 
Stavridis (NATO Commander from 2009–
2013) disagreed with this specific NATO 
definition. He stated the Tallinn Manual 
definition of cyber attack was “far too simplistic 
to account for the nuances of cyberwarfare. It 
sets a dangerously high threshold for a domain 
with comparatively low barriers to entry.”35 
Stavridis proposed there are three elements 
to “cyberforce”: intelligence (understanding 
the target environment), cyberweapons (the 
actual computer code, usually target-specific 
with a short shelf life), and intent (a calculated 
human decision). He then proposed that it is 
specifically the cyberweapon which defines 
whether cyberforce approaches the level of a 
genuine armed attack.36
For example, Stavridis outlines the 
2012 “Shamoon” virus that infected Saudi 
Aramco, the world’s largest State-owned oil 
company. This cyber operation erased data 
from computer memories which the company 
could not reconstitute. Also, company systems 
were down for two weeks, resulting in adverse 
global economic affects. Finally, more than 
30,000 workstations were replaced to rid the 
corporation network of malware. This action 
“is a far better measure of cyberforce than 
simply concentrated personal injury or physical 
damage. Yet, according to the Tallinn Manual, 
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Shamoon was not a cyber attack.”37Therefore, 
Stavridis offers his own alternative cyber attack 
definition:
[a] cyber attack is the deliberate projection of 
cyberforce resulting in kinetic or nonkinetic 
consequences that threaten or otherwise 
destabilize national security, harm economic 
Figure 1. DOD Cyberspace Operations.39
interests, create political or cultural instability; 
or hurt individuals, devices or systems.”38
This alternative definition may in fact 
become a more useful one for future military 
planners, as it broadens threats from cyberspace 
operations to include those actions which inflict 
economic harm or national security instability.
What Constitutes 
“Cyberspace Operations”?
From a Department of Defense (DOD) 
perspective, military cyberspace missions can 
be characterized using several overlapping 
definitions and relationships (see Figure 1):
Department of Defense Information 
Networks (DODIN)
These are described by the Department of the 
Army as “[t]he globally interconnected, end-
to-end set of information capabilities, and 
associated processes for collecting, processing, 
storing, disseminating, and managing 
information on-demand to warfighters, policy 
makers, and support personnel, including 
owned and leased communications and 
computing systems and services, software 
(including applications), data, security services, 
other associated services, and national security 
systems.”40
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DODIN Operations
These are described by the Department of 
the Army as “[o]perations to design, build, 
configure, secure, operate, maintain, and 
sustain Department of Defense networks to 
create and preserve information assurance 
on the Department of Defense information 
networks.”41 DODIN operations are the 
traditional methods we all think of to preserve 
data availability, integrity, confidentiality, and 
user authentication. These operations include 
configuration control and system patches, 
user training, physical security, firewalls, and 
data encryption. Many DODIN activities are 
conducted through regularly scheduled events 
and updates.
Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)
These are operations which respond to 
unauthorized activity or alert/ threat 
information which threaten the DODIN. DCO 
can be both “passive and active cyberspace 
operations intended to preserve the ability 
to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and 
protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, 
and other designated systems.”42  “Internal 
defense measures” are conducted within the 
DODIN. These are defined as being “defensive 
tools and techniques [which] are designed to 
find, fix and finish anomalous network activity 
using rule, signature and behavioral-based 
techniques.”43 By comparison, “DCO-Response 
Actions” or DCO-RA are defensive measures 
taken outside the defended network to protect 
DOD cyberspace capabilities. Once sources of 
a cyber attack are identified, response actions 
(such as custom-made computer code) may 
be employed to defend friendly cyberspace 
systems.44
Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO)
These are “operations intended to project 
power by the application of force in and 
through cyberspace.”45 OCO focuses effects 
in cyberspace to influence or degrade enemy 
weapon systems, command and control 
processes, critical infrastructures, etc.
Cyberspace Attack 
As defined by DOD, cyber attacks are activities 
that deny (by degrading, disrupting or 
destroying access to, operation of, or availability 
of a target) or that manipulate (by controlling 
or changing an adversary’s information or 
networks.)46
As can be seen, the topic of “cyber attack” 
involves not only various potential definitions 
of what a cyber attack actually entails, but also 
what means are available to respond either 
defensively or offensively to such an attack. 
While cyberspace definitions remain fluid, 
they all help establish the essential conceptual 
foundation to allow military and civilian policy 
makers to consider how “cyber attack warning” 
might be specifically implemented by NORAD.
Military Cyber Event 
Conferences
In order to provide rapid command and 
control, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS) has established emergency 
conferencing procedures that allow military 
commands around the world to simultaneously 
connect and discuss urgent military events at 
various classification levels.47  USCYBERCOM 
specifically manages two important cyberspace-
related worldwide conferences (see Figure 2):
Figure 2. Cyber Event Conferences.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 12 Essay 5 (May 2016) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
DeGering,  What is NORAD's Role in Military Cyber Attack Warning?  10
• “Cyber Watch Conferences” provide a 
specialized, technical forum for operational 
watch centers around the world to identify 
and troubleshoot anomalous cyberspace 
indications, conduct checks to verify 
circuits are serviceable, communication 
encryption devices are functioning, satellite 
relay systems are operative, etc.
•  “Cyber Event Conferences” allow senior 
decision-makers to discuss securely 
potential operational impacts with each 
other, and to deliberate what follow-on 
cyberspace actions might be required.
Another, more senior-level conference 
(managed by the Pentagon) is entitled the 
“National Event Conference” or NEC.  Using 
this conference, government and military 
agencies and commands worldwide are brought 
together for situational awareness regarding an 
urgent national event. 
One significant situation that can trigger 
a NEC is a “cyberspace event,” defined as “…
any significant loss or serious threat of loss of 
networks or data (e.g., critical cyberspace links 
or nodes, cyberspace mission data providing 
assets etc.) that threatens U.S. national security 
or interests.”48 During a cyber NEC, Commander 
USCYBERCOM is required to make an official 
“Cyberspace Attack Assessment” to U.S. (but 
not currently Canadian) national leadership 
using formally-defined assessment criteria (see 
Figure 3.)49
UNCLASSIFIED
YES In the judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM, a verified cyberspace attack has occurred, is occurring, or is imminent.
CONCERN
In the judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM, a cyberspace attack may be 
in progress or is imminent. The situation is still under assessment and 
may warrant implementation of appropriate measures and/ or plans to 
enhance cyberspace responsiveness and inter-agency awareness.
NO In the judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM, a verified cyberspace attack has not occurred, nor is one in progress.
PENDING
The judgment of CDRUSCYBERCOM will be provided as soon as 
possible. No assessment is available at this time. There is inadequate 
information available to assess whether a cyberspace attack is or may be 
occurring or is imminent.
UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 3. Cyberspace Attack Assessment Criteria.50
NORAD participates in these worldwide 
conferences via the NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), 
which acts as the central point of contact and 
coordinator for participation in all national 
conferences for both Commands (see Figure 4.)
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Figure 4. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.51
The N2C2 effectively integrates all missile 
warning, air warning, maritime warning, land 
operations and cyberspace operations, thus 
bringing the two Commands’ multiple missions 
together to create greater synergy.  However, 
due to current U.S. information classification 
policy restrictions, NORAD Canadian personnel 
must exit any national event conference once 
specific “U.S.-only” classified cyberspace topics 
are being discussed. 
Key U.S. and Canadian Cyber 
Policy Guidance
Cyberspace warning is influenced by a host 
of international, governmental and military 
policies and guidance. Both the U.S. and 
Canadian governments have published many 
documents providing guidance to military 
commands at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels. 
In an effort to establish his own 
administration’s guidance regarding 
cyberspace, in 2009 President Obama directed 
a Cyberspace Policy Review as a “clean slate” 
review assessing U.S. cybersecurity policies.52 
The results established
…strategy, policy, and standards regarding 
the security of and operations in cyberspace, 
and encompasses the full range of threat 
reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, 
international engagement, incident response, 
resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, 
including computer network operations, 
information assurance, law enforcement, 
diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions 
as they relate to the security and stability of 
the global information and communications 
infrastructure. (Emphasis added.)53 
As a near-term accomplishment, the report 
specifically recommended the Nation should 
“develop U.S. Government positions for an 
international cybersecurity policy framework 
and strengthen our international partnerships 
to create initiatives that address the full range of 
activities, policies, and opportunities associated 
with cybersecurity.” (Emphasis added.)54
The executive branch prepares and updates 
the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS)  to 
outline the key national security concerns 
of the United States, and how the current 
administration plans specifically to address 
those concerns. The current NSS, developed in 
2010, states: 
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[n]either government nor the private 
sector nor individual citizens can meet this 
challenge alone—we will expand the ways 
we work together. We will also strengthen 
our international partnerships on a range of 
issues, including the development of norms 
for acceptable conduct in cyberspace; laws 
concerning cybercrime; data preservation, 
protection, and privacy; and approaches 
for network defense and response to cyber 
attacks. We will work with all the key players— 
including all levels of government and the 
private sector, nationally and internationally—
to investigate cyber intrusion and to ensure 
an organized and unified response to future 
cyber incidents. Just as we do for natural 
disasters, we have to have plans and resources 
in place beforehand.” (Emphasis added.)55
Drafted in 2011, the U.S. International 
Strategy for Cyberspace serves as the U.S.’ 
first, comprehensive International Strategy for 
Cyberspace. Regarding military initiatives, the 
Strategy outlines the following: 
Build and enhance existing military alliances 
to confront potential threats in cyberspace. 
Cybersecurity cannot be achieved by any 
one nation alone, and greater levels of 
international cooperation are needed to 
confront those actors who would seek 
to disrupt or exploit our networks. This 
effort begins by acknowledging that the 
interconnected nature of networked systems 
of our closest allies, such as those of NATO 
and its member states, creates opportunities 
and new risks. Moving forward, the United 
States will continue to work with the militaries 
and civilian counterparts of our allies and 
partners to expand situational awareness 
and shared warning systems, enhance our 
ability to work together in times of peace and 
crisis, and develop the means and method 
of collective self-defense in cyberspace. 
Such military alliances and partnerships will 
bolster our collective deterrence capabilities 
and strengthen our ability to defend the U.S. 
against state and non-state actors. (Emphasis 
added.)56
Overall, the International Strategy for 
Cyberspace establishes a roadmap allowing U.S. 
governments and agencies to better coordinate 
cyberspace policy with our partner nations. It 
also establishes an invitation to other nations 
to join in a common vision of innovation, 
interoperability, reliability and security.
The National Military Strategy (NMS), also 
drafted in 2011, serves as the means for the 
CJCS to provide the “best military advice”57 to 
the Nation’s leadership, and outlines the ways 
and means by which the U.S. military advances 
the Nation’s enduring national interests. 
This strategy outlines three broad themes: 
[f]irst, in supporting national efforts to 
address complex security challenges, the 
Joint Force’s leadership approach is often 
as important as the military capabilities 
we provide. Second, the changing security 
environment requires the Joint Force to 
deepen security relationships with our allies 
and create opportunities for partnerships 
with new and diverse groups of actors. And 
third, our Joint Force must prepare for an 
increasingly dynamic and uncertain future in 
which a full spectrum of military capabilities 
and attributes will be required to prevent 
and win our Nation’s wars. Cyberspace 
capabilities enable Combatant Commanders 
to operate effectively across all domains. 
Strategic Command and Cyber Command 
will collaborate with U.S. government 
agencies, nongovernment entities, industry, 
and international actors to develop new 
cyber norms, capabilities, organizations, and 
skills. Should a large-scale cyber intrusion 
or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must 
provide a broad range of options to ensure our 
access and use of the cyberspace domain and 
hold malicious actors accountable. (Emphasis 
added.)58
Finally, “[j]oint Forces will secure the ‘.mil’ 
domain, requiring a resilient DOD cyberspace 
enterprise that employs detection, deterrence, 
denial, and multi-layered defense.”59 Thus, 
DOD is chartered to focus on the “.mil” domain, 
while DHS focuses on the broader “.gov” 
domain.
Similarly, Canada drafted its own Cyber 
Security Strategy in 2010.  This strategy is 
the Canadian government’s plan for meeting 
the cyberspace threat, and delivers on the 
government’s commitment to implement a 
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cyberspace strategy to protect Canada’s digital 
infrastructure. It acts as a cornerstone of the 
government’s commitment to keep Canada, and 
its cyberspace, safe, secure, and prosperous.
Further, Canada’s “Action Plan 2010-2015” 
then outlines the Canadian government’s plan 
to implement the Cyber Security Strategy and 
meet the ultimate goal of securing Canada’s 
cyberspace for the benefit of Canadians and 
their economy. The Action Plan outlines 
thirty specific actions to take, the required 
deliverables, and the lead agencies involved, all 
coordinated to meet the three pillars outlined 
in the Cyber Security Strategy.
Finally, the Canadian Forces Cyber 
Operations Primer, drafted in 2014, describes 
Cyber Operations from a Canadian Armed 
Forces (CAF) perspective, and outlines the 
operational functions in the Cyber environment, 
those being Command, Sense, Act, Shield, 
and Sustain. Under the “Sustain” function, 
the Primer states, “[s]ustaining the Force 
requires the CAF to engage in a wide range 
of multi-national political/ military alliances 
and arrangements (i.e., Five-Eyes, NATO, 
NORAD.)” (Emphasis added.)60 
As can be seen, U.S. and Canadian strategic 
cyberspace guidance documents all propose 
a closer working arrangement between each 
country as both deal with growing cyberspace 
threats. These documents significantly inform 
the discussion regarding NORAD’s potential 
new role in cyberspace threat information and 
attack assessment.
Three Proposed Courses 
of Action for NORAD 
Consideration
Informed from extensive dialogue with 
NORAD, USCYBERCOM, and Canadian 
military cyberspace practitioners, I propose 
three potential courses of action (COAs) for 
NORAD consideration regarding possible roles 
the Command might play in future military 
cyber attack warnings. Each of these three 
COAs met all five validity criteria used by the 
DOD: 61
• Adequate Can accomplish the mission 
within the commander’s guidance
• Feasible Can accomplish the mission 
within the established time, space, and 
resource limitations
• Acceptable Must balance cost and risk 
with advantage gained
• Distinguishable Must be sufficiently 
different from other COAs
• Complete Does it answer who, what, 
where, when, how and why?
I have arranged these three COAs 
sequentially by increasing levels of 
responsibility being placed upon NORAD, 
and I have examined them for their specific 
advantages, disadvantages, and levels of 
difficulty in their implementation.
COA #1.  Full NORAD Cyber Conference 
Participation
Under this COA, NORAD’s role would be to fully 
participate in all cyberspace event conferences 
in order to increase the Command’s internal 
situational awareness regarding in-progress, 
military-related cyber events.
NORAD currently participates in 
“Cyber Watch Conferences” which provide 
cyber technicians a standardized venue to 
discuss and troubleshoot detected system 
anomalies. However, during advanced “Cyber 
Event Conferences” and “National Event 
Conferences,” practitioners report Canadian 
participation is denied approximately 50 
percent of the time due to discussions involving 
non-releasable (US-only) classified cyberspace 
compartmented information. This COA 
proposes U.S. classification policy be changed by 
DOD to allow NORAD Canadians to participate 
fully in those cyberspace conferences.  
Implementing this COA eliminates those 
restrictions, makes classified cyber event 
information fully available to appropriate 
Canadian military personnel, and improves 
NORAD’s own cyberspace situational 
awareness and ability to gauge any associated 
mission impacts. 
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Advantages of COA #1 include:
• Allows full cyber event information 
exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD.
• Enables NORAD full situational awareness 
regarding cyber events that might affect the 
NORAD warning and control missions.
• Uses existing technical conference 
procedures. 
• Does not change existing relationships with 
USCYBERCOM.
• Does not require a change in the NORAD 
Agreement and/ or Terms of Reference 
negotiated between the U.S. and Canada.
Disadvantages to COA #1 (and proposed 
alternative solutions) include:
• Some classified cyberspace threat 
information and technical “tactics, 
techniques, and procedures” (TTPs) are not 
currently releasable to Canadian personnel. 
(Change DOD classification guidance to 
allow Canadians full access to cyberspace 
threat information and TTPs.)
• NORAD regional headquarters currently 
must drop off threat conferences during 
classified discussions. (Change DOD 
conference procedures to allow NORAD 
regional headquarters to remain on 
cyber event conferences during classified 
discussions.)
• Modifies existing conference checklist 
procedures. (Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists to reflect full NORAD 
participation.)
COA #2.  NORAD All-Domain Warning 
Production 
Under this COA, NORAD’s role would be 
to fuse applicable North America military-
related cyber event information with current 
NORAD aerospace and maritime operational 
information to produce all-domain warnings to 
the U.S. and Canadian governments. 
Assuming the issue of releasing classified 
cyber event information to NORAD Canadians 
is successfully resolved (proposed in COA #1), 
COA #2 directs NORAD to fuse military cyber 
event information with current aerospace and 
maritime warning information to produce 
timely all-domain warnings to the U.S. 
and Canadian governments using existing 
NORAD binational military relationships and 
established warning processes. 
This COA would allow Canadian cyber 
forces to become involved in the NORAD 
notification process. As technical cyber event 
information would initially be analyzed by 
USCYBERCOM, then provided to NORAD 
for further amalgamation, there would be no 
change to the existing relationships between 
the two commands. 
Advantages of COA #2 include:
• Allows full cyber event information 
exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD.
• Enables NORAD full situational awareness 
regarding cyber events that might affect the 
NORAD warning and control missions.
• Uses existing technical conference 
procedures.
• Does not change existing relationships with 
USCYBERCOM.
• Directs NORAD to fuse military cyber event 
information with current aerospace and 
maritime warning information to produce 
an all-domain characterization.
• Uses proven, legacy NORAD binational 
relationships and procedures to provide 
immediate all-domain warning updates to 
both U.S. and Canadian military command 
structures.
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Disadvantages to COA #2 (and proposed 
alternative solutions) include:
• Some classified cyberspace threat 
information and technical TTPs are not 
currently releasable to Canadian personnel. 
(Change DOD classification guidance to 
allow Canadians full access to cyberspace 
threat information and technical TTPs.)
• NORAD regional headquarters currently 
must drop off threat conferences during 
classified SCI discussions. (Change DOD 
conference procedures to allow NORAD 
regional headquarters to remain on 
cyber event conferences during classified 
discussions.)
• Modifies existing conference checklist 
procedures. (Modify cyberspace conference 
checklists to reflect NORAD fusing and 
dissemination of all-domain warning 
updates to both the U.S. and Canada.)
• Requires training NORAD personnel to 
fuse and disseminate all-domain warning 
updates. (Build new training program for 
NORAD personnel to fuse and disseminate 
all-domain warning updates.)
• Requires negotiating new cyberspace 
defense and response policies between 
the U.S. and Canada. (Negotiate new 
cyberspace defense and response policies 
between the U.S. and Canada, if required.)
• Requires a change in NORAD Agreement 
and/ or Terms of Reference between both 
Governments. (Negotiate change to NORAD 
Agreement and/or Terms of Reference 
between the U.S. and Canada, if required.)
COA #3.  Joint NORAD + USCYBERCOM 
Cyber Attack Assessment
Under this COA, NORAD’s role would involve 
CDRNORAD and CDRUSCYBERCOM to 
conducting a combined formal cyber attack 
assessment, if such an attack was believed to be 
in progress.
Again, assuming the releasability of classified 
cyber event information (proposed in COA #1) 
is successfully accomplished, COA #3 would 
require joint concurrence regarding a cyber 
attack assessment. While CDRUSCYBERCOM 
understands the technical cyberspace issues 
involved during a cyber attack, CDRNORAD 
has the operational responsibility to provide 
aerospace and maritime attack warning 
for North America to the civilian military 
leadership of both Nations. Providing a joint 
cyber attack assessment would strengthen the 
validity of such an evaluation.
Advantages of COA #3 include:
• Allows full cyber event information 
exchange to both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel assigned to NORAD.
• Enables NORAD full situational awareness 
regarding cyber events that might affect the 
NORAD warning and control missions.
• Uses existing technical conference 
procedures.
• Leverages USCYBERCOM’s global 
cyberspace visibility, technical 
infrastructure, and cyberspace expertise 
to accomplish an official cyber attack 
assessment.
• Leverages NORAD’s visibility on current 
air defense operations and aerospace/ 
maritime warning expertise to ascertain 
any effects on NORAD operations.
Disadvantages to COA #3 (and proposed 
alternative solutions) include:
• Some classified cyberspace threat 
information and technical TTPs are not 
currently releasable to Canadian personnel. 
(Change DOD classification guidance to 
allow Canadians full access to cyberspace 
threat information and technical TTPs.)
• NORAD regional headquarters currently 
must drop off threat conferences during 
classified discussions. (Change DOD 
conference procedures to allow NORAD 
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regional headquarters to remain on 
cyber event conferences during classified 
discussions.)
• Modifies existing conference checklist 
procedures. (Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists to reflect joint 
CDRUSCYBERCOM/ CDRNORAD cyber 
attack assessment.)
• Requires training NORAD General 
Officers for new cyber attack assessment 
coordination responsibility. (Build new 
training program for NORAD General 
Officer joint cyber attack assessment 
responsibility.)
• Changes existing relationships with 
USCYBERCOM. (Negotiate new command 
arrangements agreement between NORAD 
and USCYBERCOM.)
• Requires negotiating new cyberspace 
defense and response policies between the 
U.S. and Canada. (Negotiate new cyberspace 
defense and response policies between the 
U.S. and Canada, if required.)
• Requires changing the NORAD Agreement 
and/or Terms of Reference. (Negotiate 
change to NORAD Agreement and/or 
Terms of Reference, if required.)
COA 1 COA 2 COA 3
Proposed Solutions Weight


















conference checklists to 
reflect NORAD fusing 
and dissemination of 
all-domain warnings 
to both the U.S. and 
Canada.
1 1
Courses of Action Analysis 
and Results
Using inputs from numerous military 
cyberspace subject matter experts, I have 
weighted each COA’s proposed implementation 
solutions using an increasing score:
• “1” (Routine; requires normal NORAD 
internal staff actions.)
• “2” (Challenging; requires detailed, U.S. 
government-wide staff actions.) 
• “3” (Difficult; requires politically sensitive 
binational staff actions.)
I then summed all weighted solutions to 
present a total COA score for consideration. 
The COA which presented the greatest apparent 
advantages and the lowest disadvantages score 
was presumed to be the best COA for NORAD to 
pursue.  (Figure 5 summarizes all three COAs, 
their proposed solutions and implementation 
weights, and their specific total scorings.)
Overall, this methodology (while not strictly 
scientific) still provides the reader a general 
measure of the relative cost of implementation 
for each proposed COA. (Before any COA 
might be adopted by NORAD, a formal military 
COA analysis should be conducted, to include 
surveys and/ or interviews with cyberspace 
practitioners.)
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Modify cyberspace 
conference checklists 
to reflect joint 
CDRUSCYBERCOM 





to allow Canadians full 
access to cyberspace 
threat information and 
technical TTPs.
2 2 2 2
Change DOD conference 
procedures to allow 
NORAD regional 
headquarters to 
remain on cyber event 
conferences during 
classified discussions.
2 2 2 2
Build new training 
program for NORAD 




Build new training 
program for NORAD 
General Officer joint 











and response policies 




Agreement and/ or 
Terms of Reference, if 
required.
3 3 3
SCORES 5 13 15
Figure 5.  COA Analysis Summary.
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COA #1 is a promising first step. Overall, this 
would seem to be a realistic, achievable COA that 
offers significant improvement in NORAD cyber 
attack situational awareness and operational 
effectiveness at a cost of only an administrative 
change in DOD information classification policy. 
Releasing classified cyberspace information to 
all NORAD personnel, and allowing NORAD 
regional headquarters to remain on cyber event 
conferences, also mirrors current U.S. national 
policies which repeatedly highlight the need 
for greater U.S. cooperation and information 
sharing with our international allies. 
Under COA #1, existing classified cyber 
event conferences would continue as normal. 
However, updated internal NORAD operational 
checklists would be required to fully capitalize 
on new cyber attack warning information now 
being made available to NORAD personnel 
from such cyberspace conference attendance.
After reviewing the advantages, 
disadvantages and potential solutions 
for implementing this COA, a weighted 
implementation score of “5” would seem to 
indicate few major roadblocks to overcome.
Overall, while requiring several 
“challenging” staff actions through DOD to 
accomplish the desired releasability goal, 
this COA would enable greater information 
exchange between allies, would provide greater 
cyberspace situational awareness to NORAD, 
and would help Commander NORAD make 
more knowledgeable assessments regarding 
any potential attack upon North America.
By comparison, COA #2 proposes a much 
more active role for NORAD, assuming the 
issue regarding the releasability of classified 
cyber event information to Canadian personnel 
(proposed under COA #1) has been successfully 
resolved. It directs the Command to fuse 
military cyber event information with existing 
aerospace and maritime warning information 
to produce timely, all-domain warnings to 
U.S. and Canadian national civilian leadership 
using current NORAD binational military 
relationships and established warning 
processes.
While USCYBERCOM currently provides 
specific cyber event updates directly to military 
command centers, having NORAD produce 
broader all-domain warning products to both 
the U.S. and Canada would help both nations 
have a better appreciation for the effect a cyber 
event might have had on North American 
defenses.
Under COA #2, existing classified cyber event 
conferences continue as normal and capitalize 
on information now being fully available 
to all NORAD personnel. Updated internal 
operational checklists would be required to 
reflect NORAD fusing and dissemination of 
all-domain warnings to both nations. Also, a 
new training program would have to be built 
to train NORAD personnel on producing and 
disseminating all-domain warning products.
As cyber event information would initially be 
analyzed by USCYBERCOM, then provided to 
NORAD for further consideration, there would 
be no change to the existing relationships 
between the two commands.
Also, because this would be a major change 
to NORAD’s legacy missions and processes, 
the U.S. and Canada might have to negotiate 
new cyberspace defense and response 
policies to ensure NORAD has the correct 
mission authority. Following such binational 
negotiations, The U.S. and Canada would also 
need to update the NORAD Agreement and /
or Terms of Reference through international 
staffing channels.
After reviewing the advantages, disadvantages 
and potential solutions for implementing 
this COA, a weighted implementation score 
of “13” would seem to indicate several major 
roadblocks to overcome, mostly in the need 
to negotiate new international agreements 
between the U.S. and Canada.
Overall, while requiring both “challenging” 
and “difficult” staff actions both within 
DOD and internationally with Canada, this 
COA harnesses proven NORAD binational 
relationships and warning procedures to 
provide all-domain warning updates to both 
nations.
Finally, COA #3 is the most active NORAD 
option. Again, assuming the release of classified 
cyber event information to Canadian personnel 
(proposed under COA #1) has been successfully 
accomplished, this COA proposes a major 
change in current U.S. cyber attack assessment 
procedures.
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While USCYBERCOM has strong technical 
understanding and global visibility of 
cyberspace activities, they often lack detailed 
insight into current operations being conducted 
by global combatant commands. Under COA 
#3, this deficit would be alleviated for North 
American air defense operations by directing 
NORAD to jointly participate in all North 
American-related cyber attack assessments. 
Commander NORAD would bring an awareness 
of on-going continental air defense operations, 
would provide essential operational expertise 
when adjudicating proposed cyberspace attack 
assessments, and could evaluate what effects 
any proposed follow-on cyberspace actions 
might have on current NORAD operations. 
Some staffs have argued COA #3 is not 
required, as Commander USNORTHCOM 
(dual-hatted as Commander NORAD) already 
has the authority to declare a “Domestic 
Attack Assessment” if he judges the U.S. is 
under attack. Already having this authority 
would seem to obviate the need for him to 
assume an additional cyber attack assessment 
responsibility. However, his role as Commander 
USNORTHCOM does not specifically involve 
cyberspace operations, only involves U.S. 
military responsibilities, and does not involve 
notifications to the Canadian government 
which automatically occur within the binational 
NORAD structure.
Another concern voiced regards allowing 
another commander to participate in the cyber 
attack assessment process. One could argue 
if Commander NORAD needs to participate 
in North American-related cyber events, then 
should not Commander European Command 
participate in European-related cyber events, 
or Commander Pacific Command participate 
in cyber events occurring in Asia? Once the 
USCYBERCOM assessment process is opened 
to other geographic combatant commanders, 
does not this become a very slippery slope?
Under COA #3, existing classified cyber 
event conferences continue as normal. Updated 
internal NORAD operational checklists would 
be required to reflect joint CDRCYBERCOM 
and CDRNORAD participation in all cyber 
attack assessments. Also, a new training 
program would have to be built to train NORAD 
General Officers on their new joint assessment 
responsibility.
Additionally, if this COA were to be 
implemented, a new “Command Arrangements 
Agreement” between NORAD and 
USCYBERCOM would need to be negotiated to 
clearly outline the new cyber attack assessment 
responsibilities of each commander.
Further, because this would be a major 
change to NORAD’s legacy missions and 
processes, the U.S. and Canada might have to 
negotiate new cyberspace defense and response 
policies to ensure NORAD has the correct 
mission authority. Following such binational 
negotiations, the NORAD Agreement and /or 
Terms of Reference would also need updating 
through international staffing channels.
After reviewing the advantages, 
disadvantages and potential solutions 
for implementing this COA, a weighted 
implementation score of “15” would seem to 
indicate several major roadblocks to overcome, 
mostly in the need to negotiate international 
agreements between the U.S. and Canada, and 
new command agreements between NORAD 
and USCYBERCOM. 
Overall, while requiring both “challenging” 
and “difficult” staff actions both within DOD 
and internationally with Canada, this COA 
combines the advantages which both NORAD 
and USCYBERCOM offer to the cyber attack 
assessment process.
Recommendation
As the COAs were being developed, it became 
apparent they were not mutually exclusive, 
but in fact all three COAs could potentially be 
adopted sequentially over the course of several 
years. 
COA #1 offers a major improvement in cyber 
situational awareness at little implementation 
cost. The difficulty will be in convincing DOD 
the need to change its administrative policies 
regarding the sharing of classified cyberspace 
operational information with Canadian 
military personnel. This would not be a trivial 
endeavor. However, numerous strategic 
policies emphasize the need to share this type 
of information with international partners, 
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and NORAD Canadians are clearly one of the 
longest and most enduring allies to the U.S. 
Overall, this COA would seem to be the easiest 
to implement while significantly improving 
NORAD’s cyber situational awareness.
Later, as cyberspace information sharing 
with Canadians becomes routine, NORAD could 
reevaluate whether it is militarily desirable 
to pursue COA #2. This would be a subjective 
evaluation by the NORAD, USCYBERCOM, 
and other cyberspace information users to 
determine if there was value added in NORAD 
producing all-domain fused warnings. While 
COA analysis shows this to involve both 
“challenging” and “difficult” staff actions, a 
broader question might be “is there a real 
customer need?”
Finally, COA #3 may be militarily 
undesirable. Having Commander NORAD 
directly involved with North American cyber 
attack assessments seemed reasonable, but COA 
analysis showed many roadblocks to success. 
Further, the “challenging” task of negotiating 
new Command Arrangements Agreements 
between NORAD and USCYBERCOM might 
then generate the need to develop similar CAAs 
between USCYBERCOM and USEUCOM, 
USPACOM, etc. This greatly expands the 
overall impact of this COA, probably making 
this policy option “a bridge too far.” 
In conclusion, with global cyber attacks on 
the rise, it seems reasonable NORAD should 
explore potential new roles for cyber attack 
warning. Hopefully these three proposed COAs 
might serve as a beneficial roadmap for future 
NORAD consideration.
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Abstract
Fortresses do not usually fail well. When they 
rely on robustness or complication, positions 
of strength are only tolerant of stress up to 
a defined point or of a certain character. 
For a fortification that fails to adapt, 
centralization—even of strength—presents a 
surprising liability. Fortresses concentrate 
risk. This paper considers the way in which 
uncertain and unthinkable events undermine 
security practices that presume a greater 
degree of knowledge, uniformity, and control 
than is available.
   When facing worst cases and ambiguous 
threats, current security doctrine, theory, and 
practice promise more than they can deliver. 
Threat and catastrophe highlight a mismatch 
between reality and approach. Threat may 
be defined as official danger—governmental 
certification of possibility. Catastrophe implies 
rupture and exhaustion of capacity. Two 
problematic tendencies dominate the security 
response to threat and catastrophe: applying 
risk management when the information 
necessary to support such calculation is not 
available, and boundless precaution. In the 
first case the homeland security enterprise 
lives with a false assumption that it controls 
the risk; in the second it has little measure of 
success and surrenders decisions to threat 
politics. This paper suggests that security 
agencies need to renovate their fortresses, 
favoring adaptability over robustness in the 
face of threat and catastrophe.
The Fortress Problem
Staircases in medieval castles often spiraled 
upward clockwise around a central newel. 
The reasoning for this design tendency, so 
the theory goes, was to give the advantage to 
the (right-handed) defender, who had more 
room to swing his sword from above.1 There 
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is elegance to this idea. Fortifications may be 
complicated, but the principle of fortification 
is simple: attackers and defenders, the forces 
of good arrayed against the forces of evil, 
civilization versus barbarism and the outer 
dark. It is a simplicity that homeland security 
agencies might envy.
The crash of Germanwings 9525 in March 
2015 illustrates a more uneasy insecurity. 
When the captain left the cockpit during 
that flight, the co-pilot locked the cabin door 
and intentionally crashed the aircraft into a 
mountainside in the French Alps, killing the 144 
passengers and 6 crewmembers.2 For security 
agencies, the Germanwings crash poses a 
troubling dilemma. The pilot was able to create 
astonishing tragedy, not despite complicated 
fortification, but because of it.
After the attacks of September 2001 
(9/11), security measures in the cockpits 
of passenger airplanes were designed—like 
medieval castles—to provide decision and 
tactical advantage to the defender within the 
cockpit.3 The same security measures allowed 
a co-pilot to prevent a pilot from re-entering 
the cockpit. Shortly after the Germanwings 
crash, the European Aviation Safety Agency 
issued emergency guidance recommending two 
crew members be in the cockpit at all times.4 
In hindsight, the subsequent review of safety 
protocols belies a darker concern: procedures 
must consider more fully how to protect 
against the pilot. The professional most directly 
responsible for the safety of the plane must be 
thought of as a liability. “The irony of risk here,” 
says Ulrich Beck, “is that rationality,that is, the 
experience of the past, encourages anticipation 
of the wrong kind of risk, the one we believe we 
can calculate and control, whereas the disaster 
arises from what we do not know and cannot 
calculate.”5
Fortifications must adapt to the threats 
they face. Writing in the late 19th century, 
French architect and engineer Eugène-
The Fortress Problem
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Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc provided a primer 
in fortification. His book Annals of a Fortress 
describes the necessary adaptations that follow 
advances in technology and evolutions in 
threat.6 In its simplest abstract form, a circular 
enclosure presents a defensive problem: the 
defender of a fortress is at a disadvantage. 
Facing an attacker with projectile arms, “the 
defenders will be able to oppose only an inferior 
number of engines to the convergent fire.”7 To 
correct this weakness, variations in defensive 
measures (including bastions and star-shaped 
citadels) allow the defender to oppose greater 
numbers of attackers. The attacker in turn 
adapts by developing longer distance siege 
weapons. As this cycle of adaptation continues, 
the fortress evolves from simple to complicated 
as technology and tactics alter the paradigm 
of defense. A principle emerges: protection 
requires both strength and adaptability.
With this series of figures, Viollet-Le-Duc demonstrates the way that the application of the principles of 
fortification leads to progressively more complicated defenses. Translated by Benjamin Bucknall, Annals of 
a Fortress (Boston, J. R. Osgood and Company, 1876), Figures 77, 78, and 79.
Figure 1. From Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Annals of a Fortress.
The Germanwings crash was a deadly 
reminder that cockpit security protocols must 
adapt to what seems to be an impossible 
threat. Hardened fortresses that dominate 
much security thinking are often revealed as 
insufficient in dramatic ways, as they were in 
the case of Germanwings 9525. Risk-based 
screening employed by the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) separates 
travelers into groups of higher and lower risk 
and adjusts screening levels accordingly.8 In 
response, an adaptable enemy will simply hide 
in low risk groups. This possibility was realized 
recently, as two men were arrested in a gun 
smuggling operation that relied on one of them 
having a security clearance and airport access.9 
Even more recently, TSA discovered that 73 
airport employees were on terrorist watch 
lists.10
The Paris terror attacks that claimed the 
lives of more than 100 in November 2015 
occurred during a period of heightened 
awareness and elevated security posture.11 
Perhaps more troubling, the tactics and target 
selection were generally, if not specifically, 
anticipated—prefigured by the grisly Mumbai 
attacks of 2008, and making real the concerns 
of security agencies. Part of the challenge of 
this devastating attack is the recognition that 
it was not a strategic surprise. If the irony of 
risk is that it encourages the anticipation of 
known and calculable problems, a second irony 
of threat and catastrophe is that even known 
threats are not entirely predictable.12
Domestic security agencies have not resolved 
the competing requirements of what is likely 
versus what is imaginable. Prevailing theory 
and approach do not bridge the gap between 
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the theoretically calculable and the theoretically 
incalculable, between the probable and the 
possible. Security agencies, however, live at 
precisely these crossroads. Worst cases and 
ambiguous threats are central, not marginal 
concerns for domestic security. As a result, 
making rational decisions about profound 
uncertainties is a crucial responsibility for 
security agencies. 
The 4th century Chinese philosopher 
Zhuangzi tells the story of Zhuping man, who 
spent all his wealth and several years mastering 
the art of slaying dragons, only to find himself 
in a world without dragons.13 This is the fortress 
problem. Security agencies are given impossible 
responsibility for unthinkable perils, but may 
not simply decline them, or announce that they 
are unable to deal with terrorism or catastrophe. 
Instead, two approaches dominate security 
decisions about uncertainty: risk assessment, 
and the precautionary principle. Both prove to 
be insufficient guides.
Unbounded Risk
In order to understand the probability and 
consequence of a risk, the analysis of that risk 
must establish an area of study and an area of 
impact. Threat and catastrophe, however, have 
a knack for acquainting security organizations 
with previously unforeseen or immeasurable 
dimensions. What is not known becomes the 
central figure in risk decision-making, not 
what is known.14 Modern risks obscure the 
very dimensions which homeland security 
organizations are positioned to measure.
As early as 2005, US Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael 
Chertoff insisted that, “DHS must base its work 
on priorities driven by risk.”15 Not surprisingly, 
the DHS annual Financial Report to its 
oversight and appropriation bodies in Congress 
for fiscal year 2014 contains more than one 
hundred references to risk, its management 
and reduction, and the development of risk-
based security measures.16
Risk is the preferred tool for making 
decisions in uncertainty because it supposes 
calculated rationality. Risk is defined as “the 
probability and magnitude of a loss, disaster 
or other undesirable event,” or “when it is 
possible, at least in principle, to estimate the 
likelihood that an event (or set of events) will 
occur.”17 In his book The Taming of Chance, 
Ian Hacking has described the invention of 
risk as a shift out of the world of pure causality. 
“Causality,” says Hacking, “long the bastion of 
metaphysics, was toppled, or at least tilted: the 
past does not determine exactly what happens 
next.”18 Probabilistic thinking changed the 
relationship humans had with the future, 
allowing projections of the future to govern 
the present. Understanding that the future 
was uncertain—thus unwritten—society had 
the right to expect greater control over it. Only 
knowledge sufficient to calculate was wanting.
Risk is synonymous with sobriety: an idea 
in opposition to politics, fear, and mindless 
security musculature. For homeland security 
agencies tasked with responsibly adjudicating 
the allocation of limited resources to provide 
protection against an expanding menu of 
threats and hazards, however, unbounded 
risk—danger that cannot be fully calculated—
is problematic. U.S. counterterrorism officials, 
reacting to a mass shooting in San Bernardino in 
December of 2015, expressed their concern that 
the complexity of factors associated with the 
attack, including Islamic extremism, possible 
workplace grievance and legally purchased 
firearms “exposed a threat matrix that may 
strain domestic security agencies’ capabilities, 
no matter how aggressively they seek to adapt.”19 
It was the deadliest terror attack in the U.S. 
since 9/11, and came seven days after President 
Obama assured the nation that there was “no 
specific and credible intelligence indicating a 
plot on the homeland.”20 Homeland security 
includes the incredible. 
If security agencies cannot fully calculate 
how likely something is, or predict specific 
occurrences, they are equally challenged 
by measuring how bad an event might be. 
Contemplating the possible destruction of 
Earth due to a theoretical particle accelerator 
accident, Cambridge physicist Adrian Kent 
notes drily that in addition to the loss of all 
life on the planet “there is the opportunity 
costs arising from the absence of future 
generations.”21 This is a cost beyond accounting. 
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The difficulties of calculating catastrophe are 
not limited to such exotic risks. It is not yet 
possible to calculate the full cost of Hurricane 
Katrina. As recently as September of 2014, 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and the State of Louisiana still retained 
$812 million in unexpended hazard mitigation 
grant program funds, nearly a decade after 
Hurricane Katrina.22 
Domestic security organizations must be 
able to make rational decisions even, and 
particularly, in situations where they lack 
sufficient information to calculate the likelihood 
or consequence of a possible event. Security 
vulnerabilities are highly concentrated, causes 
are highly distributed, and impacts difficult to 
measure. In Worst Cases, Lee Clarke argues 
that, “probabilistic thinking is not the only 
way to be reasonable,” suggesting that security 
agencies need to actively engage possibilities 
along with probabilities.23
For managing very bad, highly uncertain, 
or complex possibilities, risk has distinct 
limitations: security agencies still have to 
manage threat and catastrophe beyond what 
makes actuarial sense. In situations without 
sufficient information to estimate risk, security 
agencies often turn to precaution.
Unrestrained Precaution
When an airplane carrying 224 passengers 
crashed over the Sinai in October 2015, 
Lufthansa and Air France, two of the largest 
airlines in Europe, ceased flights in the region 
“as a precaution.” They did so explicitly “because 
the reasons for the crash were not clear.”24
The precautionary principle is often 
expressed as an idiom: better safe than sorry.25 
The principle “counsels that we should avoid 
steps that will create a risk of harm; until 
safety is established through clear evidence, we 
should be cautious.”26 In a more detailed sense 
the precautionary principle proposes that, “in 
the absence of scientific near-certainty about 
the safety of the action, the burden of proof 
about absence of harm falls on those proposing 
the action.”27 Precaution can also reflect a bias 
for action, particularly when homeland security 
organizations take precautionary measures 
against threats and hazards that are uncertain. 
In this form of precaution, the burden of proof 
is on those opposing an action to demonstrate 
that it does not reduce a threat. 
On its surface, the precautionary principle 
appears to be rational, but it is not an effective 
guide for deciding between uncertainties. Taken 
seriously, says Cass Sunstein, the precautionary 
principle would in fact be a “paralyzing 
principle”—prohibiting any action, since any 
action designed to address one risk would bring 
with it potential risks and uncertainties to be 
cautious about.28 Action-biased precaution is, 
conversely, a permissive principle—authorizing 
any action on the basis that it might reduce risk. 
Applied earnestly, the precautionary principle 
either prohibits every action, or justifies any 
action. In either case, precaution is incoherent 
as a means of guiding decisions, but serves 
only as the veneer of political advocacy for one 
action or regulation over another.
Precautionary management of uncertain 
risks like terrorism becomes less about 
confronting specific threats that currently 
exist, and increasingly about the anticipation 
and prevention of an infinite array of possible 
futures. In this case, as Aradau and Van 
Munster argue, “the rationality of catastrophic 
risk translates into policies that actively 
seek to prevent situations from becoming 
catastrophic at some indefinite point in the 
future.”29 The ongoing debate about the 
government’s ability to collect the phone data 
of American citizens that it does not currently 
need—but might eventually need to support 
intelligence analysis and counterterrorism—is 
over formalized government precaution.30 The 
deadly Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 prompted 
a precautionary bill in Congress aimed at 
pausing the admittance of Syrian refugees, 
not based on information about risk but lack 
of information.31 “This is a moment,” wrote 
Representative Paul Ryan, “when it’s better to 
be safe than sorry.” 32
It is difficult to say how much safer 
precautionary spending and effort makes 
America. Close to $3.7 billion of TSA’s $7.3 
billion budget goes to screening.33 In 2015 
TSA screened 708 million passengers and 
found 2,653 firearms.34 That is, approximately 
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0.0004% of passengers had guns confiscated 
(assuming one gun per incident) and none of 
them were terrorists. John Mueller contends 
that in order to break even on counterterrorism 
spending, from a cost/benefit standpoint the 
United States would need to be experiencing 
attacks on the scale of 9/11 at least once a year, 
or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year.35 
Meanwhile, the attacks of 9/11 resulted in 
around $44 billion in insured losses, with direct 
economic losses estimated at $200 billion.36 
Faced with such catastrophic possibility but 
uncertain probabilities, it is tough to say to what 
degree TSA’s $3.7 billion screening budget is 
risk based or precautionary. The safety benefit 
of interdicting prohibited items in 0.0004% of 
passengers is also difficult to assess. The same 
year, the DHS Inspector General found a failure 
rate for catching prohibited items so high that it 
“greatly disturbed” the acting TSA chief, which 
potentially means that significantly higher 
numbers of firearms flew without incident.37 
TSA’s precautionary spending on screening has 
not interrupted any attempted terrorist attacks, 
but it is hard to say whether it deterred any.
The motivation behind precaution is noble; 
an approach intended to oppose undesirable 
possibilities, without delaying unnecessarily. 
But precaution is not applied as an equal 
principle resulting in general caution about 
everything. Rather, it has encouraged the 
growth of threat politics and a “selectivity of 
fear.”38 This means fearing, and being cautious 
about only those threats that are prominent 
or available. Such availability is subject to the 
influence of media coverage, parochial concerns, 
dread of the unfamiliar etc. Precaution then 
puts risks in the hands of political will, not 
calculation. Given that homeland security risks 
are particularly uncertain, domestic security 
agencies require something better by way of 
principle.
There is, however, no disputing the success of 
precaution, or the failure of insufficient caution. 
After witnessing the ravages of a tsunami in 
1933, Kotaku Wamura, the late mayor of the 
Japanese town of Fudai-Mura, proposed and 
successfully championed the construction of 
a $20 million floodwall designed to withstand 
an improbable 10,000-year recurrence interval 
tsunami.39 The effort was widely reviled, but 
spared the town from destruction in the wake 
of the massive (and improbable) 2011 tsunami. 
Conversely, citizens of Flint Michigan might 
reasonably expect greater precaution from 
their government with regard to drinking water 
risks. Likewise, with high uncertainty risks like 
terrorism or climate change, a certain form of 
precaution might be necessary to address the 
insufficiencies of risk.
A disciplined and potentially useful form 
of precaution may be found in John Rawls’ 
“maximin principle”, which contends that in 
conditions of uncertainty, we ought to rank 
alternatives by their worst possible outcomes, 
and pursue the outcome with the best worst 
case.40 Refining the thinking of Rawls, Sunstein 
proposes an “anti-catastrophe principle” 
as an antidote to the paralysis or spasm of 
precaution.41 More disciplined than precaution, 
anti-catastrophe analysis engages both 
imagination and calculation. It provides for 
security agencies a limiting principle to action, 
preventing excessive commitment, avoiding 
inaction or handwringing, but permitting 
action against worst case scenarios. 
Unfortunately, the plans and doctrines 
that security agencies make for impossible 
tasks are neither fully risk-based nor explicitly 
precautionary. Risk and precaution both 
presuppose that in one way or another, through 
calculation or carefulness, security agencies 
can account for every eventuality. In this spirit, 
The 9/11 Commission Report admonished 
the Federal government’s supposedly 
insufficient imagination.42 According to The 
9/11 Commission Report, the intelligence, 
law enforcement, and domestic security and 
preparedness apparatus of the nation failed to 
credibly imagine the possibility of an aircraft 
used as a weapon. The answer to this problem, 
however, is not to give equal standing to every 
imagined possibility, or to suppose we are able 
to imagine every possibility. Such regimes of 
prediction and control are brittle fortresses. 
“It is difficult,” says Michael Barkun, “to 
create contingency plans for inconceivable 
contingencies.”43 
In July 2015, Lloyds of London and the 
Centre for Risk Studies at Cambridge University 
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published a scenario analysis of a cyber attack 
on the US power grid. The results of their study 
were grim.44 An attack of relatively limited scope 
(impacting 50 out of 700 generators across 
the Northeastern region of the US) triggers a 
scenario where 93 million people are without 
power and the impact on the US economy 
is up to a trillion dollars in the most extreme 
scenario. Armed with such information, 
security agencies are tempted to choose 
between competing apocalypses. Of the fifteen 
National Planning Scenarios designed in 2005 
to support the implementation of Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), 
twelve were terrorism related. They included 
blister agent chemical attacks and improvised 
nuclear devices, but excluded the threat of 
electromagnetic pulse weapons.45 In 2014, H.R 
3410 set about to correct this oversight. The 
draft Critical Infrastructure Protection Act or 
CIPA, which passed the House in 2014, would, 
“require the Assistant Secretary of the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate to: (1) 
include in national planning scenarios the 
threat of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events.”46 
As a form of precaution, this impulse to add 
additional scenarios to the menu of security 
agencies lacks any clear limiting principle. 
There is little to suggest what threshold of 
probability or consequence warrants new 
legislation or a mandated scenario. Further, 
since it is not possible to account for every 
eventuality, particularly dreadful or novel risks 
attract constituencies and political influence to 
raise their prominence.
The unsuitability of risk management 
and precaution to unbounded risks has an 
unfortunate byproduct. The plans and schemes 
of management that security agencies produce 
reflect the liabilities of a hyperextended 
imagination: believing they have accounted for 
every eventuality, and proposing excessively 
detailed scripts for managing contingencies. 
When the detail of security plans exceeds the 
available information, such plans become 
unconscionable maps. 
Unconscionable Maps
The single paragraph long short story, “On 
Exactitude in Science” by Argentine author 
Jorge Borges describes an empire so advanced 
in cartography that its cartographer’s guild 
“struck a Map of the Empire whose size was 
that of the Empire.”47 Future generations 
find they have little use for this excessive, 
“unconscionable map” and abandon the effort 
of their forefathers. All maps are abstractions. 
They are not the thing they represent, but are 
instead an explanation of it, an orientation or a 
statement of relationship to it. Unconscionable 
maps have forgotten they are not the territory 
and believe they represent all the territory. For 
security agencies, unconscionable maps take the 
form of the thousand page operational plan that 
remains unread by the first responder, or the 
unattainable presumption to a national, “near 
real-time situational awareness capability” for 
threats and hazards.48 They are unreasonable 
or excessive not by being false, but by being 
incomplete and unaware of themselves.
Unconscionable maps have a tendency to 
pave over uncertainty—to render organizations 
insensitive to it by creating overly detailed 
scripts for uncertain futures. These are what 
Lee Clarke has called “fantasy documents,” 
that is, documents that do not actually guide 
operations, but rather serve as reassurances 
that the organization has taken the problem 
seriously and stands ready to deliver.49 
Surveying planners deployed to Hurricane 
Sandy, FEMA found in 2013 that “64 percent 
either never used, nor had access to, regional 
hurricane plans.”50 This may simply be an area 
for improvement, as the FEMA after action 
report considered it. But it may cut both ways, 
indicating that there is an important and 
often overlooked distance between plans and 
operations, between organizational promise 
and organizational capability. If planners are 
failing to read plans, then perhaps plans are 
also failing to speak to planners. Schemes of 
prediction and preparation fall short of reality. 
Reflecting on the response to Hurricane Sandy, 
FEMA Administrator Fugate wrote, “We still 
plan for what we are capable of doing. We still 
train and exercise for what we can manage. We 
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must plan, train, and exercise even bigger to 
fracture the traditional mindset.”51
Clarke emphasizes that planning, as a 
practice that makes a claim to expertise and 
knowledge about a given subject, is inherently 
political.52 Organizations are often required to 
create plans for catastrophic contingencies, 
and Clarke stresses that such plans, as fantasy 
documents, are symbols of competence, claims 
that an organization has matters in hand. Such 
plans are not necessarily false, but not quite 
real either.
Organizations do not build their fantasy 
documents purely out of self-confidence. Such 
documents are often mandated by expectation. 
In 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 21 put 
forward a national goal of “near real-time 
situational awareness” of threats and hazards 
to critical infrastructure.53 On its face, this 
is a remarkable pursuit. For companies that 
own infrastructure, such knowledge is often 
unattainable even at the facility level in many 
locations and industries. But in response to 
policies directing the pursuit of such absolute 
knowledge, homeland security organizations 
and agencies have cohered around methods for 
doing so--knowing it is not possible, they still 
pursue it. Claims to national “near real time” 
knowledge are, in this sense, unremarkable. 
They are supported by the large-scale 
organizational pursuit of those ends. And in one 
respect, this simply encourages the pursuit of 
excellence in risk management. Data collection 
and domain awareness do not necessarily 
suppose that all information can be known, but 
they have as their animating principle the idea 
that the more unlimited information collection 
capabilities and pursuits are, the better security 
will be. Unbounded risk, however, challenges 
this assumption with the grim idea that the 
information necessary to avert catastrophe will, 
by definition, only be revealed in catastrophe.
FEMA advises that emergency kits equip 
individuals and families for at least 72 hours.54 
There is little literature to suggest an origin 
for this three day minimum, less to bear out in 
practice its utility. There is no average disruption 
of 72 hours, no average catastrophic response 
or rescue time of 72 hours. It is, in short, largely 
arbitrary. It is a good idea, but no better than 
100 or 200 hours of planned survival. It is a 
time frame invoked, rather than advised. The 
purpose of challenging this accepted number is 
not to discredit preparedness, but to highlight 
a tendency that security and planning practices 
have towards arbitrariness and presumptions of 
control. For this number surely communicates 
more than simply a lower bound of disaster. 
One will find the 72-hour number not just in 
guidance for individual readiness but also in 
guidance for incident responders. 72 hours 
is a benchmark for establishing incident 
command.55 72 hours is a time frame for initial 
planning assumptions, and the transition of 
operational control to field personnel.56 What 
are we to make of catastrophe that extends 
beyond this mark? The symbolic nature of 
catastrophic plans is unavoidable—as we have 
seen, security agencies are given responsibility 
for impossible risks—but unconscionable maps 
present a secondary, self-imposed liability 
as organizations come to believe in their own 
fantasy documents.
Unconscionable maps are the unfortunate 
byproduct of the important work of applying 
risk calculation and carefulness to impossible 
security problems. Armed with such maps, 
however, agencies tasked with managing 
threats and catastrophes often claim to know 
and control more than is possible. This bias for 
imposed uniformity and presumed control is 
reflected not just in plans but also in operational 
doctrines.
Uniformity and Control
Unbounded risks have accelerated both 
precaution and the production of unconscionable 
security maps. At root, this is an effort to reduce 
uncertainty and thus increase control. It was 
this impulse that drove Guy Verhofstadft, the 
47th Prime Minister of Belgium, to argue that, 
“borderless terrorism can only be tackled by 
borderless intelligence.”57 Global risks require 
global security governance. This springs from 
the sound observation that since risks will not 
conform to political or geographic boundaries, 
the means of managing risks must not do so 
either.58 This impulse can take many forms—
including more muscular, centralized national 
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security measures, or increasingly multilateral 
cooperation between nation state security 
services. In the U.S. the same impulses have 
led to the dominance of unilateral national 
preparedness doctrines. 
First published in February of 2003, 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
5 (HSPD-5) addressed the management of 
domestic incidents. Its purpose was succinct:
[t]o enhance the ability of the United States 
to manage domestic incidents by establishing 
a single, comprehensive national incident 
management system.59
HSPD-5 directed the adoption of the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) by all 
Federal agencies, and made NIMS a requirement 
for the receipt of Federal preparedness grants 
and contracts. By tying preparedness grant 
funding to the implementation of NIMS among 
grantees, FEMA commenced a disciplined 
shift toward “institutionalizing the use of [the 
Incident Command System (ICS)] across the 
entire response system,” including non-federal 
responders.60 Likewise, The 9/11 Commission 
Report recommended the adoption of 
ICS to “enhance command, control and 
communications capabilities.”61
The stated purpose of NIMS is the provision 
of a “consistent nationwide template” for the 
management of all incidents—from house 
fires to catastrophic hurricanes and terrorist 
attacks.62 The scope of the NIMS guidance is 
national in the classical sense; it is meant to 
apply equally to government and the private 
sector, to federal, tribal, state, municipal 
governments, and citizens. The central idea 
that underlies NIMS and ICS is to approach 
the uncertainty and complexity of incidents 
with regularity and order—to impose order 
upon chaos. Bearing the mark of the scientific 
management theories of Frederick Winslow 
Taylor and Henri Fayol, ICS was designed in 
the 1970s as a joint organizational model “built 
to accomplish the five basic functions of any 
successful organization: Command, Planning, 
Operations, Logistics, and Finance.”63 As an 
answer to unbounded risk, NIMS and ICS 
suppose that singularity, comprehensiveness, 
and the unification of all approaches under 
a common scheme are the answer to such 
risks. Standardization will permit seamless 
integration across disciplines and organizations. 
Uniformity will conquer chaos.
The scientific management approach 
of NIMS and ICS tends to resist rather 
than acknowledge the inherent complexity 
of incidents. The enduring complexity of 
catastrophe undermines the singular purpose of 
imposing order on chaos.64 Such arrangements 
are designed for efficiency, not maneuverability. 
Like an assembly line, these systems do not 
respond well to change. However, after-action 
analysis following complex disasters is more 
likely to fault departments and agencies for 
insufficient organizational discipline than to 
suggest that NIMS is insufficiently adaptable.65
Considering “NIMS implementation 
behavior,” Jessica Jensen observed that states 
and localities adopting NIMS as required for 
grant funding are modifying it heavily.66 NIMS 
doctrine as written allows for a certain degree 
of local adaptation. The forms of adaptation 
taken at the implementation level nationwide 
are significant enough, however, that Jensen 
argues it may undermine the use of NIMS as 
the basis for national incident management. 
Perhaps more starkly than Jensen concludes, 
the extreme variability of approaches across 
jurisdictions undermines the usefulness of any 
national incident management model. National 
uniformity is an unconscionable map and 
perhaps fundamentally unachievable.
The intentionally inefficient system of 
federalism is the operating environment for 
domestic security. National security approaches 
like NIMS treat this network of governance as a 
liability. In the context of national preparedness, 
the efficiency of NIMS and ICS runs into a 
network of government intentionally designed 
to thwart the centralization of efficient power, 
and to recognize the disparities and rights of 
states.67 
In a tactical sense, this creates enormous 
challenges around interoperability and 
coordination for crisis management. Central to 
the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations 
was the call for interoperable communications 
and unified incident command structures.68 
Hesitance on the part of the federal government 
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influenced the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform act. More recently, 
after action reporting on the 2013 Navy Yard 
shooting in Washington, DC concluded that 
local and federal law enforcement failed to 
share key pieces of information such as the 
availability of live video within the building.69 
Such failures make uniformity appealing. 
They seem to support an argument for more 
standardization in operational capability, a 
more national approach to domestic crisis 
management, and perhaps even a single 
domestic preparedness agency. The tendency 
to impose such regularity, however, ignores the 
possibility that what is lacking is not a common 
system, but a common skill. While security 
agencies have labored unsuccessfully to impose 
unilateral doctrines and excessively detailed 
plans for contingencies, they have perhaps 
missed the starker lesson that in their current 
form security practices are not adaptable.
In his book The Next Catastrophe, Charles 
Perrow observes the tendency in modern 
systems—from infrastructure to bureaucratic 
management—towards centralization. Such 
centralization creates efficiencies, but also 
criticalities. Perrow highlights that the 
explosion of a single chlorine tanker outside 
of Los Angeles could poison 4 million people.70 
Likewise, the Metcalf substation attack of 2013 
illustrated the high costs that can result from 
localized damage to high voltage transformers 
that “make up less than 3% of transformers in 
U.S. power substations,” but “carry 60%-70% 
of the nation’s electricity.”71 In the case of the 
Metcalf substation, a very inexpensive attack 
was able to create very expensive damage. A 
coordinated attack on multiple high voltage 
transformers might be much worse. Recognizing 
the liabilities of such centralization, Perrow 
emphasizes the need to deconcentrate, both 
in physical arrangements of systems and 
within organizations. Returning to the stark 
lesson of the Germanwings crash, centralizing 
the responsibility for 144 passengers with 
one pilot makes room for catastrophe. The 
fortress problem has relevant repercussions for 
physical security, infrastructure, and systems 
of management because it concentrates risk in 
the name of efficiency and control. 
The prevailing narrative of threat and 
catastrophe response is not the disciplined 
deployment and coordination of known 
quantities, but rather the incorporation of 
uncommon partners to new circumstances. 
In this sense, a preparedness doctrine that 
embraced the network of federalism would 
recognize the inherent redundancy and 
resilience of a system that decentralizes 
strengths along with vulnerabilities. NIMS is 
ill-suited to this task. Rather than doubling 
down on scientific management, and engaging 
a unilateral doctrine of uniformity and control, 
homeland security requires an explicit doctrine 
of adaptability. High uncertainty risks may 
benefit from the strategic easing of fortifications.
The Unfortress
Some fortresses do not benefit from robustness 
alone. The next stage in the evolution of the 
American fortress requires a quantum shift 
from complication to complexity, and from 
robustness to adaptability.
For the Naskapi tribes in Canada, 
unpredictability was a matter of survival. The 
Naskapi followed the caribou, but the caribou 
were an adaptive adversary, responsive to the 
movements of hunters. The Naskapi turned to 
scapulimancy, a form of divination that relied 
on heating the shoulder blade of a caribou 
over a fire, and interpreting the cracks in its 
surface as auguries. Omar Khayam Moore 
contends that this magical practice effectively 
randomized Naskapi behavior, and served 
them as a tool for operating in conditions of 
uncertainty, outwitting their prey.72 Regularity, 
control, and knowledge are not the best or only 
tools for navigating uncharted waters.
This may sound like so much barefoot 
philosophy, a pastoral fantasy, a pre-lapsarian 
vision of adaptable plans and nimble responders. 
But it is not intended to replace the current 
tangled approaches to complex problems with 
naïve simplicity. In his book Learning from the 
Octopus, Rafe Sagarin explores the ways that 
the DOD and DHS have created bureaucratic 
structures unable to respond rapidly to their 
threat environment. Part of his critique rests on 
comparing the predictive pursuits of security 
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organizations to the adaptability of evolutionary 
systems within nature. Evolution, says Sagarin, 
“proceeds by solving survival problems as they 
arise. Many systems in society, by contrast, are 
littered with meticulously planned designs—
the Maginot Line comes to mind—that were 
entirely unable to solve emerging threats 
from the environment.”73 Organisms in nature 
survive without predictive knowledge because 
they have developed means of sensing and 
responding to changes in their environment. 
Many of the structures we put in place for 
the provision of security blunt our ability to 
respond to volatility in our environment. This 
is the danger of fortress thinking and focusing 
on solidity over adaptability, or prediction over 
agility. Unbounded risk makes such survival 
skills paramount. Assigned the unthinkable 
and the impossible, we are, in crucial and large-
scale ways, responding with sclerotic, hardened 
tools designed for regularity. The measure 
of success for a security policy, capability, 
or approach should not be its solidity, but its 
mutability, not its robustness, but its agility. 
As crisis analyst Patrick Lagadec argues, “the 
problem is no longer about knowing the tools 
that help us to avoid surprises, but to train 
ourselves to be surprised.”74 
In the world of jazz performance “a fake-
book is a bound collection of lead sheets...a 
musical score that shows only the melody of a 
work…”75 Fake books provided the minimum 
necessary information about a song. Armed 
with fake books, jazz musicians could easily 
play the standards, and play them together. The 
ultimate form of the song and the solos would 
depend on the circumstance.76 Fake books are 
form of melodic and harmonic crisis planning. 
Jazz performance relies on the interplay and 
communication between musicians as they 
improvise their way through a common theme. 
The results are unpredictable, and the essentials 
of the performance rely equally on the individual 
and technical proficiency of the musician, and 
his ability to keep time and communicate with 
the rest of the band. The written music for such 
unpredictable environments necessarily takes a 
form quite different from classical symphonic 
notation. Security agencies responding to 
complex risks may require fake book plans. 
Like the shoulder blades of the Naskapi, these 
plans are designed for change.
This is not to advocate for either divination 
or performance art in the sober business of 
security planning and operations. But the 
principles that inform such improvisational 
plans can be applied to planning for improbable 
catastrophes or dynamic environments. 
Threat and catastrophe have already begun to 
influence the way that FEMA plans for national 
contingencies. Facing unthinkable threats and 
hazards, FEMA has adopted a “Maximum of 
Maximums” approach to planning. Says FEMA 
Administrator Craig Fugate:
[i]n emergency management we have only 
planned for what our capabilities can handle 
or only looked at what we can do to respond 
as government...But what we really need to be 
doing is planning for disasters that go beyond 
our capabilities. That’s why we have to look 
beyond our government-centric approach and 
see what outside resources we can bring to the 
table.77
The maximum of maximums approach is 
effectively a “non-scenario.” It is about coming 
to understand an organization at its limits, and 
learning to reach beyond them. It is not about 
the specific features of a given plausible future, 
or the actions an organization will take. Rather, 
like fake books, these plans are exercises in 
organizational self-knowledge, and preparation 
for the uncharted waters of catastrophe. Such 
plans are self-consciously incomplete and 
mutable by design. Caution and calculation 
are tempered with “a greater appreciation of 
limits and humility.”78 Plans may still need to 
be complicated, but that complication should 
not extend to excessively detailed scripts for 
imagined futures. 
Plans are not the only complicated and robust 
fortresses that need to adapt. A provocative 
assertion went quietly unnoticed in 2014 
outside of a narrow circle of risk management 
professionals. In its published white paper 
report entitled, “Quantifying U.S. Terrorism 
Risk” the firm Risk Management Solutions 
included the following assessment:
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[models of terrorism risk] tend to presume a 
lack of Western counter-terrorism capability 
to control terrorist action against the 
U.S. homeland. This presumption may be 
attributable to a dearth of public information 
about counter-terrorism activities. Counter-
terrorism officials are duty-bound to “serve 
in silence.” The whistle-blowing revelations 
of Edward Snowden have broken this code 
of silence, and by so doing have alerted the 
general public to the widespread and intensive 
surveillance undertaken to protect them from 
terrorist attack. Widespread public concern 
over this surveillance has provoked the NSA 
to publicly declare the importance of such 
surveillance in terrorist plot interdiction.79
For companies that build terrorism risk 
models, this is a sea change. The radical 
transparency of Edward Snowden’s unlawful 
revelations allowed the insurance industry to 
better understand the mitigation in place against 
the terrorist risk. But the shift is even more 
provocative. According to Risk Management 
Solutions, terrorism risk can now be effectively 
modeled as a man-made catastrophe because 
“[c]arriers writing terrorism cover are insuring 
against the failure of a government’s counter 
terrorism operations.” In short, while the 
insurance industry is not ready to insure 
against terrorism without government financial 
backstops, they may be ready to insure against 
the government failing to be successful. In 
March of 2015, Pool Reinsurance Company 
Ltd.—the government backed insurance pool 
created by the British government in the wake of 
the Bishopsgate bombings in 1993—announced 
the purchase of terrorism reinsurance on the 
commercial market for the first time since 
its inception.80 While the industry’s ability 
to model terrorism losses has improved, 
its ability to predict terrorism has not. The 
insurance industry still views terrorism risks as 
a “constant, evolving and potentially expanding 
threat for the foreseeable future.”81 This is the 
adaptation of a modern fortress.
Conclusion
Joint intelligence products developed 
through the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence often remind the reader that 
many suspicious activities are constitutionally 
protected behaviors. Another way of expressing 
this reality is that democratic society is not 
designed to be unreasonably safe.
John Witherspoon, long time president 
of what would become Princeton University, 
signer of the Declaration of Independence, 
and teacher to many of the American founding 
fathers, considered theoretically what it meant 
for a nation to provide “reasonable security.”82 
Witherspoon recognized that absolute security 
might be totalitarian and was impossible 
anyway. It is a considerable irony that 18th 
century governmental theory should display 
such cold realism, while current national 
preparedness doctrine reflects a utopian 
confidence:
[a] secure and resilient nation with the 
capabilities required across the whole 
community to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
threats and hazards that pose the greatest 
risk.83
It may be semantic scolding to observe 
that a nation in possession of the capabilities 
to prevent all threats and hazards need not 
worry about responding to them. But it may 
also indicate that security agencies have lost 
the ability to understand themselves in terms 
of the provision of reasonable security. Security 
agencies may be in pursuit of unreasonable 
security, implicitly promising more than they 
can provide.
Faced with expanding uncertainty, security 
agencies have sought expanded predictability. 
Faced with complexity, they have sought 
regularity. Wrestling with disparate 
arrangements across jurisdictions and sectors, 
security efforts have sought to build national 
uniformity. However, uncertainty endures, 
complexity seems inevitable, and American 
government was designed specifically to resist 
the centralization of efficient power, uniform 
national systems of crisis management, or 
the centralized command of resources during 
disasters. It is the inherent nature of unbounded 
risks to defy efforts at uniformity and control. 
In one sense, this is simply to recognize 
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that the margin of what remains unknown 
is of particular import to homeland security 
agencies and efforts. The unlikely rail accident, 
the unthinkable airline crash, and the worst 
case earthquake or pandemic are specifically 
the province of agencies and organizations 
responsible for national preparedness. The 
poet Walt Whitman “dream’d in a dream” of “a 
city invincible to the attacks of the whole of the 
rest of the earth.”84 Perfect security remains as 
Whitman saw it, a dream.
However, the national capabilities and 
approaches currently in use are not optimized 
for the management of outliers or for living with 
unbounded risks. Designed around assumptions 
of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, the 
architecture of homeland security decision-
making is less attuned to situations where this 
information is unavailable. In this environment 
it is difficult to know how much safer security 
efforts make America.
Centralization and efficiency have a curious 
revenge effect—they also create vulnerabilities. 
Understanding that the tragedy of Germanwings 
9525 was made possible by robust and 
complicated fortification means recognizing 
that the centralization, even of strengths, makes 
room for unbounded risk. Distributing both 
vulnerabilities and strengths means embracing 
the network of federalism. Abandoning the 
pursuit of NIMS, or the command and control 
doctrines of ICS is an unlikely proposition, 
and yet the dynamic nature of modern risk 
may require it. Inheriting unbounded risk may 
mean turning away from the manufactured 
insecurities that accompany unconscionable 
maps, and toward a better means of living with 
and adapting to danger.
A grand design for homeland security will 
not produce grand security. Homeland security 
agencies require fewer scripted plans and more 
improvisation, more diversity, less uniformity, 
less training with partners and more learning 
to work with strangers. These things will make 
us safer, but they will not make us safe. 
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